DETAILED ACTION
Acknowledgements
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claims 9, 11, 16-18, 20 are pending.
This action is Final.
Drawings
The drawings are objected to as failing to comply with 37 CFR 1.84(p)(5) because they include the following reference character(s) not mentioned in the description: P1 and P2. Corrected drawing sheets in compliance with 37 CFR 1.121(d), or amendment to the specification to add the reference character(s) in the description in compliance with 37 CFR 1.121(b) are required in reply to the Office action to avoid abandonment of the application. Any amended replacement drawing sheet should include all of the figures appearing on the immediate prior version of the sheet, even if only one figure is being amended. Each drawing sheet submitted after the filing date of an application must be labeled in the top margin as either “Replacement Sheet” or “New Sheet” pursuant to 37 CFR 1.121(d). If the changes are not accepted by the examiner, the applicant will be notified and informed of any required corrective action in the next Office action. The objection to the drawings will not be held in abeyance.
Specification
The disclosure is objected to because of the following informalities: the drawing and specification are not in agreement for terms present, see drawing objections above.
Appropriate correction is required.
The use of the term Bluetooth and Wi-Fi, which is a trade name or a mark used in commerce, has been noted in this application. The term should be accompanied by the generic terminology; furthermore the term should be capitalized wherever it appears or, where appropriate, include a proper symbol indicating use in commerce such as ™, SM , or ® following the term.
Although the use of trade names and marks used in commerce (i.e., trademarks, service marks, certification marks, and collective marks) are permissible in patent applications, the proprietary nature of the marks should be respected and every effort made to prevent their use in any manner which might adversely affect their validity as commercial marks.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 9, 11, 16-18, 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Regarding claims 9 and 17, the limitations “wherein the processor is configured to estimate an internal diameter of a blood vessel corresponding to the average amplitude as the at least one cardiovascular health index based on a correlation that the internal diameter is relatively larger as the average amplitude is relatively larger” are rejected for lack of adequate written description. The claims recite functional limitations completed by processing structures, but the disclosure as filed does not provide adequate description of the algorithm for how applicant achieves the claimed functional features by the processor. The disclosure at most (Figure 6 PGPub paragraph 37) contains that the data is correlated, but this is a statement of fact or natural property, not how applicant programmed a processor to actively calculate an estimate of the internal diameter. Although such step may be possible, this is not the test for compliance with the written description requirement. Rather, “the test for [written description] sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). In this case, Applicant merely establish that the inventor(s) could have had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date, not that they did have possession at that time. As such, one of skill in the art would not have recognized applicant was in possession of the claimed invention at the time the application was filed. The dependent claims are rejected for depending on a rejected claim.
Federal Register Notice of January 7, 2019:
At issue in Vasudevan was whether the patent specification provided sufficient written description support for a limitation of the asserted claims. Vasudevan, 782 F.3d at 681–83. The Federal Circuit explained that ‘‘[t]he test for the sufficiency of the written description ‘is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.’ ’’ Id. at 682 (quoting Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351). The Federal Circuit emphasized that ‘‘[t]he written description requirement is not met if the specification merely describes a ‘desired result.’ ’’ Vasudevan, 782 F.3d at 682 (quoting Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349). Thus, in applying this standard to the computer-implemented functional claim at issue, the Federal Circuit stated that ‘‘[t]he more telling question is whether the specification shows possession by the inventor of how [the claimed function] is achieved.’’ Vasudevan, 782 F.3d at 683. In order to satisfy the written description requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. 112(a), the specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail such that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention at the time of filing. For instance, the specification must provide a sufficient description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve. The level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology. Information that is well known in the art need not be described in detail in the specification. However, sufficient information must be provided to show that the inventor had possession of the invention as claimed. See MPEP § 2163, subsection II(A)(2). The analysis of whether the specification complies with the written description requirement calls for the examiner to compare the scope of the claim with the scope of the description to determine whether applicant hasdemonstrated possession of the claimed invention. Id.; see also Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (‘‘The purpose of [the written description requirement] is to ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification’’); LizardTech Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (‘‘Whether the flaw in the specification is regarded as a failure to demonstrate that the applicant possessed the full scope of the invention recited in [the claim] or a failure to enable the full breadth of that claim, the specification provides inadequate support for the claim under [§ 112(a)]’’); cf. id. (‘‘A claim will not be invalidated on [§ ] 112 grounds simply because the embodiments of the specification do not contain examples explicitly covering the full scope of the claim language.’’). While ‘‘[t]here is no special rule for supporting a genus by the disclosure of a species,’’ the Federal Circuit has stated that ‘‘[w]hether the genus is supported vel non depends upon the state of the art and the nature and breadth of the genus.’’ Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011); id. (further explaining that ‘‘so long as disclosure of the species is sufficient to convey to one skilled in the art that the inventor possessed the subject matter of the genus, the genus will be supported by an adequate written description.’’). See also Rivera v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 857 F.3d 1315, 1319–21 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming the Commission’s findings that ‘‘the specification did not provide the necessary written description support for the full breadth of the asserted claims,’’ where the claims were broadly drawn to a ‘‘container . . . adapted to hold brewing material’’ while the specification disclosed only a ‘‘pod adapter assembly’’ or ‘‘receptacle’’designed to hold a ‘‘pod’’). Computer-implemented inventions are at times disclosed and claimed in terms of their functionality. For computer-implemented functional claims, the determination of the sufficiency of the disclosure will require an inquiry into the sufficiency of both the disclosed hardware and the disclosed software (i.e., ‘‘how [the claimed function] is achieved,’’ Vasudevan, 782 F.3d at 683), due to the interrelationship and interdependence of computer hardware and software. When examining computer implemented, software-related claims, examiners should determine whether the specification discloses the computer and the algorithm(s) that achieve the claimed function in sufficient detail that one of ordinary skill in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor possessed the claimed subject matter at the time of filing. An algorithm is defined, for example, as ‘‘a finite sequence of steps for solving a logical or mathematical problem or performing a task.’’ Microsoft Computer Dictionary (5th ed., 2002). Applicant may ‘‘express that algorithm in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.’’ Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1340 (internal citation omitted). It is not enough that one skilled in the art could theoretically write a program to achieve the claimed function, rather the specification itself must explain how the claimed function is achieved to demonstrate that the applicant had possession of it. See, e.g., Vasudevan, 782 F.3d at 682–83. If the specification does not provide a disclosure of the computer and algorithm(s) in sufficient detail to demonstrate to one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention that achieves the claimed result, a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) for lack of written description must be made. See MPEP § 2161.01, subsection I.
MPEP 2161.01:
I. DETERMINING WHETHER THERE IS ADEQUATE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION FOR A COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED FUNCTIONAL CLAIM LIMITATION
The 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112 contains a written description requirement that is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340, 94 USPQ2d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). To satisfy the written description requirement, the specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention at the time of filing. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344-45, 76 USPQ2d 1724, 1731-32 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1115-16 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Specifically, the specification must describe the claimed invention in a manner understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the art in a way that shows that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention at the time of filing. Id.;Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351, 94 USPQ2d at 1172. The function of the written description requirement is to ensure that the inventor had possession of the specific subject matter later claimed as of the filing date of the application relied on; how the specification accomplishes this is not material. In re Herschler, 591 F.2d 693, 700-01, 200 USPQ 711, 717 (CCPA 1979), further reiterated in In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 217 USPQ 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also MPEP §§ 2163 - 2163.04.
The written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, applies to all claims including original claims that are part of the disclosure as filed. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349, 94 USPQ2d at 1170. As stated by the Federal Circuit, “[a]lthough many original claims will satisfy the written description requirement, certain claims may not.” Id. at 1349, 94 USPQ2d at 1170-71; see also LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1343-46, 76 USPQ2d 1724, 1730-33 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1405-06 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(“The description requirement of the patent statute requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention.”). Problems satisfying the written description requirement for original claims often occur when claim language is generic or functional, or both. Ariad, 593 F.3d at 1349, 94 USPQ2d at 1171 ("The problem is especially acute with genus claims that use functional language to define the boundaries of a claimed genus. In such a case, the functional claim may simply claim a desired result, and may do so without describing species that achieve that result. But the specification must demonstrate that the applicant has made a generic invention that achieves the claimed result and do so by showing that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to the functionally-defined genus.").
For instance, generic claim language in the original disclosure does not satisfy the written description requirement if it fails to support the scope of the genus claimed. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349-50, 94 USPQ2d at 1171 (“[A]n adequate written description of a claimed genus requires more than a generic statement of an invention’s boundaries.”) (citing Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1405-06); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968, 63 USPQ2d 1609, 1616 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that generic claim language appearing in ipsis verbis in the original specification did not satisfy the written description requirement because it failed to support the scope of the genus claimed); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170, 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that “only similar language in the specification or original claims is necessary to satisfy the written description requirement”).
