Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Priority
Receipt is acknowledged of certified copies of papers required by 37 CFR 1.55.
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on November 14, 2023 is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner.
Specification
The specification has not been checked to the extent necessary to determine the presence of all possible minor errors. Applicant’s cooperation is requested in correcting any errors of which applicant may become aware in the specification.
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114
A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on April 22, 2026 has been entered.
Response to Amendment
The Amendment, filed on April 22, 2026, has been received and made of record. Claims 1-2, 6-10, and 12-20 are pending. Claims 3-5 and 11 have been canceled. Claims 1, 7, and 13-20 have been amended.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments, please see pp. 7-10 of Applicant’s remarks, filed April 22, 2026 have been entered, fully considered, and are persuasive. In light of the amendments, the rejection(s) have been withdrawn. However, upon further consideration, a new ground(s) of rejection(s) have been made.
In response to the Applicant’s argument(s), see pp. 7-10 of Applicant’s remarks, with respected to amended independent claims 1, 18, and 20 (claims 18 and 20 “have features that are substantially similar to those of claim 1”), that the prior art reference(s) Slade (US2021/0354521A1), in view of Slade (US2020/0361262A1, hereinafter, Slade’262) in amended independent claim 1, Slade, in view of Slade’262, in view of Huett (US2021/0347218A1), and further in view of Verzun (US9998434B2) in amended independent claim 18, and Slade, in view of Slade’262, and further in view of Patne (US11411766B2), in amended independent claim 20, as cited by the Applicant, fail to teach, show and/or disclose, individually or in combination, certain features of the invention, “transmit an identification signal on the first pin to the tow vehicle to identify the towed vehicle to the tow vehicle, the identification signal corresponding to a vehicle identification number (VIN) of the towed vehicle”, “a communication circuit…configured to monitor a voltage at the first pin to detect an application of electrical power to the first pin, and to, in response, transmit an identification signal on the first pin to the tow vehicle”, and “an application of electrical power”.
In light of the amendments independent claim 1, new ground(s) of rejection(s) is/are made over Slade, in view of Slade’262, in light of new prior art references, in view of Pampattiwar et al. (US 2020/0171900 A1, Pub. Date Jun. 4, 2020, hereinafter, Pampattiwar), and further in view of Ben-Noon et al. (US 2017/0093866 A1, Pub. Date Mar. 30, 2017, hereinafter, Ben-Noon). In light of the amendments in independent claim 18, new ground(s) of rejection(s) is/are made over Slade, in view of Slade’262, in view of Pampattiwar, in view of Ben-Noon, in view of Fackrell et al. (US 2007/0241868 A1, Pub. Date Oct. 18, 2007, hereinafter, Fackrell), in light of new prior art reference Troia et al. (US 2021/0070237 A1, Pub. Date Mar. 11, 2021, hereinafter, Troia), and further in view of Verzun. ). In light of the amendments in independent claim 20, new ground(s) of rejection(s) is/are made over Slade, in view of Slade’262, in view of Pampattiwar, in view of Ben-Noon, in view of Huett, in view of Troia, in view of Fackrell, and in light of new prior art reference Schumacher et al. (US 2021/0138982 A1, Pub. Date May 13, 2021, hereinafter, Schumacher). The new combination of prior art references, including the new prior art references included, further disclose the additional limitations that have been amended to independent claims 1, 18, & 20. Therefore, the Applicant’s arguments are unconvincing and the rejections of amended independent claims 1, 18, & 20, dependent claims 2, 6-10, & 12-17, which depend from and incorporate the limitations of amended independent claim 1, and dependent claim 19, which depends from and incorporates the limitations of amended independent claim 18, are respectively maintained. Rejections based on the newly cited prior art references follow.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 16 & 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 16 recites the limitation "a vehicle identification number (VIN)…" in line 3, which was previously disclosed in claim 1. The repeated recitation of “a vehicle identification number (VIN)”, introduces indefiniteness to the claim. For examination purposes, the examiner interprets “a vehicle identification number (VIN)…” from claim 16 to refer to the same “a vehicle identification number (VIN)…” in claim 1.
Claim 20 recites the limitation "a tow vehicle…” in line 12, which was previously disclosed in claim 20. The repeated recitation of “a tow vehicle…”, introduces indefiniteness to the claim. For examination purposes, the examiner interprets “a tow vehicle…” from claim 20 line 12 to refer to the same previously disclosed “a tow vehicle…” in claim 20 line 6.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-2, 6-7, & 9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Slade et al. (US 2021/0354521 A1, Pub. Date Nov. 18, 2021, hereinafter, Slade), in view of Slade et al. (US 2020/0361262 A1, Pub. Date Nov. 19, 2020, hereinafter, Slade’262), in view of Pampattiwar et al. (US 2020/0171900 A1, Pub. Date Jun. 4, 2020, hereinafter, Pampattiwar), and further in view of Ben-Noon et al. (US 2017/0093866 A1, Pub. Date Mar. 30, 2017, hereinafter, Ben-Noon).
Regarding independent claim 1, Slade, teaches:
A vehicle communication system comprising (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0035], & [0043]: “Disclosed is a cable system for a truck trailer that reduces the number and/or size of cables to reduce metal usage”):
Slade, is silent in regard to:
an electrical connector coupled to a towed vehicle and comprising a plurality of pins comprising a first pin configured to carry signals between the towed vehicle and a tow vehicle, the plurality of pins comprising a first pin configured to receive electrical power and a second pin configured to act as a signal ground; and
a communication circuit coupled to the first and second pins of the electrical connector
However, Slade, in combination with Slade’262, further teach:
an electrical connector coupled to a towed vehicle (Slade: [0005] & [0035]-[0036]: the trailer is the tow vehicle; Slade’262: Fig. 2; [0034] & [0054]) and comprising a plurality of pins comprising a first pin configured to carry signals between the towed vehicle and a tow vehicle (Slade: [0011], [0035]-[0036], & [0041]: the truck tractor is the tow vehicle and the truck trailer is the towed vehicle; Slade’262: Fig. 2; [Abstract], [0005], [0007], [0019], [0031], [0033]-[0034], [0054], [0074], [0209], & [Claim 66]: teaches an electrical connector (nose box/receptacle) coupling the towed vehicle and tow vehicle with a plurality of pins/terminals to carry signals and power), the plurality of pins comprising a first pin configured to receive electrical power (Slade: Fig. 3; [0002], [0011] & [0041]: multiple separate power cable connections 129; Slade’262: Fig. 2; [Abstract], [0005], [0007], [0019], [0031]-[0034], [0054], [0074], [0209], & [Claim 66]: power cable connection terminals 215) and a second pin configured to act as a signal ground (Slade: Fig. 3; [0002], [0011], & [0041]: ground connection 141; Slade’262: Fig. 2; [Abstract], [0005], [0007], [0019], [0031]-[0034], [0054], [0074], [0209], & [Claim 66]: discloses specific pins within the connector dedicated to receiving electrical power and a ground pin); and
a communication circuit coupled to the first and second pins of the electrical connector (Slade: Fig. 6; [0011], [0052]-[0053], & [0076]; Slade’262: Fig. 8; [0075]-[0076]: teaches a communication and control circuit situated in the nose box mount coupled directly to the power and ground pins of the connector)
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It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the vehicle communication and diagnostic system of Slade’262 with the Power Line Communication (PLC) transmission methods of Slade, according to known methods. The motivation to combine these references is to modernize standard heavy-duty vehicle interfaces (such as the SAE J-560 connector) to support advanced diagnostics and cybersecurity without adding mechanical complexity, weight, or new failure points to the physical wiring harness. A POSITA, would have a reasonable expectation of success in combining these elements. A POSITA would be motivated to place the diagnostic control circuit directly at the physical connector (e.g., nose box) as taught by Slade/Slade’262, configured to monitor voltage states (Pampattiwar), to provide immediate localized detection of tow-vehicle connection and power application without relying on extended wiring runs. Further, utilizing the PLC techniques taught by Slade, where modulating the signal directly over the existing plurality of pins is a predictable, known method to achieve bi-directional communication without proprietary connectors or having to retrofit the existing mechanical interface. The combination requires integrating standard, commercially available microcontrollers, CAN transceivers, and PLC modulators within the housing of an electrical connector, utilizing known software logic to trigger a data transmission upon a measured voltage threshold. This provides immediate, localized detection of tow-vehicle connection(s) and power application without relying on extended wiring runs, and the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions to yield expected predictable results (KSR) of a secure plug-and-play smart trailer interface.
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, are silent in regard to:
and configured to monitor a voltage at the first pin to detect an application of electrical power to the first pin,
However, Slade’262, in combination with Pampattiwar, further teach:
and configured to monitor a voltage at the first pin to detect an application of electrical power to the first pin (Slade’262:[Abstract], [0005]-[0006], [0013]-[0014], [0016], [0019], [0024]-[0026], [0028], [0030]-[0031], [0033], [0053]-[0058], [0060], [0083]-[0084], [0103]-[0106], & [0108]-[0124]: teaches the circuit monitoring the voltage at specific pins with respect to ground; Pampattiwar: [0084][0085]: provides the functional logic where detecting the application of power on the pin indicates a specific operational state/application of power from the tow vehicle),
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to incorporate and place the diagnostic control circuit directly at the physical connector (e.g. nose box), as taught by Slade’262, and configured to monitor voltage states, as taught by Pampattiwar, according to known methods. The motivation to combine these references is to modernize standard heavy-duty vehicle interfaces (such as the SAE J-560 connector) to support advanced diagnostics and cybersecurity without adding mechanical complexity, weight, or new failure points to the physical wiring harness. A POSITA, would have a reasonable expectation of success in combining these elements. The combination requires integrating standard, commercially available microcontrollers, CAN transceivers, and PLC modulators within the housing of an electrical connector, utilizing known software logic to trigger a data transmission upon a measured voltage threshold. This provides immediate, localized detection of tow-vehicle connection(s) and power application without relying on extended wiring runs, and the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions to yield expected predictable results (KSR) of a secure plug-and-play smart trailer interface.
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, and Pampattiwar, are silent in regard to:
and to, in response, transmit an identification signal on the first pin to the two vehicle to identify the towed vehicle to the tow vehicle, the identification signal corresponding to a vehicle identification number (VIN) of the towed vehicle.
However, Slade, in combination with Ben-Noon, further teach:
and to, in response, transmit an identification signal on the first pin to the tow vehicle to identify the towed vehicle to the tow vehicle (Slade: [0007], [0052]-[0058], [0077]: teaches monitoring voltage on pins to detect activation (e.g., braking) and transmitting data (IDs) to the tow vehicle over the power pin via PLC modulation, and teaching device ID/Address transmission upon power-up; Ben-Noon: [0012]-[0015], [0042], [0047]-[0051], [0053], [0063], [0066]-[0070], [0073], [0076]-[0077], [0081]-[0082], [0141]-[0142], [0144]-[0145], [0155], [0158], [0167]-[0169], [0171]-[0172], & [0174]-[0177]: teaches sending a token/ID signal over an interface port to identify and authenticate the connected vehicle),
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to incorporate and place the diagnostic control circuit directly at the physical connector (e.g. nose box), as taught by Slade’262, and configured to monitor voltage states, as taught by Pampattiwar, utilize the PLC techniques taught by Slade, and configure the system to transmit a specific, unique identifier, such as a VIN-based security token taught by Ben-Noon, according to known methods. The motivation to combine these references is to modernize standard heavy-duty vehicle interfaces (such as the SAE J-560 connector) to support advanced diagnostics and cybersecurity without adding mechanical complexity, weight, or new failure points to the physical wiring harness. The combination requires integrating standard, commercially available microcontrollers, CAN transceivers, and PLC modulators within the housing of an electrical connector, utilizing known software logic to trigger a data transmission upon a measured voltage threshold. Modulating the signal directly over the existing power pin is a predictable known method to achieve bi-directional communication without requiring proprietary connectors or retrofitting the existing mechanical interface. This provides immediate, localized detection of tow-vehicle connection(s) and power application without relying on extended wiring runs, and the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions to yield expected predictable results (KSR) of a secure plug-and-play smart trailer interface.
