DETAILED ACTION
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Election/Restrictions
In response to a Restriction Requirement filed on 04/16/2026, the Applicant elected without traverse Group I (claims 1-10 and 14-15) in a reply filed on 06/10/2026. Claims 11-13 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b) as being drawn to a nonelected Group II, there being no allowable generic or linking claim.
Currently, claims 1-10 and 14-15 are examined as below.
Priority
Receipt is acknowledged of certified copies of papers required by 37 CFR 1.55.
Information Disclosure Statement
Acknowledgment is made of applicant's Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) filed on 02/15/2024. The IDS has been considered.
Specification
The title of the invention is not descriptive. A new title is required that is clearly indicative of the invention to which the claims are directed.
The following title is suggested:
(Marked-Up Version) Artificial Synapse Device Based on Resistive Change Memory Device
(Clean Version) Artificial Synapse Device Based on Resistive Change Memory Device
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 4-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 4 is indefinite, because the limitation “the number of times the same voltage is repeatedly applied” in lines 3-4 is not mentioned before. There is insufficient antecedent basis.
Claim 5 is indefinite, because the limitation “a target” in line 3 renders the claim indefinite. It is unclear whether such target is the same target as recited in claim 1. The limitation will be interpreted as the same.
Claim 6 is indefinite, because:
(1) The limitation “filaments of oxygen vacancies” in line 4 renders the claim indefinite. It is unclear whether such oxygen vacancies are the same ones as recited earlier in claim 6. The limitation will be interpreted as the same.
(2) The limitation “filaments of first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2)” in lines 4-5 renders the claim indefinite. It is unclear whether such first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) are the same ones as recited earlier in claim 6. The limitation will be interpreted as the same.
Claim 7 is indefinite, because:
(1) The limitation “filaments of the oxygen vacancies” in lines 3-4 renders the claim indefinite. It is unclear whether such filaments of the oxygen vacancies are the same ones as recited in claim 6. The limitation will be interpreted as the same.
(2) The limitation “filaments of the first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2)” in line 4 renders the claim indefinite. It is unclear whether such filaments of the first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) are the same ones as recited in claim 6. The limitation will be interpreted as the same.
Note the dependent claims 8-9 necessarily inherit the indefiniteness of the claims on which they depend.
I. Prior-art rejections based on Park
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102/103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claims 1-5 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as anticipated by WO 2020/130345 A1 to Park et al. (“Park”) or, in the alternative, under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103 as obvious over Park.
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Regarding independent claim 1, Park in Fig. 6 teaches an artificial synapse device 660 (Fig. 6 & p.21, synaptic memristor 660), comprising:
a first electrode 620 (p.21, first electrode 620);
a second electrode 662 (p.21, second electrode 662) disposed to face the first electrode 620 (Fig. 6); and
a switching layer 661 (p.22, insulating layer 661 including a material whose resistance changes (i.e., switches) to a high resistance state and a low resistance state according to a voltage applied from the outside) formed of an amorphous carbon oxide (p.22, amorphous carbon oxide) deposited by injecting oxygen when sputtering carbon into a target between the first electrode 620 and the second electrode 662 (see Note 1 below),
wherein the artificial synapse device 660 has synaptic characteristics (p.21, synaptic memristor 660 would have synaptic characteristics) wherein a value of an output current changes gradually when a same voltage of either set voltage or reset voltage is repeatedly applied to the first electrode 620 (see Note 2 below).
Note 1: This limitation appears to be defining a device/product by a method (i.e., deposited by injecting oxygen when sputtering carbon into a target between the first electrode and the second electrode): As such, ‘[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process.” see In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). In the instant case, the limitation “deposited by injecting oxygen when sputtering carbon into a target between the first electrode and the second electrode” does not appear to add anything structural to the actual device/product that already has the amorphous carbon oxide switching layer.
Note 2: A limitation of "has synaptic characteristics wherein a value of an output current changes gradually when a same voltage of either set voltage or reset voltage is repeatedly applied to the first electrode" is attempting to define the claimed artificial synapse device by what it does, rather than by what it is, which can be evidenced by its specific structure or specific composition. See MPEP § 2173.05(g). The limitation can be construed as a function and/or a property of the claimed artificial synapse device.
