CTNF 18/632,571 CTNF 86038 DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status 07-03-aia AIA 15-10-aia The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA. Claim Objections 07-29-01 AIA Claim s 7-8 are objected to because of the following informalities: Regarding Claim 7, line 1 recites the limitation “wherein the metho further comprises”, should be corrected to recite “wherein the metho UE further comprises” . Appropriate correction is required. Regarding Claim 8, line 1 recites the limitation “the method of claim 5”, should be corrected to recite “the method UE of claim 5”. Appropriate correction is required. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 07-20-aia AIA The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. 07-21-aia AIA Claim s 1-3 and 5-7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Pragada et al. US (2013/0287012) in view of Lee et al. US (2017/0202033), and further in view of Jin et al. US (2021/0204349) . Regarding Claim 1, Pragada discloses a method comprising: a user equipment (UE) ( see Fig. 15 i.e., WTRU-1 ) transmitting, via a radio access network (RAN) node ( see Fig. 15 i.e., eNB 1510 ), a Protocol Data Unit (PDU) Session Establishment Request message ( see Fig. 15 i.e., PDN connection request ) toward a Session Management Function (SMF), ( see Fig. 15 i.e., MME (i.e., “session management function”) ) ( see Para’s [0153-0154] i.e., the WTRU sends a PDN connection request message 1325 to the MME 1315. This PDN connection request message may contain additional IEs which may assist the MME 1315 in establishing the WTRU-to WTRU PDN connection & [0171] ) and after transmitting the PDU Session Establishment Request message ( see Fig. 15 i.e., PDN connection request ), the UE receiving from the RAN node a Radio Resource Control (RRC) Connection Reconfiguration message ( see Fig. 15 i.e., RRC reconfiguration request sent from eNB 1510 to WTRU-1 1505 ) comprising: ii) a PDU Session Establishment Accept message generated by the SMF, ( see Para’s [0156] i.e., The MME 1315 now may send WTRU 1305 a PDN connection accept message encapsulated in an S1-AP bearer setup request message 1350…NAS PDN connection accept message may be sent to the WTRU 1305 in the RRC reconfiguration request message 1355 & [0178] ) and iii) indications for the activation of user plane (UP) integrity protection and ciphering for each data radio bearer (DRB) belonging to the PDU session according to a security policy received by the RAN node, ( see Para’s [0107-0108] i.e., D2D bearers between the two D2D WTRUs, [0113], [0115] i.e., D2D bearers are established in the direct path between the WTRUs, [0171-0172] i.e., user plane setup, [0204], [0306] i.e., In order to provide security on the access stratum, the direct path bearer may be configured with its own ciphering keys as part of the RRC reconfiguration process…A new key add indicator for the D2D bearers instead of key change indicator may be added to the security config HO IE (“security policy”) within the RRC reconfiguration message, [0309] i.e., ciphering and security protocols supported over D2D link & [0311] ). While Pragada discloses the RRC reconfiguration message comprises indications for the activation of ciphering for each data radio bearer (DRB) belonging to the PDU session according to a security policy received by the RAN node ( see Fig. 15 i.e., RRC reconfiguration request & Para [0306] i.e., a new key add indicator for the D2D bearers instead of key change indicator may be added to the security config HO IE (“security policy”) within the RRC reconfiguration message ), Pragada does not disclose the RRC reconfiguration message comprises indications for the activation of user plane integrity protection for each data radio bearer belonging to the PDU session according to the security policy received by the RAN node. However the claim feature would be rendered obvious in view of Lee et al. US (2017/0202033). Lee discloses the RRC reconfiguration message ( see Fig. 13 i.e., RRC conn. Reconfig. 1370 ) comprises indications for the activation of user plane integrity protection for each data radio bearer belonging to the PDU session according to the security policy received by the RAN node ( see Para’s [0025-0026], [0105] i.e., As security protection for data packets (e.g., u-plane messages), [0082] i.e., bearers for user plane data, [0125] i.e., As part of the AS security configuration (i.e., “security policy”), at 1365, the network access device controller 125-k may transmit an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the network access device 105-q. The RRC connection reconfiguration message transmitted to the network access device 105-q may include, for example, for the UE 115-d, an AS security indication indicating an AS protocol layer for protecting data packets transmitted to and received from the UE 115-d , and a UE-specific AS key. The AS security indication may also indicate a type of AS security protection, in which the type of AS security protection may include ciphering for data packets, integrity protection for data packets, or a combination thereof…Also as part of the AS security configuration, at 1370, the network access device 105-q may transmit an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the UE 115-d which may include the AS security indication ) (Lee suggests the AS security indication sent to the UE provides greater security protection including ciphering and integrity protection for data packets communicated between the UE and the network for securing the communication, (see Para’s [0085] & [0105], [0117-0118], & [0125] )). Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date for the security protection according to the security policy provided for each data radio bearer (DRB) indicated in the RRC reconfiguration message as disclosed in Pragada to further include an indication for activation of user plane (UP) integrity protection in addition to the ciphering for each data radio bearer (DRB) based on the security policy configured for the UE as disclosed in the teachings of Lee who discloses an RRC reconfiguration message indicates an AS security indication to the UE indicating a type of security protection which may include ciphering and integrity protection for user plane data packets communicated on the data radio bearer, because the motivation lies in Lee that the AS security indication sent to the UE provides greater security protection including ciphering and integrity protection for data packets communicated between the UE and the network for securing the communication. The combination of Pragada in view of Lee does not disclose the claim feature of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) Connection Reconfiguration message comprising: i) a PDU session identifier (ID) identifying a PDU session. However the claim feature would be rendered obvious in view of Jin et al. US (2021/0204349). Jin discloses a Radio Resource Control (RRC) Connection Reconfiguration message comprising: i) a PDU session identifier (ID) identifying a PDU session ( see Fig. 21 i.e., S650 RRC connection reconfiguration message & Para’s [0363-0364] i.e., The CP sends a downlink transport message to the MMF including a NAS container and RAN container. The NAS container includes a NAS message to be sent to the UE. The NAS message may be specifically a PDU session ID used to notify the UE of a PDU session, [0365-0366] i.e., The MMF sends an initial context setup request message to the AN including the NAS container and the RAN container received in S630 which may further carry the UE info and the PDU session ID & [0368-0369] i.e., S650: The AN sends an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the UE which includes the AS container received in S640 that is sent by the MMF…the UE performs RRC connection reconfiguration after receiving the RRC connection reconfiguration message…the UE records the PDU session ID corresponding to the PDU session…The UE determines, based on the AN container or the PDU session ID in the AN container, that the corresponding PDU session has been restored ). (Jin suggests the PDU session ID included in the RRC connection reconfiguration is used for indicating to the UE the PDU session association relationship between the UE and a data network in order for the UE to efficiently communicate data packets with the data network by using the PDU session ID, ( see Para [0345] & [0364] & [0368-0369] & [0374] )). Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date for the RRC connection reconfiguration message used to setup the security policy and the radio bearers for the PDU session as disclosed in Pragada in view of Lee to comprise a PDU session identifier (ID) identifying the PDU session included in the RRC connection reconfiguration message sent to the UE as disclosed in the teachings of Jin, because the motivation lies in Jin that the PDU session ID included in the RRC connection reconfiguration is used for indicating to the UE the PDU session association relationship between the UE and a data network in order for the UE to efficiently communicate data packets with the data network by using the PDU session ID. Regarding Claims 2 and 6 , While Pragada discloses the method and UE of claims 1 and 5 including wherein the indications for the activation of the security protection is used for all of the DRBs belonging to the PDU session ( see Para [0306] ), the combination of Pragada in view of Jin does not disclose the claim features of wherein the indications for the activation of user plane (UP) integrity protection and ciphering for each data radio bearer (DRB) belonging to the PDU session indicate: i) whether UP confidentiality protection shall be activated or not for all the DRBs belonging to the PDU session; and/or ii) whether UP integrity protection shall be activated or not for all the DRBs belonging to the PDU session. However the claim features would be rendered obvious in view of Lee et al. US (2017/0202033). Lee discloses ii) whether UP integrity protection shall be activated or not for all the DRBs belonging to the PDU session ( see Para [0125] i.e., the AS security protection may include integrity protection for data packets…The AS security indication could also indicate no AS security protection for data packets ). (Lee suggests the AS security indication could also indicate no AS security protection for data packets for providing configurable AS security policy for supporting configurable security protection in the network system, ( see Para’s [0074], [0077], [0119-0120], & [0164] )). Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date for the indications for the activation of the security protection used for all of the DRBs belonging to the PDU session as disclosed in Pragada in view of Jin to indicate whether UP integrity protection shall be activated or not for all the DRBs belonging to the PDU session as disclosed in the teachings of Lee, because the motivation lies in Lee that the AS security indication could also indicate no AS security protection for data packets for providing configurable AS security policy for supporting configurable security protection in the network system. Regarding Claims 3 and 7 , the combination of Pragada in view of Jin discloses the method and UE of claims 1 and 5, but does not disclose the claim feature of wherein the method further comprises activating at least one of: confidentiality protection or integrity protection for the PDU Session. However the claim features would be rendered obvious in view of Lee et al. US (2017/0202033). Lee discloses activating at least one of: confidentiality protection or integrity protection for the PDU Session ( see Para [0125] i.e., The AS security indication may also indicate a type of AS security protection, in which the type of AS security protection may include…integrity protection for data packets ) (Lee suggests the AS security indication sent to the UE provides greater security protection including ciphering and integrity protection for data packets communicated between the UE and the network for securing the communication, (see Para’s [0085] & [0105], [0117-0118], & [0125] )). Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date for the security protection according to the security policy provided for each data radio bearer (DRB) indicated in the RRC reconfiguration message as disclosed in Pragada to further include an indication for activation of user plane (UP) integrity protection for the PDU session in addition to the ciphering for each data radio bearer (DRB) based on the security policy configured for the UE as disclosed in the teachings of Lee who discloses an RRC reconfiguration message indicates an AS security indication to the UE indicating a type of security protection which may include ciphering and integrity protection for user plane data packets communicated on the data radio bearer, because the motivation lies in Lee that the AS security indication sent to the UE provides greater security protection including ciphering and integrity protection for data packets communicated between the UE and the network for securing the communication. Regarding Claim 5, Pragada discloses a user equipment (UE) ( see Fig. 1B & Para [0051] ), the UE comprising: a transmitter ( see Fig. 1B i.e., transceiver 120 & [0055] i.e., the transceiver 120 transmits signals ); and a receiver ( see Fig. 1B i.e., transceiver 120 & [0055] i.e., the transceiver 120 receives signals ), wherein the UE is configured to: use the transmitter to transmit, via a radio access network (RAN) node ( see Fig. 15 i.e., eNB 1510 ), a Protocol Data Unit (PDU) Session Establishment Request message ( see Fig. 15 i.e., PDN connection request ) toward a Session Management Function (SMF) in a communication network, ( see Fig. 15 i.e., MME (i.e., “session management function”) ) ( see Para’s [0153-0154] i.e., the WTRU sends a PDN connection request message 1325 to the MME 1315. This PDN connection request message may contain additional IEs which may assist the MME 1315 in establishing the WTRU-to WTRU PDN connection & [0171] ) and after transmitting the PDU Session Establishment Request message ( see Fig. 15 i.e., PDN connection request ), use the receiver to receive from the RAN node a Radio Resource Control (RRC) Connection Reconfiguration message ( see Fig. 15 i.e., RRC reconfiguration request sent from eNB 1510 to WTRU-1 1505 ) comprising: ii) a PDU Session Establishment Accept message generated by the SMF, ( see Para’s [0156] i.e., The MME 1315 now may send WTRU 1305 a PDN connection accept message encapsulated in an S1-AP bearer setup request message 1350…NAS PDN connection accept message may be sent to the WTRU 1305 in the RRC reconfiguration request message 1355 & [0178] ) and iii) indications for the activation of user plane (UP) integrity protection and ciphering for each data radio bearer (DRB) belonging to the PDU session according to a security policy received by the RAN node, ( see Para’s [0107-0108] i.e., D2D bearers between the two D2D WTRUs, [0113], [0115] i.e., D2D bearers are established in the direct path between the WTRUs, [0171-0172] i.e., user plane setup, [0204], [0306] i.e., In order to provide security on the access stratum, the direct path bearer may be configured with its own ciphering keys as part of the RRC reconfiguration process…A new key add indicator for the D2D bearers instead of key change indicator may be added to the security config HO IE (“security policy”) within the RRC reconfiguration message, [0309] i.e., ciphering and security protocols supported over D2D link & [0311] ). While Pragada discloses the RRC reconfiguration message comprises indications for the activation of ciphering for each data radio bearer (DRB) belonging to the PDU session according to a security policy received by the RAN node ( see Fig. 15 i.e., RRC reconfiguration request & Para [0306] i.e., a new key add indicator for the D2D bearers instead of key change indicator may be added to the security config HO IE (“security policy”) within the RRC reconfiguration message ), Pragada does not disclose the RRC reconfiguration message comprises indications for the activation of user plane integrity protection for each data radio bearer belonging to the PDU session according to the security policy received by the RAN node. However the claim feature would be rendered obvious in view of Lee et al. US (2017/0202033). Lee discloses the RRC reconfiguration message ( see Fig. 13 i.e., RRC conn. Reconfig. 