However, Ben-Noon, further teaches:
the identification signal corresponding to a vehicle identification number (VIN) of the towed vehicle (Fig. 3; [0066]-[0070], [0073], [0076]-[0077], & [0174]-[0177]).
It is recognized that the citations and evidence provided above are derived from potentially different embodiments of a single reference. Nevertheless, it would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claim invention pertains, to employ combinations and sub-combinations of these complementary embodiments, and otherwise motivate experimentation and optimization. By modifying the vehicle communication and diagnostic system of Slade’262 and Pampattiwar with the Power Line Communication (PLC) transmission methods of Slade, and further integrate the VIN-based vehicle authentication token generation of Ben-Noon, according to known methods. The motivation to combine these references is to modernize standard heavy-duty vehicle interfaces (such as the SAE J-560 connector) to support advanced diagnostics and cybersecurity without adding mechanical complexity, weight, or new failure points to the physical wiring harness. Further, the motivation to combine Ben-Noon, is to allow the tow vehicle to immediately authenticate the newly connected trailer, prevent unauthorized access to the in-vehicle network, and automatically load the correct trailer-specific diagnostic profiles (e.g., ABS configurations or lighting loads) before the vehicle is put into motion. A POSITA, would have a reasonable expectation of success in combining these elements. The combination requires integrating standard, commercially available microcontrollers, CAN transceivers, and PLC modulators within the housing of an electrical connector, utilizing known software logic to trigger a data transmission upon a measured voltage threshold. This constitutes the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions to yield the expected predictable results (KSR) of a secure plug-and-play smart trailer interface.
Regarding dependent claim 2, the combination of Slade and Slade’262, teach:
The vehicle communication system of claim 1 (Slade: [Abstract], [0004], [0035], & [0043]; Slade’262: [Abstract] & [0006]), wherein the communication circuit is within a housing of (Slade: [0011], [0018], [0043] & [0046]; Slade’262: Fig. 3; [0006]: discloses that the control circuit, which contains the communication circuit, is located physically within the circuit housing), and integrated within, the electrical connector (Slade: Fig. 1; [0011] & [0024]: Fig. 1 illustrates the components included in a cable system for a towed vehicle, where control circuit 118 is inside the housing of adapter 109; Slade’262: Fig. 2; [0019] & [0058]-[0060]: teaches that the housing for the circuit is enclosed entirely within the nose box (the electrical connector/receptacle) and is physically integrated being potentially formed as a single unitary molded structure).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the smart trailer communication system of Slade, Pampattiwar, and Ben-Noon to physically located and integrate the communication and control circuit entirely within the housing of the electrical connector (nose box) as taught by Slade and further corroborated by Slade’262, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to physically integrate the communication circuitry into the connector housing for several predictable engineering and commercial reasons such as: easy retrofitting (plug-and-play upgrades), where by integrating the circuit directly into the nose box receptacle of Slade’262, a fleet operator can upgrade a trailer to a smart trailer by replacing the old standard receptacle with a new integrated smart receptacle utilizing the existing standard wiring; signal integrity and immediate detection, by placing the monitoring circuit at the point of physical coupling (e.g., connector housing) to provide accurate and immediate voltage reading(s); and environmental protection, using the structural housing of the electrical connector to encapsulate and protect the sensitive microcontrollers (taught by Pampattiwar) and PLC transceivers (taught by Slade) without needing a separate electronics box mounted. A POSITA would have a reasonable expectation of success in making this modification, designing custom printed circuit boards (PCBs) to fit within the form factor of standardized industrial enclosures (e.g., J-560 nose box) is a routine task in mechanical and electrical engineering. The combination involves taking the known electrical components (microcontrollers, CAN transceivers, PLC modulators) and arranging them on a baseplate sized to fit within the known physical dimensions of a standard trailer receptacle, yielding the predictable result (KSR) of a compact, ruggedized, and easily installable smart connector.
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Regarding dependent claim 6, Slade, teaches:
The vehicle communication system of claim 1 (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0035], & [0043]), via a power line communication (PLC) protocol ([0004], [0053], & [0239]: discloses using a “Power Line Communication (PLC)” protocol to transmit data over the power lines for communications).
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, and Pampattiwar, are silent in regard to:
wherein the communication circuit is configured to transmit the identification signal
However, Slade, in combination with Ben-Noon, further teach:
wherein the communication circuit is configured to transmit the identification signal (Slade: [0007], [0043]-[0044], & [0053]: details that the communication system can transmit various data types, including “device identifications”, and the “control circuit 118” is configured to “send/or receive communications signals” and “control messages or signals” to and from trailer components; Ben-Noon: [0012]-[0015], [0042], [0047]-[0051], [0053], [0063], [0066]-[0070], [0073], [0076]-[0077], [0081]-[0082], [0141]-[0142], [0144]-[0145], [0155], [0158], [0167]-[0169], [0171]-[0172], & [0174]-[0177])
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to configure the communication circuit of the combined smart trailer system of Slade, Pampattiwar, Ben-Noon, and Slade’262, to transmit the vehicle identification signal using the Power Line Communication (PLC) as taught by Slade, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to utilize the PLC protocol to transmit the identification signal for the following predictable engineering reasons: overcoming physical pin limitations, a POSITA would recognize that to transmit the VIN-based security token (taught by Ben-Noon) without rendering the trailer incompatible with standard commercial trucks, the data would need to be multiplexed over the existing wires; avoiding mechanical complexity and failure; and application of a known technique to a known device, would be obvious to apply the known PLC technique to the control circuit of Slade’262 to transmit the authentication token of Ben-Noon. Further, a POSITA would have reasonable expectation of success in implementing this protocol. PLC is a mature, well-understood technology in both industrial and automotive electrical engineering. Integrating a standard PLC modulator/demodulator (modem) into the nose box communication circuit to superimpose a high-frequency data signal over the DC power line involves standard circuit design practices and yields the expected predictable result (KSR) of establishing a data link without adding new wires.
Regarding dependent claim 7, Slade, teaches:
The vehicle communication system of claim 1 (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0035], & [0043]),
Slade, is silent in regard to:
wherein the plurality of pins further comprises a third pin configured to receive a brake light power signal from the tow vehicle, and
wherein the communication circuit is further coupled to the third pin and is configured to monitor a presence of the brake light power signal at the third pin.
However, Slade, in combination with Slade’262, and Pampattiwar, further teach:
wherein the plurality of pins further comprises a third pin configured to receive a brake light power signal from the tow vehicle (Slade: Fig. 3; [0002], [0011], [0041]: among the connections is a “stop lamps and ABS braking secondary power connection 307”, serving as the “third pin” receiving brake light power signal from the tow vehicle (truck); Slade’262: [0053]-[0055]: standard J-560 connector possesses multiple power pins, including a specific pin dedicated to the stop lamps (brake lights); Pampattiwar: [0081]-[0086]: teaches having separate inputs for each of the specific power connections coming from the two vehicle), and
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the integrated hardware location of Slade’262 to include the multi-power monitoring logic taught by Pampattiwar, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to combine the integrated hardware location of Slade’262 with the multi-pin monitoring logic of Pampattiwar for the following predictable engineering reasons: optimizing signal integrity for diagnostics, motivated to physically located Pampattiwar’s multi-pin monitoring circuit inside the J-560 nose box housing, as taught by Slade and Slade’262 to place the diagnostic logic exactly at the point of physical connection between the truck and trailer to ensure accurate, immediate voltage readings; creating a self-contained smart receptacle, capable of understanding the dynamic state of the towing vehicle, by incorporating Pampattiwar’s teaching of monitoring specific pins (e.g., brake pin) into Slade/Slade’262s nose box circuit to create a plug-and-play device; and predictable use of prior art elements, using Slade/Slade’262 physical mounting location (e.g., connector housing) with Pampattiwar’s functional logic (monitoring distinct power pins for operating states). A POSITA would have reasonable expectation of success in combining these references. The combination involves the existing electrical connections within Slade/Slade’262 molded nose box assembly to standard input pins on a microcontroller, as taught by Pampattiwar. Using standard voltage-divider or isolation circuits to read 12V/24V pin states using a microcontroller located in the connector housing is a routine application of known electrical principles, yielding highly predictable results (KSR).
However, Slade, in combination with Pampattiwar, further teach:
wherein the communication circuit is further coupled to the third pin (Slade: [0005], [0011]-[0013], [0020], [0041], [0251], & [Claim 27]: “the master control circuit (118) is electrically connected to the ground cable connection and the multiple power cable connections”, where the “third pin” refers to the brake light power connection that would be one of the multiple power cable connection; Pampattiwar: Fig. 9; [0081]-[0086]: teaches that the communication/control circuit (microcontroller 908) is directly coupled to each of the separate power cable connections, which includes the brake light pin) and is configured to monitor a presence of the brake light power signal at the third pin (Slade: [Claim 27]; Pampattiwar: [0081]-[0086]: discloses the microcontroller 908 (communication circuit) monitors the presence of power on that specific pin to detect the brake light power signal (i.e., determining that the brake pedal is pressed)).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to configure the master control/communication circuit of the combined smart trailer system to couple to and monitor the specific pin associated with the brake light power signals as taught by Slade and Pampattiwar, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to configure the communication circuit to monitor the brake light power pin for the following predictable engineering reasons: enhanced diagnostic capabilities, and determining vehicle operation modes, a POSITA would be motivated to tap into the brake signal pin so the trailer’s logic controller knows the vehicle’s real-time dynamic state (e.g., decelerating or stopped). A POSITA would have a reasonable expectation of success in making this modification. Pampattiwar states the purpose of monitoring the connection (“Power on this connection indicates to the master microcontroller 908 that the brake pedal has been pressed”). This constitutes the predictable use of prior art elements to yield the expected predictable result (KSR) of a trailer system that is aware when the brakes are being applied and improve the diagnostic robustness of the system.
Regarding dependent claim 9, Slade, teaches:
The vehicle communication system of claim 1 (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0035], & [0043]),
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, are silent in regard to:
wherein the communication circuit is configured to be electrically powered through the first and second pins.
However, Slade, in combination with Pampattiwar, further teach:
wherein the communication circuit is configured to be electrically powered (Slade: [0035], [0041]-[0044], [0047], [0056], [0079], [0154], & [0238]: discloses communication circuits, such as “control circuit 118” and “component control circuit 403” are electrically connected and powered by the main power and ground cables, where the “adapter plug 127” has “multiple power cable connection terminals 129 and a ground connection 141”, where “electricity or electrical signals may be received from the truck”, the terminals/connections serve as the “first and second pins” through which power is received, control circuit 118” is also configured to connect to “metallic power cables 120, metallic ground cable 151” and the “component control circuit” is “electrically connected to at least the metallic power cable(s) 120 and the ground cable 131”; Pampattiwar: Fig. 9; [0081]-[0086]: teaches that the communication circuit (master control circuit 900) is configured to receive and be powered by the electricity provided at the connector) through the first and second pins (Slade: [0035], [0041]-[0044], [0047], [0056], [0079], [0154], & [0238]; Pampattiwar: Fig. 9; [0081]-[0086]: discloses that the circuit’s operational power loop is completed through the power pins (first pin) and the ground pin (second pin) of the connector).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to configure the communication circuit of the combined smart trailer system, comprising Slade, Slade’262, and Ben-Noon, to be electrically powered directly through the first and second pins of the connector, as taught by Slade and Pampattiwar, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to route operation power to the communication circuit directly from the standard power and ground pins for the following predictable engineering and commercial reasons: eliminating maintenance and hardware complexity, a POSITA would recognize that trailer-mounted batteries add weight, increase manufacturing costs, and introduce maintenance liabilities (e.g., batteries degrade over time, freeze in harsh winters, and require manual charging if the trailer sits idling for extended periods of time), and would be obvious to eliminate these failure points by utilizing continuous 12V/24V power supplied by the two trailer as taught Slade and Pampattiwar; synergy with the physical hardware, because the control circuit is mounted adjacent to the primary power (first pin) and ground (second pin) terminals, a POSITA would be motivated to tap into these power sources rather than running redundant power wiring from elsewhere on the chassis; and the predictable use of prior art elements, Pampattiwar teaching combining the connections from the power cable and the ground cable to provide operational power directly to the master control circuit, applying this power-routing scheme to the integrated nose box circuit of Slate’262 represents the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions to yield the predictable result of a self-sustaining diagnostic module. A POSITA would have reasonable expectation of success in implementing these power configurations. Designing a printed circuit board (PCB) to draw power from incoming terminal pins, utilizing standard commercially available diodes, as noted by Pampattiwar, and voltage step-down regulators to convert the 12V/24V pin voltage into 5Vor 3.3 logic levels required by the microcontroller, is a routine exercise/methodology in electrical engineering, and yield expected predictable results (KSR).
