DETAILED ACTION
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Arguments
The amendment filed January 16, 2026 has been entered. Claims 1, 9, 11, and 16 are presently amended. The remaining claims are in original or previously presented form. Therefore, claims 1-20 are pending in the application. Claims 1, 10, and 16 are the independent claims.
The Remarks filed January 16, 2026 have been fully considered. The applicant argues under the heading “35 U.S.C. § 112” that the claim amendments render the written description rejection given in the last detailed action, which was the Non-Final Rejection dated October 17, 2026, moot. The examiner agrees because present claim 1 now removes the phrase “wherein the tamper event is identified based on detection of removal or disconnection of a power supply to the ECU,” which existed in the previous claim set. But the examiner believes that the general issue raised in the last written description rejection still exists in the present set of claims and therefore has written a new written description rejection.
The applicant argues under the heading “35 U.S.C. § 103” that the prior art of record does not teach the current claims. The examiner respectfully does not find this argument persuasive because, at least for claim 1, the prior art appears to teach the limitations of the claim.
Claim 1 recites:
A computer-implemented method comprising:
providing, by a computing system, data from an inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed within a housing of an electronic control unit (ECU) of a vehicle to a processor remote from the vehicle,
the data including measurement data indicating movement of the ECU; and
receiving, by the computing system, from the processor remote from the vehicle a command based on the data to control operation of the electronic control unit (ECU),
the command in response to determination by the processor remote from the vehicle of a tamper event associated with the ECU,
wherein the determination of the tamper event by the processor remote from the vehicle includes
i) comparison of the measurement data with movement data from a second inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed external to the housing of the ECU and
ii) identification of the tamper event when a difference resulting from the comparison is indicative of movement of the ECU relative to the vehicle.
The “an…IMU” that has data including “measurement data indicating movement of the ECU” can broadly and reasonably relate to IMU 112 in Fig. 1A of the present disclosure. The “a second…IMU” can broadly and reasonably relate to IMU 130 in Fig. 1A. In the present filed disclosure, paragraph 0037 teaches that “The detection of movement of the ECU can be performed by comparing the measurement data (e.g., acceleration data) measured at the IMU at the housing of the ECU (e.g., IMU 112 in Fig. 1A) with the measurement data (e.g., acceleration data) measured at the IMU mounted to the vehicle structure external to the ECU housing (e.g. an IMU from sensor(s) 130 in Fig. 1A).”
In other words, the present claim can broadly and reasonably can be interpreted, at least in part, to mean that the IMU disposed within the housing of the ECU can compare its own movement to that of another sensor of the vehicle. If both sensors show movement, than the movement the IMU of the housing senses may just be vehicle movement, such as the vehicle driving down the road. But if the vehicle is not moving yet the IMU of the housing is, that may indicate that someone is tampering with the vehicle’s ECU housing and that an alarm should be sounded, or other action taken.
Zhang et al. (US2020/0160633) teaches that. Zhang paragraph 0010 teaches that “a difference between the IMU on the ECU and the IMU(s) on the vehicle can be compared” and “if the IMUs reflect different or contrary movement, this can be indicative of the IMU being moved and/or tampered with and not related primarily to vehicle motion.” Therefore, Zhang appears to the examiner to read on the present amendment.
The examiner notes that the sensors 130 in Zhang can collect data even if the vehicle is not moving. Paragraph 0010 of Zhang teaches that the sensors record data even when “the vehicle is not in motion.” In addition, the sensors record “while the vehicle is in motion.”
Please see the rejections below.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claims contain subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Claim 9 is rejected for lacking written description. To understand why, the examiner will first quote claim 1, upon which claim 9 depends.