1370 ) comprises indications for the activation of user plane integrity protection for each data radio bearer belonging to the PDU session according to the security policy received by the RAN node ( see Para’s [0025-0026], [0105] i.e., As security protection for data packets (e.g., u-plane messages), [0082] i.e., bearers for user plane data, [0125] i.e., As part of the AS security configuration (i.e., “security policy”), at 1365, the network access device controller 125-k may transmit an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the network access device 105-q. The RRC connection reconfiguration message transmitted to the network access device 105-q may include, for example, for the UE 115-d, an AS security indication indicating an AS protocol layer for protecting data packets transmitted to and received from the UE 115-d , and a UE-specific AS key. The AS security indication may also indicate a type of AS security protection, in which the type of AS security protection may include ciphering for data packets, integrity protection for data packets, or a combination thereof…Also as part of the AS security configuration, at 1370, the network access device 105-q may transmit an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the UE 115-d which may include the AS security indication ) (Lee suggests the AS security indication sent to the UE provides greater security protection including ciphering and integrity protection for data packets communicated between the UE and the network for securing the communication, (see Para’s [0085] & [0105], [0117-0118], & [0125] )). Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date for the security protection according to the security policy provided for each data radio bearer (DRB) indicated in the RRC reconfiguration message as disclosed in Pragada to further include an indication for activation of user plane (UP) integrity protection in addition to the ciphering for each data radio bearer (DRB) based on the security policy configured for the UE as disclosed in the teachings of Lee who discloses an RRC reconfiguration message indicates an AS security indication to the UE indicating a type of security protection which may include ciphering and integrity protection for user plane data packets communicated on the data radio bearer, because the motivation lies in Lee that the AS security indication sent to the UE provides greater security protection including ciphering and integrity protection for data packets communicated between the UE and the network for securing the communication. The combination of Pragada in view of Lee does not disclose the claim feature of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) Connection Reconfiguration message comprising: i) a PDU session identifier (ID) identifying a PDU session. However the claim feature would be rendered obvious in view of Jin et al. US (2021/0204349). Jin discloses a Radio Resource Control (RRC) Connection Reconfiguration message comprising: i) a PDU session identifier (ID) identifying a PDU session ( see Fig. 21 i.e., S650 RRC connection reconfiguration message & Para’s [0363-0364] i.e., The CP sends a downlink transport message to the MMF including a NAS container and RAN container. The NAS container includes a NAS message to be sent to the UE. The NAS message may be specifically a PDU session ID used to notify the UE of a PDU session, [0365-0366] i.e., The MMF sends an initial context setup request message to the AN including the NAS container and the RAN container received in S630 which may further carry the UE info and the PDU session ID & [0368-0369] i.e., S650: The AN sends an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the UE which includes the AS container received in S640 that is sent by the MMF…the UE performs RRC connection reconfiguration after receiving the RRC connection reconfiguration message…the UE records the PDU session ID corresponding to the PDU session…The UE determines, based on the AN container or the PDU session ID in the AN container, that the corresponding PDU session has been restored ). (Jin suggests the PDU session ID included in the RRC connection reconfiguration is used for indicating to the UE the PDU session association relationship between the UE and a data network in order for the UE to efficiently communicate data packets with the data network by using the PDU session ID, ( see Para [0345] & [0364] & [0368-0369] & [0374] )). Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date for the RRC connection reconfiguration message used to setup the security policy and the radio bearers for the PDU session as disclosed in Pragada in view of Lee to comprise a PDU session identifier (ID) identifying the PDU session included in the RRC connection reconfiguration message sent to the UE as disclosed in the teachings of Jin, because the motivation lies in Jin that the PDU session ID included in the RRC connection reconfiguration is used for indicating to the UE the PDU session association relationship between the UE and a data network in order for the UE to efficiently communicate data packets with the data network by using the PDU session ID . 