According to Section 2114 of the MPEP, "While features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or functionally, claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-78, 44 USPQ2d 1429,1431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The absence of a disclosure in a prior art reference relating to function did not defeat the Board’s finding of anticipation of claimed apparatus because the limitations at issue were found to be inherent in the prior art reference); see also In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA 1971); In re Danly, 263 F.2d 844, 847, 120 USPQ 528, 531 (CCPA 1959). “[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)".
Here, since Park teaches all of the claimed structure limitations of the claimed artificial synapse device, the artificial synapse device taught by Park is capable of performing the claimed function as recited in the limitation above.
Furthermore, according to Section 2112.III of the MPEP, "Where applicant claims a composition in terms of a function, property or characteristic{,} and the composition of the prior art is the same as that of the claim but the function is not explicitly disclosed by the reference, the examiner may make a rejection under both 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, expressed as a 102/103 rejection. “There is nothing inconsistent in concurrent rejections for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 and for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102.” In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 n.4, 195 USPQ 430, 433 n.4 (CCPA 1977). This same rationale should also apply to product, apparatus, and process claims claimed in terms of function, property or characteristic. Therefore, a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is appropriate for these types of claims as well as for composition claims {underlined for emphasis}."
Here, the limitation does not structurally distinguish the claimed artificial synapse device over the prior art as is it directed to a function or property of the claimed artificial synapse device. The artificial synapse device including inherently has the property or can function as recited in the limitation above.
Regarding claim 2, Park in Fig. 6 further teaches the artificial synapse device 660 has multiple conductivity levels as the value of the output current gradually increases when a set voltage with a same pulse width, pulse interval, and voltage magnitude is repeatedly applied to the first electrode 620 (see Note below).
Note: A limitation of "has multiple conductivity levels as the value of the output current gradually increases when a set voltage with a same pulse width, pulse interval, and voltage magnitude is repeatedly applied to the first electrode" is attempting to define the claimed artificial synapse device by what it does, rather than by what it is, which can be evidenced by its specific structure or specific composition. See MPEP § 2173.05(g). The limitation can be construed as a function and/or a property of the claimed artificial synapse device.
According to Section 2114 of the MPEP, "While features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or functionally, claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-78, 44 USPQ2d 1429,1431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The absence of a disclosure in a prior art reference relating to function did not defeat the Board’s finding of anticipation of claimed apparatus because the limitations at issue were found to be inherent in the prior art reference); see also In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA 1971); In re Danly, 263 F.2d 844, 847, 120 USPQ 528, 531 (CCPA 1959). “[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)".
Here, since Park teaches all of the claimed structure limitations of the claimed artificial synapse device, the artificial synapse device taught by Park is capable of performing the claimed function as recited in the limitation above.
Furthermore, according to Section 2112.III of the MPEP, "Where applicant claims a composition in terms of a function, property or characteristic{,} and the composition of the prior art is the same as that of the claim but the function is not explicitly disclosed by the reference, the examiner may make a rejection under both 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, expressed as a 102/103 rejection. “There is nothing inconsistent in concurrent rejections for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 and for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102.” In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 n.4, 195 USPQ 430, 433 n.4 (CCPA 1977). This same rationale should also apply to product, apparatus, and process claims claimed in terms of function, property or characteristic. Therefore, a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is appropriate for these types of claims as well as for composition claims {underlined for emphasis}."
Here, the limitation does not structurally distinguish the claimed artificial synapse device over the prior art as is it directed to a function or property of the claimed artificial synapse device. The artificial synapse device including inherently has the property or can function as recited in the limitation above.
Regarding claim 3, Park in Fig. 6 further teaches the artificial synapse device 660 has multiple conductivity levels as the value of the output current gradually increases when a set voltage with a same pulse width, pulse interval, and voltage magnitude is repeatedly applied to the first electrode 620 (see Note below).
Note: A limitation of "has multiple conductivity levels as the value of the output current gradually reduces when a reset voltage with a same pulse width, pulse interval, and voltage magnitude is repeatedly applied to the first electrode" is attempting to define the claimed artificial synapse device by what it does, rather than by what it is, which can be evidenced by its specific structure or specific composition. See MPEP § 2173.05(g). The limitation can be construed as a function and/or a property of the claimed artificial synapse device.
