Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC §101
1. 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
2. Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Subject Matter Eligibility Standard
3. The examiner contends that, under the judicial exceptions enumerated in the MPEP § 2106, to determine the patent-eligibility of an application, a two- part analysis has to be conducted.
Part 1: it must be determined whether the claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories of invention, i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. See MPEP 2106.03.
Part 2A: Prong 1: (1) Determine if the claims are directed to an abstract idea or one of the judicial exceptions. Examples of abstract ideas referenced in Alice Corp. include:
1. Certain method of organizing human activity such as Fundamental Economic Practices, Commercial and Legal Interactions, or Managing Personal Behavior or Relationships or Interactions Between People.
2. A mental process.
3. Mathematical relationships/formulas.
Part 2A: Prong 2: determine if the claim as a whole integrates the judicial exception into a practical application.
Part 2B: determine if the claim provides an inventive concept.
Analysis
4. Under Step 1 of the analysis, it is found that the claim indeed recites a series of steps and therefore, is a process - one of the statutory categories.
Under Step 2A (Prong 1), using claim 1 as the representative claim, it is determined that apart from generic hardware and extra-solution activity discussed in Step 2A, Prong 2 below, the claim as a whole recites a mental process. For instance, the claim language “selecting…an applicable machine learning algorithm from a plurality of different trained machine learning algorithms; processing image data of damage to a vehicle…to determine assessed damage for the vehicle; determining…differences between actual damage to the vehicle and the assessed damage; iterating…the machine learning algorithm based on the difference” are steps that can be performed in the human mind. Any steps that can be performed in the human mind fall into the category of a mental process. Thus, the claim recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea.
Under Step 2A (Prong 2), the examiner contends that the claim recites a combination of additional elements including “one or more processors and machine learning algorithm.” These additional elements, considered in the context of claim 1 as a whole, do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they simply recite systems for processing data. The processors and machine learning algorithm, with their already available basic functions, are simply being applied to the abstract idea and being used as tools in executing the claimed process. Lastly, the limitation “wherein the plurality of different machine learning algorithms are trained for respective different combinations of one or more of vehicle make, vehicle model, vehicle year, or area of damage” are recited to further narrow the scope of the abstract idea. Thus, it is determined that claim 1 is not directed to a specific asserted improvement in computer technology or otherwise integrated into a practical application and thus is directed to a judicial exception.
Under Step 2B, it is determined that, taken alone, the additional elements in the claim amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer processor— that is, mere instructions to apply a generic computer processor to the abstract idea. The only hardware or additional elements beyond the abstract idea of claim 1 are the generically recited “one or more processors and machine learning algorithm.” The specification does not point to sufficient evidence that any of these components are anything other than well-understood, routine, and conventional hardware components or systems being used in their ordinary manner. The specification substantiates this, for instance at paras 0052-0053 and 0064. Thus, applying an exception using a generic computer processor cannot integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. And looking at the limitations as an ordered combination of elements add nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually. There is no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a computer or improves any other technology. Accordingly, the examiner concludes that there are no meaningful limitations in the claim that transform the judicial exception into a patent eligible application such that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself.
The examiner contends that the ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188— 89 (1981).” A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.” Specifically, an improvement to an abstract idea cannot be a basis for determining that the claim recites significantly more than an abstract idea. Furthermore, relying on a “processor” to “perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OJP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 7788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Accordingly, the examiner concludes that the claim does not recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception within the meaning of the 2019 Guidance. Note: The analysis above applies to all statutory categories of invention. As such, the independent claims otherwise styled as a computer-readable medium encoded to perform specific tasks, machine or manufacture, for example, would be subject to the same analysis. Furthermore, the limitations in the dependent claims are thus subject to the same analysis as in claim 1 and are rejected using the same rationale as in claim 1 above. More specifically, dependent claims 3, 7-8, 16 and 19 do not recite additional elements but merely further narrow the scope of the abstract idea. However, dependent claims 2, 4-6, 9, 11-12, 14-15 and 17 and 20 recite additional elements, but these additional elements comprise the analyses of data, which is nothing but the automation of mental tasks. See Benson, Bancorp and Cyberphone. Also see Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1354 (“[W]e have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes”).
Double Patenting
5. The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 1-20 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-20 of U.S. Patent No. 11,379,886 and claims 1-20 of U.S. Patent No. 11,989,759. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other. While the independent claims in the pending application appear to be broader than those in the U.S. Patent No. 11,379,886 and 11,989,759, they recite substantially the same limitations and subject matter as those in the U.S. Patent No. 11,379,886 and 11,989,759.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 01/02/26 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant’s argument, citing example 39 of PEG, that the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application is unpersuasive. the examiner contends that the claim recites a combination of additional elements including “one or more processors and machine learning algorithm.” These additional elements, considered in the context of claim 1 as a whole, do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they simply recite systems for processing data. The processors and machine learning algorithm, with their already available basic functions, are simply being applied to the abstract idea and being used as tools in executing the claimed process. Lastly, the limitation “wherein the plurality of different machine learning algorithms are trained for respective different combinations of one or more of vehicle make, vehicle model, vehicle year, or area of damage” are recited to further narrow the scope of the abstract idea. Thus, it is determined that claim 1 is not directed to a specific asserted improvement in computer technology or otherwise integrated into a practical application and thus is directed to a judicial exception.
The examiner further contends that the claim in example 39 is not directed to any of the judicial exceptions enumerated in the MPEP 2106. However, the claim language in the pending claim “selecting…an applicable machine learning algorithm from a plurality of different trained machine learning algorithms; processing image data of damage to a vehicle…to determine assessed damage for the vehicle; determining…differences between actual damage to the vehicle and the assessed damage; iterating…the machine learning algorithm based on the difference” are steps that can be performed in the human mind. Any steps that can be performed in the human mind fall into the category of a mental process. Thus, the claim recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea.
Applicant’s argument, citing Ex Parte Desjardins, that the claims recite an improvement to technology is unpersuasive. The examiner contends that there is a clear difference between the improvements in computer functionality, on one hand, and the use of existing computer as tools to perform a particular task, on the other; the solution addressed by the applicant’s claims is a business problem and not a technical problem. Rather than addressing a problem unique to the technology in which the solution is implemented, applicant’s claim 1 merely automates, using generic computer technology, a business process in which profitability is increased by processing distributed payment transaction. Thus, it is determined that claim 1 is not directed to a specific asserted improvement in computer technology or otherwise integrated into a practical application and thus is directed to a judicial exception. The claims in Ex Parte Desjardins are directed to the improvement in the performance of the machine learning model. This is not the case in the pending claims in which the machine learning model are merely being applied to carry out the abstract idea.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to OJO O OYEBISI whose telephone number is (571)272-8298. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Friday, 9am-7pm. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Christine Behncke can be reached at 571-272-8103. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see https://ppair-my.uspto.gov/pair/PrivatePair. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/OJO O OYEBISI/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3695