DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on 06/25/2024 is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 1 is recites the limitation “GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer and GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first light-emitting layer are denoted by signs of opposite polarities each other, and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively” in lines 12-15. However, this limitation appears to be functional language as it does not provide the structure that is required to perform that function. The claim limitation is unclear about what characteristics (composite of the material/material/thickness) are required for the first layer and light-emitting layer to have an opposite polarity with each other. Is there a specific material with specific thickness for both the EL layer and the first layer that achieves the desired GSP_slope polarity for each layer. The Examiner notes that the use of functional language in a claim may fail "to provide a clear-cut indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim" and thus be indefinite. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971). For example, when claims merely recite a description of a problem to be solved or a function or result achieved by the invention, the boundaries of the claim scope may be unclear. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court explained that a vice of functional claiming occurs "when the inventor is painstaking when he recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty") (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)); see also United Carbon Co. v. Bonney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234 (1942)). For purposes of compact prosecution, the Examiner will interpret the structure describe in claim 1 as the structure required to perform the function of having “GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer and GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first light-emitting layer are denoted by signs of opposite polarities each other, and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively”. In an effort of compact prosecution, the presence of the structure laid out in the limitation of the claim will satisfy the requirement of, “GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer and GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first light-emitting layer are denoted by signs of opposite polarities each other, and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively”.
Claims 2-6 are rejected by virtue of their dependency on claim 1.
Claim 7 is recites the limitation “the first layer has negative GSP_slope (mV/nm), and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively” in lines 12-15. However, this limitation appears to be functional language as it does not provide the structure that is required to perform that function. The claim limitation is unclear about what characteristics (composite of the material/material/thickness) are required for the first layer and light-emitting layer to have an opposite polarity with each other. Is there a specific material with specific thickness for both the EL layer and the first layer that achieves the desired GSP_slope polarity for each layer. The Examiner notes that the use of functional language in a claim may fail "to provide a clear-cut indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim" and thus be indefinite. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971). For example, when claims merely recite a description of a problem to be solved or a function or result achieved by the invention, the boundaries of the claim scope may be unclear. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court explained that a vice of functional claiming occurs "when the inventor is painstaking when he recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty") (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)); see also United Carbon Co. v. Bonney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234 (1942)). For purposes of compact prosecution, the Examiner will interpret the structure describe in claim 1 as the structure required to perform the function of having “the first layer has negative GSP_slope (mV/nm), and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively.” In an effort of compact prosecution, the presence of the structure laid out in the limitation of the claim will satisfy the requirement of, “the first layer has negative GSP_slope (mV/nm), and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively”.
Claims 8-12 are rejected by virtue of their dependency on claim 7.
Claim 13 is recites the limitation “GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer and GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the electron-transport layer are denoted by signs of opposite polarities each other, and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively” in lines 12-15. However, this limitation appears to be functional language as it does not provide the structure that is required to perform that function. The claim limitation is unclear about what characteristics (composite of the material/material/thickness) are required for the first layer and light-emitting layer to have an opposite polarity with each other. Is there a specific material with specific thickness for both the EL layer and the first layer that achieves the desired GSP_slope polarity for each layer. The Examiner notes that the use of functional language in a claim may fail "to provide a clear-cut indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim" and thus be indefinite. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971). For example, when claims merely recite a description of a problem to be solved or a function or result achieved by the invention, the boundaries of the claim scope may be unclear. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court explained that a vice of functional claiming occurs "when the inventor is painstaking when he recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty") (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)); see also United Carbon Co. v. Bonney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234 (1942)). For purposes of compact prosecution, the Examiner will interpret the structure describe in claim 1 as the structure required to perform the function of having “GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer and GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the electron-transport layer are denoted by signs of opposite polarities each other, and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively.” In an effort of compact prosecution, the presence of the structure laid out in the limitation of the claim will satisfy the requirement of, “GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer and GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the electron-transport layer are denoted by signs of opposite polarities each other, and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively”.
Claims 14-19 are rejected by virtue of their dependency on claim 13.