07-22-aia AIA Claim s 4 and 8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Pragada et al. US (2013/0287012) in view of Lee et al. US (2017/0202033), and further in view of Jin et al. US (2021/0204349) as applied to claim s 1 and 5 above, and further in view of Norrman US (2014/0369315) . Regarding Claims 4 and 8 , the combination of Pragada in view of Jin discloses the method and UE of claims 1 and 5 including communicating data packets on all DRBs of the PDU session according to the PDU Session ID between the UE and the RAN according to the security policy ( Pragada, see Para [0306] ), but does not disclose the claim feature of further comprising: receiving a decision from a home network that security protection of UP data terminating in the RAN is not to be used by the UE, and in response to the decision, precluding operational use by the UE of an algorithm to, at least one of, encrypt or integrity protect UP data sent on all radio bearers serving at least one of a Slice ID or a PDU Session ID between the UE and the RAN. However the claim feature would be rendered obvious in view of Lee et al. US (2017/0202033). Lee discloses receiving a decision from a home network ( see Fig. 13 i.e., network access device 105 & Para’s [0078] i.e., network access devices 105 may be Home eNodeBs & [0080] i.e., A network access device may be a home network access device ) that security protection of UP data terminating in the RAN is not to be used by the UE, ( see Para [0125] i.e., the AS security protection may include integrity protection for data packets…The AS security indication could also indicate no AS security protection for data packets transmitted to and received from the UE 115-d ). and in response to the decision, precluding operational use by the UE of at least one of, encrypt or integrity protect UP data sent on all radio bearers serving a PDU Session between the UE and the RAN, ( see Fig. 13 & see Para [0125] i.e., the AS security protection may include integrity protection for data packets…The AS security indication could also indicate no AS security protection for data packets transmitted to and received from the UE 115-d ) (Lee suggests the AS security indication could also indicate no AS security protection is to be used for data packets for providing configurable AS security policy for supporting configurable security protection in the network system, ( see Para’s [0074], [0077], [0119-0120], & [0164] )). Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date for the indications for the activation of the security protection used for all of the DRBs belonging to the PDU session as disclosed in Pragada in view of Jin to receive a decision from a home network that security protection of UP data terminating in the RAN is not to be used by the UE as disclosed in the teachings of Lee, because the motivation lies in Lee that the AS security indication could also indicate no AS security protection is to be used for data packets for providing configurable AS security policy for supporting configurable security protection in the network system. The combination of Pragada in view of Lee, and further in view of Jin does not disclose the UE using an algorithm to, at least one of, encrypt or integrity protect UP data. However the claim feature would be rendered obvious in view of Norrman US (2014/0369315). Norrman discloses a UE using an algorithm indicated from the network to, at least one of, encrypt or integrity protect data between the UE and the network ( see Para’s [0004] i.e., the network and the terminal must use the same security algorithms to process the data i.e., ciphering and integrity protection algorithms, [0008] i.e., the UE and the source eNB can communicate securely using the selected security algorithms, & [0009] ) (Norrman suggests the UE and the base station can communicate securely using the selected algorithms which offer confidentiality and integrity protection for data transmitted between the network and the UE, ( see Para’s [0004] & [0008-0009] )). Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date for the encryption or integrity protection of UP data sent on all DRBs according to the security policy configured for the UE which may be precluded as disclosed in Pragada in view of Lee, and further in view of Jin to be performed according to the security algorithm configured for the UE to at least one of, encrypt or integrity protect data between the UE and the network as disclosed in the teachings of Norrman which results in precluding operational use by the UE of the algorithm to encrypt or integrity protect the UP data sent on all radio bearers, because the motivation lies in Norrman that the UE and the base station can communicate securely using the selected algorithms which offer confidentiality and integrity protection for data transmitted between the network and the UE. Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ADNAN A BAIG whose telephone number is (571)270-7511. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 9:00am-5:00pm. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Huy Vu can be reached at 571-272-3155. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. 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If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /ADNAN BAIG/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 2 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 3 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 4 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 5 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 6 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 7 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 8 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 9 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 10 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 11 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 12 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 13 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 14 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 15 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 16 Art Unit: 2461 Application/Control Number: 18/632,571 Page 17 Art Unit: 2461
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