DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments, filed 3/17/2026, have been fully considered and the examiner’s responses are given below.
The 35 U.S.C. 103 rejections are withdrawn, however new grounds are presented below.
Applicant’s amendments to claim 1 alters the scope of the claim, therefore new prior art has been applied and applicant’s arguments are moot.
Applicant argues that Yusuke does not short-circuit the three-phase lines to apply an electromagnetic brake after a timed sequence following a vehicle-stop determination. Examiner respectfully disagrees. The combination of Jabaji and Yusuke teaches this limitation. Jabaji teaches that the battery is disconnected from the electrical system after a time period when the vehicle speed is zero and the engine is turned off. Yusuke teaches that when the power to the motor is broken, the motor acts as a generator and short circuits the three-phase lines to act as an electromagnetic brake.
Applicant argues that Hammerschmidt does not teach the non-crash half of claim 6. Examiner respectfully disagrees. Although Hammerschmidt does not teach the non-crash half, this is taught by Jabaji (See rejection below).
Claim Objections
Claim 1 is objected to because of the following informalities:
Regarding claim 1, “determine by the stop determination unit that” should read “determine, by the stop determination unit, that”.
Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Interpretation
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitation(s) is/are: “stop determination unit” in claim 1.
Because this/these claim limitation(s) is/are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, it/they is/are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1-4 and 6-7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Regarding claim 1, claim limitation “stop determination unit” invokes 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. However, the written description fails to disclose the corresponding structure, material, or acts for performing the entire claimed function and to clearly link the structure, material, or acts to the function. It is disclosed that a wheel speed sensor is part of the stop determination part, however the specification is devoid of any description of structure of what the stop determination unit is physically made of. Therefore, the claim is indefinite and is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.
Applicant may:
(a) Amend the claim so that the claim limitation will no longer be interpreted as a limitation under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph;
(b) Amend the written description of the specification such that it expressly recites what structure, material, or acts perform the entire claimed function, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. 132(a)); or
(c) Amend the written description of the specification such that it clearly links the structure, material, or acts disclosed therein to the function recited in the claim, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. 132(a)).
If applicant is of the opinion that the written description of the specification already implicitly or inherently discloses the corresponding structure, material, or acts and clearly links them to the function so that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize what structure, material, or acts perform the claimed function, applicant should clarify the record by either:
(a) Amending the written description of the specification such that it expressly recites the corresponding structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function and clearly links or associates the structure, material, or acts to the claimed function, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. 132(a)); or
(b) Stating on the record what the corresponding structure, material, or acts, which are implicitly or inherently set forth in the written description of the specification, perform the claimed function. For more information, see 37 CFR 1.75(d) and MPEP §§ 608.01(o) and 2181.
Regarding claim 1, “the stop determination unit” lacks antecedent basis, therefore this claim is indefinite. For the purposes of examination, Examiner has interpreted “the stop determination unit” to mean “a stop determination unit”.
Regarding claims 2-4 and 6-7, these claims depend from claim 1 and are therefore rejected for the same reason as claim 1 above, as they do not cure the deficiencies of claim 1 noted above.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-4 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Jabaji (US 20050200201 A1, cited in a previous office action) in view of Yusuke (JP 2003223220 A, cited in a previous office action) and Nozaki (US 20130311023 A1).
Regarding claim 1, Jabaji discloses a high-voltage part configured to be supplied with a high voltage from a power supply (Paragraph 0028; High-voltage part is mapped to electrical system loads; Power supply is mapped to batteries (16 and 16A));
a controller configured to control the power supply and the high-voltage part (Paragraphs 0028-0031; Controller is mapped to load and battery control device (LBCD));
the controller includes a processor configured to (Paragraph 0035);
start counting time in response to the obtained vehicle speed reaching zero or substantially zero (Paragraphs 0054, 0058);
and limit output of the high voltage to the high-voltage part when the time that elapses after the vehicle speed has reached zero or substantially zero reaches a first predetermined time (Paragraphs 0054, 0058; first predetermined time is mapped to the pre-selected time delay (e.g. three minutes)).
Jabaji does not specifically state an electric suspension apparatus that is provided in a vehicle, comprising; an electric actuator; the electric actuator includes a motor; the high voltage is at a voltage level sufficient to drive the motor;
However, Yusuke teaches an electric suspension apparatus that is provided in a vehicle, comprising (Abstract, Page 11 Paragraph 7 – Page 12 Paragraph 1);
an electric actuator (Page 3 Paragraph 2, Page 11 Paragraph 7 – Page 12 Paragraph 1; The electric actuator of Yusuke is the high-voltage part);
the electric actuator includes a motor (Page 3 Paragraph 2, Page 11 Paragraph 7 – Page 12 Paragraph 1);
the high voltage is at a voltage level sufficient to drive the motor (Page 11 Paragraph 6 – Page 12 Paragraph 1, Page 17 Paragraph 10);
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Jabaji with an electric suspension comprising an electric actuator including a motor, and a high voltage to drive the motor of Yusuke with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that an electric suspension with a motor is able to generate different amounts of force to damp vibrations. This allows vibrations of different magnitude and frequencies to be suppressed more effectively. One would have been motivated to combine Jabaji with Yusuke as this achieves superior vibration damping in vehicles. As stated in Yusuke, “if electric energy is applied to the electromagnetic suspension device to use it as a motor, an arbitrary force can be easily generated. Therefore, the force is applied to increase the damping force or generate an arbitrary control force. It is possible to increase the vibration suppressing effect by operating the suspension as an active suspension” (Page 3 Paragraph 0002).