Claims 2, 8, and 14 are recites the limitation “the first layer is configured to block holes”. However, this limitation appears to be functional language as it does not provide the structure that is required to perform that function. The claim limitation is unclear about what characteristics (composite of the material/material/thickness) are required for the first layer to “block holes”. Is there a specific material with specific thickness achieves the desired “holes” in the first layer. The Examiner notes that the use of functional language in a claim may fail "to provide a clear-cut indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim" and thus be indefinite. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971). For example, when claims merely recite a description of a problem to be solved or a function or result achieved by the invention, the boundaries of the claim scope may be unclear. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court explained that a vice of functional claiming occurs "when the inventor is painstaking when he recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty") (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)); see also United Carbon Co. v. Bonney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234 (1942)). For purposes of compact prosecution, the Examiner will interpret the structure describe in claim 1 as the structure required to perform the function of having “the first layer is configured to block holes”.
Claims 3, 9, and 15 are recites the limitation “the first layer is configured to block holes”. However, this limitation appears to be functional language as it does not provide the structure that is required to perform that function. The claim limitation is unclear about what characteristics (composite of the material/material/thickness) are required for the first layer to “block holes”. Is there a specific material with specific thickness achieves the desired “holes” in the first layer. The Examiner notes that the use of functional language in a claim may fail "to provide a clear-cut indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim" and thus be indefinite. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971). For example, when claims merely recite a description of a problem to be solved or a function or result achieved by the invention, the boundaries of the claim scope may be unclear. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court explained that a vice of functional claiming occurs "when the inventor is painstaking when he recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty") (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)); see also United Carbon Co. v. Bonney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234 (1942)). For purposes of compact prosecution, the Examiner will interpret the structure describe in claim 1 as the structure required to perform the function of having “the first layer is configured to block holes”.
Claims 3, 9, and 15 are recites the limitation “the first layer has a hole mobility lower than or equal to 1 × 10-8 cm2/Vs when a square root of electric field strength [V/cm] is 600”. However, this limitation appears to be functional language as it does not provide the structure that is required to perform that function. The claim limitation is unclear about what characteristics (composite of the material/material/thickness) are required for the first layer to “block holes”. Is there a specific material with specific thickness achieves the desired “hole mobility lower than or equal to 1 × 10-8 cm2/Vs when a square root of electric field strength [V/cm] is 600” in the first layer. The Examiner notes that the use of functional language in a claim may fail "to provide a clear-cut indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim" and thus be indefinite. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971). For example, when claims merely recite a description of a problem to be solved or a function or result achieved by the invention, the boundaries of the claim scope may be unclear. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court explained that a vice of functional claiming occurs "when the inventor is painstaking when he recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty") (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)); see also United Carbon Co. v. Bonney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234 (1942)). For purposes of compact prosecution, the Examiner will interpret the structure describe in claim 1 as the structure required to perform the function of having “the first layer has hole mobility lower than or equal to 1 × 10-8 cm2/Vs when a square root of electric field strength [V/cm] is 600”.
Claims 6, 12, and 19 are recites the limitation “spin density of the first layer is lower than or equal to 1 × 1017 spins/cm3”. However, this limitation appears to be functional language as it does not provide the structure that is required to perform that function. The claim limitation is unclear about what characteristics (composite of the material/material/thickness) are required for the first layer to have a “spin density lower than or equal to 1 × 1017 spins/cm3”. Is there a specific material with specific thickness achieves the desired “spin density lower than or equal to 1 × 1017 spins/cm3” in the first layer. The Examiner notes that the use of functional language in a claim may fail "to provide a clear-cut indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim" and thus be indefinite. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971). For example, when claims merely recite a description of a problem to be solved or a function or result achieved by the invention, the boundaries of the claim scope may be unclear. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court explained that a vice of functional claiming occurs "when the inventor is painstaking when he recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty") (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)); see also United Carbon Co. v. Bonney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234 (1942)). For purposes of compact prosecution, the Examiner will interpret the structure describe in claim 1 as the structure required to perform the function of the first layer having “spin density of the first layer is lower than or equal to 1 × 1017 spins/cm3”.