Claims 8 & 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Slade, in view of Slade’262, in view of Pampattiwar, in view of Ben-Noon, and further in view of Fackrell et al. (US 2007/0241868 A1, Pub. Date Oct. 18, 2007, hereinafter Fackrell).
Regarding dependent claim 8, Slade, teaches:
The vehicle communication system of claim 7 (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0035], & [0043]),
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, and Pampattiwar, are silent in regard to:
wherein the communication circuit is further configured to transmit the identification signal
However, Slade, in combination with Ben-Noon, further teach:
wherein the communication circuit is further configured to transmit the identification signal (Slade: [0007], [0043], [0041], [0053], [0056], [0077], & [Claim 27]: details that the vehicle communication system can transmit various data types, including “device identifications” for vehicles or devices within those vehicles and details the adapter plug 127 with multiple connection terminals, including “stop lamps and ABS braking secondary power connection 307” from the tow vehicle, and teaches a communication circuit (microcontroller 1015 within control circuit 118) that monitors the presence of power on connection terminals, including the brake lights, and sends messages in response to power detected; Ben-Noon: [0012]-[0015], [0042], [0047]-[0051], [0053], [0063], [0066]-[0070], [0073], [0076]-[0077], [0081]-[0082], [0141]-[0142], [0144]-[0145], [0155], [0158], [0167]-[0169], [0171]-[0172], & [0174]-[0177])
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the Power Line Communication (PLC) trailer data system of Slade to format and transmit a vehicle-specific identification signal corresponding to a vehicle identification number (VIN), as taught by Ben-Noon, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to combine the PLC transmission capabilities of Slade with the VIN-based security token generation of Ben-Noon for the following predictable engineering and cybersecurity reasons: securing the vehicle network against unauthorized access, a POSITA would be further motivated to apply Ben-Noon’s VIN-token logic to Slade’s PLC system to ensure that the tow vehicle can cryptographically authenticate the trailer before accepting diagnostic or control data from it; automated fleet profiling, would be obvious to configure Slade’s control circuit to transmit a VIN-based identification signal (Ben-Noon) as its initial payload data, to allow the tow vehicle’s central computer to cross-reference the VIN, verify the trailer’s identify, and automatically apply operational profiles (e.g., dimensions, weight limits, and ABS configurations) for that specific trailer; and application of a known data payload to a known carrier, would be an obvious design choice to combine the teachings of Slade (PLC carrier) and Ben-Noon (VIN-based security token) to solve the problem of identifying and securing connected hardware in an automotive environment. A POSITA would have a reasonable expectation of success in combining these references. The combination involves configuring the microcontroller of Slade to access the trailer’s stored VIN, execute a standard hashing or token-generation algorithm (as taught by Ben-Noon), and pass that digital token to the PLC transceiver for transmission to the tow vehicle. Transmitting a specific string of identification data over an established communication link constitutes the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions, where the modern era of automotive cybersecurity, linking a physical communication bus to a cryptographic hardware identifier is considered a standard, highly predictable engineering result (KSR).
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, are silent in regard to:
in response to the presence of the brake light power signal.
However, Slade, in combination with Pampattiwar, and Fackrell, further teach:
in response to the presence of the brake light power signal (Slade: [0007], [0043], [0041], [0053], [0056], [0077], & [Claim 27]: teaches that the control circuit transmits data to the tow vehicles based on triggering signals or status changes; Pampattiwar: [0081]-[0085]: teaches the microcontroller detecting the specific operating mode of the brake pedal being pressed based on the presence of power on the brake pin; Fackrell: [0008], [0026]-[0027]: describes transmitting identification data over existing power lines, including those related to the braking system (ABS power lines), using the brake line as a carrier for data).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the smart trailer communication system, comprising the teachings of Slade, Slade’262, Pampattiwar, and Ben-Noon, to configure the communication circuit to transmit the vehicle identification signal in response to the presence of the brake light power signal, guided by the teachings of Fackrell, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to utilize the brake light power signal, taught by Slade/Pampattiwar/Fackrell as the trigger for transmitting the trailer’s identification signal (taught by Slade/Ben-Noon) for the following predictable engineering and industry reasons: industry standard for tractor-trailer pairing, where Fackrell teaches utilizing the dedicated Anti-lock Braking system (ABS) power line to transmit a trailer identifier from the trailer’s control unit to the tractor’s processing unit, a POSITA would be further motivated to utilize the braking events as a means to verify this identification; safety-critical authentication, Pampattiwar teaches monitoring the brake light power connection to determine when the brake pedal has been pressed, a POSITA would recognize that immediately authenticating the trailer’s identify (e.g., VIN-based token of Ben-Noon) at the exact moment the brakes are applied ensures that the tractor’s ABS profiles and braking loads are matched to the physical trailer; and predictable use of triggering signals, as taught by Slade, teaching data is sent from the trailer to the tow vehicle based on the triggering signals from the control circuit, Pampattiwar teaches detecting the presence of power on the brake pin, therefore making it an obvious design choice to use this specific voltage detection as the triggering signal for the ID transmission. A POSITA would have reasonable expectation of success in implementing this logic, requiring routine software programming of the microcontroller (taught by Pampattiwar) to execute a standard “IF/THEN” routine to transmit the generated VIN token (Ben-Noon). Integrating this transmission sequence into the braking power architecture is a predictable extension of the trailer tracking system, as described by Fackrell, yielding expected predictable results (KSR).
Regarding dependent claim 12, Slade, teaches:
The vehicle communication system of claim 1 (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0035], & [0043]),
Slade, is silent in regard to:
wherein the electrical connector is a 7-pin socket or a 7-pin plug.
However, Slade, in combination with Slade’262, and Fackrell, further teach:
wherein the electrical connector is a 7-pin socket or a 7-pin plug (Slade: [0005], [0011], [0013], [0036], [0041], & [0156]: refers to an “SAE J-560 7-wire trailer power connector on each end” of the power cable connecting the tractor and trailer; Slade’262: [Abstract], [0005], [0007], [0019], [0031], [0033], [0054], [0074], [0209], & [Claim 66]: corroborates that the nose box receptacle (the socket) conforms to this standard seven pins (six power + one ground); Fackrell: [0008], [0025]-[0026], & [Claim 21]: identifies the industry-standard umbilical connection between a tractor and trailer as utilizing a seven pin connector).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to configure the electrical connector of the combined smart trailer communication system, comprising the teachings of Slade, Slade’262, Pampattiwar, and Ben-Noon, as a 7-pin socket or 7-pin plug, guided by the teachings of industry standardization found in Slade, Slade’262, and Fackrell according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to utilize a 7-pin connector form factor for the following predictable engineering and commercial reasons: universal industry standardization, recognizing that introducing a smart communication system using a proprietary, non-standard connector (e.g., a 5-pin or 9-pin design) would render the trailer incompatible with many of the existing trucks on the road, destroying the commercial viability; compatibility with legacy hardware, Slade’262 teaches integrating the control circuit directly into the nose box that defines an outward-facing receptacle conforming to the J-560 standard, which includes six power terminals and one ground terminal (seven pins total), and would be an obvious design choice to package the combined communication of Slade and Pampattiwar to this 7-pin physical architecture to allow plug-and-play upgrading on legacy trailers; and predictable application of known standards, where applying the known SAE J-560 7-pin standard to house the communication circuit constitutes the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions to yield the predictable result of a universally compatible smart trailer. A POSITA working in automotive design would have a reasonable expectation of success in implement a 7-pin connector, the physical dimensions, tolerances, and pin-outs of 7-pin commercial vehicle connectors are public, heavily documented standards. Routing the power, ground, and PLC signals through a standard 7-pin injection-molded housing is a fundamental manufacturing process that requires no undue experimentation, and yield expected predictable results (KSR).
Claim 10 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Slade, in view of Slade’262, in view of Pampattiwar, in view of Ben-Noon, and further in view of ConWys AG (DE 202005017151 U1, Pub. Date Feb. 02, 2006, hereinafter, ConWys AG).
Regarding dependent claim 10, Slade, teaches:
The vehicle communication system of claim 1 (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0035], & [0043]),
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, Pampattiwar, and Ben-Noon, are silent in regard to:
wherein the communication circuit comprises an internal battery configured to power the communication circuit in an absence of power on the first pin.
However, ConWys, further teaches:
wherein the communication circuit comprises an internal battery ([0062]-[0063]: teaches that the communication/control circuit can comprise a compact battery to serve as an emergency power supply) configured to power the communication circuit in an absence of power on the first pin ([0062]-[0063]: identifies the problem of the power supply failure to the control device (communication circuit) and provides a solution with the use of a “compact battery” for the control device to function (e.g. send error messages) when the primary power from a supply line is absent so the circuit remains alive to function and output fault messages despite the absence of main power).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the communication circuit of the combined smart trailer system (comprising Slade, Slade’262, Pampattiwar, and Ben-Noon), to include an internal battery configured to power the communication circuit in the absence of power on the first pin, as taught by ConWys, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to integrate the emergency backup batter into the trailer’s communication circuit for the following predictable engineering and safety reasons: overcoming single points of failure, recognizing that if the main power pin fails or the cable is severed, the smart diagnostic circuit instantly loses power and dies, unable to broadcast the fault(s); ensuring continuous fault reporting, with the compact backup emergency battery, further motivation to apply this teaching to the communication of Slade;262 would ensure that critical safety alerts and trailer identification signals (Ben-Noon) can be transmitted; and predictable improvement of a known device, where the combination takes the established concept of a continuous power supply (Pampattiwar) and outfitting it with a standard failover (ConWys AG: [0003], [0050],[0059], & [0062]-[0063]) to increase the reliability of the safety system, representing the application of a known technique to a known device to yield the predictable result of a fault-tolerant diagnostic module. A POSITA designing hardware for field applications would have a reasonable expectation of success implementing this feature. It involves standard, textbook power-management design: adding a compact internal battery (such as a lithium coin cell or small rechargeable pack) to the integrated PCB inside the nose box housing, and utilizing standard power-multiplexing circuitry (e.g., diode a dedicated power-switch IC) to automatically failover to battery power when the voltage monitored at the first pin drops below a designated threshold, and yield expected predictable results (KSR).
Claims 13-14 & 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Slade, in view of Slade’262, in view of Pampattiwar, in view of Ben-Noon, in view of Huett et al. (US 2021/0347218 A1, Pub. Date Nov. 11, 2001, hereinafter, Huett), and further in view of Troia et al. (US 2021/0070237 A1, Pub. Date Mar. 11, 2021, hereinafter, Troia).
Regarding dependent claim 13, Slade, teaches:
The vehicle communication system of claim 1 (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0007], [0035], [0043], & [0056]: mentions “Data communicated between the nose box and trailer devices…can include, but is not limited to…device identifications…” and “each trailer component may have a different address so that each component can identify itself individually and separate from other trailer components”),
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, and Pampattiwar, are silent in regard to:
wherein the identification signal is based on an identifier associated with the (VIN) of the towed vehicle
However, Ben-Noon, in combination with Troia, further teach:
wherein the identification signal is based on an identifier associated with the (VIN) of the towed vehicle (Ben-Noon: [0105], [0108]-[0109], & [0131]: teaches the token is associated with the VIN; Troia: Fig. 5; [0056]-[0068]: provides data structure, teaching that the secure message 530 carries the VIN 532 as the vehicle identifier)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the vehicle authentication system of Ben-Noon to structure the transmission of the VIN-based security token using the secure message packet architecture taught by Troia, including a header with control information configured to indicate the encryption status of the payload, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to combine the token-generation logic of Ben-Noon with the packet-framing structure of Troia for the following predictable engineering reasons: providing a robust delivery mechanism, further motivating a POSITA to package Ben-Noon’s token with Troia’s secure message architecture to ensure the token is transmitted in an organized, standard, and routable format; enabling deterministic parsing at the receiver, recognizing that the receiver must know instantly whether an incoming data frame contains standard, unencrypted identifier data or an encrypted security token, utilizing the header control information taught by Troia to flag the encryption status of the incoming identifier; and application of a known data structure to a known output, applying Troia’s defined secure message structure to organize and transmit the authentication token taught by Ben-Noon, constitutes the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. An engineer specializing in automotive network protocols, such as CAN, LIN, or Ethernet, would have a high expectation of success in combining these references. Defining the byte structure of a data frame, allocating a bit or byte within Troia’s header control information to act as a Boolean flag (e.g., Encrypted: True/False) for the subsequent Ben-Noon token payload, which is a fundamental and routine programming task in network software architecture, would not require undue experimentation and yield the predictable result (KSR) of a stable, crash-resistant cryptographic handshake.
