DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
1. Claims 1-21 are pending in the instant patent application.
Claims 1-21 are under examination.
Claim Objections
2. Claim 1, 6-8, 12, 13, 16 and 18 are objected to because of the following informalities:
The claims recite “T2Rs” and “T1Rs” without first providing the full name of the terms. It is suggested that the terms be spelled out at their first use and in all independent claims so that it is clearly understood what they stand for. Appropriate correction is suggested.
3. Claim 2 is objected to for reciting the term “tast,” which appears a typo.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
4. Claims 1-21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
5. Claims 1 and 18 are vague and indefinite for reasons that follow. First, the claims recite limitation “functionality of T2Rs and/or T1Rs,” which in the absence of precise definition of the term “functionality” renders the claims indefinite. Furthermore, it is not clear and cannot be determined from the claims or the specification as originally filed how determining phenotypic expression of the receptors correlates with detection of “functionality.” Next, the claims expressly require obtaining taste preference information and/or determining “taste preference score” without any indication as what specific physical, objective and repeatable steps support “obtaining” and “determining.” It is not obvious whether taste preference encompasses testing different types, species, strains of cannabis, standardized and/or arranged to be compared with a positive and negative control, and further analyzed to produce meaningful “score.” Finally, the step of “predicting cannabis preferences for the subject” in the context of the claimed subject matter makes no sense. Briefly, it is not clear what encompasses “prediction,” whether the final step relates to identification of the preferred cannabis, such as types, species, strains, or provides a numeric value that corresponds to “preference,” or anything else. Applicant is advised to rewrite the claims to better express claimed subject matter.
6. Applicant is advised that one of the purposes of the 112, second paragraph is to provide a clear warning to others as to what constitutes infringement of the patent (see, e.g., Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1379, 55 USPQ2d 1279, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The test for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is whether “those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F .2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
In precedential decision Ex parte Kenichi Miyazaki, Appeal 2007-330, BPAI stated “In particular, rather than requiring that the claims are insolubly ambiguous, we hold that if a claim is amendable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.”
Further, the federal Circuit stated in Halliburton Energy Servs.:
When a claim limitation is defined in purely functional terms, the task of determining whether that limitation is sufficiently definite is a difficult one that is highly dependent on context (e.g., the disclosure in the specification and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art area). We note that the patent drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the patent claims, and it is highly desirable that patent examiner demand that applicants do so in appropriate circumstances so that the patent can be amended during prosecution rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity in litigation.
Halliburton Energy Servs. V. M-ILLC 514 F .3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
7. Claims 2 and 19 are vague and ambiguous for reciting limitation “cannabis bin scores.” The metes and bounds of the limitation cannot be determined from the claim or the specification as filed. The relevant art of record does not recognize the term and the specification fails to provide definitions that support the limitation. This renders the claims indefinite.
8. Regarding claim 13, the phrase "for example" renders the claim indefinite because it is unclear whether the limitation(s) following the phrase are part of the claimed invention. See MPEP § 2173.05(d).
9. Claims 3-12, 14-17, 20 and 21 are indefinite for being dependent from indefinite claim(s).
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
10. Claims 1-21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention.
Claims 1-21 are directed to methods for predicting cannabis preference of a subject. However, the specification does not provide sufficient guidance to enable practice the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.
The enablement requirement is met when one skilled in the art, having read the specification, could practice the invention without “undue experimentation.” Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d at 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation include (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art and, (8) the breadth of the claims. In re Wands, 8 USPQ2d, 1400 (CAFC 1988).
The specification discloses the need for “reliable methods of predicting taste preferences of cannabis,” p. 4. At pp.7-20, the specification broadly describes prophetic examples schematically depicted within Fig. 1-3. However, there is no explanation of what stands for “taste preference information,” how to determine “taste preference score,” the units for the “taste preference score” and for “cannabis bin score,” or description of different meaningful and standardizes examples of “bitter and/or sweet cannabis.” The specification fails to provide any factual data or supply a line of sound scientific reasoning to support any of the steps recited within claim 6, for example, to be practiced in association with the instant claimed methods. In fact, the specification does not describe a single embodiment that satisfies the claims’ limitations.