Claim 1 recites:
A computer-implemented method comprising:
providing, by a computing system, data from an inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed within a housing of an electronic control unit (ECU) of a vehicle to a processor remote from the vehicle,
the data including measurement data indicating movement of the ECU; and
receiving, by the computing system, from the processor remote from the vehicle a command based on the data to control operation of the electronic control unit (ECU),
the command in response to determination by the processor remote from the vehicle of a tamper event associated with the ECU,
wherein the determination of the tamper event by the processor remote from the vehicle includes
i) comparison of the measurement data with movement data from a second inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed external to the housing of the ECU and
ii) identification of the tamper event when a difference resulting from the comparison is indicative of movement of the ECU relative to the vehicle.
Claim 9 recites:
The computer-implemented method of claim 1,
movement of the electronic control unit (ECU),
removal of a power supply associated with the electronic control unit (ECU),
a change in the electronic control unit (ECU),
failure to communicate with a remote operation center,
an unauthorized backup associated with the electronic control unit (ECU),
an unauthorized system level check associated with the electronic control unit (ECU), and
spoofing associated with the electronic control unit (ECU).
The antecedent to “the tamper event” in claim 9 is “a tamper event associated with the ECU” as recited in claim 1. Claim 1 then refers to this “a tamper event” when reciting:
wherein the determination of the tamper event by the processor remote from the vehicle includes
i) comparison of the measurement data with movement data from a second inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed external to the housing of the ECU and
ii) identification of the tamper event when a difference resulting from the comparison is indicative of movement of the ECU relative to the vehicle.
Besides “movement of the…ECU” every bullet on the list in claim 9 does not reasonably involve in movement data detected by an IMU. The following tamper events in claim 9 cannot reasonably be determined by points “i)…and ii)” as recited in claim 1, said tamper events in claim 9 being:
removal of a power supply associated with the electronic control unit (ECU),
a change in the electronic control unit (ECU),
failure to communicate with a remote operation center,
an unauthorized backup associated with the electronic control unit (ECU),
an unauthorized system level check associated with the electronic control unit (ECU), and
spoofing associated with the electronic control unit (ECU).
It lacks written description to say that the tamper event can be determined by comparing IMU movement data, and then to say that the tamper event can be, for example, unauthorized backup or spoofing. The original disclosure does not teach that those tamper events involve movement of the ECU and reasonably they do not. As mentioned in the last detailed action, the “removal of a power supply” from the ECU could mean that the ECU gets unplugged or a short in the circuit occurs, but neither necessarily requires IMU movement data for detection nor is it taught in the filed specification as being detected by IMU movement data.
One item on the above list from claim 9 states that the tamper event can include “a change in the electronic control unit (ECU)”. Paragraph 0037 of the present filed disclosure does teach that the tamper event can include this, but a “change” in the ECU is extremely general. It could mean a change in position, such as when it is being moved or vibrated. That would put the “change in the electronic control unit” under the category of “movement of the electronic control unit” as recited earlier in claim 9. For examination purposes, that is how “a change in the…ECU” will be interpreted.
The applicant points to paragraph 0037 as providing written description for movement data detecting, for example, that a software update is needed or that spoofing has occurred. How such things could be detected using IMU movement data really needs more explanation rather than just a statement that this can be done. Otherwise, what is the applicant disclosing to the public in exchange for short-term protection? As previous office actions have shown and as this one has done again in the “Response to Arguments” section, Zhang et al. (US2020/0160633) teaches that data from an IMU in the housing of the ECU can be compared to data from an IMU mounted on the vehicle. If the IMU ECU is moving but the vehicle is not, then that indicates tampering. Or, if the IMU ECU is moving and the vehicle is also moving, that simply indicates vehicle movement. Is the present disclosure, paragraph 0037, teaching, for example, that if the IMU ECU is not indicating movement but the IMU of the vehicle is indicating movement than that could be indicative of needing a software update or the occurrence of spoofing? That is not spelled out in any kind of detail in the disclosure. It is not obvious at all that that is what paragraph 0037 teaches.
