DETAILED ACTION
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Information Disclosure Statements
The Information Disclosure Statements (IDS) filed on 2/29/2024 have been acknowledged.
Priority
Acknowledgment is made of applicant's claim for foreign priority based on an application filed in South Korea on 8/31/2021.
Status of Application
Claims 1-10 are pending.
Claims 1 and 8 are the independent claims.
Non-Final Office Action
CLAIM INTERPRETATION
During examination, claims are given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification and limitations in the specification are not read into the claims. See MPEP §2111, MPEP §2111.01 and In re Yamamoto et al., 222 USPQ 934 10 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Under a broadest reasonable interpretation, words of the claim must be given their plain meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent with the specification. See MPEP 2111.01 (I). It is further noted it is improper to import claim limitations from the specification, i.e., a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment. See 15 MPEP 2111.01 (II).
A first exception to the prohibition of reading limitations from the specification into the claims is when the Applicant for patent has provided a lexicographic definition for the term. See MPEP §2111.01 (IV). Following a review of the claims in view of the specification herein, the Office has found that Applicant has not provided any lexicographic definitions, either expressly or implicitly, for any claim terms or phrases with any reasonable clarity, deliberateness and precision. Accordingly, the Office concludes that Applicant has not acted as his/her own lexicographer.
A second exception to the prohibition of reading limitations from the specification into the claims is when the claimed feature is written as a means-plus-function. See 35 U.S.C. §112(f) and MPEP §2181-2183. As noted in MPEP §2181, a three prong test is used to determine the scope of a means-plus-function limitation in a claim:
the claim limitation uses the term "means" or "step" or a term used as a substitute for "means" that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function
the term "means" or "step" or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word "for" (e.g., "means for") or another linking word or phrase, such as "configured to" or "so that"
the term "means" or "step" or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
The Office has found herein that certain claims contain limitations of means or means type language that must be analyzed under 35 U.S.C. §112 (f). Each such limitation will be discussed in turn as follows:
Claim Interpretations - 35 USC § 112(f)
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, (f) paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
Use of the word “means” (or “step for”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim element is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) (pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph). The presumption that 35 U.S.C. 112(f) (pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph) is invoked is rebutted when the function is recited with sufficient structure, material, or acts within the claim itself to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step for”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim element is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) (pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph). The presumption that 35 U.S.C. 112(f) (pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph) is not invoked is rebutted when the claim element recites function but fails to recite sufficiently definite structure, material or acts to perform that function.
Claim elements in this application that use the word “means” (or “step for”) are presumed to invoke 35 U.S.C. 112(f) except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Similarly, claim elements that do not use the word “means” (or “step for”) are presumed not to invoke 35 U.S.C. 112(f) except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
Claims 8-10 has/have been interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because it uses/they use a generic placeholder “unit” coupled with functional language “which” without reciting sufficient structure to achieve the function. Furthermore, the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier.
Since Claims 8-10 invokes 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, Claims 8-10 has/have been interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification that achieves the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
A review of the specification shows that the following appears to be the corresponding structure described in the specification for the 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph limitation:
Claims 8-10 all recite a receiving unit which receives autonomous mobile vehicle information. In the specification, the corresponding structure found was “may be mounted in a computing device, such as a server computer, a notebook computer, or a desktop computer“ [Specification, Page 13].
Claims 8-10 all recite a determining unit which determines whether the second autonomous mobile vehicle corresponds to the first autonomous mobile vehicle. In the specification, the corresponding structure found was “may be mounted in a computing device, such as a server computer, a notebook computer, or a desktop computer“ [Specification, Page 13].
Claims 8-10 all recite a transmitting unit which transmits control information. In the specification, the corresponding structure found was “may be mounted in a computing device, such as a server computer, a notebook computer, or a desktop computer“ [Specification, Page 13].
If applicant wishes to provide further explanation or dispute the examiner’s interpretation of the corresponding structure, applicant must identify the corresponding structure with reference to the specification by page and line number, and to the drawing, if any, by reference characters in response to this Office action.
