DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Status of Claims
This action is in reply to the communication filed on . The disposition of claims is as follows:
Pending:
Rejected:
Response to Arguments and Amendments
Applicant's arguments filed have been fully considered. The Examiner proceeds below with a response.
Regarding Claims rejected under 35 U.S.C. § :
Applicant's arguments have been fully considered but they are not persuasive
Applicant presents the following arguments:
Contrary to the Examiner's assertions, the claimed invention of claims 1-18 provide a specific and concrete improvement in the field of automated vehicle control. For example, as specifically described in the specification (see, e.g., paragraphs [0007]- [0024]; [0046]-[0091], "DETAILED DESCRIPTION"; Figures 1-5), the invention reduces the number of controller parameters required for precise control of transverse deviation and steering wheel angle. This is achieved by isolating speed-dependent and speed- independent portions of the control model, enabling real-time compensation for speed dependency in the controlled system (see Spec., paragraphs [0046]-[0060], Fig. 1 and associated text).
Claims 1 and 2 expressly recite that the first control module and its associated mathematical model are independent of vehicle speed, thereby isolating the speed-independent portion of the control model. For example, claim 1 recites "wherein a provisional manipulated variable is determined by the first control module, wherein the provisional manipulated variable is independent of a speed of the motor vehicle ...." Thus, claim 1 provides for isolating speed-independent portions of the control module. Similarly, Claim 2, for example, "wherein the first control module is based on a first mathematical model of the at least one controlled system, wherein the first mathematical model corresponds to a non-linear model of the at least one controlled system from which the speed dependency is isolated."
Claims 3, 8 and 9 all include recitations where the speed-dependent portion is isolated, and more specifically, these claims recite that the second control module is based on the speed-dependent portion of the model and is configured to invert and compensate for speed dependency in real time, including by way of a virtual control loop and feedback linearization.. For example, claim 3 recites, "wherein the second control module is based on a second mathematical model of the at least one controlled system, wherein the second mathematical model corresponds to a speed-dependent portion of a non-linear model of the at least one controlled system." Further, claim 8 recites that the "second control module inverts the speed dependency of the at least one controlled system in real time in order to compensate for the speed dependency of the at least one controlled system." Claim 9 recites that the second control module invert the speed dependency by way of a virtual control loop and feedback linearization."
Accordingly, the above recitations, taken together, demonstrate that the claims distinctly isolate and separately address the speed-dependent and speed-independent portions of the control model, as supported by the specification (see, e.g., Specification, paragraphs [0065]-[0091], FIGS. 3-5).
The Examiner respectfully disagrees.
In connection with Applicant’s arguments alleging that the claim subject matter as a whole is integrated into a practical application because there is an improvement to other technology or technical field, the examiner respectfully disagrees.
The inquiry as to whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea “often turns on whether the claims focus on ‘the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities ... or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.’” Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Enfish, LLC, 822 F.3d at 1335–36).
MPEP § 2106.05(a) provides exemplary considerations that are indicative of an additional element or combination of elements integrating the judicial exception into a practical application, such as:
Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical field—see (MPEP § 2106.05(a));
Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine (MPEP § 2106.05(b));
Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (MPEP § 2106.05(c)); and
Applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception (MPEP § 2106.05(e)).
In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of “integration into a practical application” include:
Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely include instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea (MPEP § 2106.05(f));
Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception (MPEP § 2106.05(g)); and
Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use (MPEP § 2106.05(h)).
Short of attorney argument that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d), Applicant does not persuasively argue that any additional element or combination of elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. In the present case, limitations (A) though (D) of Claim 1 recite at least in part concepts identified as abstract ideas for the reasons above.“ The abstract idea itself cannot supply the inventive concept, no matter how groundbreaking the advance.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). . Therefore the limitations do not meet the criteria or considerations as indicative of integration into a practical application.
