Prosecution Insights
Last updated: November 20, 2026
Application No. 18/190,808

DYNAMIC BIDDING IN VIRTUAL COLLABORATIVE DOMAIN

Final Rejection §101§112
Filed
Mar 27, 2023
Examiner
VAN BRAMER, JOHN W
Art Unit
3622
Tech Center
3600 — Transportation & Electronic Commerce
Assignee
International Business Machines Corporation
OA Round
2 (Final)
33%
Grant Probability
At Risk
3-4
OA Rounds
11m
Est. Remaining
67%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants only 33% of cases
33%
Career Allowance Rate
193 granted / 581 resolved
-18.8% vs TC avg
Strong +34% interview lift
Without
With
+33.5%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
4y 7m
Avg Prosecution
29 currently pending
Career history
616
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
28.8%
-11.2% vs TC avg
§103
30.3%
-9.7% vs TC avg
§102
17.5%
-22.5% vs TC avg
§112
15.8%
-24.2% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 581 resolved cases

Office Action

§101 §112
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Response to Amendment The amendment filed on August 12, 2026, cancelled no claims. Claims 1-2, 5, 8-9, 12, 15-16, and 18-19 were amended and no new claims were added. Thus, the currently pending claims addressed below are claims 1-20. Claim Interpretation The following claim terms have been interpreted in light of the applicant’s disclosure: computer readable storage media: interpreted as non-transitory computer readable storage medium (Interpretation based on paragraph 20 of the applicant’s specification which makes it clear that the computer program product is a physical tangible device comprises a storage media (also called “mediums”); and disavows any interpretation of said storage media (also called “mediums”) being a signal when it states: “A computer readable storage medium, as that term is used in the present disclosure, is not to be construed as storage in the form of transitory signals per se, such as radio waves or other freely propagating electromagnetic waves, electromagnetic waves propagating through a waveguide, light pulses passing through a fiber optic cable, electrical signals communicated through a wire, and/or other transmission media.”.) The applicant has provided definitions in their specification for the following terms: a "virtual collaborative domain" is any applicable tool, resource, or digital space configured to be shared amongst a plurality of users, in which the physical locations of users are dispersed over a large geographical area; however, users are associated with computing devices operating within a shared virtual environment resulting in users being able to view the same virtual content simultaneously. Virtual collaborative domains may include but are not limited to distributed simulations, 3D multiplayer games, collaborative engineering of software, collaborative learning applications, virtual arenas, conference rooms/multi-party discussion platforms, concerts, metaverses, or any other applicable shared resources known to those of ordinary skill in the art. (Paragraph 23 of the applicant’s disclosure) a "virtual content" is any applicable type of multi-media (e.g., video, image, animation, music, and the like), avatar, virtual object (e.g., a sign, a label, a menu, a sticker, a brochure, a product packaging, a text, an audio, an infographics, a video, an animation, a hologram, etc.), electronic advertisement, offers, promotions, discounts, notification, etc. configured to be inserted into a digital and/or virtual space within a virtual environment. (Paragraph 24 of the applicant’s disclosure) Claim Objections The amendment filed on August 12, 2026, has overcome the Claim Objections to claims 5-6, 12-13, and 19-20. Thus, the objections are hereby withdrawn. The amendment filed on August 12, 2026, has overcome the Claim Objections to claims 15-20. Thus, the objections are hereby withdrawn. Claims 8-14 are objected to because of the following informalities: Independent claim 8 recites: “program instructions to; analyzing a first virtual collaborative domain;”. The semicolon after “to” in this limitation appears to be a typographical error. For the purpose of prosecuting the claims, the examiner is going to interpret this limitation as if the limitation had been amended to recite: “program instructions to analyze a first virtual collaborative domain;” Dependent claims 9-14 inherit and fail to correct the deficiencies of the claims from which they depend. As such, claims 9-14 are objected to by virtue of dependency. Appropriate correction is required. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. Claims 1-20 are directed to a method, a computer program product, and a system which would be classified under one of the listed statutory classifications (i.e., 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (hereinafter “PEG”) “PEG” Step 1=Yes). However, claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. Claim(s) 1, 8, and 15 recite(s) the following abstract idea: analyzing a first virtual collaborative domain; assigning, in response to the analysis, a potentiality score of the virtual space for bidding of the first virtual collaborative domain; determining the first virtual collaborative domain and the second virtual collaborative domain comprise one or more different configurations and that a plurality of virtual elements of the second virtual collaborative domain are presentable in the virtual space; conducting a virtual auction for the virtual space; infusing, based on the determining and in response to conducting the virtual auction, a second virtual collaborative domain with the first virtual collaborative domain by porting a plurality of virtual elements of the second virtual collaborative domain to the virtual space of the first virtual collaborative domain The limitations as detailed above, as drafted, falls within the “Certain Method of Organizing Human