DETAILED ACTION
Notice of AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
This action is responsive to the following communications: the Application filed September 29, 2023.
Claims 1-19 are pending. Claims 20-26 are withdrawn due to an Election/Restriction Requirement. Claim 1 is independent.
Election/Restrictions
Claims 20-26 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b) as being drawn to a nonelected invention, there being no allowable generic or linking claim. Election was made without traverse in the reply filed on December 2, 2025.
Information Disclosure Statement
Acknowledgment is made of applicant’s Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) filed on September 29, 2023, March 8, 2024, June 6, 2024, April 4, 2025, September 30, 2025. These IDSs have been considered.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claim 12 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 12 recites the limitation "the soft and hard layers" in line 3. There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-2, 6-13 and 16-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Luo et al. (U.S. 10,204,677; hereinafter “Luo”).
Regarding independent claim 1, Luo discloses a write circuit (Fig. 6: 622 and 632) for writing state (see col. 4, ll. 24-46) into at least one memory cell in a magnetic Josephson junction (MJJ)-based memory circuit (see col. 4, ll. 32-33), the write circuit comprising:
a first current source (Fig. 6: 622), the first current source configured to generate a first current for imparting an easy axis magnetic field component on an MJJ (“zero state, ”see col. 5, ll. 58-67 and col. 6, ll. 1-30) in at least one selected memory cell among a plurality of memory cells in the memory circuit during a write operation (see col. 12, ll. 55-67 and col. 13, ll. 1-22); and
a second current source (Fig. 6: 632), the second current source configured to generate a second current that induces a third current in the at least one selected memory cell that passes through the MJJ in the at least one selected memory cell during the write operation, the third current being a seed current for setting a π-state current of the MJJ in at least one superconducting loop of the at least one selected memory cell for a subsequent read operation (“π-state, ”see col. 5, ll. 58-67 and col. 6, ll. 1-30),
wherein at least the first current source is configured such that, during the write operation, the MJJ in the at least one selected memory cell transitions: (i) from a π-state, in which a clockwise or counter-clockwise current circulates in a superconducting loop in the at least one memory cell, to a zero-state, in which no current circulates in the superconducting loop, back to the π-state; or (ii) from the zero-state to the π-state; or (iii) from the π-state to the zero-state (see col. 5, ll. 58-67 and col. 6, ll. 1-30).
Regarding claim 2, Luo discloses a control circuit coupled to at least the first the first current source, the control circuit being configured to control a direction of the first current to thereby control a direction of the easy axis field component imparted on the MJJ in the at least one selected memory cell (Fig. 6: 610, 618 and 630).
Regarding claim 6, Luo discloses the limitations with respect to claim 2.
As discussed above, Luo’s write circuit is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “write circuit,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “alternate the direction of the first current on alternate write cycles.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Luo’s write circuit appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 7, Luo discloses the limitations with respect to claim 2.
As discussed above, Luo’s write circuit is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “write circuit,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “alternate the direction of the first current within a same write operation.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Luo’s write circuit appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 8, Luo discloses the limitations with respect to claim 2.
As discussed above, Luo’s write circuit is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “write circuit,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “alternate a direction of the first current every other write operation.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Luo’s write circuit appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 9, Luo discloses the limitations with respect to claim 2.
As discussed above, Luo’s write circuit is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “write circuit,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “receive at least one of (i) a first attribute indicating a domain orientation of the MJJ in the at least one memory cell when the MJJ is in the π-state, and (ii) a second attribute indicating there is no circulating current when the MJJ is in the zero-state, and to control the direction of the easy axis field component imparted on the MJJ in the at least one selected memory cell as a function of at least one of the first and second attributes.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Luo’s write circuit appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 10, Luo discloses wherein the control circuit is configured to control the second current source to thereby control the third current being a seed current for setting the π-state current during the transition of the MJJ from at least one of (i) the zero-state to the π-state, and (ii) the π-state through the 0-state to the π-state (“π-state, ”see col. 5, ll. 58-67 and col. 6, ll. 1-30).
Regarding claim 11, Luo discloses the limitations with respect to claim 2.