According to Section 2114 of the MPEP, "While features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or functionally, claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-78, 44 USPQ2d 1429,1431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The absence of a disclosure in a prior art reference relating to function did not defeat the Board’s finding of anticipation of claimed apparatus because the limitations at issue were found to be inherent in the prior art reference); see also In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA 1971); In re Danly, 263 F.2d 844, 847, 120 USPQ 528, 531 (CCPA 1959). “[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)".
Here, since Park teaches all of the claimed structure limitations of the claimed artificial synapse device, the artificial synapse device taught by Park is capable of performing the claimed function as recited in the limitation above.
Furthermore, according to Section 2112.III of the MPEP, "Where applicant claims a composition in terms of a function, property or characteristic{,} and the composition of the prior art is the same as that of the claim but the function is not explicitly disclosed by the reference, the examiner may make a rejection under both 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, expressed as a 102/103 rejection. “There is nothing inconsistent in concurrent rejections for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 and for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102.” In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 n.4, 195 USPQ 430, 433 n.4 (CCPA 1977). This same rationale should also apply to product, apparatus, and process claims claimed in terms of function, property or characteristic. Therefore, a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is appropriate for these types of claims as well as for composition claims {underlined for emphasis}."
Here, the limitation does not structurally distinguish the claimed artificial synapse device over the prior art as is it directed to a function or property of the claimed artificial synapse device. The artificial synapse device including inherently has the property or can function as recited in the limitation above.
Regarding claim 4, Park in Fig. 6 further teaches the artificial synapse device 660 performs one memory operation of a short-term memory operation wherein a current value is reduced to an initial value after a certain time based on the number of times the same voltage is repeatedly applied and a long-term memory operation wherein the current value is maintained after the certain time (see Note below).
Note: A limitation of "performs one memory operation of a short-term memory operation wherein a current value is reduced to an initial value after a certain time based on the number of times the same voltage is repeatedly applied and a long-term memory operation wherein the current value is maintained after the certain time" is attempting to define the claimed artificial synapse device by what it does, rather than by what it is, which can be evidenced by its specific structure or specific composition. See MPEP § 2173.05(g). The limitation can be construed as a function and/or a property of the claimed artificial synapse device.
According to Section 2114 of the MPEP, "While features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or functionally, claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-78, 44 USPQ2d 1429,1431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The absence of a disclosure in a prior art reference relating to function did not defeat the Board’s finding of anticipation of claimed apparatus because the limitations at issue were found to be inherent in the prior art reference); see also In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA 1971); In re Danly, 263 F.2d 844, 847, 120 USPQ 528, 531 (CCPA 1959). “[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)".
Here, since Park teaches all of the claimed structure limitations of the claimed artificial synapse device, the artificial synapse device taught by Park is capable of performing the claimed function as recited in the limitation above.
Furthermore, according to Section 2112.III of the MPEP, "Where applicant claims a composition in terms of a function, property or characteristic{,} and the composition of the prior art is the same as that of the claim but the function is not explicitly disclosed by the reference, the examiner may make a rejection under both 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, expressed as a 102/103 rejection. “There is nothing inconsistent in concurrent rejections for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 and for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102.” In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 n.4, 195 USPQ 430, 433 n.4 (CCPA 1977). This same rationale should also apply to product, apparatus, and process claims claimed in terms of function, property or characteristic. Therefore, a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is appropriate for these types of claims as well as for composition claims {underlined for emphasis}."
Here, the limitation does not structurally distinguish the claimed artificial synapse device over the prior art as is it directed to a function or property of the claimed artificial synapse device. The artificial synapse device including inherently has the property or can function as recited in the limitation above.
Regarding claim 5, Park in Fig. 6 further teaches the switching layer 661 is formed of the amorphous carbon oxide (p.22, amorphous carbon oxide) deposited by injecting oxygen in an oxygen content of 10% to 11% based on an on-axis sputtering process when sputtering the carbon to a target (see Note below).
Note: This limitation appears to be defining a device/product by a method (i.e., deposited by injecting oxygen in an oxygen content of 10% to 11% based on an on-axis sputtering process when sputtering the carbon to a target): As such, ‘[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process.” see In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). In the instant case, the limitation “deposited by injecting oxygen in an oxygen content of 10% to 11% based on an on-axis sputtering process when sputtering the carbon to a target” does not appear to add anything structural to the actual device/product having the amorphous carbon oxide switching layer.