Because the specification does not provide neither enough guidance for the claimed methods for predicting cannabis preferences, nor working examples, which would show that the claimed methods were successfully achieved, undue experimentation on part of one skilled in the art would be required to discover how to practice the claimed invention.
The nature of the invention involving biological molecules and their effect on a physiological system is complex and unpredictable. As was found in Ex parte Hitzeman, 9 USPQ2d 1821 (BPAI 1987), a single embodiment may provide broad enablement in cases involving predictable factors such as mechanical or electrical elements, but more will be required in cases that involve unpredictable factors such as most chemical reactions and physiological activity. This invention is in a class of invention which the CAFC has characterized as "the unpredictable arts such as chemistry and biology", Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See also In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (CCPA 1970); Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1026 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 856 (1991).
The prior art recognizes T1R as G protein-coupled chemosensory receptor, see US patent 7,241,880, for example. Screening of different compounds for stimulating the receptors has also been explained, see col. 3-4 of the ‘880 patent. However, stimulation of the receptors with agonists to release products for further interaction with reagents, such as in claim 6, for example, has not been reported. It is also not recognized in the art that phenotypic expression of T2R or T1R is directly associated with cannabis preference of a subject under testing.
The specification contemplates methods for predicting cannabis preferences of a subject based on phenotypic expression of T2Rs and/or T1Rs. However, the specification fails to teach any factual evidence directly supporting such assertion. Therefore, no methods for predicting cannabis preferences can be envisioned because the information provided within the specification does not directly relate to any of the subject matter of claims 1-21. Merely explaining the steps as depicted within Fig. 1-3 is meaningless to a skilled practitioner set to obtain taste preference information, determine taste preference score, calculate bin scores, stimulate receptors with various agonists, detect products released as a result of stimulation, or record a “discerned level of taste perception,” as currently claimed.
A mere wish or plan of obtaining the claimed invention is not sufficient.
The standard of an enabling disclosure is not the ability to make and test if the invention worked but one of the ability to make and use with a reasonable expectation of success.
A patent is granted for a completed invention, not the general suggestion of an idea and how that idea might be developed into the claimed invention. If mere plausibility were the test for enablement under section 112, applicants could obtain patent rights to “inventions” consisting of little more than respectable guesses as to the likelihood of their success. In the decision of Genentec, Inc, v. Novo Nordisk, 42 USPQ 2d 100, (CAFC 1997), the court held that:
“[p]atent protection is granted in return for an enabling disclosure of an invention, not for vague intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable” and that “[t]ossing out the mere germ of an idea does not constitute enabling disclosure.” The court further stated that “when there is no disclosure of any specific starting material or of any of the conditions under which a process is to be carried out, undue experimentation is required; there is a failure to meet the enablement requirements that cannot be rectified by asserting that all the disclosure related to the process is within the skill of the art,” “[i]t is the specification, not the knowledge of one skilled in the art, that must supply the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement.”
The instant specification is not enabling because one cannot follow the guidance presented therein and practice the claimed methods without first making a substantial inventive contribution to perfect the methods and complete the invention.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
11. Claims 1-21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. Method claim(s) 1-21, broadly directed to evaluation of naturally occurring taste receptors, set forth laws of nature by reciting relationship between changes that occur naturally during stimulation of taste receptors. The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception for reasons that follow.
The subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. 101 of natural products (i.e., whether the claimed product is a non-naturally occurring product of human ingenuity that is markedly different from naturally occurring products) was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court decisions including Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116, 106 USPQ2d 1972 (2013), and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1289, 101 USPQ2d 1961 (2012). "[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175, 185 (1981); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U. S. (2010). "Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work." Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U. S. 63, 67 (1972).
In brief, in Prometheus, a method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder is the focus. This method comprises a) administering 6-thioguanine to patients and b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in the patients and c) correlate the level of 6-thioguanine, i.e. a certain level/red blood cells, with the decision whether a need for increase or decrease the amount of 6-thioguanine treatment in said patients.