Claim 18 recites the limitation “a difference between the GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the electron-transport layer and the GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer is greater than or equal to 20 (mV/nm)”. However, this limitation appears to be functional language as it does not provide the structure that is required to perform that function. The claim limitation is unclear about what characteristics (composite of the material/material/thickness) are required for the first layer to have a “spin density lower than or equal to 1 × 1017 spins/cm3”. Is there a specific material with specific thickness achieves the desired “a difference between the GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the electron-transport layer and the GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer is greater than or equal to 20 (mV/nm)”. The Examiner notes that the use of functional language in a claim may fail "to provide a clear-cut indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim" and thus be indefinite. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971). For example, when claims merely recite a description of a problem to be solved or a function or result achieved by the invention, the boundaries of the claim scope may be unclear. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court explained that a vice of functional claiming occurs "when the inventor is painstaking when he recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty") (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)); see also United Carbon Co. v. Bonney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234 (1942)). For purposes of compact prosecution, the Examiner will interpret the structure describe in claim 1 as the structure required to perform the function of the first layer having “a difference between the GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the electron-transport layer and the GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer is greater than or equal to 20 (mV/nm)”.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Watabe et al. [US 2023/0232707 A1], “Watable”.
Regarding claim 1, Watabe discloses a light-emitting device (Fig. 1A, 550X) comprising:
a first electrode (551X);
a second electrode (552X) facing the first electrode (as shown);
a first light-emitting layer (103X and ¶[0087]);
a second light-emitting layer (103X2 and ¶[0088]; and
a first layer (106X),
wherein the first light-emitting layer and the second light-emitting layer are between the first electrode and the second electrode (as shown in Fig. 1A),
wherein the first layer is between the first light-emitting layer and the second light-emitting layer (as shown in Fig. 1A),
wherein GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer and GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first light-emitting layer are denoted by signs of opposite polarities each other, and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively ([0091]-¶[0094] and ¶[0631] and claim 1). Further, the Examiner notes that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA); In re Minks, 169 USPQ 120 (Bfunctiond Appeals); In re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967); In re Otto, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See MPEP §2114. The recitation of “GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer and GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first light-emitting layer are denoted by signs of opposite polarities each other, and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively” does not distinguish the present invention over the prior art of Watabe who teaches the structure as claimed.
Regarding claim 2, Watabe discloses claim 1, Watabe further discloses the first layer is configured to block holes (¶[0091] The intermediate layer (106X) has a function of supplying electrons to the anode side and supplying holes to the cathode side when voltage is applied. The intermediate layer 106X can be referred to as a charge-generation layer.) Further, the Examiner notes that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA); In re Minks, 169 USPQ 120 (Bfunctiond Appeals); In re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967); In re Otto, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See MPEP §2114. The recitation of “configured to block holes” does not distinguish the present invention over the prior art of Watabe who teaches the structure as claimed.
Regarding claim 3, Watabe discloses claim 1, Watabe further discloses the first layer has a hole mobility lower than or equal to 1 × 10-8 cm2/Vs when a square root of electric field strength [V/cm] is 600 (¶[0094]). Further, the Examiner notes that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA); In re Minks, 169 USPQ 120 (Bfunctiond Appeals); In re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967); In re Otto, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See MPEP §2114. The recitation of the first layer “has a hole mobility lower than or equal to 1 × 10-8 cm2/Vs when a square root of electric field strength [V/cm] is 600” does not distinguish the present invention over the prior art of Watabe who teaches the structure as claimed.
Regarding claim 4, Watabe discloses claim 1, Watabe further discloses the first layer comprises a first substance having any one of a pyrrolidine skeleton, a piperidine skeleton, and a hexahydropyrimidopyrimidine skeleton (¶[0080] and ¶[0023] and claim 5).
Regarding claim 5, Watabe discloses claim 1, Watabe further disclose the first layer comprises a first substance and a second substance, wherein the first substance is an organic compound having any one of a pyrrolidine skeleton, a piperidine skeleton, and a hexahydropyrimidopyrimidine skeleton, and wherein the second substance is an electron-transport organic compound (¶[0010]-¶[0012] and ¶[0080] and ¶[0023] and claim 5).
Regarding claim 6, Watabe discloses claim 1, Watabe further discloses a spin density of the first layer is lower than or equal to 1 × 1017 spins/cm3 ([0091]-¶[0094] and ¶[0631] and claim 1). Further, the Examiner notes that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA); In re Minks, 169 USPQ 120 (Bfunctiond Appeals); In re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967); In re Otto, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See MPEP §2114. The recitation of the first layer “a spin density of the first layer is lower than or equal to 1 × 1017 spins/cm3” does not distinguish the present invention over the prior art of Watabe who teaches the structure as claimed.