As discussed above, Luo’s write circuit is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “write circuit,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “control the first current source to apply the first current in a first direction for applying an easy axis magnetic field to the MJJ in the selected memory cell, the MJJ comprising a soft layer and a hard layer arranged in a stacked structure, the MJJ being configured in the π-state before the write operation, wherein magnetic domain orientations of the soft and hard layers are parallel with respect to each other to increase a magnitude of the applied first current in the first direction such that the MJJ transitions to the zero-state, wherein the magnetic domain orientation of the soft layer switches in direction from its orientation in the π-state before the write operation of the MJJ to control the second current source to couple into the superconducting loop including the MJJ a clockwise or counter-clockwise seed current while concurrently increasing the magnitude of the applied first current in the first direction, such that the MJJ transitions back to the π-state, wherein the magnetic domain orientation of the hard layer switches in direction from its original orientation before the write operation; and to control the first and second current sources to remove the easy axis magnetic field applied to the MJJ in the selected memory cell and to remove the seed current coupled into the superconducting loop, respectively, such that the MJJ remains configured in the π-state, wherein the magnetic domain orientations of the soft and hard layers are aligned with one another, and wherein a circulating current is trapped in the superconducting loop including the MJJ, a direction of the circulating current being a function of a direction of the seed current coupled into the superconducting loop.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Luo’s write circuit appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 12, Luo discloses the limitations with respect to claim 2.
As discussed above, Luo’s write circuit is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “write circuit,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “control the first current source such that the respective magnetic domain orientations of the soft and hard layers of the MJJ in the π-state after the write operation are opposite relative to the respective magnetic domain orientations of the soft and hard layers of the MJJ in the π-state before the write operation.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Luo’s write circuit appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 13, Luo discloses the limitations with respect to claim 11.
As discussed above, Luo’s write circuit is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “write circuit,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “control the first and second current sources such that the respective magnetic domain orientations of the soft and hard layers of the MJJ in the π-state before the write operation are opposite the first direction of the applied easy axis magnetic field, and wherein the control circuit is further configured: to switch a direction of the applied easy axis magnetic field generated by the first current source to a second direction, opposite the first direction, after the MJJ transitions to the zero-state; and to increase the magnitude of the applied easy axis magnetic field in the second direction, while concurrently coupling into the superconducting loop the clockwise or counter-clockwise seed current, until the MJJ transitions back to the π-state, wherein the respective magnetic domain orientations of the soft and hard layers are in a same direction relative to their respective magnetic domain orientations before the write operation.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Luo’s write circuit appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 16, Luo discloses the limitations with respect to claim 1.
As discussed above, Luo’s write circuit is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “write circuit,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “control the first and second current sources to apply an easy axis magnetic field and a seed current, respectively, to the MJJ in the selected memory cell such that a domain orientation of the MJJ in the π-state prior to the write operation is the same as the domain orientation of the MJJ in the π-state after the write operation has completed.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Luo’s write circuit appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 17, Luo discloses the limitations with respect to claim 1.
As discussed above, Luo’s write circuit is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “write circuit,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “control the first and second current sources to apply an easy axis magnetic field and a seed current, respectively, to the MJJ in the selected memory cell such that a domain orientation of the MJJ in the π-state prior to the write operation is different relative to the domain orientation of the MJJ in the π-state after the write operation has completed.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Luo’s write circuit appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 3-5, 14-15 and 18-19 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.
The following is a statement of reasons for the indication of allowable subject matter:
With respect to claim 3, there is no teaching or suggestion in the prior art of record to provide the recited control circuit comprises one or more flip-flop circuits, each of the flip-flop circuits being associated with at least one of the plurality of memory cells in the memory circuit and configured to receive at least a portion of a decoded write address supplied to the flip-flop circuit and to generate an output control signal.
With respect to claim 14, there is no teaching or suggestion in the prior art of record to provide the recited one non-superconducting decoder circuit configured to received at least a portion of an encoded non-superconducting write address signal and to generate a decoded address signal.
With respect to claim 18, there is no teaching or suggestion in the prior art of record to provide the recited all components in the write circuit are superconducting elements.
With respect to claim 19, there is no teaching or suggestion in the write circuit are a hybrid combination of superconducting elements and non-superconducting elements.
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ALFREDO BERMUDEZ LOZADA whose telephone number is (571)272-0877. The examiner can normally be reached 7:00AM-3:30PM EST.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Alexander G Sofocleous can be reached at 571-272-0635. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/Alfredo Bermudez Lozada/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2825