Paragraph 0037 does state that the tamper event is related to measurement data from the IMU. The first sentence reads that “a tamper event of the ECU…based on the measurement data from the IMU” can be identified. Yet the next sentence seems to make the detection of measurement data just one of many ways that tamper events can be detected. That next sentence reads that “The tamper event can including, for example, detection of movement of the ECU and/or sensors” but it can also include “if backup battery is needed, detection of spoofing,” etc. Since it is difficult to believe that spoofing, for example, is detected with movement data, and the disclosure does not explain it, paragraph 0037 should be considered in light of the whole invention.
This consideration logically includes paragraph 0048 of the original disclosure which teaches that sometimes “the tamper event can happen in the vehicle” while other times it can “happen outside the vehicle.” An example of the latter is when “a tamper event can be detection of a failure to communicate to a remote operation center / server,” or “an unauthorized backup of all the firmware…and spoof detection for firmware and updates.” If these backups were not pre-approved by the server, they might be tamper events. This is an example of a tamper event outside the vehicle and it does not use measurement data from the IMU. The examiner doubts that it is the applicant’s contention that the detection of an authorized firmware update detected by an external server is spoofing detected by comparative IMU data from IMUs mounted on the vehicle, yet the specification says that spoofing is detected in this way. Detecting spoofing and software updates from a server without IMU movement data is reasonable and taught in the disclosure, but detecting them using IMU movement data is not. It seems to the examiner that paragraph 0037 does not provide written description for how IMU movement data can identify the need for a software update and that other sections of the disclosure actually correct this concept.
For examination purposes, the examiner will not provide art rejections for the following bullets because they lack written description as involving movement:
failure to communicate with a remote operation center,
an unauthorized backup associated with the electronic control unit (ECU),
an unauthorized system level check associated with the electronic control unit (ECU), and
spoofing associated with the electronic control unit (ECU).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The text of those sections of Title 35, U.S. Code not included in this action can be found in a prior Office action.
The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claims 1-4, 8-14, and 16-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Zhang et al. (US20200160633 A1) in view of Dougan (US2021/0248884 A1).
Regarding claim 1, Zhang teaches:
A computer-implemented method comprising:
providing, by a computing system, data from an inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed within a housing of an electronic control unit (ECU) of a vehicle (see Zhang, Fig. 3A for a vehicle with an IMU 301 attached to an ECU 210 inside a housing 312 of a vehicle 314. The ACM 242 (access control module 242) of the vehicle and the ECU 210, which together are analogous to the “computing system” of the present claim, can provide data from the IMU to a processor remote from the vehicle. This is seen in Fig. 3A in that there are lines going from the vehicle housing 312 to the “Management server 332,” which includes a processor and is remote from the vehicle 312. See also Figs. 6 and 7. See paragraph 0032 for a system that detects that a vehicle ECU has “been tampered with” by detecting this using an IMU. When the “unauthorized access is detected” the system engages in “notifying a server”. See paragraph 0058 for sensors 301 in Fig. 3A being IMUs. See also paragraphs 0033-0034 which teach a security and safety platform 100 which receives security data from fleet vehicles 102 and returns data to the vehicles.