If applicant does not intend to have the claim limitation(s) treated under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112 , sixth paragraph, applicant may amend the claim(s) so that it/they will clearly not invoke 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, or present a sufficient showing that the claim recites/recite sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function to preclude application of 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
For more information, see MPEP § 2173 et seq. and Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance With 35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 FR 7162, 7167 (Feb. 9, 2011).
Claim Objections
The claims are objected to because they contain multiple idiomatic errors, for example, however not an all-encompassing list:
Claim 2 states “wherein the external terminal controls the first autonomous mobile vehicle while communicating with the first autonomous mobile vehicle using the control information” and it way this claim is written, it appears the clause of “using the control information” gets mixed up and becomes confusing, for example is this clause part of the autonomous vehicle using this, or the external terminal doing this? The Office is going to interpret this as “wherein the external terminal controls the first autonomous mobile vehicle using the control information, while communicating with the first autonomous mobile vehicle” for clarity.
The way all these claims are written, it is not always clear what is meant and not always proper English. Substitute claims with all of the mentioned and not mentioned minor grammatical errors are required. See 37 CFR 1.52(a) and (b).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the applicant regards as the invention.
Claim 1 states “and requests information of the second autonomous mobile vehicle from an external terminal” and it is unclear what the metes and bounds of this limitation are. Is the external terminal not the same system that is receiving and transmitting, or is it separate? Can it be the same, for example can the external terminal do all of these steps? Further, it appears that this might be a translation error where the clause at the end gets confused as to what is doing what. When the Office looks into the specification, it becomes unclear what the actual metes and bounds of the claims are, thus the claims are indefinite. What is receiving, transmitting and what part is the external terminal? The Office suggests amending the claims to clearly recite what steps are being carried out by what parts of the system for clarity as this issue is prevalent throughout all of the dependent claims as well. The Office is going to interpret any computing system that can carry out all the steps, as recited, as reading on this. Appropriate action is required.
Claim 8 is rejected under the same rational as Claim 1.
Claim 4 states “receiving registration information including information about a management area and a necessary authority from the external terminal” and “wherein in the transmitting of control information, the management area, a location of the first autonomous mobile vehicle, and the location of the second autonomous mobile vehicle are compared to determine whether the second autonomous mobile vehicle corresponds to the first autonomous mobile vehicle” and once again, where these steps are being performed is unclear, thus indefinite. First, what is “necessary authority” and what is not? This first relative term “necessary” makes the claims unclear, thus indefinite as what is and what is not is not defined and means different things to different people/systems. The Office suggests either stating what steps create the necessity, like what is required or how is authority determined, or changing the claims to state a value or amount of authority, such as “a level of authority” thus allowing the term to have metes and bounds. Also, what does the authority do? Would just having the software installed be authority as one without the software not have authority? Would being able to access the database be authority? Would being able to write and read to the DMV database be authority? What is actually being granted with this authority and how? Finally, there appears to be a list of data sets transmitted, such as control information the management area, location of the first vehicle, and location of the second vehicle and it appears that these data sets are “compared”, but how are all of these variables compared? Is this a translation error or is this an actual step? They are different data sets, thus understanding what is required to find the “correspondence” is unclear, thus indefinite. Based on the specification and the interview conducted on 10/27/2025, it appears that the correspondence is merely future location data and avoidance, so both vehicles will not be in the same place at the same time. The Office is going to interpret any system that is able communicate with this software as having authority, since that is necessary. Further, any system that has the same data for comparison for avoidance as reading on the corresponding. The Office strongly suggests amending the claims to clearly capture the steps of the data being compared, and how, for the output of the correspondence and what authority is being used for. Finally, identifying specific management areas, as any area of interest could be a management area as this term is extremely broad, so defining the management areas would also help with clarity. Appropriate action is required.