Activity” grouping of abstract ideas namely commercial or legal interactions because they recite advertising marketing and sales related activities. Accordingly, the claim recites an abstract idea (i.e. “PEG” Revised Step 2A Prong One=Yes). This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application because the claim only recites the additional elements of a computing device with a processor and memory executing program instructions (e.g., a general-purpose computer). The additional technical elements above are recited at a high-level of generality (i.e. as a generic processor performing a generic computer function of processing, communicating and displaying) such that it amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the additional technical elements above do not integrate the abstract idea/judicial exception into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. More specifically, the additional elements fail to include (1) improvements to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field (see MPEP 2106.05(a)), (2) applying or using a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition (see Vanda memo), (3) applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine (see MPEP 2106.05(b)), (4) effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (see MPEP 2106.05(c)), or (5) applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception (see MPEP 2106.05(e) and Vanda memo). Rather, the limitations merely add the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea (see MPEP 2106.05(f)), or generally link the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use (see MPEP 2106.05(h)). Thus, the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea (i.e. “PEG” Revised Step 2A Prong Two=Yes) When considering Step 2B of the Alice/Mayo test, the claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the claims do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. More specifically, as discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional elements of using a computing device with a processor and memory executing program instructions (e.g., a general-purpose computer) to perform the claimed functions amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. “Generic computer implementation” is insufficient to transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention (See Affinity Labs, _F.3d_, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016), citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352, 2357) and more generally, “simply appending conventional steps specified at a high level of generality” to an abstract idea does not make that idea patentable (See Affinity Labs, _F.3d_, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016), citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300). Moreover, “the use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or user interface do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter (See FairWarning, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1293, citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). As such, the additional elements of the claim do not add a meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because they would be generic computer functions in any computer implementation. Thus, taken alone, the additional elements do not amount to significantly more than the above-identified judicial exception (the abstract idea). Looking at the limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually. There is no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of the computer or improves any other technology. Their collective functions merely provide generic computer implementation. The Examiner notes simply implementing an abstract concept on a computer, without meaningful limitations to that concept, does not transform a patent-ineligible claim into a patent-eligible one (See Accenture, 728 F.3d 1336, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013), citing Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1280), limiting the application of an abstract idea to one field of use does not necessarily guard against preempting all uses of the abstract idea (See Accenture, 728 F.3d 1336, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013), citing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231), and further the prohibition against patenting an abstract principle “cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the [principle] to a particular technological environment” (See Accenture, 728 F.3d 1336, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013), citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 584), and finally merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not render the claims any less abstract (See Affinity Labs, _F.3d_, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016), citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Applicant herein only requires a general-purpose computer (as evidenced from paragraphs 26-29 and figure 1 of the applicant’s disclosure); therefore, there does not appear to be any alteration or modification to the generic activities indicated, and they are also therefore recognized as insignificant activity with respect to eligibility. Thus, taken individually and in combination, the additional elements do not amount to significantly more than the above-identified judicial exception (the abstract idea) (i.e. “PEG” Step 2B=No). The dependent claims 2-7; 9-14 and 16-20 appear to merely further limit the abstract idea by adding the additional steps of analyzing, based on the one or more different configurations, the second virtual domain to identify the virtual space of the second virtual collaborative domain at which virtual content from the virtual space of the first collaborative domain is presentable; and dynamically modifying a virtual appraisal based on a change