Regarding claim 10, Park in Fig. 6 further teaches the first electrode 620 and the second electrode 662 is formed of at least one metal material selected from platinum (Pt), tungsten (W), gold (Au), rubidium (Ru), iridium (Ir), palladium (Pd) (p.22).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claims 6-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Park in view of US 2015/0036413 A1 to Dellmann et al. (“Dellmann”).
Regarding claim 6, Park in Fig. 6 teaches the switching layer 661 is formed between the first electrode 620 and the second electrode 662.
Park does not explicitly disclose oxygen atoms, oxygen ions, oxygen vacancies, first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) of carbon atoms and second hybrid orbitals (C-C sp3) of carbon atoms coexist in a pristine state of the switching layer, and, when the set voltage is applied to the first electrode, filaments of oxygen vacancies and filaments of first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) are formed between the first electrode and the second electrode, thereby becoming a set state of a low-resistance state (LRS).
Dellmann recognizes a need for improved performances and increased resistivity of a resistive memory element (abstract, ¶ 54-¶ 55). Dellmann satisfies the need by providing oxygen atoms (¶ 38), oxygen ions (¶ 54), oxygen vacancies (¶ 54), first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) of carbon atoms (¶ 55) and second hybrid orbitals (C-C sp3) of carbon atoms (¶ 55) coexist in a pristine state of a switching layer 14 (Figs. 1-3, ¶ 37, ¶ 53, resistively switchable material/layer 14 is an amorphous carbon oxide having switchable resistance between different states; ¶ 15, ¶ 54-¶ 55), and, when a set voltage (Fig. 1, ¶ 50, ¶ 80, set voltage pulse 24 applies to the layer 14 through the electrode 16) is applied to a first electrode 16 (Fig. 1, ¶ 37, ¶ 50, ¶ 80, conductive electrode 16), filaments of oxygen vacancies (¶ 54) and filaments of first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) (¶ 80 & ¶ 5, conductive filaments are C-C sp2 filaments) are formed between the first electrode 16 and a second electrode 12 (Fig. 1, ¶ 37, electrode 12), thereby becoming a set state of a low-resistance state (LRS) (¶ 55 & ¶ 80).
Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to use the amorphous carbon oxide resistive layer taught by Dellmann for the switching layer taught by Park, so as to have improved performances and increased resistivity of a resistive memory element (Dellmann: abstract, ¶ 54-¶ 55).
Regarding claim 7, the combination of Park and Dellmann further teaches wherein in the switching layer 661, 14 (Park; Dellmann) when the set voltage is applied to the first electrode 16 (Dellmann), a binding ratio of the first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) increases while the oxygen ions move toward the second electrode 12 (Dellmann), and filaments of the oxygen vacancies and filaments of the first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) are formed as a binding ratio of the second hybrid orbitals (C-C sp3) and a binding ratio of the oxygen atoms and the carbon atoms decrease (see Note below).
Note: A limitation of "in the switching layer when the set voltage is applied to the first electrode, a binding ratio of the first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) increases while the oxygen ions move toward the second electrode, and filaments of the oxygen vacancies and filaments of the first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) are formed as a binding ratio of the second hybrid orbitals (C-C sp3) and a binding ratio of the oxygen atoms and the carbon atoms decrease" is attempting to define the claimed switching layer by what it does, rather than by what it is, which can be evidenced by its specific structure or specific composition. See MPEP § 2173.05(g). The limitation can be construed as a function and/or a property of the claimed artificial synapse device.
According to Section 2114 of the MPEP, "While features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or functionally, claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-78, 44 USPQ2d 1429,1431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The absence of a disclosure in a prior art reference relating to function did not defeat the Board’s finding of anticipation of claimed apparatus because the limitations at issue were found to be inherent in the prior art reference); see also In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA 1971); In re Danly, 263 F.2d 844, 847, 120 USPQ 528, 531 (CCPA 1959). “[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)".
Here, since the combination of Park and Dellmann teaches all of the claimed structure limitations of the claimed artificial synapse device, the artificial synapse device taught by Park and Dellmann is capable of performing the claimed function as recited in the limitation above.
