DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Priority
Receipt is acknowledged of certified copies of papers required by 37 CFR 1.55.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The text of those sections of Title 35, U.S. Code not included in this action can be found in a prior Office action.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claim(s) 1 and 4-7 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Tate (US 20130038080 A1) in view of Lipkin (US 3423121 A).
Regarding claim 1, Tate (US 20130038080 A1) discloses a moving object comprising:
a seat installed on a floor of a passenger cabin (Tate, figure 1, item 28), the seat including a seat portion of which a passenger sits (Tate, figure 2, item 28, seat has a seat pan); and
a storage portion provided below the seat and configured to store baggage of the passenger seated on the seat portion of the seat (Tate, figures 2 and 6, item 29),
and
the seat portion and the storage portion overlap each other in plan view (Tate, figures 1-3, seat pan is located directly above the storage portion as viewed from overhead), except:.
wherein at least a part of the storage portion is located below a floor surface of the passenger cabin (Tate, figure 2, item 24).
Lipkin (US 3423121 A) teaches at least a part of the storage portion is located below a floor surface of the passenger cabin (Lipkin, figures 1-2, item 20).
Tate and Lipkin are both considered analogous art as they are both in the same field of seating arrangement. It would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the application for one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the storage portion of Tate with at least part of the storage system located below a floor surface of the passenger cabin of Lipkin with a reasonable expectation of success in order to reduce the height of the seat.
Regarding claim 4, Tate as modified by Lipkin teaches the moving object according to claim 1, wherein
a front end of the storage portion is located rearward of a front end of a seat portion provided for the seat, in a plan view (Tate, figures 1 and 2, items 28 and 29, front of storage located rear of front of seat).
Regarding claim 5, Tate as modified by Lipkin teaches the moving object according to claim 1, further comprising:
a displacement restriction member configured to restrict displacement of the baggage in a vertical direction inside the storage portion (Tate, figures 2 and 6, items 29 and 42, lid on compartment).
Regarding claim 6, Tate as modified by Lipkin teaches the moving object according to claim 5, wherein
the displacement restriction member is formed of at least a part of a beam member provided for the floor (Tate, figures 2 and 6, items 38 and 44, beam members).
Regarding claim 7, Tate as modified by Lipkin teaches the moving object according to claim 5, wherein
the displacement restriction member is a lid member provided for the storage portion (Tate, figures 2 and 6, items 29 and 42, lid).
Claim(s) 2 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Tate (US 20130038080 A1) in view of Lipkin (US 3423121 A) as applied to claims 1 above, and further in view of Guilon (US 8342300 B2).
Regarding claim 2, Tate as modified by Lipkin teaches the moving object according to claim 1, except:
wherein the seat includes:
a shock absorber configured to absorb a load applied to the seat portion by enabling the seat portion to make reciprocating motion along a vertical direction, and
a direction of a displacement of the shock absorber is parallel to a direction of displacement of a backrest of the seat portion.
Guilon (US 8342300 B2) teaches a seat where the seat includes:
a shock absorber configured to absorb a load applied to the seat portion by enabling the seat portion to make reciprocating motion along a vertical direction (Guilon, figure 1, item 1), and
a direction of a displacement of the shock absorber is parallel to a direction of displacement of a backrest of the seat portion (Guilon, figure 1, item 2, backrest is parallel with the shock absorber and moves with the shock absorber).
Tate as modified by Lipkin and Guilon are both considered analogous art as they are both in the same field of seating arrangements. It would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the application for one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the seat of Tate with a shock absorber of Guilon with a reasonable expectation of success in order to reduce jostling of the passengers, particularly during hard landings, and increase passenger comfort.
Claim(s) 3 and 11 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Tate (US 20130038080 A1) in view of Lipkin (US 3423121 A) as applied to claims 1 above, and further in view of Kawecki (US 20200096072 A1).
Regarding claim 3, Tate as modified by Lipkin teaches the moving object according to claim 1, wherein
the storage portion is located under the seat portion in a plan view (Tate, figures 1-2 and 6, items 28 and 29, storage located under seat), except:
the seat comprises a pair of leg portions.
Kawecki (US 20200096072 A1) teaches a pair of leg portions (Kawecki, figure 3, item 310).
Tate as modified by Lipkin and Kawecki are both considered analogous art as they are both in the same field of seating arrangements. It would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the application for one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the seat of Tate with the pair of leg portions of Kawecki with a reasonable expectation of success in order to provide longitudinal stability to the seat attachment.
Regarding claim 11, Tate as modified by Lipkin teaches the moving object according to claim 1, except:
wherein the moving object is a vertical take-off and landing aircraft.