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, Pampattiwar, and Ben-Noon, are silent in regard to:
and an encryption key, and comprises a code indicating whether the identifier is encrypted.
However, Huett, in combination with Troia, further teach:
and an encryption key (Huett: [0050], [0055], [0066], & [Claim 16]; Troia: [0061] & [0067]: teaches that the secure message incorporates and is based on a private encryption key, used to generate the message authentication code to secure the payload), and comprises a code indicating whether the identifier is encrypted (Huett: [0050], [0055], & [0066]: emphasizes verifying and legitimacy using encrypted tokens, to determine authorized/encrypted and unauthorized/unencrypted communications; Troia: [0049], [0057], [0067], [0073], [Claim 5], [Claim 9], & [Claim 17]: teaches a header field containing control information for the secure message, the control information serves as the code/flag indicating the security and encryption states of the subsequent payload (the VIN identifier)).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to structure the secure VIN-based identification signal, taught by Ben-Noon, using the secure message packet architecture taught by Huett and Troia, including the use of header control information to indicate the message’s encryption status, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to implement Huett/Troia’s packet structure, including a control information code indicating encryption status, for the following predictable engineering reasons: ensuring deterministic packet parsing, recognizing that if a communication circuit receives a stream of data, it must know whether the incoming bits are plaintext (unencrypted) or ciphertext (encrypted), Troia teaches placing control information in the header of the secure message to handle its delivery, and is an obvious and mandatory design choice to include a status code/flag within the control information to indicate if the payload is encrypted; preventing system faults, utilizing a control code to indicate encryption status as derived from Troia’s header structure, is a standard, predictable solution to ensure the master unit (e.g., Slade, Slade’262, or Pampattiwar) safely and correctly route the incoming identifier to the decryption cipher; and application of known protocols, where formulating a secure data packet with a header containing a security status code represents the predictable use of standard cryptographic network protocols (such as AUTOSAR SecOC or IPsec) applied to the automotive environment, yielding the expected result of a stable communication loop. An engineer specializing in vehicle network architecture would have a high expectation of success, where defining a specific bit or byte in a message header to act as a Boolean encrypted true/false control code is a fundamental programming task, that would require routine software configuration of the CAN transceivers and microcontrollers, yielding expected predictable results (KSR).
Regarding dependent claim 14, Slade, teaches:
The vehicle communication system of claim 13 (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0007], [0035], [0043], & [0056]: the component IDs are “unique values identifying the system” parts),
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, and Pampattiwar, are silent in regard to:
wherein the identifier comprises the VIN of the towed vehicle or a unique value identifying the vehicle communication system, the unique value being mapped to the VIN of the towed vehicle.
However, Ben-Noon, in combination with Huett, and Troia, further teach:
wherein the identifier comprises the VIN of the towed vehicle (Ben-Noon: Fig. 3; [0067] & [0076]-[0077]: teach that the secure identifier token/message comprises the VIN to identify the specific vehicle originating the token/message; Huett: [0053], [0057], & [0064]: discusses remote diagnostics, service updates, and manufacturer linking for caravans, that refer to unique vehicle-level identifiers like a VIN; Troia: Fig. 5; [0059]-[0061]: teaches that the secure identifier token/message comprises the VIN to identify the specific vehicle originating the token/message) or a unique value identifying the vehicle communication system, the unique value being mapped to the VIN of the towed vehicle (Ben-Noon: [0073]-[0074] & [0082]: teaches a unique token value (VSID) derived from (mapped mathematically to) the VIN; Huett: [0053], [0057], & [0064]: mapping unique electronic identifies such as module serial numbers/addresses to a vehicle’s VIN for diagnostics, service history, and warranty is standard practice; Troia: [0059]-[0061]: teaches including a unique serial number identifying the hardware component (vehicle communication system), which is packaged alongside/mapped to the VIN).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the vehicle communication system, comprising the combined teachings of Slade, Slade’262, Pampattiwar, and Ben-Noon, to configure the secure identifier to comprise the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) of the towed vehicle, or a unique value mapped to the VIN, as taught by Huett, Ben-Noon, and Troia, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to utilize the VIN, or a value directly mapped to it, as the core identifier in the security token for the following predictable engineering and industry reasons: universal hardware identification, where Huett/Ben-Noon/Troia recognize that the VIN is the universally standardized, permanent, and unique identification sequence assigned to every manufactured vehicle, and would be an obvious design choice to use the serial number as the cryptographic identifier instead of invent a new proprietary numbering scheme that could cause conflicts; fleet management and diagnostic profiling, Troia teaches that including the VIN in the secure message so that the receiving device can identify the origin of the message, further motivating a POSITA to include the VIN in the identifier signal so the tow vehicle can instantly authenticate the trailer, cross-reference the VIN with fleet management software, and securely load the trailer’s specific operational profile; and cryptographic (mapped values) practices, further motivating a POSITA by Ben-Noon to use a unique value (VSID) mathematically mapped to the VIN, providing the same unique hardware tracking capability while satisfying modern cryptographic standards. A POSITA would have a high expectation of success in implementing these features. Every modern electronic control unit (ECU) or master control circuit installed on a commercial vehicle stores the vehicle’s VIN in its non-volatile memory. Writing a software routing for the microcontroller (taught by Pampattiwar) to retrieve this stored VIN from memory and insert it into the payload of the secure message packet (taught by Troia) prior to transmission is a standard fundamental operation in automotive software engineering, yielding expected predictable results (KSR).
Regarding dependent claim 16, Slade, teaches:
The vehicle communication system of claim 1 (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0035], & [0043]),
Slade, is silent in regard to:
wherein the communication circuit is configured to generate the identification signal
However, Slade, in combination with Troia, further teach:
wherein the communication circuit is configured to generate the identification signal (Slade: [0007], [0044], & [0056]-[0057]; Troia: [Abstract], [0013]-[0014], [0026]-[0027], [0029], [0038]-[0040], [0043], [0048]-[0051], [0055]-[0056], [0061], [0064]-[0067], [0073], [0075], [Claim 1], [Claim 6], & [Claim 11]: teaches that the control unit/circuit utilizes its processing resources to generate the secure message/identification signal)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the communication circuit of the smart trailer system, taught by Slade and Pampattiwar, to be configured to actively generate the identification signal (e.g., secure message), guided by the teachings of Troia, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to configure the communication circuit to generate the identification signal, rather than retrieving and transmitting a static file, for the following predictable engineering and cybersecurity reasons: preventing replay attacks via dynamic generation, further motivating a POSITA to apply Slade/Troia’s active generation logic to the trailer’s communication circuit to ensure every identification signal produced is mathematically unique and fresh, defeating replay attacks; decentralized computing architecture, ensuring the trailer can independently negotiate its own security state without relying on external processors or the tow vehicle to format the data; and predictable utilization of available processing power, where it is an obvious design choice to utilize the existing logic capabilities of Pampattiwar’s circuit to execute the generation steps taught by Slade/Troia, maximizing the utility of the hardware present in the design. A POSITA would have a high expectation of success. Microcontrollers (e.g., master control circuit of Pampattiwar) are designed to execute software routines that compile variables (e.g., stored VIN, an encryption key, and a counter) into a structured data packet. Configuring a circuit to generate a message packet prior to handing it off to a transceiver is considered a textbook operation in network engineering and embedded systems design, that would yield expected predictable results (KSR).
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, and Pampattiwar, are silent in regard to:
by encrypting an identifier associated with a vehicle identification number (VIN) of the towed vehicle via an encryption key
However, Ben-Noon, in combination with Huett, and Troia, further teach:
by encrypting an identifier associated with a vehicle identification number (VIN) of the towed vehicle via an encryption key (Ben-Noon: [0039], [0046], [0048], [0051], [0056], [0066]-[0069], [0076]-[0077], [0079]-[0080], [0082], [0109], [0124], [0131], & [0148]: teachings signing (cryptographically securing) the token with a key tied to the VIN; Huett: [0050], [0053], [0064], & [0066]: confirms the use of encoders to encrypt the signals containing security tokens; Troia: Fig. 7; [Abstract], [0002], [0013], [0025]-[0028], [0039], [0043], [0049], [0060]-[0062], [0067], [0073]-[0074], [Claim 1], [Claim 5], [Claim 6], [Claim 9], [Claim 11], & [Claim 17]: discloses that the message, which contains the VIN, is secured/encrypted using a Message Authentication Code generated via the private encryption key).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to configure the communication circuit of the combined vehicle communication system to generate the identification signal by encrypting the identifier associated with the VIN via an encryption key, based on the teaches of Ben-Noon, Huett, and Troia, according to known methods. A POSITA would be highly motivated to configure the communication circuit’s encoders to execute an encryption algorithm on the VIN-based identifier for the following predictable engineering and cybersecurity reasons: preventing network spoofing, Huett identifies this issue, teaching that to ensure unauthorized products are excluded from the network, the system’s encoders/decoders must be configured to encrypt signals to ensure network products are embedded with security tokens; securing the specific identifier, Ben-Noon teaches that the most secure token is mathematically associated with the vehicle’s unique VIN, Troia provides the execution method, teaching that the circuit generates the secure message by utilizing a private encryption key to generate a Message Authentication Code (MAC) that secures the payload, which includes the VIN; and predictable application of known cryptographic methods, the combination involves programming the microcontroller of the communication circuit to run a standard cryptographic hashing or encryption algorithm (e.g., AES-128 or HMAC) on the stored VIN data before passing data to the PLC receiver, represents the application of known data security techniques (Huett/Troia) to a known vehicle identifier (Ben-Noon) to yield the predictable result (KSR) of a mathematically secure authentication transmission. An electronics or software engineer specializing in automotive networks would have a high expectation of success. Generating an encrypted signal using a stored private key and a stored VIN is a routine, foundational operation in modern digital security.
Claim 15 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Slade, in view of Slade’262, in view of Pampattiwar, in view of Ben-Noon, in view of Huett, in view of Troia, in view of Patne et al. (US 11411766 B2, Filing Date Jan. 8, 2021, hereinafter, Patne), and further in view of Wentz (US 2020/0153627 A1, Pub Date. May 14, 2020, hereinafter, Wentz).
Regarding dependent claim 15, Slade, teaches:
The vehicle communication system of claim 13 (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0035], & [0043]),
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, and Pampattiwar, are silent in regard to:
wherein the encryption key is based on a manufacturing date of the towed vehicle,
However, Ben-Noon, in combination with Huett, and Wentz, further teach:
wherein the encryption key is based on a manufacturing date of the towed vehicle (Ben-Noon: [0074], [0082], & [0159]: teaches generating the vehicle-specific token/encryption key by applying mathematical cryptographic functions to a unique attribute of the vehicle; Huett: [0050], [0053], [0055], [0064], [0066], and [Claim 16]: discloses encryption and security elements based on manufacturer/warranty links for each vehicle; Wentz: [0027], [0084], & [0091]: teaches using the manufacturing date and serial numbers of hardware components as the core elements to generate cryptographic assertions and authentications),
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the vehicle authentication system of Ben-Noon and Huett to specifically utilize the manufacturing date of the vehicle/hardware as the unique attribute upon which the encryption key is based, guided by the hardware attestation teachings of Wentz, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to combine Ben-Noon’s key-generation logic, with Huett’s code logic to indicate encryption status and handling of received signals, with Wentz’s manufacture date attestation for the following predictable engineering and cybersecurity reasons: establishing immutable hardware anchors, further motivating a POSITA to use the manufacturing date (Wentz) as the specific unique attribute (Ben-Noon) and encryption status (Huett) because a manufacturing date is a permanent, factory-established metric that cannot be digitally altered, ensuring the resulting encryption key is permanently bound to the true physical origin of the hardware; enhancing cryptographic entropy, recognizing that combining the manufacturing date with other identifiers (e.g., VIN or serial number) creates a composite seed that is harder for an attacker to guess or replicate; and predictable use of prior art elements, the combination involves selecting a specific known hardware attribute, the manufacturing date taught by Wentz, and feeding it into the standard cryptographic hashing function taught Ben-Noon, and further taught by Huett. This represents the predictable application of known data security techniques to yield the predictable result of a secure, hardware-anchored authentication key. An engineer specializing in automotive network protocols and cybersecurity would have a high expectation of success in combining these references. Every modern electronic control unit (ECU) stores basic manufacturing metadate, including its build date. Writing a software routine to retrieve this stored manufacturing date and input it as the mathematical seed for Ben-Noon’s token-generation algorithm is a standard, fundamental operation in modern digital security, requires no undue experimentation, and yields expected predictable results (KSR).