The Federal Circuit has explained that a specification cannot always support expansive claim language and satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112 “merely by clearly describing one embodiment of the thing claimed.” LizardTech v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1346, 76 USPQ2d 1731, 1733 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The issue is whether a person skilled in the art would understand applicant to have invented, and been in possession of, the invention as broadly claimed. In LizardTech, claims to a generic method of making a seamless discrete wavelet transformation (DWT) were held invalid under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, because the specification taught only one particular method for making a seamless DWT and there was no evidence that the specification contemplated a more generic method. “[T]he description of one method for creating a seamless DWT does not entitle the inventor . . . to claim any and all means for achieving that objective.” LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1346, 76 USPQ2d at 1733.
Similarly, original claims may lack written description when the claims define the invention in functional language specifying a desired result but the specification does not sufficiently describe how the function is performed or the result is achieved. For software, this can occur when the algorithm or steps/procedure for performing the computer function are not explained at all or are not explained in sufficient detail (simply restating the function recited in the claim is not necessarily sufficient). In other words, the algorithm or steps/procedure taken to perform the function must be described with sufficient detail so that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand how the inventor intended the function to be performed. See MPEP §§ 2163.02 and 2181, subsection IV.
The level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351, 94 USPQ2d at 1172; Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357-58, 76 USPQ2d 1078, 1083-84 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Computer-implemented inventions are often disclosed and claimed in terms of their functionality. For computer-implemented inventions, the determination of the sufficiency of disclosure will require an inquiry into the sufficiency of both the disclosed hardware and the disclosed software due to the interrelationship and interdependence of computer hardware and software. The critical inquiry is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date. Vasudenvan Sofware, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 682. 114 USPQ2d 1349, 1356 (citing Ariad Pharm., Inc. V. Eli Lilly & Co, 598 F.3d 1336, 1351, 94 USPQ2d 1161, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2010) in the context of determining possession of a claimed means of accessing disparate databases).
When examining computer-implemented functional claims, examiners should determine whether the specification discloses the computer and the algorithm (e.g., the necessary steps and/or flowcharts) that perform the claimed function in sufficient detail such that one of ordinary skill in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor possessed the claimed subject matter at the time of filing. It is not enough that one skilled in the art could write a program to achieve the claimed function because the specification must explain how the inventor intends to achieve the claimed function to satisfy the written description requirement. See, e.g., Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 681-683, 114 USPQ2d 1349, 1356, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversing and remanding the district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity for lack of adequate written description where there were genuine issues of material fact regarding “whether the specification show[ed] possession by the inventor of how accessing disparate databases is achieved”). If the specification does not provide a disclosure of the computer and algorithm in sufficient detail to demonstrate to one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, for lack of written description must be made. For more information regarding the written description requirement, see MPEP § 2162- § 2163.07(b). If the specification does not provide a disclosure of sufficient corresponding structure, materials, or acts that perform the entire claimed function of a means- (or step-) plus- function limitation in a claim under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or the sixth paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, "the applicant has in effect failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention" as required by the 35 U.S.C. 112(b) [or the second paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112]. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1850 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). A rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or the second paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112 must be made in addition to the written description rejection.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 9, 11, 16-18, 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Regarding claims 9 and 17, the limitations “wherein the processor is configured to estimate an internal diameter of a blood vessel corresponding to the average amplitude as the at least one cardiovascular health index based on a correlation that the internal diameter is relatively larger as the average amplitude is relatively larger” renders the claims indefinite. The claims recite functional limitations completed by processing structures, but the disclosure as filed does not provide any explanation as to how such estimation is completed. The disclosure at most (Figure 6 PGPub paragraph 37) contains that the data is correlated, but this is a statement of fact or natural property, not how applicant programmed a processor to actively calculate an estimate of the internal diameter. As the claims are not clear as to how such calculation is made, the metes and bounds of the claims are unclear which renders the claim indefinite.