Note that the examiner is arguing here that Zhang teaches everything before the parentheses containing bold, i.e., before the italicized claim language. To the degree that the “data from an…IMU” is raw IMU data, Zhang does not teach sending that to “a processor remote from a vehicle”. But Zhang does teach, as noted above, notifying a server with results based on raw IMU data. If that can be considered “data from an…IMU” than Zhang in fact does teach sending this to a processor remote from a vehicle. However, other art teaches this more explicitly so the examiner will rely on that other art.) to a processor remote from the vehicle,
receiving, by the computing system, from the processor remote from the vehicle a command based on the data to control operation of the electronic control unit (ECU) (see Zhang Fig. 5 for the computing system of the vehicle, which is the ACM 242, receiving from the management server 332 data regarding an “access token” 512. See also Figs. 6 and 7. In Fig. 6, data is sent to a mobile device 336 and a token is received back from the mobile device. The system of Zhang can detect that someone is tampering with the ECU (see paragraphs 0031 and 0038) and it can send the IMU data to a server (see paragraph 0032). The server can then send a command back to the computing system. See paragraph 0032 for, “once an unauthorized access is detected, an alarm protocol (based on one or more security policies) may be triggered by the ACM, which can including sounding an alarm; notifying a server…or other suitable action defined in the corresponding security policies.” The command from the server to the computing system of the vehicle can include providing “no access” to the vehicle, or granting access to the vehicle housing 312, which is the housing of the ECU. See paragraph 0056 for the teaching that the ACM 242 in cooperation with the “management server 332” can “toggle access to one or more vehicle components (e.g., ECU 210)” and trigger an alarm. See Zhang paragraph 0053 for the teaching that the ACM 242 can “detect unauthorized physical access to the interior of vehicle compartment 312,” which as seen in Fig. 3A is the housing in which the ECU with the IMU on it is located. Paragraph 0053 then states that the ACM 242 “can then perform one or more operations to deter the unauthorized access, or at least to mitigate the loss caused by the unauthorized access.” Paragraph 0056 continues the discussion of unauthorized access by teaching that the ACM 242 can control an access element 399. The access element 399 that can be a button inside the vehicle. When the button is pressed, it can enable or disable “vehicle components (e.g., ECU 210).” It seems reasonable to interpret this access element, in at least one broad reasonable interpretation, to be a push button ignition system. Yet this access element 399 is “controlled by ACM 242, or other suitable module, processor(s), or the like”. In other words, Zhang teaches that the ACM 242, (the “access control module” of the vehicle according to paragraph 0008), can disable the push button ignition system of the vehicle. If someone tampers with the vehicle, the push button ignition system will be disabled from turning the vehicle on. According to paragraphs 0008, 0053, and 0056 then, if an authorized person tampers with the vehicle ECU as detected via the IMU on the ECU, the ACM receives signals indicating this and, in response, disable “vehicle components (e.g., ECU 210).”),
the command in response to determination by the processor remote from the vehicle of a tamper event associated with the ECU,
wherein the determination of the tamper event by the processor remote from the vehicle includes
i) comparison of the measurement data with movement data from a second inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed external to the housing of the ECU (see Zhang paragraph 0010 teaches that “a difference between the IMU on the ECU and the IMU(s) on the vehicle can be compared” and “if the IMUs reflect different or contrary movement, this can be indicative of the IMU being moved and/or tampered with and not related primarily to vehicle motion.” The “IMUs on the vehicle” in Zhang are analogous to the “second…IMU” in the present clause. In Zhang, sensors 130 can collect data even if the vehicle is not moving. Paragraph 0010 of Zhang teaches that the sensors record data even when “the vehicle is not in motion.” In addition, the sensors record “while the vehicle is in motion.”) and
ii) identification of the tamper event when a difference resulting from the comparison is indicative of movement of the ECU relative to the vehicle (see Zhang paragraph 0010 teaches that “a difference between the IMU on the ECU and the IMU(s) on the vehicle can be compared” and “if the IMUs reflect different or contrary movement, this can be indicative of the IMU being moved and/or tampered with and not related primarily to vehicle motion.” Sensors 130 in Zhang can collect data even if the vehicle is not moving. Paragraph 0010 of Zhang teaches that the sensors record data even when “the vehicle is not in motion.” In addition, the sensors record “while the vehicle is in motion.”).
Yet Zhang does not explicitly further teach (note the italicized portion):
providing, by a computing system, data from an inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed within a housing of an electronic control unit (ECU) of a vehicle to a processor remote from the vehicle,
the command in response to determination by the processor remote from the vehicle of a tamper event associated with the ECU.