Applicant further argues:
B. Integration into a Practical Application
The claimed method is implemented in a motor vehicle, involving physical components. Indeed, the method is not merely a mathematical calculation or mental process; it is applied to control a physical system, resulting in improved vehicle safety and performance.
More specifically, claim 1 recites a control method for automated control of a transverse deviation and/or a steering wheel angle of a motor vehicle by an overall control loop, . .. wherein the at least one controlled system comprises a front-axle actuator of the motor vehicle and/or a steering wheel of the motor vehicle. Thus, the language of claim 1 expressly ties the claimed method directly to physical components in a motor vehicle, not just a mathematical concept
Thus, claim 1, for example, expressly recites the application of the control method to physical components of a motor vehicle, including a front-axle actuator and steering wheel, as an example. Further, the dependent claims also include recitations that demonstrate the claimed method is implemented into a practical application. For example, claims 5 and 8 both recite the use of measured variables from the vehicle's systems and real-time operation, respectively. These elements demonstrate that the claimed invention embodied in these claims is not merely an abstract idea or a mathematical concept, but it integrated into a practical application involving real-world vehicle control. As further support, Applicant respectfully points to the specification (see, e.g., Spec., pp. 7-12, Figs. 1-5).
Examiner respectfully disagrees with Applicant’s argument that the claimed limitations are indicative of integration into a practical application.
Although Applicant argues that the control method is applied to control a physical system, the claim as drafted fails to recite a step or multiple steps to actually implement control of the motor vehicle recited.
Under Prong 2 of Step 2A, the claimed limitations have been interpreted by the Examiner as merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea (See MPEP 2106.05(f)) because there is no improvement to the claimed computer elements, or to any other technology or technical field. Short of attorney argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application” (See MPEP § 2106.04(d)), Applicant does not persuasively argue that any additional element or combination of elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Therefore, the limitations do not meet the criteria or considerations as indicative of integration into a practical application.
Applicant further argues:
C. Not a Mental Process
In the Office Action, the Examiner asserts that the claimed method steps could be performed mentally. Applicant respectfully disagrees. The claimed control method requires real-time computation, sensor data, and interaction with physical vehicle components. Indeed, the method is simply incapable of being performed mentally or with pen and paper.
For example, claim 1 recites "a provisional manipulated variable is determined by the first control module ...independent of a speed of the motor vehicle ... " . .. final manipulated variable ... is determined . . . by way of the second control module ... compensates for a speed dependency ..." These steps require dynamic computation and real-time processing of vehicle data, which cannot be done mentally.
As another example, claim 5 recites ". .. the disturbance variable estimator determines the unknown disturbance variables based on a reference trajectory ... measured variables ...and/or the provisional manipulated variable ..." This claim involves processing sensor data and trajectory inputs - operations that require embedded systems and cannot be performed mentally.
As a further example, claim 8 recites that ". . .the second control module inverts the speed dependency ... in real time ..." Real-time inversion of speed-dependent dynamics is a computational task requiring control algorithms and hardware. Again, this claim includes recitations that cannot be performed mentally.
The claimed invention is not a mental process. The claims, for example, claims 1, 5 and 8 outlined above, recite real-time control of vehicle components using mathematical models, sensor data, and feedback linearization. The specification provides detailed equations (see Equations (1)-(8), Spec. pp. 6-10) and system diagrams (Figs. 1, 3-5) that describe a control architecture requiring embedded computation and physical actuation. These operations cannot be performed mentally or with pen and paper. Accordingly, the claims are directed to a technical solution implemented in a practical system, not to an abstract idea."
Examiner respectfully disagrees with Applicant’s argument that the claimed limitations are indicative of integration into a practical application.
Although Applicant argues that the control method requires real-time computation, sensor data, and interaction with physical vehicle components, the claim as drafted fails to recite a step or multiple steps to actually implement control of the motor vehicle recited.