Kawecki (US 20200096072 A1) teaches moving object is a vertical take-off and landing aircraft (Kawecki, abstract, vtol aircraft).
Tate as modified by Lipkin and Kawecki are both considered analogous art as they are both in the same field of seating arrangements. It would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the application for one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the moving object of Tate as modified by Lipkin with a vtol aircraft of Kawecki with a reasonable expectation of success in order to reduce the required infrastructure for moving object operations.
Claim(s) 8 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Tate (US 20130038080 A1) in view of Lipkin (US 3423121 A) as applied to claims 7 above, and further in view of Tremblay (US 11266252 B2).
Regarding claim 8, Tate as modified by Lipkin teaches the moving object according to claim 7, except:
the storage portion further includes a locking mechanism configured to maintain the lid member in a closed state.
Tremblay (US 11266252 B2) teaches a storage portion further includes a locking mechanism configured to maintain the lid member in a closed state (Tremblay, figure 1, items 110 and 310, lid with latch).
Tate as modified by Lipkin and Tremblay are both considered analogous art as they are both in the same field of seating arrangements. It would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the application for one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the seat of Tate with a locking mechanism of Tremblay with a reasonable expectation of success in order to prevent the hatch from opening during vehicle maneuvering.
Claim(s) 9 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Tate (US 20130038080 A1) in view of Lipkin (US 3423121 A) as applied to claims 1 above, and further in view of Agarwala (US 20190283880 A1).
Regarding claim 9, Tate as modified by Lipkin teaches the moving object according to claim 1, except:
further comprising:
a sensor configured to detect whether or not the baggage is stored in the storage portion; and
a notification device including a display configured to, when the moving object arrives at a destination and the baggage is stored in the storage portion, give notification indicating that the baggage is stored in the storage portion.
Agarwala (US 20190283880 A1) teaches a sensor configured to detect whether or not the baggage is stored in the storage portion (Agarwala, figure 3, item 303); and
a notification device including a display configured to, when the moving object arrives at a destination and the baggage is stored in the storage portion, give notification indicating that the baggage is stored in the storage portion (Agarwala, figure 3, items 223 and 307, ¶24, indicator displays colors to indicate whether baggage is present or not).
Tate as modified by Lipkin and Agarwala are both considered analogous art as they are both in the same field of seating arrangements. It would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the application for one of ordinary skill in the art to modify baggage compartment of Tate with a sensor and notification device of Agarwala with a reasonable expectation of success in order to prevent passengers from forgetting their luggage.
Claim(s) 10 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Tate (US 20130038080 A1) in view of Lipkin (US 3423121 A) as applied to claims 1 above, and further in view of Dilmaghani (DE 102010013219 A1).
Regarding claim 10, Tate as modified by Lipkin teaches the moving object according to claim 1, except:
wherein
a space in which a component of the moving object is placed is formed below the storage portion.
Dilmaghani (DE 102010013219 A1) teaches a space in which a component of the moving object is placed is formed below the storage portion (Dilmaghani, figure 3d, items 50 and 49).
Tate as modified by Lipkin and Dilmaghani are both considered analogous art as they are both in the same field of seating arrangements. It would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the application for one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the cabin of Tate as modified by Lipkin with a luggage compartment of Dilmaghani with a reasonable expectation of success in order increase storage capacity.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments, see page 5 of applicant’s reply, filed 08/05/2055, with respect to the objection to the title have been fully considered and are persuasive. This objection has been withdrawn.
Applicant’s arguments, see page 5 of applicant’s reply, filed 08/05/2055, with respect to the amendment to change the interpretation of claim 9 under 35 USC 112(f) have been fully considered and are persuasive. Due to the amendments, the “notification device” is no longer being interpreted under 35 USC 112(f).
Applicant’s arguments with respect to claim(s) 2 have been considered but are moot because the new ground of rejection does not rely on any reference applied in the prior rejection of record for any teaching or matter specifically challenged in the argument.
Applicant's arguments filed 08/05/2025 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant argues that:
Tate fails to teach a storage compartment located below the floor
Lipkin fails to teach a storage compartment located under a seat
In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Here, Lipkin is used to modify the seat of Tate to have a below part of its seat storage compartment. Whether the compartment of Lipkin was originally designed to store partitions would not make it incapable of instead storing luggage and Lipkin is merely used to teach below compartment storage.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
Behr (US 10909397 B2) teaches a compartment under the seat closed by a hatch
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to RYAN ANDREW YANKEY whose telephone number is (571)272-9979. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Thursday 8:30 - 5:00.
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/RYAN ANDREW YANKEY/ Examiner, Art Unit 3642
/JOSHUA J MICHENER/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3642
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