Regarding claim 7, Watabe discloses a light-emitting device (Fig. 1A, 550X) comprising:
a first electrode (551X);
a second electrode (552X) facing the first electrode (as shown);
a first light-emitting layer (103X and ¶[0087]);
a second light-emitting layer (103X2 and ¶[0088]; and
an electron-transport layer (¶[0157] and 106X3); and
a first layer(106X),
wherein the first light-emitting layer and the second light-emitting layer are between the first electrode and the second electrode (as shown),
wherein the electron-transport layer and the first layer are between the first light-emitting layer and the second light-emitting layer (as shown),
wherein GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer and GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the electron-transport layer are denoted by signs of opposite polarities each other, and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively ([0091]-¶[0094] and ¶[0631] and claim 1).
Further, the Examiner notes that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA); In re Minks, 169 USPQ 120 (Bfunctiond Appeals); In re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967); In re Otto, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See MPEP §2114. The recitation of “GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer and GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first light-emitting layer are denoted by signs of opposite polarities each other, and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively” does not distinguish the present invention over the prior art of Watabe who teaches the structure as claimed.
Regarding claim 8, Watabe discloses claim 7, Watabe further discloses the first layer is configured to block holes (¶[0091] The intermediate layer (106X) has a function of supplying electrons to the anode side and supplying holes to the cathode side when voltage is applied. The intermediate layer 106X can be referred to as a charge-generation layer.) Further, the Examiner notes that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA); In re Minks, 169 USPQ 120 (Bfunctiond Appeals); In re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967); In re Otto, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See MPEP §2114. The recitation of “configured to block holes” does not distinguish the present invention over the prior art of Watabe who teaches the structure as claimed.
Regarding claim 9, Watabe discloses claim 1, Watabe further discloses the first layer has a hole mobility lower than or equal to 1 × 10-8 cm2/Vs when a square root of electric field strength [V/cm] is 600 (¶[0094]). Further, the Examiner notes that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA); In re Minks, 169 USPQ 120 (Bfunctiond Appeals); In re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967); In re Otto, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See MPEP §2114. The recitation of the first layer has “a hole mobility lower than or equal to 1 × 10-8 cm2/Vs when a square root of electric field strength [V/cm] is 600” does not distinguish the present invention over the prior art of Watabe who teaches the structure as claimed.
Regarding claim 10, Watabe discloses claim 1, Watabe further discloses the first layer comprises a first substance having any one of a pyrrolidine skeleton, a piperidine skeleton, and a hexahydropyrimidopyrimidine skeleton (¶[0080] and ¶[0023] and claim 5).
Regarding claim 11, Watabe discloses claim 1, Watabe further disclose the first layer comprises a first substance and a second substance, wherein the first substance is an organic compound having any one of a pyrrolidine skeleton, a piperidine skeleton, and a hexahydropyrimidopyrimidine skeleton, and wherein the second substance is an electron-transport organic compound (¶[0010]-¶[0012] and ¶[0080] and ¶[0023] and claim 5).
Regarding claim 12, Watabe discloses claim 1, Watabe further discloses a spin density of the first layer is lower than or equal to 1 × 1017 spins/cm3 ([0091]-¶[0094] and ¶[0631] and claim 1). Further, the Examiner notes that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA); In re Minks, 169 USPQ 120 (Bfunctiond Appeals); In re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967); In re Otto, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See MPEP §2114. The recitation of the first layer has “a spin density of the first layer is lower than or equal to 1 × 1017 spins/cm3” does not distinguish the present invention over the prior art of Watabe who teaches the structure as claimed.
Regarding claim 13, Watabe discloses a light-emitting device (Fig. 1A, 550X) comprising:
a first electrode (551X);
a second electrode (552X) facing the first electrode (as shown);
a first light-emitting layer (103X and ¶[0087]);
a second light-emitting layer (103X2 and ¶[0088]; and
an electron-transport layer (¶[0157] and 106X3); and
a first layer(106X),
wherein the electron-transport layer and the first layer are between the first light emitting layer and the second light-emitting layer (as shown),
wherein GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer and GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the electron-transport layer are denoted by signs of opposite polarities each other, and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively ([0091]-¶[0094] and ¶[0631] and claim 1).