Under Prong 2 of Step 2A, the claimed limitations have been interpreted by the Examiner as merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea (See MPEP 2106.05(f)) because there is no improvement to the claimed computer elements, or to any other technology or technical field. Short of attorney argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application” (See MPEP § 2106.04(d)), Applicant does not persuasively argue that any additional element or combination of elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Therefore, the limitations do not meet the criteria or considerations as indicative of integration into a practical application.
Applicant further argues:
D. The Guidance on Evaluating Subject Matter Eligibility of Claims
Under 35 U.S.C. 101 issued by the Deputy Commissioner for Patents on August 4, 2025 Further Demonstrate that the Claims are Eligible Subject Matter Applicant respectfully draws attention to the USPTO's August 4, 2025 memorandum regarding subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. §101, which provides important clarifications on the "mental process" grouping and the analysis of integration into a practical application. The memorandum reiterates that claim limitations which cannot practically be performed in the human mind-such as those requiring real-time computation, processing of sensor data, and hardware-based control-do not fall within the "mental process" abstract idea grouping (see Memo, pp. 2-3). The present claims recite, for example, real-time control of vehicle actuators using sensor data and mathematical models (see Claims 1, 5, 8, 10-11; Spec., pp. 7-12, Figs. 1-5), which are operations that cannot be performed mentally or with pen and paper.
Further, the memorandum emphasizes that the analysis under Step 2A Prong Two must consider the claim as a whole and whether it provides a particular solution to a technological problem or an improvement to a technical field (Memo, pp. 3-5). The present claims, when considered as a whole, provide a specific solution to the technical problem of compensating for speed dependency in vehicle control systems, resulting in improved accuracy and efficiency. This is not a mere instruction to "apply" an abstract idea, but a meaningful limitation that integrates any recited judicial exception into a practical application, as further supported by the specification (Spec., pp. 2-4, 6-12, Figs. 1-5). Accordingly, in view of the USPTO's current guidance, Applicant respectfully submits that the claims are not directed to a mental process and are integrated into a practical application, and thus are eligible under 35 U.S.C. §101.
In connection with Applicant’s arguments alleging that the claim subject matter as a whole is integrated into a practical application because there is an improvement to other technology or technical field, the examiner respectfully disagrees. Under 35 USC § 101 Step 2A, Prong Two, the Examiner is unpersuaded the additional elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Limitations that are indicative of “integration into a practical application” include:
Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical field—see (MPEP § 2106.05(a));
Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine (MPEP § 2106.05(b));
Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (MPEP § 2106.05(c)); and
Applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception (MPEP § 2106.05(e)).
In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of “integration into a practical application” include:
Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely include instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea (MPEP § 2106.05(f));
Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception (MPEP § 2106.05(g)); and
Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use (MPEP § 2106.05(h)).
In the present case, limitations (A) though (D) of Claim 1 recite at least in part concepts identified as abstract ideas for the reasons above.“ The abstract idea itself cannot supply the inventive concept, no matter how groundbreaking the advance.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).
The claim as drafted fails to recite a step or multiple steps to actually implement control of the motor vehicle recited.
Under Prong 2 of Step 2A, the claimed limitations have been interpreted by the Examiner as merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea (See MPEP 2106.05(f)) because there is no improvement to the claimed computer elements, or to any other technology or technical field. Short of attorney argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application” (See MPEP § 2106.04(d)), Applicant does not persuasively argue that any additional element or combination of elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Therefore, the limitations do not meet the criteria or considerations as indicative of integration into a practical application.
Regarding Claims rejected under 35 U.S.C. § :
Applicant's arguments have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant presents the following arguments:
When a disclosure describes a claimed invention in a manner that permits one skilled in the art to reasonably conclude that the inventor possessed the claimed invention the written description requirement is satisfied. (MPEP §2163 (emphasis added)). This possession may be shown in any number of ways and an Applicant need not describe every claim feature exactly because there is no in haec verbarequirement. (MPEP § 2163). Rather, to satisfy the written description requirement, all that is required is "reasonable clarity."(MPEP § 2163.02). Also, an adequate description may be made in any way through express, implicit, or even inherent disclosures in the application, including words, structures, figures, diagrams, and/or formulae. (MPEP §§ 2163(1), 2163.02). Finally, it is important to be mindful of the generally inverse correlation between the level of skill and knowledge in the art and the specificity of disclosure necessary to satisfy the written description requirement. (MPEP § 2163(II)(A)(2)) (inventions in "predictable" or "mature" require a lesser showing of possession than inventions in more "unpredictable" arts).