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, Pampattiwar, Ben-Noon, Huett, and Troia, are silent in regard to:
and the code comprises a binary bit.
However, Patne, further teaches:
and the code comprises a binary bit ([Abstract], [Col. 1, ll. 15-26], [Col. 6, ll. 52-58], [Col. 7, ll. 1-2], [Col. 12, ll. 61-67], [Col. 13, ll. 1-4 & 58-67], [Col. 26, ll. 49-64], [Col. 27, ll. 28-41], [Col. 39, ll. 16-20], [Col. 40, ll. 1-4], [Claim 1], [Claim 6], [Claim 15], & [Claim 20]: teaches that the security/authentication indicator is injected into the data frame in the structural form of a single authentication bit (a binarity bit), code such as a binary bit indicates is a data field, such as an identifier is encrypted or authenticated, allowing receiving systems to process or reject a signal).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the vehicle communication system, comprising the teachings of Slade, Slade’262, Pampattiwar, Ben-Noon, Huett, and Troia, to configure the encryption key to be based on a manufacturing date of the towed vehicle, as taught by Wentz, and to configure the encryption status code to comprise a binary bit as taught by Patne, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to combine these teachings for the following predictable engineering and cryptographic reasons: immutable cryptographic seeding, further motivating a POSITA to use the manufacturing date (Wentz) as the specific unique attribute (Ben-Noon) because the build date of a commercial trailer is a permanent, factory-stamped metric that cannot be digitally altered, ensuring the encryption key is permanently bound to the physical hardware of that specific trailer; optimizing network bandwidth, where it is an obvious routine design choice to structurally format Troia’s encryption status code as a the single binary bit taught by Patne; and predictable improvement, implementing a binary status flag (Patne) to manage a key derived from a manufacturing date (Wentz) represents the predictable application of known data compression and cryptographic seeding techniques to yield the predictable result (KSR) of a secure, bandwidth-efficient vehicle communication system.
Claim 17 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Slade, in view of Slade’262, in view of Pampattiwar, in view of Ben-Noon, in view of Troia, and further in view of Verzun et al. (US 9998434 B2, Pat. Date Jun. 12, 2018, hereinafter, Verzun).
Regarding dependent claim 17, Slade, teaches:
The vehicle communication system of claim 1 (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0007], [0035], [0043], & [0056]),
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, Pampattiwar, and Ben-Noon, are silent in regard to:
wherein the communication circuit is configured to generate the identification signal by:
encrypting the intertwined value via an encryption key to generate an encrypted identifier;
However, Troia, in combination with Verzun, further teach:
wherein the communication circuit is configured to generate the identification signal by (Troia: Fig. 7; [Abstract], [0002], [0013], [0025]-[0028], [0039], [0043], [0049], [0060]-[0062], [0067], [0073]-[0074], [Claim 1], [Claim 5], [Claim 6], [Claim 9], [Claim 11], & [Claim 17]: teaches the communication circuit generating the identification signal (secure message); Verzun: [Col. 75, ll. 32-34] & [Col. 109, ll. 50-52]):
encrypting the intertwined value via an encryption key to generate an encrypted identifier (Troia: Fig. 7; [Abstract], [0002], [0013], [0025]-[0028], [0039], [0043], [0049]-[0050], [0061]-[0062], [0067], [0073]-[0074], [Claim 1], [Claim 5], [Claim 6], [Claim 9], [Claim 11], & [Claim 17]: teaches utilizing a private encryption key; Verzun: Fig. 55A; [Col. 72, ll. 19-30], [Col. 75, ll. 32-34], [Col. 105, ll. 36-42], [Col. 109, ll. 50-52], [Col. 114, ll. 4-67], [Col. 115, ll. 1-3], [Col. 119, ll. 57-67], & [Col. 120, ll. 1-5, 20-31, & 37-45]: describes the generation of random numbers or “seeds” for use in cryptographic operations using a “seed generator” based on “state” (e.g., time), Fig. 55A is the Encryption Process 1020 applying encryption Method to Plaintext 930 yielding Ciphertext 1024);
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the secure message generation circuit of Troia to generate the identification signal by utilizing the multi-stage cryptographic pipeline taught by Verzun, comprising generating a random sed, intertwining bits, encrypting the value, and scrambling the bits, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to combine Troia’s message generation architecture with Verzun’s cryptographic pipeline for the following predictable engineering and cybersecurity reasons: defeating packet inspection and traffic analysis, further motivating a POSITA to apply Verzun’s pipeline to Troia’s communication circuit to ensure the secure message is camouflaged from network sniffers; obfuscation of the message payload, recognizing that applying Verzun’s pipeline to Troia’s message generation creates a defense that prevents an attacker from recognizing that a security token is being transmitted; and predictable enhancement of data security, applying Verzun’s software-based cryptographic pipeline to Troia’s Electronic Control Unit (ECU) constitutes the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. A software or cybersecurity engineer would have a high expectation of success. Troia teaches that the vehicle’s communication circuit contains a microcontroller capable of executing cryptographic algorithms (e.g., generating a MAC using a private key). Modifying the firmware of the existing microcontroller to execute the additional software routines taught by Verzun (e.g., calling a pseudo-random number generator for the seed, executing a bit-interleaving loop, and applying a bit-scrambling algorithm) is a routine programming task that requires no new physical hardware and yields the predictable result of obfuscated data transmission, yielding expected predictable results (KSR).
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, Pampattiwar, Ben-Noon, and Troia, are silent in regard to:
generating a random seed number; and scrambling bits of the encrypted identifier to generate the identification signal.
However, Verzun, teaches:
generating a random seed number (Fig. 51E; [Col. 75, ll. 32-34], [Col. 8, ll. 45-55], [Col. 105, ll. 36-50], [Col. 109, ll. 50-52], & [Col. 119, ll. 5-16]: describes the generation of random numbers or “seeds” for use in cryptographic operations using a “seed generator” based on “state” (e.g., time) and Fig. 51E has Seed Generation 921 outputting a seed 929 value to a Hidden Number Generator 960); and scrambling bits of the encrypted identifier to generate the identification signal (Fig. 51A; [Abstract], [Col. 104, ll. 32-40], [Col. 105, ll. 28-67], & [Col. 106, ll. 1-17]: teaches the process of “scrambling” bits or data segments/bits to reorder them, making information incomprehensible, mentions scrambling before encryption, and dynamic scrambling occurs at different stages throughout data transport, and then mixed (intertwined), and encrypted, Fig. 51A shows the Packet Scrambling 926 passing data through Scrambling Algorithms 922).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the vehicle communication system’s message generation process, comprising the teachings of Pampattiwar, Troia and Ben-Noon, to utilize the specific multi-stage cryptographic pipeline taught by Verzun, comprising seed generation, bit-interleaving, encryption, and bit-scrambling, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to implement the exact sequence of cryptographic operations taught by Verzun to protect the vehicle’s VIN-based token for the following predictable engineering and cybersecurity reasons: defeating replay attacks and packet sniffing, further motivating a POSITA to apply Verzun’s dynamic pipeline to the trailer’s communication circuit to ensure the critical VIN identifier produces a unique data payload every time it is transmitted, rendering recorded packets useless to attackers; intertwining and scrambling, further applying Verzun’s final Scrambling pass (Fig. 51A) to the ciphertext obfuscates the packet structure, hiding the underlying MAC headers from unauthorized sniffers, and would be an obvious and desirable design choice to adopt this multi-layered approach to maximize the information content of the identification signal; and predictable integration of modular security functions, Verzun teaches and diagrams all four of the discrete modular operations for securing network data (Seed>Mix>Encrypt>Scramble). Stringing these known software security modules together in a series to process Troia’s secure message constitutes the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions to yield the expected result of a mathematically fortified and un-spoofable transmission. A cybersecurity engineer designing automatic networks would have a high expectation of success. Cryptographic functions such as pseudo-random number generation (the seed), bit-interleaving, AES encryption, and bit-wise scrambling are standard, well-documented software routines. They can be easily compiled into the firmware and executed by the communication circuit’s microcontroller (taught by Pampattiwar and Troia) without requiring any new physical hardware or undue experimentation, and yield expected predictable results (KSR).
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, and Pampattiwar, are silent in regard to:
intertwining bits of the random seed number and an identifier associated with a vehicle identification number (VIN) of the tow vehicle to generate an intertwined value;
However, Ben-Noon, in combination with Verzun, further teach:
intertwining bits of the random seed number and an identifier associated with a vehicle identification number (VIN) of the tow vehicle to generate an intertwined value (Ben-Noon: [0109]: provides the identifier tied to VIN; Verzun: Fig. 61A; [Col. 72, ll. 19-30], [Col. 105, ll. 36-42], [Col. 119, ll. 57-67], & [Col. 120, ll. 1-5, 20-31, & 37-45]: teaches “scrambling” which is the “reordering” or “intertwining” of data segments and uses numerical “seed” values as an input in the process, as well as the “mixing process” utilizing an “interleaved” (intertwined) algorithm where distinct input data streams are woven together bit-by-bit or block-by-block to create a mixed/intertwined output value);
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the vehicle communication system’s message generation process, comprising the teachings of Troia and Ben-Noon, to utilize the specific multi-stage cryptographic pipeline taught by Verzun, comprising seed generation, bit-interleaving, encryption, and bit-scrambling, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to implement the sequence of cryptographic operations taught by Verzun to protect the vehicle’s VIN-based token for the following predictable engineering reasons: defeating advanced network intrusions, further motiving a POSITA to apply Verzun’s multi-layered pipeline to the trailer’s communication circuit to ensure critical VIN identifier cannot be reverse-engineered or spoofed; intertwining and scrambling, further applying Verzun’s final scrambling pass (Fig. 51A) to the ciphertext which obfuscates the packet structure itself, hiding the underlying MAC headers and unauthorized sniffers; and predictable integration of modular security functions; where Verzun teaches and diagrams all four of the discrete modular operations (Seed>Mix>Encrypt>Scramble). Stringing these known security modules together in a series to process Troia’s secure message constitutes the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions to yield the expected result of a mathematically fortified transmission. A cybersecurity engineer designing automotive networks would have a high expectation of success. Cryptographic functions such as bit-interleaving, AES encryption, and bit-wise scrambling are standard, well-documented software routines that can be easily compiled and executed by the communication circuit’s existing microcontroller without requiring any new physical hardware, yielding expected predictable results (KSR).
Claims 18-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Slade, in view of Slade’262, in view of Pampattiwar, in view of Ben-Noon, in view of Fackrell, in view of Troia, and further in view of Verzun.
Regarding independent claim 18, Slade, teaches:
A method of transmitting an identification signal by a vehicle communication system, the method comprising (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0007], [0011], [0027], [0035]-[0036], & [0043]):
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, and Pampattiwar, are silent in regard to:
identifying an identifier associated with a vehicle identification number (VIN) of a towed vehicle coupled to the vehicle communication system;
transmitting the identification signal to the tow vehicle coupled to the towed vehicle to identify the towed vehicle to the tow vehicle in response to detecting the application of electrical power to the first pin.