to the potentiality score which are both considered part of the abstract idea (Claims 2, 9, and 16); further limiting the analyzing of the first virtual collaborative domain which is considered part of the abstract idea; (Claims 3, 10, 17 and 18); further limiting the assigning of the potentiality score which is considered part of the abstract idea (Claims 4 and 11); further limiting the conducting of the virtual auction which is considered part of the abstract idea (Claims 5-6, 12-13, and 19-20); and adding the limitation wherein users of the first virtual collaborative domain may interact with the second virtual collaborative domain and a plurality of elements of the second virtual collaborative domain which is outside the scope of the applicant’s invention and, as such, considered part of the abstract idea (Claims 7, 14), and therefore only further limit the abstract idea (i.e. “PEG” Revised Step 2A Prong One=Yes), does/do not include any new additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception, and as such are “directed to” said abstract idea (i.e. “PEG” Step 2A Prong Two=Yes); and do not add significantly more than the idea (i.e. “PEG” Step 2B=No). Thus, based on the detailed analysis above, claims 1-20 are not patent eligible. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a): (a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112: The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. Independent claims 1, 8, and 15 have been amended to recite “infusing, by the computing device, a second virtual collaborative domain with the first virtual collaborative domain by porting a plurality of virtual elements of the second virtual collaborative domain to the virtual space of the first virtual collaborative domain based on determining, by the computing device, the first virtual collaborative domain and the second virtual collaborative domain comprise one or more different configurations and the plurality of virtual elements are presentable in the virtual space”, or substantially similar limitations. As currently claimed said “infusing…by porting” is a claim to a functional genus which is broad enough to encompass any and all means of performing such infusing by porting. As per the “Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications” issued on January 21, 2011 and MPEP 2161.01, the first paragraph of § 112 contains a written description requirement that is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. To satisfy the written description requirement, the specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. Specifically, the specification must describe the claimed invention in a manner understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the art and show that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. The written description requirement of § 112, ¶ 1 applies to all claims including original claims that are part of the disclosure as filed. Claims may fail to satisfy the written description requirement when the invention is claimed and described in functional language, but the specification does not sufficiently identify how the invention achieves the claimed function. Therefore, the applicant specification must disclose sufficient species of performing the claimed “infusing...by porting” to prove that their specification supports the claimed genus of any and all ways in which the claimed “infusing…by porting” could be performed. Paragraph 42 indicates infusing by embedding but merely embedding does not inherently require porting. Paragraph 53 indicates that the virtual content integration module 360 communicates with augmented reality module 390 in order to facilitate porting of the virtual content within the virtual space of the first VCD over to the virtual space of the second VCD during the infusion of the second VCD into the first VCD, but does not disclose how such porting is being performed. Paragraphs 56 and 59 indicate that the augmented reality module infuses an operating VCDs in a manner that allows interactions but does not disclose how the infusing is expected to be performed. It might be argued that Paragraph 59 discloses one species in which “infusing…by porting” is performed in that augmented reality module maintains VCD libraries that allow them to be identified, but it does not actually state that it infuses the libraries by porting one library into another library or how such porting is actually performed. As such, the examiner has been unable to find support for a single species of “infusing…by porting” much less sufficient species of “infusing…by porting” to prove the applicant invented an invention capable of “infusing…by porting” in any and all means possible. The test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date. A description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the requirement, Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, 107 F.3d 1565, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1997). To satisfy the written description requirement, the specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. Specifically, the specification must describe the claimed invention in a manner understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the art and show that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. The written description requirement of § 112, ¶ 1 applies to all claims including original claims that are part of the disclosure as filed. Claims may fail to satisfy the written description requirement when the invention is claimed and described in functional language, but the specification does not sufficiently identify how the invention achieves the claimed function. The problem is especially acute with genus claims that use functional language to define the boundaries of a claimed genus. In such a case, the functional claim may simply claim a desired result and may do so without