In view of the foregoing, Applicant respectfully submits that ordinarily skilled artisans would reasonably conclude that Applicant possessed the claimed controller on the basis of the aforementioned at least implicit descriptions. Applicant further submits that this conclusion is buttressed by the maturity and predictability of the art and because an adequate disclosure need not be express or even implied. Thus, the present application adequately describes the claimed invention.
A. Rack Force Value and Related Terms
As the Office Action notes, independent claim 1 recites a control method that employs "processing rack force values originating from two models to form a quotient, which determines a feedback force value, by a second rack force value being modified by the quotient controller ..." Applicant submits that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably conclude that Applicant's disclosure adequately described the claimed invention at the time of filing. Indeed, the specification describes how force values (including rack force values) are derived from sensor data and mathematical models. See, for example:
. Spec., Paragraph [0050]: "The first controlled system 20 comprises a front-axle actuator 21 of the motor vehicle 12, which comprises a steering rack of the motor vehicle 12, wherein the front-axle actuator 21 is configured to steer the motor vehicle 12."
. Spec., Paragraph [0060]: Equations for calculating lateral forces and rack forces
using the Pacejka tire model (see equations for F_f and f_r.
. Spec., Paragraph [0066]: "The mathematical model shown in figure 3 may be restructured in order to isolate the speed dependency of the model from the speed v of the motor vehicle 12."
B. Processing Rack Force Values and Forming a Quotient
The Office Action also alleged that the specification does not provide adequate written description of how a rack force value originating from two models to form a quotient is processed, or how a feedback force value is determined by a second rack force value being modified by the quotient. To the contrary, the specification describes how rack force values originating from two models (speed-dependent and speed- independent) are processed to form a quotient, which is used in the control method. See:
. Spec., Paragraph [0068]: "Generally speaking, the inverse of the speed- dependent portion 24 is replicated in the second control module 18, while the speed-independent portion 26 is replicated in the first control module 16."
. Spec., Paragraph [0071]: "The inversion unit 28 is configured to invert the speed dependency of the first controlled system 20 by way of a virtual control loop and feedback linearization in real time in order to compensate for the speed dependency of the first controlled system 20."
C. The Rejection Should be Withdrawn
As shown above, specification, in which the claims are to be read in light of, provides the necessary context for how rack force values are obtained from two models (i.e., speed-dependent and speed-independent), how the quotient is formed, and how it is used to modify a second rack force value to determine a feedback force value. (Spec., Figs. 3-5). While the Examiner alleges that the specification has "no written context as to how or what specific algorithms are performed), such a position is belied by the equations, control loop diagrams and description of the process for estimating disturbance variables, calculating manipulated variables and applying feed back linearization (FIGS. 1-5). Indeed, contrary to the unsupported assertions in the Office Action, the details in the specification demonstrate possession of the invention and enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the invention defined by claim 1.
Those of ordinary skill in the art would understand that such a disclosure at least implies the meaning of rack force value in the context of the application as a whole, especially in view of the maturity and predictability of the subject art. Accordingly, the rejection should be withdrawn.
The Examiner respectfully disagrees.