Furthermore, according to Section 2112.III of the MPEP, "Where applicant claims a composition in terms of a function, property or characteristic{,} and the composition of the prior art is the same as that of the claim but the function is not explicitly disclosed by the reference, the examiner may make a rejection under both 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, expressed as a 102/103 rejection. “There is nothing inconsistent in concurrent rejections for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 and for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102.” In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 n.4, 195 USPQ 430, 433 n.4 (CCPA 1977). This same rationale should also apply to product, apparatus, and process claims claimed in terms of function, property or characteristic. Therefore, a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is appropriate for these types of claims as well as for composition claims {underlined for emphasis}."
Here, the limitation does not structurally distinguish the claimed switching layer over the prior art as is it directed to a function or property of the claimed artificial synapse device. The artificial synapse device including inherently has the property or can function as recited in the limitation above.
Regarding claim 8, the combination of Park and Dellmann further teaches in the switching layer 661, 14 (Park; Dellmann) when the reset voltage is applied to the first electrode 16 (Dellmann) in the set state, the filaments of the oxygen vacancies and the filaments of the first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) between the first electrode 16 and the second electrode 12 (Dellmann) are broken, becoming a reset state of a high-resistance state (HRS) (see Note below).
Note: A limitation of " in the switching layer when the reset voltage is applied to the first electrode in the set state, the filaments of the oxygen vacancies and the filaments of the first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) between the first electrode and the second electrode are broken, becoming a reset state of a high-resistance state (HRS)" is attempting to define the claimed switching layer by what it does, rather than by what it is, which can be evidenced by its specific structure or specific composition. See MPEP § 2173.05(g). The limitation can be construed as a function and/or a property of the claimed artificial synapse device.
According to Section 2114 of the MPEP, "While features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or functionally, claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-78, 44 USPQ2d 1429,1431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The absence of a disclosure in a prior art reference relating to function did not defeat the Board’s finding of anticipation of claimed apparatus because the limitations at issue were found to be inherent in the prior art reference); see also In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA 1971); In re Danly, 263 F.2d 844, 847, 120 USPQ 528, 531 (CCPA 1959). “[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)".
Here, since the combination of Park and Dellmann teaches all of the claimed structure limitations of the claimed artificial synapse device, the artificial synapse device taught by Park and Dellmann is capable of performing the claimed function as recited in the limitation above.
Furthermore, according to Section 2112.III of the MPEP, "Where applicant claims a composition in terms of a function, property or characteristic{,} and the composition of the prior art is the same as that of the claim but the function is not explicitly disclosed by the reference, the examiner may make a rejection under both 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, expressed as a 102/103 rejection. “There is nothing inconsistent in concurrent rejections for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 and for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102.” In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 n.4, 195 USPQ 430, 433 n.4 (CCPA 1977). This same rationale should also apply to product, apparatus, and process claims claimed in terms of function, property or characteristic. Therefore, a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is appropriate for these types of claims as well as for composition claims {underlined for emphasis}."
Here, the limitation does not structurally distinguish the claimed switching layer over the prior art as is it directed to a function or property of the claimed artificial synapse device. The artificial synapse device including inherently has the property or can function as recited in the limitation above.
Regarding claim 9, the combination of Park and Dellmann further in the switching layer when the reset voltage is applied to the first electrode, the filaments of the oxygen vacancies and the filaments of the first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) are broken as the oxygen ions move toward the first electrode, the binding ratio of the first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) decreases, and the binding ratio of the second hybrid orbitals (C-C sp3) and the binding ratio of the oxygen atoms and the carbon atoms increase (see Note below).
Note: A limitation of "in the switching layer when the reset voltage is applied to the first electrode, the filaments of the oxygen vacancies and the filaments of the first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) are broken as the oxygen ions move toward the first electrode, the binding ratio of the first hybrid orbitals (C-C sp2) decreases, and the binding ratio of the second hybrid orbitals (C-C sp3) and the binding ratio of the oxygen atoms and the carbon atoms increase” is attempting to define the claimed switching layer by what it does, rather than by what it is, which can be evidenced by its specific structure or specific composition. See MPEP § 2173.05(g). The limitation can be construed as a function and/or a property of the claimed artificial synapse device.
According to Section 2114 of the MPEP, "While features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or functionally, claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-78, 44 USPQ2d 1429,1431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The absence of a disclosure in a prior art reference relating to function did not defeat the Board’s finding of anticipation of claimed apparatus because the limitations at issue were found to be inherent in the prior art reference); see also In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA 1971); In re Danly, 263 F.2d 844, 847, 120 USPQ 528, 531 (CCPA 1959). “[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)".