describing species that achieve that result. But the specification must demonstrate that the applicant has made a generic invention that achieves the claimed result and do so by showing that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to the functionally-defined genus. The level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology. Computer-implemented inventions are often disclosed and claimed in terms of their functionality. This is because writing computer programming code for software to perform specific functions is normally within the skill of the art once those functions have been adequately disclosed. Nevertheless, for computer-implemented inventions, the determination of the sufficiency of disclosure will require an inquiry into both the sufficiency of the disclosed hardware as well as the disclosed software due to the interrelationship and interdependence of computer hardware and software. When examining computer-implemented functional claims, examiners should determine whether the specification discloses the computer and the algorithm (e.g., the necessary steps and/or flowcharts) that perform the claimed function in sufficient detail such that one of ordinary skill in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor invented the claimed subject matter. Specifically, if one skilled in the art would know how to program the disclosed computer to perform the necessary steps described in the specification to achieve the claimed function and the inventor was in possession of that knowledge, the written description requirement would be satisfied. If the specification does not provide a disclosure of the computer and algorithm in sufficient detail to demonstrate to one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention including how to program the disclosed computer to perform the claimed function, a rejection under § 112, ¶ 1 for lack of written description must be made. In the instant case, the claimed invention fails to satisfy the written description requirement because the claims is to a genus of invention described using functional language, but the specification does not sufficiently identify how the invention achieves the claimed function because the genus claims use functional language to define the boundaries of the claimed genus. The claims simply claim a desired result and does so without describing species that achieve that result. There is no indication in the specification that demonstrates that the applicant invented species sufficient to support a claim to the functionally-defined genus. There is no disclosure in the applicant’s specification of the algorithm (e.g., the necessary steps and/or flowcharts) that perform the claimed function in sufficient detail such that one of ordinary skill in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor invented the claimed subject matter. There are no specific examples of how the claimed genus described using functional language would be used to obtain the desired result given a single species. There are no algorithms or flow charts that describe the specific details necessary for implementation of the genus claimed using a single species of the claimed genus. Hence, it is clear that the specification fails to satisfy the written description because it does not sufficiently identify how the invention achieves the claimed functions. An adequate written description of a claimed genus requires more than the generic statement of the inventions boundaries as presented in the independent claims 1, 8, and 15. As such, claims 1, 8, and 15 are rejected for failing to comply with the written description requirement. Dependent claims 2-7, 9-14, and 16-20 fail to correct the deficiencies of the claims from which they depend and, as such, are rejected by virtue of dependency. Possible Allowable Subject Matter Claims 1-20 contain subject matter that would be allowable over the prior art if the applicant were to be able to overcome the Claim Objections, the 35 USC 112(a) rejections, and the 35 USC 101 rejections above. The following is a statement of reasons for the indication of allowable subject matter: The examiner has found prior art (see Hall: 2019/0349643 and Kim et al.: 9,517,403) that discloses: a computer-implemented method, a computer program product, and a computer system for bidding in a virtual space, comprising: analyzing, by a computing device, a first virtual collaborative domain (e.g., a virtual reality broadcasting event or augmented reality broadcasting event, such as a sporting event (e.g., virtual space race); assigning, in response to the analysis and by the computing device, a potentiality score (e.g., intensity score) of the virtual space for bidding of the first virtual collaborative domain; conducting, by the computing device, a virtual auction for the virtual space, wherein the virtual space is owned and customized by a third-party (e.g., customized virtual space race car); and displaying, in response to finalizing the virtual auction, virtual content (e.g., an advertisement) within the virtual space within the first virtual collaborative domain. The examiner has also found prior art (see Henderson: 2022/0292543) that discloses: a computer-implemented method, a computer program product, and a computer system for bidding in a virtual space, comprising: analyzing, by a computing device, a first virtual collaborative domain; assigning, in response to the analysis and by the computing device, a potentiality score of the virtual space for bidding of the first virtual collaborative domain; conducting, by the computing device, a virtual auction for the virtual space; and infusing, in response to finalizing the virtual auction and by the computing device, virtual space in the first virtual collaborative domain with user created custom content. However, the examiner has been unable to find prior art, that would