Although applicant contends that instant specification paragraphs [0068] and [0071] describe how rack force values originating from two models are processed to form a quotient in regards to claim limitation: , this is insufficient to satisfy the written description requirement. To satisfy the written description requirement, the Specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Specifically, to have “possession,” the Specification must describe the claimed invention in a manner understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the art and show that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Id.; Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Original claims may fail to satisfy the written description requirement when the invention is claimed and described in functional language but the specification does not sufficiently identify how the invention achieves the claimed function. Id. This can occur when the algorithm or steps for performing the computer function are not explained at all or are not explained in sufficient detail. Additionally, it is not enough that one skilled in the art could write a program to achieve the claimed function because the specification must explain how the inventor intends to achieve the claimed function to satisfy the written description requirement. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 681–683 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 84 Fed. Reg. 57, 62 (Jan. 7, 2019).
Applicant's arguments amount to an assertion that it would be common practice for a person skilled in the art to determine based on an inverse of the speed-dependent portion 24 replicated in the second control module 18; a speed-independent portion 26 is replicated in the first control module 16; and an inversion unit 28 is configured to invert the speed dependency of the first controlled system 20 by way of a virtual control loop and feedback linearization in real time in order to compensate for the speed dependency of the first controlled system 20.
Applicant asserts that a person skilled in the art understands how to . Although a person skilled in the art may arguably have familiarity with various speed dependent and speed independent models, such a person would not understand that the Applicant had possession of the claimed invention.
Employing various speed dependent and speed independent models, would require at least some knowledge of how processing occurs. Absent knowledge of how processing is employed with the specified inputs, a person skilled in the art would be faced with a vast amount of inputs, algorithms, models, and data sets that would confound the process of implementing Applicant's actual invention.
Moreover, Applicant does not direct Examiner to any language, steps or flow charts in the disclosure to show particular hardware or an algorithm, such that a skilled artisan would understand how to . There is no description of what the steps / procedure actually entail. They are simply treated as black boxes that accept certain inputs and output a value. As noted in the MPEP, “original claims may lack written description when the claims define the invention in functional language specifying a desired result but the specification does not sufficiently describe how the function is performed or the result is achieved” (See MPEP § 2161.01 I.)
Absent from the Specification is any discussion as to the particular steps, i.e., algorithm, necessary to perform the claimed functions. As such, the rejection is maintained as the instant Specification does not disclose sufficient detail to demonstrate to one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention including how to . Stated differently, the steps, procedure or algorithm taken to perform the claimed functions are not described in sufficient detail in the instant Specification to demonstrate that the inventor was in possession of that knowledge.
Therefore, the rejection has been maintained.
Regarding Claims rejected under 35 U.S.C. § :
Applicant's arguments have been fully considered but they are not persuasive
Specifically, it remains unclear what is meant by:
processing rack force values originating from two models to form a quotient, which determines a feedback force value, by a second rack force value being modified by the quotient
Therefore, the rejection has been maintained.
Claim Interpretation
Claimed "" and "" are taken as known to a person having ordinary skill in the art as an electronic control unit, ECU, or microprocessor which are conventional computers with non-transitory memory or art recognized equivalents including but not limited to a single controller, sections or parts of a single controller, or multiple linked controllers.
Claim Interpretation – 35 USC § 112(f)
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitation are:
Because this/these claim limitation(s) is/are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, it/they is/are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea) without significantly more.
In sum, claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception to patentability (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) and do not include an inventive concept that is something “significantly more” than the judicial exception under the analysis which follows.
For purposes of compact prosecution and clarity, designations have been assigned to limitations of Claim for purposes of evaluation under 35 USC § 101 as follows:
(A) “”
(B) “”
(C) “”
(D) “”
Step 1 – Statutory Category Determination - MPEP § 2106.03
Under Eligibility Step 1 analysis, it must first be determined whether the claims are directed to one of the four statutory categories of invention (i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). Applying Eligibility Step 1 of the analysis for patentable subject matter to the claims, it is determined that the claims are directed to the statutory category of a . Therefore, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong One.
Step 2A, Prong One – Does the claim recite an abstract idea? - MPEP § 2106.04:
Under the Step 2A, Prong One analysis, it must be determined whether the claims recite an abstract idea that falls within one or more designated categories of patent ineligible subject matter (i.e., organizing human activity, mathematical concepts, and mental processes) that amount to a judicial exception to patentability.