However, Dougan teaches:
providing, by a computing system, data from an inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed within a housing of an electronic control unit (ECU) of a vehicle to a processor remote from the vehicle (see Dougan Fig. 1 and paragraph 0046 for a vibration sensor 206 on a deadbolt 238 of a house. See paragraph 0047 for the teaching that, in some implementations the smart lock 110, which contains the vibration sensor 206 and controller 230 (see Fig. 2), “may output the vibration data to the…monitoring server 150,” which is remote from the device, and the “monitoring server 150 may determine if the vibration criteria meets the vibration criteria.” Paragraph 0067 teaches that the “monitoring server 150 analyzes the smart lock data 148 and the monitoring system data 146 to determine that attempted entry is occurring.” Paragraph 0072 teaches that the server itself can determine whether a vibration frequency is within a programmed frequency range and, in response, “classify the deadbolt vibration as an indication of attempted entry.” See paragraph 0041 for the vibration sensor being an accelerometer.),
the command in response to determination by the processor remote from the vehicle of a tamper event associated with the ECU (see paragraph 0067 which teaches that the “monitoring server 150 analyzes the smart lock data 148 and the monitoring system data 146 to determine that attempted entry is occurring.” Paragraph 0072 teaches that the server itself can determine whether a vibration frequency is within a programmed frequency range and, in response, “classify the deadbolt vibration as an indication of attempted entry.” See paragraph 0041 for the vibration sensor being an accelerometer. Paragraph 0074 teaches that the server 150 may then send commands back to the “automation controls 140” including a “command to a sensor” to collect more data or “sounding an alarm of the property 102,” or sending an alert to a third-party such as a security personnel or emergency services. According to paragraph 0079 the system can detect if the latch 242 is latched but the deadbolt is not locked and the server can send a command to the controller 230 to lock the deadbolt 238.).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified the system, as taught by Zhang, to add the additional features of providing, by a computing system, data from an inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed within a housing of an electronic control unit (ECU) of a vehicle to a processor remote from the vehicle, the command in response to determination by the processor remote from the vehicle of a tamper event associated with the ECU, as taught by Dougan. The motivation for doing so would be to “prevent” unauthorized access while utilizing the benefits of a server to provide alerts to owners, as recognized by Dougan (see paragraphs 0004 and 0011).
Furthermore, since the claimed invention is merely a combination of old elements by known methods, and in the combination each element merely would have performed the same function as it did separately, and one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the results of the combination were predictable.
This conclusion of obviousness corresponds to KSR rationale “A”: it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have combined prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results. See MPEP § 2141, subsection III.
Regarding claim 2, Zhang and Dougan teach the computer-implemented method of claim 1.
Zhang further teaches:
A computer-implemented method wherein
the inertial measurement unit (IMU) is rigidly disposed within the housing of the electronic control unit (ECU) such that movement of the housing is detectable by the inertial measurement unit (IMU) (see Zhang paragraph 0008 which teaches that the IMU is “physically coupled to the electronic control unit and configured to detect a movement of the ECU”. The paragraph goes on to state that “The ECU can be housed in a vehicle compartment inside the vehicle”. Paragraph 0010 of Zhang also teaches that the IMU can detect when the ECU is moving, and can even determine that the ECU is being moved while the vehicle itself is not in motion. But still nothing here states that the IMU is actually rigidly attached to the housing of the ECU.
It seems reasonable that the ECU 210 in Zhang (which as shown in Fig. 3A, has an IMU item 301 coupled to it) would be bolted or otherwise rigidly fixed to the vehicle compartment, item 312.
See Zhang paragraph 0058, which teaches that “In certain embodiments, one or more sensors (301) may be configured to detect when a vehicle compartment is breached (opened) and/or one or more vehicle components are tampered with. For example, one or more motions sensors (e.g., IMU) can be used to detect when a vehicle compartment is opened (e.g., detects hood 320 movement). Alternatively or additionally, motion sensor(s) (301) may detect when a vehicle component (e.g., ECU 210) is moved or tampered with due to a physical movement, vibrations, or the like. Motion sensors can include an inertial measurement unit (IMU), or other suitable motion detection solution.” This paragraph clearly states that the IMU detects tampering of the vehicle compartment, said vehicle compartment being analogous to the “housing of the ECU” in the present application.