Jabaji does not specifically state a vehicle speed sensor configured to detect a vehicle speed of the vehicle; obtain the vehicle speed from the vehicle speed sensor; output the vehicle speed to a stop determination part; determine by the stop determination unit that the vehicle that was traveling is in a stopped state when the vehicle speed is zero or substantially zero.
However, Nozaki teaches a vehicle speed sensor configured to detect a vehicle speed of the vehicle (Nozaki - Paragraphs 0078-0081) “wheel speed sensors 11-14”
obtain the vehicle speed from the vehicle speed sensor (Nozaki - Paragraphs 0078-0081) “wheel speed sensors 11-14”
output the vehicle speed to a stop determination part (Nozaki - Paragraphs 0078-0081) “ECU 1000 proceeds to S16 to determine that vehicle 1 has stopped”
determine by the stop determination unit that the vehicle that was traveling is in a stopped state when the vehicle speed is zero or substantially zero (Nozaki - Paragraphs 0080-0081) “ECU 1000 proceeds to S16 to determine that vehicle 1 has stopped and causes SMR 710 to open to cut off the high voltage”
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Jabaji with a vehicle speed sensor and a stop determination part of Nozaki with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that both Jabaji and Nozaki discuss disconnecting the battery when the vehicle is stopped. One would have been motivated to combine as this prevents battery leakage (Nozaki – Paragraph 0081).
Regarding claim 2, Jabaji discloses the processor is configured to stop high-voltage output (Paragraphs 0054, 0058).
Jabaji does not specifically state stop high-voltage output to the motor.
However, Yusuke teaches stop high-voltage output to the motor (Page 2 Paragraph 5, Page 12 Paragraph 5 – Page 13 Paragraph 6).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Jabaji with stopping high-voltage output to the motor of Yusuke with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that it is possible to use a motor for an electric suspension. However, the battery connected to the electric suspension may experience electrical leakage even when the vehicle is not in use. This is because the electrical systems such as the electric suspension are connected to the battery. One would have been motivated to combine Jabaji with Yusuke as this reduces battery electricity depletion. As stated in Jabaji, “A common problem in electrical systems that employ a stored energy source such as a battery is gradual dissipation of the stored energy via leakage associated with devices that remain connected to the electrical circuit. The accumulation of such leakage in the electrical system over an extended period depletes the stored energy source. Accordingly, there is a need for a control device that protects the stored energy sources from the detrimental effect of electrical leakage” (Paragraphs 0004-0006).
Regarding claim 3, Jabaji discloses when the time that elapses after the vehicle speed has reached zero or substantially zero reaches the first predetermined time the processor is configured to stop high-voltage output (Paragraphs 0054, 0058).
Jabaji does not specifically state the motor is a three-phase motor; short-circuit three-phase lines of the three-phase motor to apply an electromagnetic brake.
However, Yusuke teaches the motor is a three-phase motor (Page 10 Paragraph 3);
short-circuit three-phase lines of the three-phase motor to apply an electromagnetic brake (Page 13 Paragraph 8 – Page 13 Paragraph 10, Page 21 Paragraph 4 – Page 21 Paragraph 6).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Jabaji with a three-phase motor and short-circuiting the three-phase lines to apply an electromagnetic brake of Yusuke with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that it is possible to use a more efficient three-phase motor for vehicle suspensions. Short-circuiting the motor to apply an electromagnetic brake reduces the amount of electricity and resources required for suspension damping. One would have been motivated to combine Jabaji with Yusuke as this achieves better energy efficiency. As stated in Yusuke, “when the semi-active damper is configured as described above (used as a generator), it is not necessary to apply electric energy to the electromagnetic suspension device, and the power consumption can be suppressed to a very low level” (Page 2 Paragraph 6 – Page 3 Paragraph 1).
Regarding claim 4, Jabaji discloses a vehicle.
Jabaji does not specifically state the electric actuator further includes a drive element configured to drive the motor; the processor is configured to stop switching of the drive element.