be obvious to combine with either Hall and Kim or Henderson, which discloses infusing, by a computing device, a second virtual collaborative domain with the first virtual collaborative domain in response to conducting a virtual auction for virtual space. In Hall and Kim, the virtual race car would already be part of the virtual race (e.g., first collaborative domain) when then auction for advertising on the virtual race car based on the intensity score is initiated. As such, even if one where to somehow considered the customized virtual race car to be a second virtual collaborative domain, it would not be infused with the first virtual collaborative domain in response to concluding the virtual auction. In Henderson, when the virtual space being auctioned is virtual real estate, such as a popup shop, mobile food truck, retail store, or shipping container, the virtual space is able to be customized by a user in the first collaborative domain when the auction is finalized. When the virtual space being auctioned is virtual shelf space, the winner of the shelf space auction has either previously created, within the first virtual collaborative domain, the product that will be placed on the shelf, or must create the product, within the first virtual collaborative domain, after the auction is created. As such, the neither the customized virtual real estate nor the virtual shelf space can be said to be a second virtual collaborative domain that is infused with the first virtual collaborative domain as required by the limitations of the claims. When the virtual space being auctioned is virtual shelf space. As such, claims 1-20 contain subject matter that would be allowable over the prior art if the applicant were to be able to overcome the Claim Objections and 35 USC 101 rejections above. The examiner notes that, given the breadth of the definition of a "virtual collaborative domain", he considered whether the internet, or a metaverse operating as a digital twin of the internet or portion thereof, could be considered the first virtual collaborative domain. The answer to this question was that the term is broad enough to encompass the claimed “first collaborative virtual domain”. However, when one creates a new website to add to such a domain, the new website cannot be considered a “second collaborative virtual domain” because until it is actively operating within the first collaborative virtual domain (e.g., the internet) it cannot be said to be an “applicable tool, resource, or digital space configured to be shared amongst a plurality of users, in which the physical locations of users are dispersed over a large geographical area”, as it is not able to be shared amongst a plurality of user until has already been infused with the first virtual collaborative domain. As such, it would be code that is infused with the first collaborative domain and not a second virtual collaborative domain that is infused with a first virtual collaborative domain. Thus, prior art that discloses auctioning off domain names for use on the internet, prior art that discloses auctioning portions of a currently active website, and prior art that discloses auctioning advertising space on a webpage or website would not be valid prior art, as the code for the new website, code for a new portion of an existing website, and/or advertisements created for display on a web page or website would not satisfy the definition of a second “collaborative virtual domain”. The claims requires that one virtual collaborative domain be infused with another collaborative domain upon finalization of the auction. Therefore, both must be “virtual collaborative domains” prior to the auction, and the infusion to occur upon finalization of said auction. As such, claims 1-20 contain subject matter that would be allowable over this type of prior art if the applicant were to be able to overcome the Claim Objections, the 35 USC 112(a) rejections, and the 35 USC 101 rejections above. Response to Arguments Applicant's arguments filed August 12, 2026, have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. The applicant argues that the claims overcome the 101 rejections by reciting a practical application of the judicial exception in view of the 2024 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance. The examiner strongly disagrees. There are no limitations in the claims as currently amended which would even be capable of transforming the abstract idea into a practical application under Step 2a, Prong 2 or capable of being considered significantly more under Step 2b. The claims clearly recite steps of an abstract idea and then merely require that the abstract idea be applied using a general-purpose computer as a tool. This is clearly an indication of claims that are not indicative of integration into a practical application. MPEP 2106 makes it clear that it is the “additional elements” of a claim which must integrate the abstract idea into a practical application (see MPEP 2106.05(a) - “It is important to note, the judicial exception alone cannot provide the improvement”; and MPEP 2106.05(a)(II) - “However, it is important to keep in mind that an improvement in the abstract idea itself (e.g. a recited fundamental economic concept) is not an improvement in technology”). “Additional elements” are defined as those elements which are not part of the abstract idea itself. The claimed infusing by porting is not a technology instead they are steps that can be done by a person manually doing such porting or infusion. While it is possible that if the claims required the use of some applicant invented underlying technology for performing such infusing by porting that this underlying technology could be an additional element capable of transforming the abstract idea into a practical application, but the generic terms of infusing and porting do not themselves inherently require a