Other paragraphs of Zhang teach that the IMU can further or additionally detect movement of the ECU. For example, Zhang paragraph 0032 teaches that “examples of sensors that can detect whether the vehicle compartment(s) and/or components therein (e.g., ECU) have been tampered with may include a position sensor to detect when a cover (e.g., hood) for a vehicle compartment (e.g., engine bay) has been opened, a position sensor and/or motion sensor (e.g., inertial measurement unit (IMU)) to detect when certain components (e.g., ECU) have been moved or tampered with, a light sensor to detect when an compartment is opened…or other suitable sensing system, and any combination thereof”. Here Zhang presents a list of sensors that can detect “whether the vehicle compartment(s)…have been tampered with. These components include the position sensor, which detects when the hood is tampered with; the IMU, which detects when the ECU is tampered with; and the light sensor, which detects when light comes into the vehicle compartment.).
Regarding claim 3, Zhang and Dougan teach the computer-implemented method of claim 1.
Zhang further teaches:
A computer-implemented method wherein
the inertial measurement unit (IMU) is independent from sensors mounted to the vehicle external to the housing and associated with detection of an environment external to the vehicle (in the filed specification of the present application, paragraph 0018 teaches that “the IMU 112 is independent from sensor(s) 130. The sensors 130 and the IMU are not the same sensors or sensor suite, they are “separate” and therefore “independent”. Paragraph 0045 teaches that the vehicle sensors may include a separate IMU that is mounted to the vehicle structure and that is different from the one “at the housing of the ECU.” With that in mind, see Zhang, paragraph 0040 for external sensors 206. See paragraph 0041 for those including Lidar, radar, and cameras. See Fig. 2 for these external sensors 206 being separate and independent from the internal sensors 208. Furthermore, an IMU inside a vehicle compartment such as under the hood of the vehicle as shown in Fig. 3A must be independent from sensors mounted to the vehicle external. Lidar and cameras for navigation do not work unless they can see the vehicle environment.)
Regarding claim 4, Zhang and Dougan teach the computer-implemented method of claim 1.
Zhang further teaches:
A computer-implemented method wherein
the housing of the electronic control unit (ECU) is positioned within the vehicle to prevent access to the interior of the housing until after the housing is moved (in a broad reasonable interpretation, the claim appears to mean that the housing must be moved before the interior of the housing can be accessed. The housing of the ECU otherwise prevents access to the interior of the housing. With that in mind, see Zhang, paragraph 0008 and Fig. 3A for a housing of an ECU. See paragraph 0009 for the system granting access to the locking mechanism of the vehicle compartment (which is the housing of the ECU) unless someone has been granted access to the housing.).
Regarding claim 8, Zhang and Dougan teach the computer-implemented method of claim 1.
Zhang further teaches:
A computer-implemented method wherein
the inertial measurement unit (IMU) is coupled to the processor via a wireless network, the processor associated with security of the electronic control unit (ECU) and not associated with steering of the vehicle (see Zhang, Figs. 6 and 7, for a management server 322 that is coupled to the IMU that provides authorization to access the ECU housing, but is not associated with steering of the vehicle).
Regarding claim 9, Zhang and Dougan teach the computer-implemented method of claim 1.
Zhang further teaches:
The computer-implemented method of claim 1,
movement of the electronic control unit (ECU) (see Zhang paragraph 0010 teaches that “a difference between the IMU on the ECU and the IMU(s) on the vehicle can be compared” and “if the IMUs reflect different or contrary movement, this can be indicative of the IMU being moved and/or tampered with and not related primarily to vehicle motion.” Sensors 130 in Zhang can collect data even if the vehicle is not moving. Paragraph 0010 of Zhang teaches that the sensors record data even when “the vehicle is not in motion.” In addition, the sensors record “while the vehicle is in motion.” See Zhang paragraph 0054 for the system detecting attempts to open the hood of the vehicle or otherwise detecting motion using the motion sensor. See paragraph 0058 for the motion sensor being an IMU sensor),
removal of a power supply associated with the electronic control unit (ECU),
a change in the electronic control unit (ECU) (see Zhang paragraph 0010 teaches that “a difference between the IMU on the ECU and the IMU(s) on the vehicle can be compared” and “if the IMUs reflect different or contrary movement, this can be indicative of the IMU being moved and/or tampered with and not related primarily to vehicle motion.” Sensors 130 in Zhang can collect data even if the vehicle is not moving. Paragraph 0010 of Zhang teaches that the sensors record data even when “the vehicle is not in motion.” In addition, the sensors record “while the vehicle is in motion.” See Zhang paragraph 0054 for the system detecting attempts to open the hood of the vehicle or otherwise detecting motion using the motion sensor. See paragraph 0058 for the motion sensor being an IMU sensor),
failure to communicate with a remote operation center,
an unauthorized backup associated with the electronic control unit (ECU),
an unauthorized system level check associated with the electronic control unit (ECU), and
spoofing associated with the electronic control unit (ECU).