Claims 2-3, 5-7, and 9-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being dependent on rejected claim and for failing to cure the deficiencies listed above.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
101 Analysis – Step 1
Claim 1 is directed to an process. Therefore, Claim 1 is within at least one of the four statutory categories.
Claim 8 is directed to an apparatus (system). Therefore, Claim 8 is within at least one of the four statutory categories.
101 Analysis – Step 2A, Prong I
Regarding Prong I of the Step 2A analysis in the 2019 PEG, the claims are to be analyzed to determine whether they recite subject matter that falls within one of the follow groups of abstract ideas: a) mathematical concepts, b) certain methods of organizing human activity, and/or c) mental processes.
Claims 1 and 8 include limitations that recite an abstract idea (emphasized below) and Claim 8 will be used as a representative claim for the remainder of the 101 rejections.
Claim 8 recites: An information sharing and controlling system of an autonomous mobile vehicle,
comprising: a receiving unit which receives autonomous mobile vehicle information including information about a first autonomous mobile vehicle which moves toward a destination and information about a movement route of the first autonomous mobile vehicle and receives an information request signal which includes information about a location of a second autonomous mobile vehicle and requests information of the second autonomous mobile vehicle from an external terminal;
a determining unit which determines whether the second autonomous mobile vehicle corresponds to the first autonomous mobile vehicle;
and a transmitting unit which transmits control information including the information about the first autonomous mobile vehicle and information for controlling the first autonomous mobile vehicle to the external terminal when the second autonomous mobile vehicle corresponds to the first autonomous mobile vehicle.
The examiner submits that the foregoing bolded limitation(s) constitute a “mental process” because under its broadest reasonable interpretation, the claim covers performance of the limitation in the human mind. Specifically, the “receiving, determining, and transmitting” steps encompass a user to gather information, determine and then transmit the data. Accordingly, the claim recites at least one abstract idea.
101 Analysis – Step 2A, Prong II
Regarding Prong II of the Step 2A analysis in the 2019 PEG, the claims are to be analyzed to determine whether the claim, as a whole, integrates the abstract into a practical application. As noted in the 2019 PEG, it must be determined whether any additional elements in the claim beyond the abstract idea integrate the exception into a practical application in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception. The courts have indicated that additional elements merely using a computer to implement an abstract idea, adding insignificant extra solution activity, or generally linking use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use do not integrate a judicial exception into a “practical application.”
In the present case, the additional limitations beyond the above-noted abstract idea are as follows (where the underlined portions are the “additional limitations” while the bolded portions continue to represent the “abstract idea”):
For the following reason(s), the examiner submits that the above identified additional limitations do not integrate the above-noted abstract idea into a practical application.
Regarding the additional limitations of “a computer”, the examiner submits that these limitations are an attempt to generally link additional elements to a technological environment. In particular, the “computer” is recited at a high level of generality and merely automates the receiving, determining, and transmitting steps, therefore acting as a generic computer to perform the abstract idea. Additionally, the computer is claimed generically and are operating in their ordinary capacity and do not use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. The additional limitations are no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a computer. Furthermore, the examiner submits that the recitations of determining is a mere definition that does not necessarily impose any meaningful limits on performing the steps in the human mind, as it only compares vehicle data where a user could in fact perform this mentally or using paper and pencil. In addition to that, the examiner submits that receiving data and using a computer, are insignificant extra-solution activities that merely use a computer to perform the process. In particular, the receiving steps are recited at a high level of generality (i.e. as a general means of gathering data for use in the determining step), and amounts to mere data gathering, which is a form of insignificant extra-solution activity.
Thus, taken alone, the additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Further, looking at the additional limitation(s) as an ordered combination or as a whole, the limitation(s) add nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually. For instance, there is no indication that the additional elements, when considered as a whole, reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to another technology or technical field, apply or use the above-noted judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition, implement/use the above-noted judicial exception with a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim, effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing, or apply or use the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is not more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception (MPEP § 2106.05). Accordingly, the additional limitation(s) do/does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea.