Further, the Examiner notes that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA); In re Minks, 169 USPQ 120 (Bfunctiond Appeals); In re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967); In re Otto, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See MPEP §2114. The recitation of “GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer and GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first light-emitting layer are denoted by signs of opposite polarities each other, and wherein the GSP_slope (mV/nm) is a parameter represented by V/d when a surface potential and a thickness of a film are represented by V (mV) and d (nm), respectively” does not distinguish the present invention over the prior art of Watabe who teaches the structure as claimed.
Regarding claim 14, Watabe discloses claim 13, Watabe further discloses the first layer is configured to block holes (¶[0091] The intermediate layer (106X) has a function of supplying electrons to the anode side and supplying holes to the cathode side when voltage is applied. The intermediate layer 106X can be referred to as a charge-generation layer.) Further, the Examiner notes that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA); In re Minks, 169 USPQ 120 (Bfunctiond Appeals); In re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967); In re Otto, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See MPEP §2114. The recitation of “configured to block holes” does not distinguish the present invention over the prior art of Watabe who teaches the structure as claimed.
Regarding claim 15, Watabe discloses claim 13, Watabe further discloses the first layer has a hole mobility lower than or equal to 1 × 10-8 cm2/Vs when a square root of electric field strength [V/cm] is 600 (¶[0094]). Further, the Examiner notes that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA); In re Minks, 169 USPQ 120 (Bfunctiond Appeals); In re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967); In re Otto, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See MPEP §2114. The recitation of the first layer “has a hole mobility lower than or equal to 1 × 10-8 cm2/Vs when a square root of electric field strength [V/cm] is 600” does not distinguish the present invention over the prior art of Watabe who teaches the structure as claimed.
Regarding claim 16, Watabe discloses claim 13, Watabe further discloses the first layer comprises a first substance having any one of a pyrrolidine skeleton, a piperidine skeleton, and a hexahydropyrimidopyrimidine skeleton (¶[0080] and ¶[0023] and claim 5).
Regarding claim 17, Watabe discloses claim 13, Watabe further discloses the first layer comprises a first substance and a second substance, wherein the first substance is an organic compound having any one of a pyrrolidine skeleton, a piperidine skeleton, and a hexahydropyrimidopyrimidine skeleton, and wherein the second substance is an electron-transport organic compound (¶[0010]-¶[0012] and ¶[0080] and ¶[0023] and claim 5).
Regarding claim 18, Watabe discloses claim 13, Watabe further discloses a difference between the GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the electron-transport layer and the GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer is greater than or equal to 20 (mV/nm) ([0091]-¶[0094] and ¶[0631] and claim 1). Further, the Examiner notes that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA); In re Minks, 169 USPQ 120 (Bfunctiond Appeals); In re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967); In re Otto, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See MPEP §2114. The recitation of “a difference between the GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the electron-transport layer and the GSP_slope (mV/nm) of the first layer is greater than or equal to 20 (mV/nm)” does not distinguish the present invention over the prior art of Watabe who teaches the structure as claimed.
Regarding claim 19, Watabe discloses claim 13, Watabe further discloses a spin density of the first layer is lower than or equal to 1 × 1017 spins/cm3 ([0091]-¶[0094] and ¶[0631] and claim 1). Further, the Examiner notes that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 181 USPQ 641 (CCPA); In re Minks, 169 USPQ 120 (Bfunctiond Appeals); In re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967); In re Otto, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See MPEP §2114. The recitation of “a spin density of the first layer is lower than or equal to 1 × 1017 spins/cm3” does not distinguish the present invention over the prior art of Watabe who teaches the structure as claimed.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
Lee et al. [US 2011/0133226 A1] discloses an organic light emitting diode device including an anode, a cathode facing the anode, and a light emitting member between the anode and cathode, wherein the light emitting member includes at least two light emitting units displaying the same or different color as one another, and a charge-generation layer between the at least two light emitting units, the charge-generation layer including a first charge-generation layer and a second charge-generation layer that each include an undoped material, and wherein the first charge-generation layer has an ionization energy that is about the same as or less than an electron affinity of the second charge-generation layer. The first charge-generation layer may include, e.g., metal-substituted tetra(hexahydropyrimidopyrimidine) or a metal having low ionization energy.
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PRIYA M. RAMPERSAUD
Examiner
Art Unit 2897
/PRIYA M RAMPERSAUD/Examiner, Art Unit 2897
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