Regarding claim 10, Zhang and Dougan teach the computer-implemented method of claim 9.
Zhang further teaches:
The computer-implemented method of claim 9, wherein,
in response to the tamper event, a tamper response is provided from the processor to disable the electronic control unit (ECU) (see Zhang paragraph 0053 for the teaching that the ACM 242 can “detect unauthorized physical access to the interior of vehicle compartment 312,” which as seen in Fig. 3A is the housing in which the ECU with the IMU on it is located. Paragraph 0053 then states that the ACM 242 “can then perform one or more operations to deter the unauthorized access, or at least to mitigate the loss caused by the unauthorized access.” Paragraph 0056 continues the discussion of unauthorized access by teaching that the ACM 242 can control an access element 399. The access element 399 that can be a button inside the vehicle. When the button is pressed, it can enable or disable “vehicle components (e.g., ECU 210).” It seems reasonable to interpret this access element, in at least one broad reasonable interpretation, to be a push button ignition system. Yet this access element 399 is “controlled by ACM 242, or other suitable module, processor(s), or the like”. In other words, Zhang teaches that the ACM 242, (the “access control module” of the vehicle according to paragraph 0008), can disable the push button ignition system of the vehicle. If someone tampers with the vehicle, the push button ignition system will be disabled from turning the vehicle on. According to paragraphs 0008, 0053, and 0056 then, if an authorized person tampers with the vehicle ECU as detected via the IMU on the ECU, the ACM receives signals indicating this and, in response, disable “vehicle components (e.g., ECU 210).”).
Regarding claim 11, Zhang teaches
A system comprising (see Zhang, Fig. 3A):
at least one processor (the ECU 210 undoubtably has a processor); and
a memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the system to perform operations comprising (see paragraph 0114):
providing data from an inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed within a housing of an electronic control unit (ECU) of a vehicle to a processor remote from the vehicle, (the rest of the claim from this bullet down is substantially similar to claim 1. Please see the rejection of that claim.)
the data including measurement data indicating movement of the ECU; and
receiving from the processor remote from the vehicle a command based on the data to control operation of the electronic control unit (ECU), the command in response todetermination by the processor remote from the vehicle of a tamper event associated with the ECU,
wherein the determination of the tamper event by the processor remote from the vehicle includes
i) comparison of the measurement data with movement data from a second inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed external to the housing of the ECU and
ii) identification of the tamper event when a difference resulting from the comparison is indicative of movement of the ECU relative to the vehicle.
Regarding claim 16, Zhang teaches:
A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium including instructions that, when executed by at least one processor of a computing system, cause the computing system to perform operations comprising (see Fig. 3A and paragraph 0114):
providing data from an inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed within a housing of an electronic control unit (ECU) of a vehicle to a processor remote from the vehicle (the rest of the claim from this bullet down is substantially similar to claim 1. Please see the rejection of that claim.),
the data including measurement data indicating movement of the ECU; and
receiving from the processor remote from the vehicle a command based on the data to control operation of the electronic control unit (ECU), the command in response todetermination by the processor remote from the vehicle of a tamper event associated with the ECU,
wherein the determination of the tamper event by the processor remote from the vehicle includes
i) comparison of the measurement data with movement data from a second inertial measurement unit (IMU) disposed external to the housing of the ECU and
ii) identification of the tamper event when a difference resulting from the comparison is indicative of movement of the ECU relative to the vehicle.