The dependent claims are rejected for depending on a rejected claim.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 9, 11, 16-18, 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. The claim(s) recite(s):
Claims 9, 17 (9 representative)
extract at least one characteristic factor of an oscillometric signal (mathematical concepts and/or mental processes)
extract a pulse wave from the oscillometric signal (mathematical concepts and/or mental processes)
extract at least one cardiovascular health index by analyzing the characteristic factor and the pulse wave (mathematical concepts and/or mental processes)
extract the at least one characteristic factor by setting a specific section between a systolic blood pressure (SBP) and a diastolic blood pressure (DBP) according to a cuff pressure, and calculating an average amplitude by averaging amplitudes of a plurality of pulses included in the oscillometric signal within the specific section as the at least one characteristic factor (mathematical concepts and/or mental processes)
estimate an internal diameter of a blood vessel corresponding to the average amplitude as the at least one cardiovascular health index based on a correlation that the internal diameter is relatively larger as the average amplitude is relatively larger (mathematical concepts and/or mental processes)
These claim limitations fall within the identified groupings of abstract ideas:
Mathematical Concepts:
mathematical relationships
mathematical formulas or equations
mathematical calculations
Mental Processes
concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)
This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application because:
Under the step 2A, analysis is conducted on the additional features of the claim. Under this analysis, the additional features beyond the judicial exception are:
Claim 9
electronic device for extracting a cardiovascular health status by using an oscillometric signal, the electronic device comprising: memory; and a processor connected to the memory and configured to execute at least one instruction stored in the memory, wherein the processor is configured to (Computer structures used as a tool to implement the exception(s))
Claim 17
non-transitory computer-readable recording medium in which a computer program for executing a method of extracting a cardiovascular health status by using an oscillometric signal in an electronic device has been stored (Computer structures used as a tool to implement the exception(s))
These features in the claim do not integrate the exception into a practical application of the exception as the additional elements in the claim do not apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is no more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.
Limitation concepts that are indicative of integration into a practical application:
Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical field - see MPEP 2106.05(a)
Applying or using a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition – see Vanda Memo
Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine - see MPEP 2106.05(b)
Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing - see MPEP 2106.05(c)
Applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception - see MPEP 2106.05(e) and Vanda Memo
Limitation concepts that are not indicative of integration into a practical application:
Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea - see MPEP 2106.05(f)
Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception - see MPEP 2106.05(g)
Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use – see MPEP 2106.05(h)
Under Step 2B, the claim limitations are evaluated for an inventive concept. The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because, when considered separately and in combination, they do not add significantly more to the exception. Analyzing the additional claim limitations individually, the additional limitation that is not directed to the abstract idea are the same as those identified above in step 2A. The computer structures cited above are claimed as performing generic computer functions routinely used in computer applications. Generic computer components recited as performing generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities amount to no more than implementing the abstract idea with a computerized system. The additional limitations recited in the dependent claims are directed to further details of the exception(s) (A more specific abstraction is still an abstraction). Looking at the limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually. Therefore, analyzing the claims as an ordered combination under the Mayo/Alice analysis the features claimed are directed to patent ineligible limitations.
Response to Arguments
The examiner acknowledges applicant’s submission of amendments to the claims, drawings, and specification filed 3/31/2026.
Applicant’s arguments regarding the drawing objections have been fully considered and are partially persuasive due to the amendments to the drawings, but not all objections were directly addressed. the objections remain as presented above.
Applicant’s arguments regarding the specification objections have been fully considered but are not persuasive as not all issues have been completely addressed; the objections remain as presented above.
Applicant’s arguments regarding the rejections of the claims under 35 U.S.C. 101 have been fully considered but are not persuasive. Applicant’s arguments are conclusory and directed to the exception itself, with conclusory finding that a practical application exists for improved functionality. This is not found to be persuasive and the rejections are updated to account for the amendments to the claims.
Applicant’s arguments regarding the rejections of the claims in view of prior art have been fully considered and are persuasive due to the amendments to the claims. While Russell teaches calculations of radius using average amplitude of ith heartbeat as discussed in Figure 7-8, there is no direct teaching for the algorithmic processes that the claims recite in making such estimation using the set time interval which encompasses more than an ith beat, as such, the rejections in view of art are withdrawn.
Conclusion
No prior art rejections are applied, but the claims are not allowable due to the rejections under 35 U.S.C. 112/101.
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to MICHAEL R BLOCH whose telephone number is (571)270-3252. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 11-8 EST.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Robert (Tse) Chen can be reached at (571)272-3672. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/MICHAEL R BLOCH/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3791
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