DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA. Introductory Remarks This action is in response to communications filed on 25 July 2023 . Claim(s) 1- 20 is/are presently pending in the application, of which, claim(s) 1 , 8, and 15 is/are presented in independent form. No priority is claimed. An IDS was received on 16 August 2023 and 2 August 2024 . All references have been considered. Examiner’s Note The rejections below group claims that may not be identical, but whose language and scope are so substantively similar as to lend themselves to grouping, in the interests of clarity and conciseness. Any citation to the instant specification herein is made to the PGPub version (if applicable). The examiner notes that no statement has been entered regarding the inventorship of individual claims as required under 37 CFR 1.56 , and therefore assumes that all claims have the same inventorship or are directed to inventions that were commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the invention. Double Patenting The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg , 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman , 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi , 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum , 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel , 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington , 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969). A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA. A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b). The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13. The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA/25, or PTO/AIA/26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer . Claims 1, 8, and 15 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1, 8, and 15 of copending Application No. 18/414,057 (reference application). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the only difference is that the distribution is “based, at least in part, on locations [of the portions]”. Given this extremely broad language (inclusive of, for example, merely retrieving the data from those locations), the claims are not patentably distinct from one another. This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (b ) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph: The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the appl icant regards as his invention. Claims 1, 8, and 15 (and correspondingly their dependent claims) are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention. Each of these independent claims recites “information to be distributed only between two or more respective processing cores”. The use of the language of “ to be distributed ” renders these claim(s) indefinite as it is unclear whether such distribution is required by the claims or whether this is merely a statement of intended use/purpose. See generally In re Collier , 397 F.2d 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (“The main fault we observe in claim 17 is indefiniteness in the sense that things which may be done are not required to be done. For example, the ferrule or connector member is crimpable but not required, structurally, to be crimped; the ground wire "means," which we take to be a piece of wire, is for disposition under the ferrule but is not required to be disposed anywhere; it becomes displaced when the ferrule is crimped but that may never be, so far as the language of claim 17 is concerned. These cannot be regarded as structural limitations and therefore not as positive limitations in a claim directed to structure.”). The dependent claim(s) do nothing to cure this deficiency, and is/are likewise rejected. For the purposes of compact prosecution, this limitation is considered to be a statement of intended use. Dependent claims 6, 7, 13, 14, 17, and 20 recite similar language (“to be distributed” , “to be partitioned” , and “to be performed” ), which are similarly rejected m utatis mutandis . Claims 4, 11, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention. Claim 4 is representative of claims 11 and 18, and states “wherein the inferencing is to train one or more neural networks”. However, inferencing as understood in the art is the use of an already trained model to infer results rather than training any new machine learning. This is reflected by applicant’s own statements. Kyle Aubrey, What’s the Difference Between Deep Learning Training and Inference? , NVIDIA, 29 July 2016, updated October 2025, https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/difference-deep-learning-training-inference-ai/ . Given this understanding of the term in the art and a lack of a different definition within the specification, these claims directly contradict what inferencing is understood to encompass. This renders the claims indefinite. Generally, when the claims are indefinite, vague or unclear, they cannot be construed without speculation or conjecture; therefore, the indefinite claims are not treated on the merits with respect to prior art. See In re Steele , 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA 1962) (A prior art rejection cannot be sustained if the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would have to make speculative assumptions concerning the meaning of claim language.); see also In re Wilson , 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970) ("If no reasonably definite meaning can be ascribed to certain terms in the claim, the subject matter does not become obvious-the claim becomes indefinite."). Notwithstanding Steele , the Office has made every attempt to construe the claims in what the Office believes is the intent of the Applicants in the interest of compact prosecution. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. Claims 8 - 10, 12- 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to FILLIN "Identify whether the claim(s) are directed to a law of nature; a natural phenomenon; or an abstract idea." \* MERGEFORMAT an abstract idea without significantly more. The claim(s) recite(s) mental process steps of receiving data, processing that data, and transmitting the results of the data processing . In this analysis, only those claim limitations stipulated as additional elements are considered to be limitations distinct from the abstract idea itself. Claim 8 recites, “ caus ing inferencing of two or more contiguous portions of information to be distributed only between two or more respective processing cores ”, which is merely processing data. The re are no additional elements in the claim . Therefore, the claim does not amount to a practical application of an abstract idea nor significantly more than the judicial exception . D ependent claims 9 and 12-14 add no additional elements to the abstract idea claimed. Dependent claim 10 adds the additional element that the inferencing is to be performed using a large-language model. This is merely applying the abstract idea on generic computing components. This do es nothing to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application or amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Claims 1-3, 5-7, 15-17, 19, and 20 are considered patent-eligible since the claims amount to nothing more than a processor comprising one or more circuits followed by statements of intended use that do not receive patentable weight. Claims 4, 11, and 18 cannot be evaluated for eligibility due to their indefiniteness. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis ( i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action: A person shall be entitled to a patent unless – (a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale , or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. Claim(s) 1-3, 5- 10 , 1 2 -17, 19, and 20 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102 (a)(1) as being anticipated by Tang et al. (U.S. PGPub No. 2023/0205581 A1) (hereinafter Tang) . As per claim 1 , Tang teaches a processor ( claim 1 ) comprising: one or more circuits ( id. ) to cause inferencing of two or more contiguous portions of information to be distributed only between two or more respective processing cores ( Intended uses are not afforded patentable weight. MPEP 2111.02; See also In re Schreiber , 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431 ( Fed.Cir . 1997) ) . As per claim 8, Tang teaches a method ( claim 12 ) , comprising: causing inferencing of two or more contiguous portions of information to be distributed only between two or more respective processing cores ( id. ) . As per claim 15 , Tang teaches a computer system comprising: one or more processors and memory storing instructions (claim 1) that, if performed by the one or more processors, cause inferencing of two or more contiguous portions of information to be distributed only between two or more respective processing cores ( Given this language the instructions may never be performed. Tang still teaches the claim even if they were performed. See 0081 ) . As per claim s 2 , 9, and 16 , Tang teaches t he processor of claim 1, wherein the one or more circuits are to further cause inferencing of two or more second contiguous portions of information to be distributed only between the two or more respective processing cores ( Intended uses are not afforded patentable weight. MPEP 2111.02; See also In re Schreiber , 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431 ( Fed.Cir . 1997) ; Further, t his is mere repetition of claim 1 ) . As per claim 3 , Tang teaches t he processor of claim 1, wherein processing cores of a first computing device perform inferencing on one or more noncontiguous portions of the information ( claim 1 – “ matrix multiplication ” clearly not all data within the matrices can be contiguous to one another ; see also Figures 7B and 8B and their descriptions ) . As per claim 5 , Tang teaches t he processor of claim 1, wherein a first processing core of the two or more respective processing cores is to communicate one or more intermediate results of the inferencing to a second processing core of the two or more respective processing cores ( Intended uses are not afforded patentable weight. MPEP 2111.02; See also In re Schreiber , 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431 ( Fed.Cir . 1997) ) . As per claim s 6 , 13 , and 20, Tang teaches t he processor of claim 1, wherein one or more activations based, at least in part, on the two or more contiguous portions of information are to be distributed to the two or more respective processing cores ( Intended uses are not afforded patentable weight. MPEP 2111.02; See also In re Schreiber , 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431 ( Fed.Cir . 1997) ) . As per claims 7 and 14, Tang teaches t he processor of claim 1, wherein the two or more contiguous portions of information are to be partitioned based, at least in part, on resources of the processor ( Intended uses are not afforded patentable weight. MPEP 2111.02; See also In re Schreiber , 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431 ( Fed.Cir . 1997) ) . As per claim 10, Tang teaches the method of claim 8, wherein the inferencing is to be performed using a large-language model ( Intended uses are not afforded patentable weight. MPEP 2111.02; See also In re Schreiber , 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431 ( Fed.Cir . 1997) ) . As per claims 12 and 19, Tang teaches t he method of claim 8, wherein a first processing core of the two or more respective processing cores is to communicate one or more intermediate results of the inferencing to a second processing core of the two or more respective processing cores ( Intended uses are not afforded patentable weight. MPEP 2111.02; See also In re Schreiber , 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431 ( Fed.Cir . 1997) ) . As per claim 17 , Tang teaches t he computer system of claim 15, wherein the inferencing is to be performed using a diffusion model ( Intended uses are not afforded patentable weight. MPEP 2111.02; See also In re Schreiber , 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431 ( Fed.Cir . 1997) ) . Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to FILLIN "Examiner name" \* MERGEFORMAT TYLER J TORGRIMSON whose telephone number is FILLIN "Phone number" \* MERGEFORMAT (571)270-5550 . The examiner can normally be reached FILLIN "Work Schedule?" \* MERGEFORMAT Monday - Friday 9 am - 5:30 pm . Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, FILLIN "SPE Name?" \* MERGEFORMAT Aleksander Kerzhner can be reached at FILLIN "SPE Phone?" \* MERGEFORMAT 571.270.1760 . The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /TYLER J TORGRIMSON/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2165