Regarding claim 17, the claim is substantially similar to claim 2. Please see the rejection for that claim.
Regarding claim 18, the claim is substantially similar to claim 3. Please see the rejection for that claim.
Regarding claim 19, the claim is substantially similar to claim 4. Please see the rejection for that claim.
Claims 5, 6, 15, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Zhang in view of Dougan in further view of Goldstein (U.S. Pat. No. 11,080,978 B1).
Regarding claim 5, Zhang and Dougan teach the computer-implemented method of claim 1.
Yet Zhang and Dougan do not further teach:
A computer-implemented method wherein
the inertial measurement unit (IMU) is powered by a first power source disposed within the housing of the electronic control unit (ECU).
However, Goldstein teaches:
A computer-implemented method wherein
the inertial measurement unit (IMU) is powered by a first power source disposed within the housing of the electronic control unit (ECU) (in the filed specification of the present application, see Fig. 1B and paragraph 0025 for “the power source 111 of the ECU 110 is operated connected to the power source 120 of the vehicle 100. The power source 116 of the IMU 112 is independent of the power source of the ECU 111. In some implementations, the power source 116 of the IMU 112 can be a battery.” Based on this, the “first power source” that powers the IMU is item 116 in Fig. 1B. In one broad reasonable interpretation, the IMU has its own power source, much like an Apple Airtag Since security sensors may need to stay on longer than the vehicle’s engine or motor, the sensor may need its own power supply. Therefore, having a power source for the IMU security sensor makes sense.
With that in mind, see Goldstein, col. 1, lines 14-23 and col. 21, lines 23-25 for the disclosure being related to controlling access to a vehicle, computer or other valuable or safety-related product. See col. 8, lines 28-35 for an IMU that can be “inside a physical space” such as the “body of a physical safe” or “can be attached to its surface”. See col. 8 for the IMU being “coupled to a power source”. Although taught in conjunction with a vehicle, the IMU sensor disclosed by Goldstein is powered independently from the main vehicle. See col. 21, lines 4-11 for the IMU being an “ultra-low power” device that powers up other devices when the safe is disturbed such as through motion. ).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified the system, as taught by Zhang and Dougan to add the additional features of the inertial measurement unit (IMU) is powered by a first power source disposed within the housing of the electronic control unit (ECU), as taught by Goldstein. The motivation for doing so would be continuously monitor the system even while other components are not active, as recognized by Goldstein (see col. 21, lines 4-11). Furthermore, since the claimed invention is merely a combination of old elements by known methods, and in the combination each element merely would have performed the same function as it did separately, and one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the results of the combination were predictable.
This conclusion of obviousness corresponds to KSR rationale “A”: it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have combined prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results. See MPEP § 2141, subsection III.
Regarding claim 6, Zhang and Dougan and Goldstein teach the computer-implemented method of claim 5.
Zhang further teaches:
A computer-implemented method wherein
the electronic control unit (ECU) is associated with a second power source (see Zhang Fig. 2 for the ECU 210 being connected to the network bus 216. Where does the ECU 210 taught by Zhang get their power from? From the engine and/or battery of course. This is so obvious that it goes without saying. The ECU 210 in Zhang is obviously powered. The ultimate source of its power is the engine of the vehicle, which is taught in paragraph 0004. The vehicle taught by Zhang is a “modern vehicle”.).
Regarding claim 15, the claim is substantially similar to claim 5. Please see the rejection for that claim.
Regarding claim 20, the claim is substantially similar to claim 5. Please see the rejection for that claim.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to DANIEL M. ROBERT whose telephone number is (571)270-5841. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 7:30-4:30 EST.
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/DANIEL M. ROBERT/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3665