technology of any sort. Since infusing by porting as currently claimed could be performed manually by a person, they are clearly part of the abstract idea itself and not an “additional element” of the claims. The applicant argues some portions of the specification that disclose infusion being in nested manner. However, no such nesting is required in the claims. Furthermore, based on the applicant’s specification, the nested manner and nested functionality are not part of the infusing by porting. Instead, as made clear in paragraph 59, it is the virtual auction that is performed in a nested manner, and any nested functionality associated with the virtual content is enabled by VCDs being maintained in a VCD library of the augmented reality module, and the nesting is the ability for a user to interact with the virtual content according to information from the sensors not the VCDs, that are infused by porting. Thus, there is nothing in the claims themselves which provide any type of nesting functionality. The applicant puts forth an argument that selection of the given virtual space in the first virtual space is important and based on factors that the human mind are not able to ascertain. This argument is immaterial. The only category of abstract idea which requires the abstract idea be capable of being performed in the human mind is the “Mental Process” category of abstract idea (See MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)IIIA as cited in the applicant’s arguments). The instant application has been identified as reciting an abstract idea which fall in the “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity” category which has no such restrictions. As such, it is immaterial whether the selection can be done by the human mind. Furthermore, it appears that the applicant has misconstrued the Alice decision. In Alice it is the “additional elements” and/or “additional features” of the claims that supply the improvement and an additional element of a general-purpose computer which merely applies an abstract idea appears to be no more than a drafting effort to overcome a 101 rejection. Therefore, the Alice decision support the examiner’s position that the claims are properly rejected under 35 USC 101. As such, it is clear that the claim merely require applying the abstract idea using the general-purpose computer as a tool which is incapable of transforming an abstract idea into a practical application under Step 2a, Prong 2 and incapable of being considered significantly more under Step 2b. Thus, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing, and the rejections have been maintained. Conclusion The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. Prado (2008/0228479) which discloses analyzing a first virtual collaborative domain to determine keywords in avatar discussions in a virtual world, sorting the keywords by auction value for displaying an advertisement on a virtual billboard near the avatars, thereby assigning a potentiality score for the virtual billboard (i.e., virtual space), conducting an auction for the virtual billboard, and displaying, in response to finalizing the virtual auction within the virtual world. Aghdaii et al. (2021/0201392) which discloses analyzing content being viewed in augmented reality such as a live sporting event, news event, concert, or social event; assigning a value of desired impression (i.e., potentiality score) for advertising in the augmented reality scene; conducting, by the computing device, a virtual auction for the virtual space; and displaying, in response to finalizing the virtual auction, virtual content within the virtual space. While an advertisement of the winner the auction could be said to be infused with the first virtual collaborative domain, the advertisement could not be said to be a second virtual collaborative domain based on the applicant’s definition; Metricmarketing, Here’s What You Need to Know About Metaverse Advertising, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220926021917/https://www.metricmarketing .com/blog/metaverse-advertising/, pages 1-11 which discloses the state of the art in Metaverse advertising. Secondlife, Marketing Your Products in Second Life, February 2016, https://wiki.secondlife.com/w/index.php?title=Marketing_Your_Products_In_Second_Life&oldid=1199081, pages 1-4 which discloses the virtual collaborative domain called Secondlife which allows users to rent or purchase locations, customize the location with your business, generate custom advertisements for your business, and then advertise your business using virtual billboards positioned throughout the Secondlife virtual domain. Stein, Spatial shits its metaverse focus to the web, and selling NF real estate, Dec. 14, 2021, https://www.cnet.com/tech/computing/spatial-is-shifting-its-metaverse-focus-to-the-web-and-selling-its-own-environment-nfts/, pages 1-16 which discloses creating a second virtual collaborative domain using the GLB file format, which can work within a first virtual collaborative domain, assuming that the first virtual collaborative domain will work with the GLB file format, which might be said to be infusing the second virtual collaborative domain with the first virtual collaborative domain. However, this would create an entire virtual space within the first virtual collaborative domain, and not be a virtual space already within the first virtual collaborative domain as required by the claims. Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JOHN W VAN BRAMER whose telephone number is (571)272-8198. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Thursday 5:30 am - 4 pm EST. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Abhishek Vyas can be reached on 571-270-1836. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /John Van Bramer/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3621
Read full office action