In Prometheus, the Court found that "[i]f a law of nature is not patentable, neither is a process reciting a law of nature, unless that process has additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself." Additionally, "conventional or obvious" "[pre]solution activity" is normally not sufficient to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law." Flook, 437 U. S., at 590; see also Bilski, 561 U. S., ("[T]he prohibition against patenting abstract ideas 'cannot be circumvented by'.., adding 'insignificant post-solution activity'" (quoting Diehr, supra, at 191-192)).
The Court also summarized their holding by stating "[t]o put the matter more succinctly, the claims inform a relevant audience about certain laws of nature; any additional steps consist of well understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community; and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately."
Thus, if the claim recites or involves a judicial exception, such as a law of nature/natural principle or natural phenomenon (e.g., the law of gravity, F=ma, sunlight, barometric pressure, etc.), and/or something that appears to be a natural product (e.g., a citrus fruit, uranium metal, nucleic acid, protein, etc.), then the claim only qualifies as eligible subject matter if the claim as a whole recites something significantly different than the judicial exception itself.
In the instant case, based upon an analysis with respect to the claim as a whole, claims 1-21 are determined to be directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. The rationale for this determination is explained below in view of controlling legal precedent set forth in 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility (79 FR 74618) dated December 16, 2014 and 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (84 FR 50) dated January 07, 2019.
The instant claims 1-21 are directed to a process. (Step 1: Yes).
Next, Step 2, is the two-part analysis from Alice Corp. (also called the Mayo test) to determine whether the claim is directed to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas (the judicially recognized exceptions). (In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) the Supreme Court sets forth a two-step test for determining patent eligibility. First, determine if the claims encompass a judicial exception (a natural phenomenon/law of nature/abstract idea). If so, then ask whether the remaining elements/steps, either in isolation or combination with the other non-patent-ineligible elements, are sufficient to ‘“transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297). Put another way, there must be a further “inventive concept” to take the claim into the realm of patent eligibility. Id. at 2355. In the recent Myriad v Ambry case, the CAFC found claims (drawn to methods comprising obtaining tissue samples, analyzing sequences of cDNA and comparing germline sequences of a gene to wild-type sequences) to encompass the abstract mental processes of ‘comparing’ and ‘analyzing’. Recitation of specific techniques (in Myriad claims 7 and 8 further recited hybridization and PCR) were deemed not “enough” to make the claims patent-eligible since the claims contained no otherwise new process. The elements/steps recited in addition to the judicial exception did nothing more than spell out what practitioners already knew). The instant claims 1-21 encompass changes in the naturally occurring T1R and T2R chemosensory receptors during binding with a relevant ligand, cannabis, the process that is governed by a law of nature, and thus is a judicial exception. The relation between any changes in T1R and T2R upon contact with cannabis exists in principle and is a consequence of the ways these receptors function, entirely natural process, a natural phenomenon, and thus a judicial exception (Step 2A/1: Yes). Next, prong two of Step 2A requires identifying whether there are additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s) and evaluating those additional elements to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application of the exception. “Integration in to a practical application” requires an additional element or combination of additional elements in the claim to apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such as the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. In the instant case, the claims do not recite any additional elements to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application because all the steps of the claimed methods are limited to only those that measure, or attempt to measure, changes in T1R and T2R during stimulation.
Finally, claims 1-21 do not recite any elements, or combinations of elements to ensure that the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception because the active steps of the claims are recited at a high level of generality to be limited to describing a process of receptor binding. (Step 2B: No).
Thus, for reasons fully explained above, claims 1-21 do not satisfy the requirement of 35 U.S.C. 101 and are therefore rejected.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
12. Claims 1-21 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-20 of copending Application No. 18/506,015 and claims 1, 2, 12, 14-17, 19, 20, 25, 59-62 and 64 of copending Application No. 18/513,534 (reference applications). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of these three patent applications recite identical steps and differ only in the claims’ preamble—preference for cannabis, wine or distilled spirit—thus, reading on the same inventive concept.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Conclusion
13. No claim is allowed.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to OLGA N CHERNYSHEV whose telephone number is (571)272-0870. The examiner can normally be reached 9AM to 5:30PM, Monday to Friday.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Jeffrey Stucker can be reached at (571)272-0911. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/OLGA N CHERNYSHEV/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1675
June 2, 2026
Prosecution Insights