However, Ben-Noon, in combination with Troia, further teach:
identifying an identifier associated with a vehicle identification number (VIN) of a towed vehicle coupled to the vehicle communication system (Ben-Noon: [0009], [0014], [0027], [0038]-[0039], [0048], [0051], [0056], [0060], [0066]-[0067], [0076], ]0079], [0082], [0109], [0148], [0156]-[0157], [0159], [0163], [0165]-[0166], [Claim 7], & [Claim 17]: both references teach identifying and utilizing an identifier (the token/message) that is directly tied to the towed vehicle’s VIN; Troia: [Abstract], [0013], [0021], [0025]-[0026], [0043], [0049]-[0050], [0058]-[0062], [0073], & [Claim 18]);
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the vehicle communication system’s identification method to identify and utilize an identifier associated with the vehicle identification number (VIN) of the towed vehicle, by combining the vehicle-specific token logic of Ben-Noon with the secure message architecture of Troia, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to combine Ben-Noon’s and Troia’s teachings to tie the identification signal to the vehicle’s VIN for the following predictable engineering and management reasons: universal and permanent hardware identification, motivated to utilize the VIN (or an identifier associated with it, as taught by Ben-Noon) as the core identifier, rather than reinventing a proprietary numbering scheme that could cause tracking conflicts across different fleet operators; secure packaging of the hardware ID, further motivating to package Ben-Noon’s VIN-based token with Troia’s secure message architecture to ensure the identifier is transmitted in an organized, standard, and routable format that the tow vehicle’s receiving ECU can easily parse and authenticate; predictable application of known standards, Utilizing a stored VIN to generate a vehicle-specific transmission packet represents the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. The combination ensures that the identification broadcast to the tow vehicle is securely and permanently bound to the physical hardware of the attached trailer. An engineer specializing in automotive networks would have a high expectation of success. Writing a software routine to retrieve the stored VIN from memory and utilize it as the baseline identifier in a message packet prior to transmission is a standard, fundamental operation in automotive software engineering, requiring no undue experimentation, and yield expected predictable results (KSR).
However, Slade, in combination with Ben-Noon, further teach:
transmitting the identification signal to the tow vehicle coupled to the towed vehicle to identify the towed vehicle to the tow vehicle in response to detecting the application of electrical power to the first pin (Slade: [0007], [0052]-[0058], [0077]: teaches monitoring voltage on pins to detect activation (e.g., braking) and transmitting data (IDs) to the tow vehicle over the power pin via PLC modulation, and teaching device ID/Address transmission upon power-up; Ben-Noon: [0012]-[0015], [0042], [0047]-[0051], [0053], [0063], [0066]-[0070], [0073], [0076]-[0077], [0081]-[0082], [0141]-[0142], [0144]-[0145], [0155], [0158], [0167]-[0169], [0171]-[0172], & [0174]-[0177]: teaches sending a token/ID signal over an interface port to identify and authenticate the connected vehicle).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to incorporate and place the diagnostic control circuit directly at the physical connector (e.g. nose box), as taught by Slade’262, and configured to monitor voltage states, as taught by Pampattiwar, utilize the PLC techniques taught by Slade, and configure the system to transmit a specific, unique identifier, such as a VIN-based security token taught by Ben-Noon, according to known methods. The motivation to combine these references is to modernize standard heavy-duty vehicle interfaces (such as the SAE J-560 connector) to support advanced diagnostics and cybersecurity without adding mechanical complexity, weight, or new failure points to the physical wiring harness. The combination requires integrating standard, commercially available microcontrollers, CAN transceivers, and PLC modulators within the housing of an electrical connector, utilizing known software logic to trigger a data transmission upon a measured voltage threshold. Modulating the signal directly over the existing power pin is a predictable known method to achieve bi-directional communication without requiring proprietary connectors or retrofitting the existing mechanical interface. This provides immediate, localized detection of tow-vehicle connection(s) and power application without relying on extended wiring runs, and the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions to yield expected predictable results (KSR) of a secure plug-and-play smart trailer interface.
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, Pampattiwar, and Ben-Noon, are silent in regard to:
the vehicle communication system comprising an electrical connector coupled to the towed vehicle and comprising a plurality of pins configured to carry signals between the towed vehicle and a tow vehicle,
However, Slade, in combination with Fackrell, further teach:
the vehicle communication system comprising an electrical connector coupled to the towed vehicle (Slade: [0005] & [0035]-[0036]: the trailer is the tow vehicle; Fackrell: [0005], [0008], [0025]-[0026], & [Claim 21]) and comprising a plurality of pins configured to carry signals between the towed vehicle and a tow vehicle (Slade: [0011], [0035]-[0036], & [0041]: the truck tractor is the tow vehicle and the truck trailer is the towed vehicle, teaches the electrical connector coupling the trailer to the tow vehicle; Fackrell: [0005], [0008], [0025]-[0026], & [Claim 21]: establishes that the connector contains a plurality of pins (7 pins) to carry the signals between the vehicles),
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the vehicle communication system and general trailer connector of Slade to configure the electrical connector as an industry standard connector comprising a plurality of pins (e.g., the 7-pin SAE J-560 configuration), as taught by Fackrell, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to combine the architecture of Slade with the physical connector teachings of Fackrell for the following predictable engineering and logistics reasons: industry standardization, further motivating to configure Slade’s connector to match the standard plurality of pins taught by Fackrell to ensure the smart trailer is legally and commercially interoperable with existing tow vehicles; avoiding costly fleet retrofits, understanding that the market success relies on backward compatibility, utilizing Fackrell’s teachings of the standard J-560 connector ensures that Slate’s communication signals can be routed through the established multi-pin hardware already present on millions of trucks; and the predictable use of standard components, implementing Fackrell’s standard 7-pin connector to physically bridge Slate’s trailer and tow vehicle represents the predictable application of a known, standardized mechanical component to a known communication system to yield the predictable result (KSR) of a universally compatible physical link.
Slade, is silent in regard to:
the plurality of pins comprising a first pin configured to receive electrical power and a second pin configured to act as a signal ground;
However, Slade, in combination with Slade’262, further teach:
the plurality of pins comprising a first pin configured to receive electrical power (Slade: Fig. 3; [0002], [0011] & [0041]: multiple separate power cable connections 129; Slade’262: Fig. 2; [Abstract], [0005], [0007], [0019], [0031]-[0034], [0054], [0074], [0209], & [Claim 66]: power cable connection terminals 215) and a second pin configured to act as a signal ground (Slade: Fig. 3; [0002], [0011], & [0041]: ground connection 141; Slade’262: Fig. 2; [Abstract], [0005], [0007], [0019], [0031], [0033]-[0034], [0054], [0074], [0209], & [Claim 66]: discloses specific pins within the connector dedicated to receiving electrical power and a ground pin);
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the vehicle communication and diagnostic system of Slade’262 with the Power Line Communication (PLC) transmission methods of Slade, according to known methods. The motivation to combine these references is to modernize standard heavy-duty vehicle interfaces (such as the SAE J-560 connector) to support advanced diagnostics and cybersecurity without adding mechanical complexity, weight, or new failure points to the physical wiring harness. A POSITA, would have a reasonable expectation of success in combining these elements. A POSITA would be motivated to place the diagnostic control circuit directly at the physical connector (e.g., nose box) as taught by Slade/Slade’262, configured to monitor voltage states (Pampattiwar), to provide immediate localized detection of tow-vehicle connection and power application without relying on extended wiring runs. Further, utilizing the PLC techniques taught by Slade, where modulating the signal directly over the existing plurality of pins is a predictable, known method to achieve bi-directional communication without proprietary connectors or having to retrofit the existing mechanical interface. The combination requires integrating standard, commercially available microcontrollers, CAN transceivers, and PLC modulators within the housing of an electrical connector, utilizing known software logic to trigger a data transmission upon a measured voltage threshold. This provides immediate, localized detection of tow-vehicle connection(s) and power application without relying on extended wiring runs, and the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions to yield expected predictable results (KSR) of a secure plug-and-play smart trailer interface.
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, are silent in regard to:
the vehicle communication system being configured to monitor a voltage at the first pin to detect an application of electrical power to the first pin;
However, Slade’262, in combination with Pampattiwar, further teach:
the vehicle communication system being configured to monitor a voltage at the first pin to detect an application of electrical power to the first pin (Slade’262:[Abstract], [0005]-[0006], [0013]-[0014], [0016], [0019], [0024]-[0026], [0028], [0030]-[0031], [0033], [0053]-[0058], [0060], [0083]-[0084], [0103]-[0106], & [0108]-[0124]: teaches the circuit monitoring the voltage at specific pins with respect to ground; Pampattiwar: [0084]-[0085]: provides the functional logic where detecting the application of power on the pin indicates a specific operational state/application of power from the tow vehicle);
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to incorporate and place the diagnostic control circuit directly at the physical connector (e.g. nose box), as taught by Slade’262, and configured to monitor voltage states, as taught by Pampattiwar, according to known methods. The motivation to combine these references is to modernize standard heavy-duty vehicle interfaces (such as the SAE J-560 connector) to support advanced diagnostics and cybersecurity without adding mechanical complexity, weight, or new failure points to the physical wiring harness. A POSITA, would have a reasonable expectation of success in combining these elements. The combination requires integrating standard, commercially available microcontrollers, CAN transceivers, and PLC modulators within the housing of an electrical connector, utilizing known software logic to trigger a data transmission upon a measured voltage threshold. This provides immediate, localized detection of tow-vehicle connection(s) and power application without relying on extended wiring runs, and the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions to yield expected predictable results (KSR) of a secure plug-and-play smart trailer interface.
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, Pampattiwar, Ben-Noon, Fackrell, and Troia, are silent in regard to:
generating a random seed number;
intertwining bits of the random seed number and the identifier to generate an intertwined value;
and scrambling bits of the encrypted identifier to generate the identification signal; and
However, Verzun, teaches:
generating a random seed number (Fig. 51E; [Col. 75, ll. 32-34], [Col. 8, ll. 45-55], [Col. 105, ll. 36-50], [Col. 109, ll. 50-52], & [Col. 119, ll. 5-16]: describes the generation of random numbers or “seeds” for use in cryptographic operations using a “seed generator” based on “state” (e.g., time) and Fig. 51E has Seed Generation 921 outputting a seed 929 value to a Hidden Number Generator 960);
intertwining bits of the random seed number and the identifier to generate an intertwined value (Fig. 61A; [Col. 72, ll. 19-30], [Col. 105, ll. 36-42], [Col. 119, ll. 57-67], & [Col. 120, ll. 1-5, 20-31, & 37-45]: teaches the Mixing/Interleaved process where the seed bits and identifier data are intertwined to form a mixed/intertwined value);
and scrambling bits of the encrypted identifier to generate the identification signal (Fig. 51A; [Abstract], [Col. 104, ll. 32-40], [Col. 105, ll. 28-67], & [Col. 106, ll. 1-17]: teaches scrambling the bits of the encrypted payload to generate the final obfuscated transmission signal); and
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the baseline method of transmitting a vehicle identification signal, as taught by the combination of Slade, Pampattiwar, Ben-Noon, and Troia, to generate that signal by executing the sequential steps of generating a random seed, intertwining bits, encrypting the value, and scrambling the bits, as taught by Verzun, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to incorporate Verzun’s multi-step cryptographic pipeline into the trailer’s identification method for the following predictable engineering and cybersecurity reasons: securing the automated power-up, recognizing that this automated broadcast signal creates a security vulnerability the moment electrical power is applied to the first pin of the connection, and the trailer transmits its identification signal to the tow vehicle; dynamic payload generation, applying Verzun’s exact sequence, generating a random seed, intertwining it with the VIN identifier, encrypting it, and scrambling the bits, guarantees that the identification signal generated upon every single power-up is mathematically unique and structurally obfuscated; and the predictable application of known security methods, incorporating Verzun’s method ensures that if the trailer’s power-up broadcast is maliciously recorded, the recorded packet cannot be re-used to spoof the trailer later, the random seed will change the output, and applying this known sequence of cryptographic operations to secure an automated data transmission constitutes the predictable use of prior art method steps according to their established functions. A software or cybersecurity engineer would have a high expectation of success, executing a sequential pipeline of mathematical functions (seed generation>interleaving>encryption>scrambling), which is what modern microcontrollers are designed to do. Programming the trailer’s communication circuit to execute these software routines as a prerequisite loop before executing the final transmit command requires no undue experimentation and yields the expected predictable result (KSR) of a secure handshake.
