DETAILED ACTION
Notice of AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
This action is responsive to the following communications: the Application filed January 12, 2024.
Claims 7-14 are pending. Claims 1-6 and 15-22 are withdrawn due to an Election/Restriction Requirement. Claim 7 is independent.
Election/Restrictions
Claims 1-6 and 15-22 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b) as being drawn to a nonelected Species, there being no allowable generic or linking claim. Election was made without traverse in the reply filed on February 12, 2026.
Priority
Receipt is acknowledged of certified copies of papers required by 37 CFR 1.55 received on February 26, 2024.
Information Disclosure Statement
Acknowledgment is made of applicant’s Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) filed on January 12, 2024. This IDS has been considered.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 7-9 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Park (U.S. 2016/0099079).
Regarding independent claim 7, Park discloses an electronic device (Fig. 9) comprising:
a repair control circuit (Fig. 1: 100) configured to receive a bootup signal (Fig. 1: FZYEN) to generate a bootup counting signal (Fig. 1: ATROWB<0:15>) comprising a pulse that is periodically generated after a start of first and second bootup operations (see pages 1-2, par. 0024-0025 and 0028), configured to generate a comparison signal after comparing first and second row addresses that are received by the repair control circuit after the start of the first and second bootup operations and the generation of first and second fuse data (see page 2, par. 0046); and
a fuse circuit configured to output the first and second fuse data, the first and second fuse data generated by the first and second rupture operations based on the bootup counting signal (see pages 1-2, par. 0022-0027).
As discussed above, Park’s electronic device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “electronic device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “generate a repair result signal for detecting whether first and second rupture operations are additionally performed based on the comparison signal, and configured to output the repair result signal to an outside of the electronic device when a repair output signal is received by the repair control circuit.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Park’s electronic device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 8, Park discloses the limitations with respect to claim 7.
As discussed above, Park’s electronic device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “electronic device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “the first row address that is input after the start of the first bootup operation and the second row address that is input after the start of the second bootup operation have an identical logic level combination.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Park’s electronic device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 9, Park discloses the limitations with respect to claim 7.
As discussed above, Park’s electronic device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “electronic device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “the comparison signal is a signal that is enabled when the first row address and the first fuse data have an identical logic level combination after the start of the first bootup operation and that is enabled when the second row address and the second fuse data have an identical logic level combination after the start of the second bootup operation.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Park’s electronic device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 14, Park discloses the limitations with respect to claim 7.
As discussed above, Park’s electronic device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “electronic device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “the fuse circuit is configured to generate the first fuse data by performing the first rupture operation on a plurality of fuses based on a fail address when a rupture signal is enabled prior to the first bootup operation and to output the first fuse data after the start of the first bootup operation, and the fuse circuit is configured to generate the second fuse data by performing the second rupture operation on the plurality of fuses based on the fail address when the rupture signal is enabled prior to the second bootup operation and to output the second fuse data after the start of the second bootup operation.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Park’s electronic device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 10-13 objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.
The following is a statement of reasons for the indication of allowable subject matter:
With respect to claim 10, there is no teaching or suggestion in the prior art of record to provide the recited bootup control circuit configured to generate the bootup counting signal comprising a pulse that is periodically generated when the bootup signal is received by the bootup control circuit, configured to generate a first bootup flag that is enabled during a first bootup operation period in response to receiving the bootup signal, and configured to generate a second bootup flag that is enabled during a second bootup operation period in response to receiving the bootup signal; a repair detection circuit configured to generate a repair detection signal by comparing the first bootup flag, an address during a period in which the second bootup flag is enabled, and the first and second fuse data; and a repair result signal output circuit configured to output the repair detection signal as the repair result signal when the repair output signal is input.
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ALFREDO BERMUDEZ LOZADA whose telephone number is (571)272-0877. The examiner can normally be reached 7:00AM-3:30PM EST.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Alexander G Sofocleous can be reached at 571-272-0635. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/Alfredo Bermudez Lozada/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2825