Abstract Ideas:
With respect to Independent Claim , claim limitations ()-() recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the three enumerated groupings of abstract ideas set forth in MPEP § 2106.04(a).
Mental Processes – MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III):
Claim limitations ()-() fall within the mental process grouping of patent ineligible subject matter. Each limitation relates to functions that could be performed alternatively as mental processes, i.e., concepts performed in the human mind or using pen and paper (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion).
Specifically, a mental process, that can be performed in the human mind since each of the above steps could alternatively be performed in the human mind or with the aid of pen and paper. This conclusion follows from CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) where our reviewing court held that 35 U.S.C. § 101 did not embrace a process defined simply as using a computer to perform a series of mental steps that people, aware of each step, can and regularly do perform in their heads. See also In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840–41 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794–95 (CCPA 1982); Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F. 3d 1350, 1354–1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category”).
Claim limitations ()-() encompass concepts within the mental process abstract idea grouping in that that capable of being performed in the human mind, by a human using a pen and paper. Limitations ()-() include concepts that exemplify processes performed in the human mind including observations, evaluations, judgments, and/or opinions.
Furthermore, mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
Mathematical Concepts: (Mathematical Relationships, Mathematical Formulas or Equations, Mathematical Calculations) - MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(I)
Claim limitations ()-() fall within the mathematical concept grouping of patent ineligible subject matter.
Specifically, the claim limitations invoke the functions of . The Instant Specification fails to attribute special definitions to the language used in limitations ()-(). Consequently, the words and phrases of the limitation(s) have been given the plain meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art. See MPEP §§ 2173.01, 2173.05(a), and 2111.01.
These steps are common computer processing functions that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known generic computers were capable of performing and would have associated with generic computers. .
“A mathematical relationship may be expressed in words or using mathematical symbols . . . [t]here is no particular word or set of words that indicates a claim recites a mathematical calculation. That is, a claim does not have to recite the word “calculating” in order to be considered a mathematical calculation. For example, a step of “determining” a variable or number using mathematical methods or “performing” a mathematical operation may also be considered mathematical calculations when the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim in light of the specification encompasses a mathematical calculation.”) citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89, 209 USPQ 1, 9 (1981), Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972), Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978), and Burnett v. Panasonic Corp., 741 Fed. Appx. 777, 780 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“using a formula to convert geospatial coordinates into natural numbers”).
Step 2A, Prong Two - Does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application? - MPEP § 2106.04:
Under the Step 2A, Prong Two analysis, the identified abstract idea to which the claim is directed does not include limitations that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, since the recited features of the abstract idea are being applied on a computer or computing device or via software programming that is simply being used as a tool (“apply it”) to implement the abstract idea. See MPEP §2106.05(f). This conclusion follows from the claim limitations which only recite a generic outside of the abstract idea.
In addition, merely “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“simply appending generic computer functionality to lend speed or efficiency to the performance of an otherwise abstract concept does not meaningfully limit claim scope for purposes of patent eligibility.”), aff’d, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Accordingly, the additional elements of a do not transform the abstract idea into a practical application of the abstract idea.
A plain reading of the figures and associated descriptions in the specification reveals that generic processors may be used to execute the claimed steps. The additional elements are recited at a high level of generality (i.e., as a generic processor performing generic computer functions) such that it amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using generic computer components (See MPEP 2106.05(f)) and limits the judicial exception to a particular environment (See MPEP 2106.05(h)). Mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component and limiting the judicial exception to a particular environment doesn’t integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A. Accordingly, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. Hence, independent claim is directed to an abstract idea.