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, Pampattiwar, Ben-Noon, and Fackrell, are silent in regard to:
encrypting the intertwined value via an encryption key to generate an encrypted identifier;
However, Troia, in combination with Verzun, further teach:
encrypting the intertwined value via an encryption key to generate an encrypted identifier (Troia: Fig. 7; [Abstract], [0002], [0013], [0025]-[0028], [0039], [0043], [0049]-[0050], [0061]-[0062], [0067], [0073]-[0074], [Claim 1], [Claim 5], [Claim 6], [Claim 9], [Claim 11], & [Claim 17]: teaches utilizing a private encryption key for secure vehicle messages; Verzun: Fig. 55A; [Col. 72, ll. 19-30], [Col. 75, ll. 32-34], [Col. 105, ll. 36-42], [Col. 109, ll. 50-52], [Col. 114, ll. 4-67], [Col. 115, ll. 1-3], [Col. 119, ll. 57-67], & [Col. 120, ll. 1-5, 20-31, & 37-45]: teaches encrypting the mixed value);
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the method of generating a secure vehicle message, as taught by Troia, to execute the multi-stage cryptographic steps taught by Verzun, generating a random seed, intertwining bits, encrypting the value, and scrambling the bits, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to combine Troia’s power-up message generation with Verzun’s cryptographic steps for the following predictable engineering and cybersecurity reasons: securing the automated power-up handshake, further motivating to look at dynamic network security protocols, where Verzun teaches the sequence of steps required to randomize a data payload, ensuring that even if the underlying identifier is static, the resulting packet changes every time; algorithmic implementation of the generation step, recognizing that substituting Verzun’s pipeline of steps for Troia’s basic generation step creates a secure authentication method; and predictable enhancement of data security methods, applying Verzun’s sequence of software-based cryptographic steps to Troia’s automated power-up trigger constitutes the predictable use of prior art method steps according to their established functions, as vehicle networks become more connected, the methods to authenticate hardware (Troia) must be fortified by enterprise-grade data obfuscation sequences (Verzun). A software or cybersecurity engineer would have a high expectation of success, Troia establishes that the vehicle’s electronic control unit executes software steps to generate a Message Authentication Code. Modifying the ECU’s firmware sequence to execute the additional software sub-routines taught by Verzun (e.g., executing a pseudo-random number generator, bit-interleaving loop, and bit-scrambling algorithm) immediately upon detecting power is a routine software engineering task that requires no new physical hardware, and yield expected predictable results (KSR).
Regarding dependent claim 19, the combination of Slade, teaches:
The method of claim 18 (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0007] [0035], & [0043]),
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, and Pampattiwar, silent in regard to:
wherein the identifier comprises the VIN of the towed vehicle or a unique value identifying the vehicle communication system, the unique value being mapped to the VIN of the towed vehicle.
However, Ben-Noon, in combination with Troia, further teach:
wherein the identifier comprises the VIN of the towed vehicle (Ben-Noon: [0039], [0067]-[0068], [0073]-[0074], [0076]-[0077], [0082], [0109], & [0147]-[0149]; Troia: Fig. 7; [Abstract], [0013], [0025]-[0026], [0043], [0049]-[0050], [0059]-[0062], [0073], & [Claim 18]: both Ben-Noon and Troia teach that the secure identifier token/message directly comprises the vehicle identification number (VIN) to identify the specific vehicle originating the message during the transmission method) or a unique value identifying the vehicle communication system, the unique value being mapped to the VIN of the towed vehicle (Ben-Noon: [0039], [0067]-[0068], [0073]-[0074], [0076]-[0077], [0082], [0109], & [0147]-[0149]: teaches generating a unique token value (VSID) mathematically derived from (mapped to) the VIN; Troia: Fig. 7; [Abstract], [0013], [0025]-[0026], [0043], [0049]-[0050], [0059]-[0062], [0073], & [Claim 18]: both references teach a method including a unique serial number identifying the hardware component (vehicle communication system), which is packaged alongside/mapped to the VIN).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the method of transmitting a secure vehicle identification signal, as taught by Slade, Slade’262, Pampattiwar, Troia, and Verzun, to format the identifier to comprises the vehicle identification number (VIN) of the towed vehicle, or a unique value mapped to the VIN, as taught by the combined teachings of Ben-Noon and Troia, according to known methods. A POSITA would have been motivated to utilize the VIN (or a value mapped directly to it) as the identifier for this method for the following predictable engineering, security, and flee-management reasons: universal hardware for fleet logistics, further motivating to use the VIN as the identified because inventing a proprietary, randomized ID scheme would make it impossible to track the trailer across different fleet operators or cross-reference it with national databases; providing a static seed for the cryptographic pipeline, recognizing that configuring the method to use the VIN meets the requirement for a static baseline identifier that the cryptographic steps can then securely obfuscate for transmission; and data obfuscation and bandwidth optimization, further motivating to implement the second alternative: using a unique value mathematically mapped/concatenated to the VIN (e.g., Ben-Noon’s VSID or Troia’s component serial number), this predictable variation provides the same unique hardware tracking capability, reducing payload size or prevent malicious threats from easily reading the raw VIN off the wiring. An automotive software engineer would have a high success implement this method. Every modern trailer electronic control unit (ECU) stores its factory-assigned VIN in its non-volatile memory (EEPROM). Writing a software method that commands the microcontroller to fetch this memory address (the VIN) and drop it into the payload variable, or run it through a standard mapping function, prior to executing the encryption steps in a fundamental and routine operation in embedded systems programming, that would yield expected predictable results (KSR).
Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Slade, in view of Slade’262, in view of Pampattiwar, in view of Ben-Noon, in view of Huett, in view of Troia, in view of Fackrell, and further in view of Schumacher et al. (US 2021/0138982 A1, Pub. Date May 13, 2021, hereinafter, Schumacher).
Regarding independent claim 20, Slade, teaches:
A method of vehicle identification (Fig. 1; [Abstract], [0004], [0007], [0035]-[0036], [0043], & [0046]), the method comprising:
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, and Pampattiwar, are silent in regard to:
identifying an identifier associated with a vehicle identification number (VIN) of a towed vehicle
transmitting the identification signal to a tow vehicle that is electrically coupled to the tow vehicle;
However, Ben-Noon, in combination with Troia, further teach:
identifying an identifier associated with a vehicle identification number (VIN) of a towed vehicle (Ben-Noon: [0009], [0014], [0027], [0038]-[0039], [0048], [0051], [0056], [0060], [0066]-[0067], [0076], ]0079], [0082], [0109], [0148], [0156]-[0157], [0159], [0163], [0165]-[0166], [Claim 7], & [Claim 17]; Troia: [Abstract], [0013], [0021], [0025]-[0026], [0043], [0049]-[0050], [0058]-[0062], [0073], & [Claim 18])
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the vehicle communication system’s identification method to identify and utilize an identifier associated with the vehicle identification number (VIN) of the towed vehicle, by combining the vehicle-specific token logic of Ben-Noon with the secure message architecture of Troia, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to combine Ben-Noon’s and Troia’s teachings to tie the identification signal to the vehicle’s VIN for the following predictable engineering and management reasons: universal and permanent hardware identification, motivated to utilize the VIN (or an identifier associated with it, as taught by Ben-Noon) as the core identifier, rather than reinventing a proprietary numbering scheme that could cause tracking conflicts across different fleet operators; secure packaging of the hardware ID, further motivating to package Ben-Noon’s VIN-based token with Troia’s secure message architecture to ensure the identifier is transmitted in an organized, standard, and routable format that the tow vehicle’s receiving ECU can easily parse and authenticate; predictable application of known standards, Utilizing a stored VIN to generate a vehicle-specific transmission packet represents the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. The combination ensures that the identification broadcast to the tow vehicle is securely and permanently bound to the physical hardware of the attached trailer. An engineer specializing in automotive networks would have a high expectation of success. Writing a software routine to retrieve the stored VIN from memory and utilize it as the baseline identifier in a message packet prior to transmission is a standard, fundamental operation in automotive software engineering, requiring no undue experimentation, and yield expected predictable results (KSR).
However, Slade, in combination with Ben-Noon, and Troia, further teach:
transmitting the identification signal to a tow vehicle that is electrically coupled to the tow vehicle (Slade: [0007], [0052]-[0058], [0077]; Ben-Noon: [0012]-[0015], [0042], [0047]-[0051], [0053], [0063], [0066]-[0070], [0073], [0076]-[0077], [0081]-[0082], [0141]-[0142], [0144]-[0145], [0155], [0158], [0167]-[0169], [0171]-[0172], & [0174]-[0177]; Troia: [0048]-[0051]: teaches the upon the physical trigger (the power cycle), the component initiates a communicative connection to transmit its secure identification message to the host);
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the baseline method of identifying a towed vehicle, as taught by the combination of Slade, Slade’262, Pampattiwar, and Fackrell to include the steps of coding the identifier to operate an identification signal, transmitting that identification signal locally to the electrically coupled tow vehicle, guided by the secure messaging teachings of Slade, Ben-Noon, and Troia, and configured to monitor voltage states, as taught by Pampattiwar, utilize the PLC techniques taught by Slade, and configure the system to transmit a specific, unique identifier, such as a VIN-based security token taught by Ben-Noon, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to incorporate Troia’s active coding and transmission steps into the trailer’s boot-up sequence for the following predictable engineering and cybersecurity reasons: establishing local hardware trust, applying Troia’s coding step to the trailer’s baseline identifier to ensure the tow vehicle is cryptographically verifying the physical hardware it is hitched to, rather than reading a spoofable plain-text ID string; enabling the telematics gateway, Troia teaches the necessity of the component initiating a communicative connection to the host device upon being power-cycled, and would be functionally necessary and obvious design choice to utilize Troia’s method of transmitting the coded signal locally to the tow vehicle as a prerequisite step before the tow vehicle passes the data up to the remove server; and predictable integration of standard security handshakes, configuring the method so that the trailer actively codes its VIN and pushes it to the tow vehicle upon power-up represents the predictable application of known digital authentication methods, transforming the trailer connection into a modern, secure cryptographic handshake, yielding the predictable result of preventing unauthorized hardware from integrating with the tow vehicle’s central computer network. An automotive software engineer would have a high expectation of success, microcontrollers designed for vehicular communication (e.g., those managing CAN or PLC networks) feature dedicated instruction sets for encrypting or hashing data (coding). Programming the trailer’s electronic control unit to run this coding routine and subsequently execute a transmit command across the local data pins the moment it wakes up from a power-on event is a standard, fundamental protocol in embedded systems architecture, that would yield expected predictable results (KSR).
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, Pampattiwar, and Ben-Noon, are silent in regard to:
by a vehicle communication system comprising an electrical connector coupled to the towed vehicle and comprising a plurality of pins configured to carry signals between the towed vehicle and a tow vehicle,
coding the identifier to operate an identification signal;
However, Slade, in combination with Fackrell, further teach:
by a vehicle communication system comprising an electrical connector coupled to the towed vehicle (Slade: [0005] & [0035]-[0036]; Fackrell: [0005], [0008], [0025]-[0026], & [Claim 21]) and comprising a plurality of pins configured to carry signals between the towed vehicle and a tow vehicle (Slade: [0011], [0035]-[0036], & [0041]; Fackrell: [0005], [0008], [0025]-[0026], & [Claim 21]),
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the vehicle communication system and general trailer connector of Slade to configure the electrical connector as an industry standard connector comprising a plurality of pins (e.g., the 7-pin SAE J-560 configuration), as taught by Fackrell, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to combine the architecture of Slade with the physical connector teachings of Fackrell for the following predictable engineering and logistics reasons: industry standardization, further motivating to configure Slade’s connector to match the standard plurality of pins taught by Fackrell to ensure the smart trailer is legally and commercially interoperable with existing tow vehicles; avoiding costly fleet retrofits, understanding that the market success relies on backward compatibility, utilizing Fackrell’s teachings of the standard J-560 connector ensures that Slate’s communication signals can be routed through the established multi-pin hardware already present on millions of trucks; and the predictable use of standard components, implementing Fackrell’s standard 7-pin connector to physically bridge Slate’s trailer and tow vehicle represents the predictable application of a known, standardized mechanical component to a known communication system to yield the predictable result (KSR) of a universally compatible physical link.