Here, since the combination of Park and Dellmann teaches all of the claimed structure limitations of the claimed artificial synapse device, the artificial synapse device taught by Park and Dellmann is capable of performing the claimed function as recited in the limitation above.
Furthermore, according to Section 2112.III of the MPEP, "Where applicant claims a composition in terms of a function, property or characteristic{,} and the composition of the prior art is the same as that of the claim but the function is not explicitly disclosed by the reference, the examiner may make a rejection under both 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, expressed as a 102/103 rejection. “There is nothing inconsistent in concurrent rejections for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 and for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102.” In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 n.4, 195 USPQ 430, 433 n.4 (CCPA 1977). This same rationale should also apply to product, apparatus, and process claims claimed in terms of function, property or characteristic. Therefore, a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is appropriate for these types of claims as well as for composition claims {underlined for emphasis}."
Here, the limitation does not structurally distinguish the claimed switching layer over the prior art as is it directed to a function or property of the claimed artificial synapse device. The artificial synapse device including inherently has the property or can function as recited in the limitation above.
II. Prior-art rejections based on Ando
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claims 14-15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable and obvious over US 2019/0273205 A1 to Ando et al. (“Ando”).
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Regarding independent claim 14, Ando in Fig. 6 teaches an artificial synapse device array 70 (Fig. 7, ¶ 34, ¶ 43, ¶ 54-¶ 55, RRAM crossbar array 70 including resistive random access memories (ReRAMs or RRAMs) 60, which are a synapse including resistive switching memory elements 61 (Fig. 6, ¶ 53)), comprising:
a plurality of artificial synapse devices 61 (Figs. 6-7, ¶ 53-¶ 55, resistive switching memory elements 61), each of the artificial synapse devices 61 comprising a first electrode 64 (Fig. 6, second metal layer 64), a second electrode 62 (Fig. 6, ¶ 53, first metal layer 62) disposed to face the first electrode 62, and a switching layer 63 (Fig. 6, ¶ 53, insulating layer 63 of switching element 61 would switch between states);
a plurality of word lines 74 (Figs. 6-7, ¶ 55, word lines 74) connected to a first electrode 64 (Figs. 6-7, electrode 64 on the bottom of layer 63) of each of the plural artificial synapse devices 61; and
a plurality of bit lines 72 (Figs. 6-7, ¶ 55, bit lines 72) connected to a second electrode 62 (Figs. 6-7, electrode 62 on the top of layer 63) of each of the plural artificial synapse devices 61,
wherein each of the plural artificial synapse devices 61 has synaptic characteristics wherein a value of an output current changes gradually when a same voltage of either set voltage or reset voltage is repeatedly applied to the first electrode 64 through each of the plural word lines 74 (see Note below).
Note: A limitation of "has synaptic characteristics wherein a value of an output current changes gradually when a same voltage of either set voltage or reset voltage is repeatedly applied to the first electrode through each of the plural word lines" is attempting to define the claimed artificial synapse device by what it does, rather than by what it is, which can be evidenced by its specific structure or specific composition. See MPEP § 2173.05(g). The limitation can be construed as a function and/or a property of the claimed artificial synapse device.
According to Section 2114 of the MPEP, "While features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or functionally, claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-78, 44 USPQ2d 1429,1431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The absence of a disclosure in a prior art reference relating to function did not defeat the Board’s finding of anticipation of claimed apparatus because the limitations at issue were found to be inherent in the prior art reference); see also In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA 1971); In re Danly, 263 F.2d 844, 847, 120 USPQ 528, 531 (CCPA 1959). “[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)".
Here, since Ando teaches all of the claimed structure limitations of the claimed artificial synapse device, the artificial synapse device taught by Ando is capable of performing the claimed function as recited in the limitation above.
Furthermore, according to Section 2112.III of the MPEP, "Where applicant claims a composition in terms of a function, property or characteristic{,} and the composition of the prior art is the same as that of the claim but the function is not explicitly disclosed by the reference, the examiner may make a rejection under both 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, expressed as a 102/103 rejection. “There is nothing inconsistent in concurrent rejections for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 and for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102.” In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 n.4, 195 USPQ 430, 433 n.4 (CCPA 1977). This same rationale should also apply to product, apparatus, and process claims claimed in terms of function, property or characteristic. Therefore, a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is appropriate for these types of claims as well as for composition claims {underlined for emphasis}."