Step 2B – Whether a Claim Amounts to Significantly More – See MPEP § 2106.05:
Under the Step 2B analysis, the additional elements are evaluated to determine whether they amount to something “significantly more” than the recited abstract idea. (i.e., an innovative concept). Here, the additional elements, such as a ” do not amount to an innovative concept since, as stated above in the Step 2A, Prong Two analysis, the claims are simply using the additional elements as a tool to carry out the abstract idea (i.e., “apply it”) on a computer or computing device and/or via software programming. See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05(f). The additional elements are specified at a high level of generality to simply implement the abstract idea and are not themselves being technologically improved. See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05 I.A; Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Thus, these elements, taken individually or together, do not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract ideas themselves.
The additional elements of the rejected dependent claims merely refine and further limit the abstract idea of the independent claims and do not add any feature that is an “inventive concept” which cures the deficiencies of their respective parent claim. None of the rejected dependent claims considered individually, including their respective limitations, include an “inventive concept” of some additional element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claims in practice amount to something “significantly more” than patent-ineligible subject matter to which the claims are directed.
The elements of the instant process steps when taken in combination do not offer substantially more than the sum of the functions of the elements when each is taken alone. The claims as a whole, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself because the claims do not effect an improvement to another technology or technical field; the claims do not amount to an improvement to the functioning of an electronic device itself which implements the abstract idea (e.g., the general purpose computer and/or the computer system which implements the process are not made more efficient or technologically improved); the claims do not perform a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (i.e., the claims do not use the abstract idea in the claimed process to bring about a physical change. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was imparted by the claimed process; contrast, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was not imparted by the claimed process); and the claims do not move beyond a general link of the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (e.g., “” in Claim ).
Regarding Claims : These claims depend from Claim and only add further details to the steps in that independent claim and do not recite any further limitations that cause the claims to be patent eligible. Rather, the limitations of dependent claims are directed toward additional aspects of the judicial exception and/or well-understood, routine and conventional additional elements that do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Therefore, dependent claims are not patent eligible and are also rejected on the same grounds provided for in the rejection of Claim .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112(a)
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claims contain subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Regarding Claim ,
The claim recites “.”
However, the instant specification disclosure contains no reference to a rack force value. Therefore, the specification does not provide adequate written description of “.” Claimed subject matter should be described in the specification in such a manner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the inventor was in possession of the claimed invention as of the effective filing date.
Regarding Claim ,
The claim recites “.”
The specification does not provide adequate written description of how . There is no written content as to how or what specific algorithms are performed (i.e. formulas, algorithms, sequence of mathematical steps, process of determination, for example)
To satisfy the written description requirement, the Specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Specifically, to have “possession,” the Specification must describe the claimed invention in a manner understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the art and show that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Id.; Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Original claims may fail to satisfy the written description requirement when the invention is claimed and described in functional language but the specification does not sufficiently identify how the invention achieves the claimed function. Id. This can occur when the algorithm or steps for performing the computer function are not explained at all or are not explained in sufficient detail. Additionally, it is not enough that one skilled in the art could write a program to achieve the claimed function because the specification must explain how the inventor intends to achieve the claimed function to satisfy the written description requirement. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 681–683 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 84 Fed. Reg. 57, 62 (Jan. 7, 2019).
There is no description of what the steps / procedure actually entail. They are simply treated as black boxes that accept certain inputs () and output a . As noted in the MPEP, “original claims may lack written description when the claims define the invention in functional language specifying a desired result but the specification does not sufficiently describe how the function is performed or the result is achieved” (See MPEP § 2161.01 I). In particular, the MPEP requires description of “an algorithm or steps/procedure taken to perform the function."
Claimed subject matter should be described in the specification in such a manner as to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention. The specification does not at all describe the steps / procedure involved in which would necessarily involve some calculations or steps that have not been described.
It is noted that this is not an enablement rejection. Applicant’s failure to disclose any meaningful structure/algorithm as to how this value is generated raises questions whether applicant truly had possession of this feature at the time of filing.
Regarding Claims ,
The claims ultimately depend from a claim that fails to comply with the written description requirement and are rejected for depending therefrom.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claim are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the applicant regards as the invention.