101 Analysis – Step 2B
Regarding Step 2B of the 2019 PEG, representative independent Claim 8 does not include additional elements (considered both individually and as an ordered combination) that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception for the same reasons to those discussed above with respect to determining that the claim does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. As discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional element of the apparatus, the computer amounts to nothing more than applying the exception using a generic computer component. Generally applying an exception using a generic computer component cannot provide an inventive concept. And as discussed above, the additional limitations of receiving data, determining and transmitting data, the examiner submits that these limitations are insignificant extra-solution activities.
Further, a conclusion that an additional element is insignificant extra-solution activity in Step 2A should be re-evaluated in Step 2B to determine if they are more than what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field. The additional limitations of receiving the data and determining are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities because the background recites that the sensors from which the data is acquired/received are all conventional sensors. MPEP 2106.05(d)(II), and the cases cited therein, including Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016), TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015), indicate that mere collection or receipt of data over a network is a well‐understood, routine, and conventional function when it is claimed in a merely generic manner. Hence, Claim 8 is not patent eligible.
Further Claim 1 are not patent eligible for the same reasons.
Dependent Claims 2-7 and 9-10 when analyzed as a whole, are held to be patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the additional recited limitation(s) fail(s) to establish that the claim(s) is/are not directed to an abstract idea. The additional elements, if any, in the dependent claims are not sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception for the same reasons as with Claims 1 and 8.
Office Note: In order to overcome this rejection, the Office suggests further defining the limitations of the independent claims, for example linking the claimed subject matter to a non-generic device and controlling a vehicle with control information and stating what the control information controls (navigation, steering, speed…). Limitations such as these suggested above would further bring the claimed subject matter out of the realm of abstract idea and into the realm of a statutory category.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1, 3-8, and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102 (a) (1) as being anticipated by Venman et al. (United States Patent Publication 2020/0217675).
With respect to Claim 1: Venman discloses “An information sharing and controlling method of an autonomous mobile vehicle” [Venman, ¶ 0012 and 0018];
“comprising: receiving autonomous mobile vehicle information including information about a first autonomous mobile vehicle which moves toward a destination” [Venman, ¶ 0016, 0018-0019, 0023, and 0026];
“and information about a movement route of the first autonomous mobile vehicle” [Venman, ¶ 0016, 0018-0019, 0023, and 0026];
“receiving an information request signal which includes information about a location of a second autonomous mobile vehicle” [Venman, ¶ 0018, 0023, and 0026-0033];
“and requests information of the second autonomous mobile vehicle from an external terminal” [Venman, ¶ 0018, 0023, and 0026-0033];
“and transmitting control information including the information about the first autonomous mobile vehicle and information for controlling the first autonomous mobile vehicle to the external terminal when the second autonomous mobile vehicle corresponds to the first autonomous mobile vehicle” [Venman, ¶ 0018, 0023, and 0026-0033].
With respect to Claim 3: Venman discloses “The information sharing and controlling method of an autonomous mobile vehicle of claim 1, wherein when the external terminal is a portable smart device” [Venman, ¶ 0018, 0023, and 0026-0033];
“the external terminal calculates the location of the second autonomous mobile vehicle displayed on a camera application to generate the information request signal” [Venman, ¶ 0018, 0023, and 0026-0033].
With respect to Claim 4: Venman discloses “The information sharing and controlling method of an autonomous mobile vehicle of claim 1, further comprising: before the receiving of the information request signal, receiving registration information including information about a management area and a necessary authority from the external terminal” [Venman, ¶ 0018, 0023, and 0026-0034];
“wherein in the transmitting of control information, the management area, a location of the first autonomous mobile vehicle, and the location of the second autonomous mobile vehicle are compared to determine whether the second autonomous mobile vehicle corresponds to the first autonomous mobile vehicle.” [Venman, ¶ 0018, 0023, and 0026-0034].