However, Huett, in combination with Troia, further teach:
coding the identifier to operate an identification signal (Huett: [0021], [0025], [0027], [0048], [0051], [0054], [0058], [0061], [0063], [0066], [Claim 7], [Claim 8], [Claim 14], & [Claim 16]; Troia: Fig. 7; [Abstract], [0002], [0013]-[0014], [0020], [0027], [0029], [0037]-[0039], [0048]-[0051], [0055]-[0068], [0072]-[0076], [Claim 1], [Claim 4], [Claim 5], [Claim 6], [Claim 8], [Claim 9], [Claim 11], [Claim 16], [Claim 17], & [Claim 18]: both references teach active coding (encrypting, formatting, and embedding) of the identifier into a mathematically secure identification signal before transmission);
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the secure message generation method of Troia to code (or encrypt) the identifier to operate the identification signal, guided by the signal encryption and token-embedding teachings of Huett, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to combine Troia’s secure message architecture with Huett’s signal-coding teachings for the following predictable engineering and cybersecurity reasons: preventing network spoofing via hardware injection, motivating the application of Huett’s coding/encryption step to the identifier data in Troia’s Message Authentication Code (MAC) to ensure the signal is mathematically obfuscated from unauthorized hardware; bridging authentication and coding, recognizing that to transmit Troia’s secure message across a physical medium (e.g., a vehicle CAN bus or PLC line), the physical communication circuit must utilize the encoders taught by Huett to code the digital identifier into a mathematically secure analog or digital transmission signal; and predictable enhancement of data security, applying Huett’s active signal encryption to Troia’s baseline authentication message constitutes the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions, the data must be actively coded (Huett) to guarantee the integrity of the authentication handshake (Troia). An automotive software or electrical engineer would have a high expectation of success, modern microcontrollers utilized in vehicle communication networks feature hardware encoders and cryptographic libraries. Programming the communication circuit’s encoder to run a standard coding or encryption algorithm, as taught by Huett, on the stored identifier prior to formatting Troia’s final secure message is a fundamental, routine operation in embedded systems that requires no undue experimentation, and yields expected predictable results (KSR).
Slade, is silent in regard to:
the plurality of pins comprising a first pin configured to receive electrical power and a second pin configured to act as a signal ground;
However, Slade, in combination with Slade’262, further teach:
the plurality of pins comprising a first pin configured to receive electrical power (Slade: Fig. 3; [0002], [0011] & [0041]; Slade’262: Fig. 2; [Abstract], [0005], [0007], [0019], [0031]-[0034], [0054], [0074], [0209], & [Claim 66]) and a second pin configured to act as a signal ground (Slade: Fig. 3; [0002], [0011], & [0041]: ground connection 141; Slade’262: Fig. 2; [Abstract], [0005], [0007], [0019], [0031]-[0034], [0054], [0074], [0209], & [Claim 66]: discloses specific pins within the connector dedicated to receiving electrical power and a ground pin);
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the vehicle communication and diagnostic system of Slade’262 with the Power Line Communication (PLC) transmission methods of Slade, according to known methods. The motivation to combine these references is to modernize standard heavy-duty vehicle interfaces (such as the SAE J-560 connector) to support advanced diagnostics and cybersecurity without adding mechanical complexity, weight, or new failure points to the physical wiring harness. A POSITA, would have a reasonable expectation of success in combining these elements. A POSITA would be motivated to place the diagnostic control circuit directly at the physical connector (e.g., nose box) as taught by Slade/Slade’262, configured to monitor voltage states (Pampattiwar), to provide immediate localized detection of tow-vehicle connection and power application without relying on extended wiring runs. Further, utilizing the PLC techniques taught by Slade, where modulating the signal directly over the existing plurality of pins is a predictable, known method to achieve bi-directional communication without proprietary connectors or having to retrofit the existing mechanical interface. The combination requires integrating standard, commercially available microcontrollers, CAN transceivers, and PLC modulators within the housing of an electrical connector, utilizing known software logic to trigger a data transmission upon a measured voltage threshold. This provides immediate, localized detection of tow-vehicle connection(s) and power application without relying on extended wiring runs, and the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions to yield expected predictable results (KSR) of a secure plug-and-play smart trailer interface.
Slade, in combination with Slade’262, are silent in regard to:
the vehicle communication system being configured to monitor a voltage at the first pin to detect an application of electrical power to the first pin;
However, Slade’262, in combination with Pampattiwar, further teach:
the vehicle communication system being configured to monitor a voltage at the first pin to detect an application of electrical power to the first pin (Slade’262:[Abstract], [0005]-[0006], [0013]-[0014], [0016], [0019], [0024]-[0026], [0028], [0030]-[0031], [0033], [0053]-[0058], [0060], [0083]-[0084], [0103]-[0106], & [0108]-[0124]: teaches the circuit monitoring the voltage at specific pins with respect to ground; Pampattiwar: [0084]-[0085]: teaches configuring the controller to monitor the voltage on the power pin (first pin) to detect when electrical power is applied by the tow vehicle);
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to incorporate and place the diagnostic control circuit directly at the physical connector (e.g. nose box), as taught by Slade’262, and configured to monitor voltage states, as taught by Pampattiwar, according to known methods. The motivation to combine these references is to modernize standard heavy-duty vehicle interfaces (such as the SAE J-560 connector) to support advanced diagnostics and cybersecurity without adding mechanical complexity, weight, or new failure points to the physical wiring harness. A POSITA, would have a reasonable expectation of success in combining these elements. The combination requires integrating standard, commercially available microcontrollers, CAN transceivers, and PLC modulators within the housing of an electrical connector, utilizing known software logic to trigger a data transmission upon a measured voltage threshold. This provides immediate, localized detection of tow-vehicle connection(s) and power application without relying on extended wiring runs, and the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions to yield expected predictable results (KSR) of a secure plug-and-play smart trailer interface.
Slade’262, in combination, Pampattiwar, Ben-Noon, Huett, Troia, and Fackrell, are silent in regard to:
transmitting a transmission signal corresponding to the identification signal to a remote server in response to detecting the application of electrical power to the first pin; and
However, Slade, in combination with Pampattiwar, and Schumacher, further teach:
transmitting a transmission signal corresponding to the identification signal to a remote server in response to detecting the application of electrical power to the first pin (Slade: [0004]-[0008], [0011], [0019], [0022]-[0023], [0041]-[0044], [0054], [0062], [0064], [0070], [0072], [0076]-[0081], [0102], [0104]-[0107], [0109], [0114], [0116]-[0123], [0161]-[0164], [0182]-[0183], [0224]-[0230], [0237]-[0241], [0245]-[0246], & [Claim 44]; Pampattiwar: [0010]-[0011], [0071]-[0075], [0078]-[0086], [0092], [0130], [0160]-[0161], [0205], [0214], [0216]-[0217], [0220]-[0222], [0225], [0230], [0232]-[0235], [0238]-[0240], [0271], [0279]-[0280], [0283]-[0284], [0305]-[0311], [0327], [0334], [0345], [Claim 4], & [Claim 5]: teaches the automated transmission trigger (transmitting in response to detecting power on the first pin); Schumacher: [Abstract], [0010], [0020], [0023], [0041]-[0044], [0046], [0048]-[0050], [0054]-[0061], [0063], [0068], [0070]-[0076], [0080], [0082]-[0088], [0091], [0094]-[0112], [0117], [Claim 5], [Claim 13], & [Claim 16]: teaches transmitting the authentication information/signal to a remote server via a wireless antenna); and
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the baseline automated transmission method of Pampattiwar to transmit the signal corresponding to the identification signal to a remote server in response to detecting the application of electrical power, guided by the centralized authentication teachings of Schumacher, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to combine Pampattiwar’s physical power-detection trigger with Schumacher’s remote-server transmission architecture for the following predictable engineering and fleet-management reasons: overcoming limitations of local databases, motivating the incorporation of Schumacher’s remote server transmission step into the method to ensure the tow vehicle verifies the trailer against a live, master fleet database rather than relying on outdated local data; automating the telematics ping, recognizing the obvious synergy of using Pampattiwar’s power-detection event as the universal software interrupt to trigger Schumacher’s transmission to the remote server, this combination ensures the fleet management cloud is notified the instant a tractor hooks up to a trailer, prevent a lag in asset tracking or security verification; and predictable integration of local and cloud networks, modifying a local hardware handshake method to simultaneously forward the authentication request over a wireless antenna to a cloud server represents the predictable application of modern telematics architecture, the combination routes the signal generated by Pampattiwar’s trigger to the network taught by Schumacher, yielding the predictable result of a real-time, cloud-verified trailer connection. A telematics or automotive software engineer would have a high expectation of success, modern commercial tow vehicles are universally equipped with Telematics Control Units (TCUs) containing cellular modems (e.g., LTE/4G/5G). Programming the vehicle’s central computer to execute a routing script that takes a locally received data package (triggered by a voltage change on a pin) and forwarding it over the cellular modem to a designated remote IP address is a fundamental networking operation requiring no undue experimentation, and yield expected predictable results (KSR).
Slade, in combination, Slade’262, Pampattiwar, Ben-Noon, Huett, Troia, and Fackrell, are silent in regard to:
receiving from the remote server, the VIN of the towed vehicle at the tow vehicle to identify the towed vehicle to the tow vehicle.
However, Schumacher, further teaches:
receiving from the remote server, the VIN of the towed vehicle at the tow vehicle to identify the towed vehicle to the tow vehicle ([0006]-[0008], [0010], [0017], [0020], [0024]-[0025], [0041]-[0044], [0046], [0056], [0058]-[0061], [0075]-[0085], [0087], [0094], [0097]-[0098], [0100], [0109], [0112], [0118], [Claim 1], [Claim 2], [Claim 3], [Claim 5], [Claim 10], & [Claim 13] : teaches receiving the authentication data back from the remote server to identify and authenticate the connected asset, and further teaches that the remote server’s tracking records utilize the vehicle identification number (VIN)).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the local vehicle identification method to further comprise transmitting a signal corresponding to the identification signal to a remote server, and receiving the VIN of the towed vehicle back from the remote server, guided by the centralized authentication teachings of Schumacher, according to known methods. A POSITA would be motivated to incorporate Schumacher’s remote server architecture into the trailer identification method for the following predictable engineering and commercial fleet-management reasons: centralized fleet management and security, utilizing Schumacher’s remote server step to ensure the physical connection is verified against a live, master fleet database; dynamic authorization via cloud verification, where it is an obvious and superior design choice to route the trailer’s identification signal to the remote server to leverage the dynamic authorization capabilities; asset confirmation (returning the VIN), further recognizing that configuring the remote server to transmit the actual unencrypted VIN back down to the tow vehicle’s computer is the standard, predictable method for confirming to the local truck exactly which physical asset it has just authenticated; and predictable integration of telematics, the addition of a remote server lookup represent the predictable application of modern telematics to a baseline physical connection, by utilizing a wireless antenna to bridge the local trailer network with a cloud database, providing the expected result of a fully connected, globally verifiable smart-fleet asset. An automotive software engineer specializing in telematics would have a high expectation of success, modern commercial tow vehicles are universally equipment with cellular modems and internet-connected electronic control units. Programming the tow vehicle to format a locally received authentication packet into a standard web-protocol request (e.g., JSON or HTTPS), transmit it over a cellular network to a remote server’s API, and parse the returning data payload (containing the VIN) is a fundamental, and routine operation of modern IoT and connected-vehicle engineering, yielding expected predictable results (KSR).
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. Smith et al. (US 2019/0322319 A1) discloses systems and methods for automated operations and handling of autonomous trucks and trailers hauled thereby.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to HUGO NAVARRO whose telephone number is (571)272-6122. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday 07:30-5:00 pm MST.
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/HUGO NAVARRO/Examiner, Art Unit 2858 May 25, 2026
/EMAN A ALKAFAWI/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2858 6/1/2026
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