Prosecution Timeline

Show 1 earlier event
Nov 17, 2023
Response after Non-Final Action
May 14, 2026
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §101, §112
Aug 04, 2026
Applicant Interview (Telephonic)
Aug 04, 2026
Examiner Interview Summary
Aug 12, 2026
Response Filed
Oct 28, 2026
Final Rejection mailed — §101, §112
Nov 18, 2026
Examiner Interview Summary
Nov 18, 2026
Applicant Interview (Telephonic)

Precedent Cases

Applications granted by this same examiner with similar technology

Patent 12718265
PUSHING CONTENT TO SECONDARY CONNECTED DEVICES
2y 4m to grant Granted Aug 25, 2026
Patent 12694746
ELECTRICAL COMPUTERS AND DIGITAL PROCESSING SYSTEMS INVOLVING INTERPROGRAM OR INTERPROCESS COMMUNICATION REGARDING AMUSEMENT DEVICES AND GAMES
3y 1m to grant Granted Jul 28, 2026
Patent 12657602
ADVERTISING DEVICE MONITORING METHOD AND DEVICE
3y 11m to grant Granted Jun 16, 2026
Patent 12602708
SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR CAPABILITY PACKAGES OFFERING BASED ON ANALYSIS OF EDITED WEBSITES AND THEIR USE
3y 5m to grant Granted Apr 14, 2026
Patent 12586097
SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PROVIDING VIRTUAL ITEMS TO USERS OF A VIRTUAL SPACE
2y 3m to grant Granted Mar 24, 2026
Study what changed to get past this examiner. Based on 5 most recent grants.

Strategy Recommendation AI-generated — please review before filing

Get a prosecution strategy drawn from examiner precedents, rejection analysis, and claim mapping.
Typically takes 5-10 seconds — AI-generated, attorney review required before filing

Prosecution Projections

3-4
Expected OA Rounds
33%
Grant Probability
67%
With Interview (+33.5%)
4y 7m (~11m remaining)
Median Time to Grant
Moderate
PTA Risk
Based on 581 resolved cases by this examiner. Grant probability derived from career allowance rate.

Sign in with your work email

Enter your email to receive a magic link. No password needed.

Personal email addresses (Gmail, Yahoo, etc.) are not accepted.

Free tier: 3 strategy analyses per month