With respect to Claim 5: Venman discloses “The information sharing and controlling method of an autonomous mobile vehicle of claim 1, wherein the autonomous mobile vehicle information includes the movement route, a current location, operator information, and information for controlling an operation of the first autonomous mobile vehicle” [Venman, ¶ 0018, 0023, and 0026-0034, 0038, and 0044].
With respect to Claim 6: Venman discloses “The information sharing and controlling method of an autonomous mobile vehicle of claim 1, further comprising: receiving movement information including information of a movement route, a current location, and a speed from a predetermined user” [Venman, ¶ 0018, 0023, and 0026-0033];
“and transmitting a control command to control the first autonomous mobile vehicle to reduce a collision possibility of the user and the first autonomous mobile vehicle information in response to the movement information” [Venman, ¶ 0018, 0023, and 0026-0033].
With respect to Claim 7: Venman discloses “The information sharing and controlling method of an autonomous mobile vehicle of claim 1, further comprising: receiving avoidance information including information about an avoidance area that the first autonomous mobile vehicle must avoid from the external terminal” [Venman, ¶ 0018, 0023, and 0026-0033];
“and transmitting a control command to control the first autonomous mobile vehicle to avoid the avoidance area in response to the avoidance information” [Venman, ¶ 0018, 0023, and 0026-0033].
With respect to Claims 8 and 10: all limitations have been examined with respect to the method in Claims 1 and 3-7. The system taught/disclosed in Claims 8 and 10 can clearly perform the method of Claims 1 and 3-7 as the cited prior art anticipates the method with the computing system [Venman, ¶ 0012, 0018, 0023, and 0026-0033]. Therefore Claims 8 and 10 are rejected under the same rationale.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(a), the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned at the time any inventions covered therein were made absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and invention dates of each claim that was not commonly owned at the time a later invention was made in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c) and potential pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(e), (f) or (g) prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(a).
Claims 2 and 9 are rejected under 35 USC 103 as being unpatentable over Venman et al. (United States Patent Publication 2020/0217675) in view of Li (United States Patent Publication 2022/0163969).
With respect to Claim 2: While Venman discloses “The information sharing and controlling method of an autonomous mobile vehicle of claim 1, wherein the external terminal controls the first autonomous mobile vehicle while communicating with the first autonomous mobile vehicle using the control information” [Venman, ¶ 0018, 0023, and 0026-0033];
Venman does not state that the control data controls the vehicle.
Li, which is also a vehicle control system with route planning system in management areas where routes are optimized between vehicles for collision avoidance teaches “wherein the external terminal controls the first autonomous mobile vehicle while communicating with the first autonomous mobile vehicle using the control information” [Li, ¶ 0031].
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to incorporate the teachings of Li into the invention of Venman to not only include control the displaying of routes on a vehicle that avoids other vehicles based on the other vehicles data as Venman discloses but in a case where the vehicle is an autonomous vehicle, control the vehicle to follow the optimized paths as taught by Li with a reasonable expectation of success. One would be motivated to incorporate aspects of the cited prior art Li into Venman to create a more robust system that more efficiently move through management areas, such as warehouses [Li, ¶ 0058]. Additionally, the claimed invention is merely a combination of old, well known elements such as collision avoidance with autonomous vehicles and in the combination each element merely would have performed the same function as it did separately, and one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention would have recognized that the results of the combination would have been predictable.
With respect to Claim 9: all limitations have been examined with respect to the method in Claim 2. The system taught/disclosed in Claim 9 can clearly perform the method of Claim 2 as the cited prior art anticipates the method with the computing system [Venman, ¶ 0012, 0018, 0023, and 0026-0033]. Therefore Claim 9 is rejected under the same rationale.
Prior Art (Not relied upon)
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure can be found in the attached form 892.
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JESS G WHITTINGTON whose telephone number is (571)272-7937. The examiner can normally be reached on 7-5.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Scott Browne can be reached on (571)-270-0151. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/JESS WHITTINGTON/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3666c