However, Yusuke teaches the electric actuator further includes a drive element configured to drive the motor (Abstract, Page 11 Paragraph 7 – Page 12 Paragraph 1, Page 14 Paragraph 5 - Page 15 Paragraph 7; Drive element is mapped to controller 7);
the processor is configured to stop switching of the drive element (Page 14 Paragraph 5 - Page 15 Paragraph 7; Switching is mapped to relay control signal).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Jabaji with a motor and drive element, and stop switching of the drive element of Yusuke with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that when the suspension power cables do not receive power, the relays controlling the suspension motors are closed, switching of the motor controller is stopped, and the suspension motors are short circuited. This enables the suspension to continue damping even when not receiving power from the battery. One would have been motivated to combine Jabaji with Yusuke as this improves safety of the vehicle. As stated in Yusuke, “the suspension unit 2 exerts a damping force even during so-called non-control, such as power-off, disconnection of various cables, battery exhaustion (power-off), runaway of the control device 7 and driver 4, and ignition switch off. Can occur and the safety is greatly improved” (Page 18 Paragraph 5).
Claims 6-7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Jabaji, Yusuke, and Nozaki, as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Hammerschmidt (US 20190184834 A1, cited in a previous office action).
Regarding claim 6, Jabaji discloses the processor is configured to (Paragraph 0035);
stop, when the vehicle is not in a crash, output of the high voltage to the high-voltage part based on a second stop elapse time after the vehicle speed has reached zero or substantially zero, the second stop elapse time being the first predetermined time (Paragraphs 0054, 0058).
Jabaji does not specifically state a vehicle comprising: the electric suspension apparatus; the electric actuator.
However, Yusuke teaches a vehicle comprising: the electric suspension apparatus (Abstract, Page 11 Paragraph 7 – Page 12 Paragraph 1);
the electric actuator (Page 3 Paragraph 2, Page 11 Paragraph 7 – Page 12 Paragraph 1; The electric actuator of Yusuke is the high-voltage part).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Jabaji with an electric suspension comprising an electric actuator of Yusuke with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that an electric suspension with a motor is able to generate different amounts of force to damp vibrations. This allows vibrations of different magnitude and frequencies to be suppressed more effectively. One would have been motivated to combine Jabaji with Yusuke as this achieves superior vibration damping in vehicles. As stated in Yusuke, “if electric energy is applied to the electromagnetic suspension device to use it as a motor, an arbitrary force can be easily generated. Therefore, the force is applied to increase the damping force or generate an arbitrary control force. It is possible to increase the vibration suppressing effect by operating the suspension as an active suspension” (Page 3 Paragraph 0002).
Jabaji does not specifically state stop, when the vehicle is in a crash, output of the high voltage to the high-voltage part based on a first stop elapse time after the vehicle crashes.
However, Hammerschmidt teaches stop, when the vehicle is in a crash, output of the high voltage to the high-voltage part based on a first stop elapse time after the vehicle crashes (Paragraphs 0009-0010, 0025-0026, 0030, 0067).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Jabaji with stopping power to the high-voltage part after an elapse time after the vehicle crashes of Hammerschmidt with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that after a vehicle crashes, the high voltage system may pose a safety risk for the occupants inside the vehicle. To improve safety, the high voltage battery is disconnected from the electrical system. One would have been motivated to combine Jabaji with Hammerschmidt as this achieves improved occupant safety. As stated in Hammerschmidt, “Pyrotechnic switches, which are also called pyrotechnic fuses, serve to interrupt an electrical circuit in a targeted and safe manner when certain conditions occur. Pyrotechnic switches have a rapid disconnection response, this allowing the high-voltage battery to be safely disconnected from the high-voltage electrical system of a vehicle within an extremely short time after said vehicle is involved in a crash” (Paragraph 0010).
Regarding claim 7, Jabaji discloses the second stop elapse time (Paragraphs 0054, 0058).
Jabaji does not specifically state the first stop elapse time is shorter than the second stop elapse time.
However, the combination of Jabaji and Hammerschmidt teaches the first stop elapse time is shorter than the second stop elapse time (Jabaji, Paragraphs 0054, 0058; Jabaji teaches the second stop elapse time is three minutes. Hammerschmidt, Paragraphs 0009-0010, 0025-0026, 0030, 0067; Hammerschmidt teaches the first stop elapse time is milliseconds).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Jabaji with stopping power to the high-voltage part, after the vehicle stops, quicker when the vehicle is in a crash than when it is not involved in a crash of Hammerschmidt with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that after a vehicle crashes, the high voltage system may pose a safety risk for the occupants inside the vehicle. To improve safety, the high voltage battery is disconnected from the electrical system after a shorter elapse time than when the vehicle is not involved in a crash. One would have been motivated to combine Jabaji with Hammerschmidt as this achieves improved occupant safety. As stated in Hammerschmidt, “Pyrotechnic switches, which are also called pyrotechnic fuses, serve to interrupt an electrical circuit in a targeted and safe manner when certain conditions occur. Pyrotechnic switches have a rapid disconnection response, this allowing the high-voltage battery to be safely disconnected from the high-voltage electrical system of a vehicle within an extremely short time after said vehicle is involved in a crash” (Paragraph 0010).
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner
should be directed to Matthew Ho whose telephone number is (571) 272-1388. The examiner can
normally be reached on Mon-Thurs 9:00-5:30 EST.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Navid Z Mehdizadeh can be reached on (571)-272-7691. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/MATTHEW HO/ Examiner, Art Unit 3669
/NAVID Z. MEHDIZADEH/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3669
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