Here, the limitation does not structurally distinguish the claimed artificial synapse device over the prior art as is it directed to a function or property of the claimed artificial synapse device. The artificial synapse device including inherently has the property or can function as recited in the limitation above.
However, Ando does not explicitly disclose the switching layer is formed of an amorphous carbon oxide deposited by injecting oxygen when sputtering carbon to a target between the second electrode.
Dellmann recognizes a need for improved performances and increased resistivity of a resistive memory element (abstract, ¶ 54-¶ 55). Dellmann satisfies the need by providing a switching layer 14 (Figs. 1-3, ¶ 37, ¶ 53, resistively switchable material/layer 14 is an amorphous carbon oxide having switchable resistance between different states) is formed of an amorphous carbon oxide (¶ 53, amorphous carbon oxide comprising C-O bond) deposited by injecting oxygen when sputtering carbon to a target between a second electrode 12 (Figs. 1-4, ¶ 60, ¶ 62 disclose a-C:O compound is obtained by sputtering to a graphite target on the bottom electrode 12 in a chamber including O2 gas).
Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to use the amorphous carbon oxide taught by Dellmann for the switching layer taught by Ando, so as to have improved performances and increased resistivity of a resistive memory element (Dellmann: abstract, ¶ 54-¶ 55).
Regarding claim 15, the combination of Ando and Dellmann further teaches each of the artificial synapse devices has multiple conductivity levels as the value of the output current gradually increases when a set voltage with a same pulse width, pulse interval, and voltage magnitude is repeatedly applied to the first electrode through each of the plural word lines or multiple conductivity levels as the value of the output current gradually reduces when a reset voltage with a same pulse width, pulse interval, and voltage magnitude is repeatedly applied to the first electrode through each of the plural word lines (see Note below).
Note: A limitation of "has multiple conductivity levels as the value of the output current gradually increases when a set voltage with a same pulse width, pulse interval, and voltage magnitude is repeatedly applied to the first electrode through each of the plural word lines or multiple conductivity levels as the value of the output current gradually reduces when a reset voltage with a same pulse width, pulse interval, and voltage magnitude is repeatedly applied to the first electrode through each of the plural word lines" is attempting to define the claimed artificial synapse device by what it does, rather than by what it is, which can be evidenced by its specific structure or specific composition. See MPEP § 2173.05(g). The limitation can be construed as a function and/or a property of the claimed artificial synapse device.
According to Section 2114 of the MPEP, "While features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or functionally, claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-78, 44 USPQ2d 1429,1431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The absence of a disclosure in a prior art reference relating to function did not defeat the Board’s finding of anticipation of claimed apparatus because the limitations at issue were found to be inherent in the prior art reference); see also In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA 1971); In re Danly, 263 F.2d 844, 847, 120 USPQ 528, 531 (CCPA 1959). “[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)".
Here, since Park teaches all of the claimed structure limitations of the claimed artificial synapse device, the artificial synapse device taught by Park is capable of performing the claimed function as recited in the limitation above.
Furthermore, according to Section 2112.III of the MPEP, "Where applicant claims a composition in terms of a function, property or characteristic{,} and the composition of the prior art is the same as that of the claim but the function is not explicitly disclosed by the reference, the examiner may make a rejection under both 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, expressed as a 102/103 rejection. “There is nothing inconsistent in concurrent rejections for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 and for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102.” In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 n.4, 195 USPQ 430, 433 n.4 (CCPA 1977). This same rationale should also apply to product, apparatus, and process claims claimed in terms of function, property or characteristic. Therefore, a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is appropriate for these types of claims as well as for composition claims {underlined for emphasis}."
Here, the limitation does not structurally distinguish the claimed artificial synapse device over the prior art as is it directed to a function or property of the claimed artificial synapse device. The artificial synapse device including inherently has the property or can function as recited in the limitation above.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
WO 2020/130344 A1 to Park et al. relates to a neuron comprising a two-terminal spin element for integrating and firing, in which the two-terminal spin element is formed to have a negative differential resistance (NDR) area in which an electric current decreases as voltage increases.
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/M.L./Examiner, Art Unit 2817
/ELISEO RAMOS FELICIANO/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2817
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