Regarding Claim ,
Claimed Limitation:
A great degree of uncertainty and confusion exists regarding the proper interpretation of the following claim limitation:
The specification, as interpreted by a person having ordinary skill in the art, fails to provide reasonable certainty as to how the claim limitations should be interpreted and the intended boundaries of the subject matter encompassed by the claim. Both the specification and the claims appear to be literal translations into English from a foreign document. Considerable speculation is required to interpret the intended meaning of the claim and what the claim is intended to encompass. As such, the examiner is unable to interpret the meaning and scope of this claim with substantial certainty that would be required to attempt to apply prior art to reject the claim. Therefore, the examiner will not attempt to apply prior art to reject this claim because unreasonable and speculative assumptions as to the proper interpretation of claimed limitations that would be required to reject the claim on the basis of prior art would be improper. (See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 134 USPQ 292 (CCPA 1962), MPEP §2143.03(I), MPEP §2173.06(II)¶2; “it is improper to rely on speculative assumptions regarding the meaning of a claim and then base a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 on these assumptions”; “a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 should not be based on considerable speculation about the meaning of terms employed in a claim or assumptions that must be made as to the scope of the claims.”).
Regarding Dependent Claims ,
The claims are dependent from claim , such that claims also include the indefinite subject matter recited by claim and are rejected for at least the same reasons that claim is rejected.
Special Definitions for Claim Language - MPEP § 2111.01(III)-(IV)
No special definitions are seen as present in the specification regarding the language used in the claims. Consequently, the words and phrases of the claims are given the plain meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art. (See MPEP §§ 2173.01, 2173.05(a), and 2111.01).
If special definitions are present, Applicant should bring them to the attention of the Examiner and the prosecution history in the next response.
To date, Applicant has provided no indication of special definitions.
Terminology
The Examiner notes that the following terms are utilized in Applicant’s specification as follows:
:
:
:
See Instant PgPub: ¶¶
:
See Instant PgPub: ¶
:
See Instant PgPub: ¶¶
:
See Instant PgPub: ¶
:
See Instant PgPub: ¶
References Cited
R1: ()
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure is provided on the attached PTO-892 Notice of References Cited form.
discloses:
A control method for automated control of a transverse deviation and/or a steering wheel angle of a motor vehicle by an overall control loop () (¶¶) (),
wherein the overall control loop has a first control module, a second control module, and at least one controlled system (¶¶) (),
wherein the at least one controlled system comprises a front-axle actuator of the motor vehicle and/or a steering wheel of the motor vehicle () (¶¶)
wherein a provisional manipulated variable is determined by the first control module, wherein the provisional manipulated variable is independent of a speed of the motor vehicle (¶¶) (),
wherein a final manipulated variable for the at least one controlled system is determined based on the provisional manipulated variable by way of the second control module, wherein the second control module compensates for a speed dependency of the at least one controlled system (¶¶) ().
The examiner has pointed out particular references contained in the prior art of record in the body of this action for the convenience of the applicant. Although the specified citations are representative of the teachings in the art and are applied to the specific limitations within the individual claim, other passages and figures may apply as well. Applicant should consider the entirety of identified prior art references as applicable as to the limitations of the claims. It is noted that any citations to specific pages, paragraph numbers, columns, lines, or figures in the prior art references presented and any interpretation of the reference should not be considered to be limiting in any way. A reference is relevant for all it contains and may be relied upon for all that it would have reasonably suggested to one having ordinary skill in the art. See MPEP § 2123. It is respectfully requested from the applicant, in preparing the response, to consider fully the entire references as potentially teaching all or part of the claimed invention, as well as the context of the passage as taught by the prior art or disclosed by the examiner.
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to SCOTT A REINBOLD whose telephone number is (313)446-6607. The examiner can normally be reached on MON - FRI: 8AM - 5PM EST.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Logan Kraft, can be reached on (571)270-5065. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/SCOTT A REINBOLD/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3747