Detailed Action
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Amendment
This Final Office action is responsive to the communication filed under 37 C.F.R. § 1.111 on December 11, 2025 (hereafter “Response”). The amendments to the claims are acknowledged and have been entered.
Claims 1–8 and 11–15 are now amended.
Claims 9 and 10 are now canceled.
New claims 16–21 are now added.
Claims 1–8 and 11–21 are pending in the application.
Response to Arguments
Claim Objections
All prior objections to the claims are hereby withdrawn in response to the amendment correcting the informalities that raised those objections.
Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112
The rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) is hereby withdrawn, responsive to the Applicant rebutting the Office’s 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) interpretation of claim 14 via the amendment.
Subject Matter Eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101
The rejection of claims 1–15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for claiming a judicial exception thereof without significantly more stands. It is withdrawn only as to those claims that were cancelled, and extended now to the newly added claims. The Applicant’s remarks have been considered in light of the amendment, but do not persuade the Examiner to withdraw the rejection.
The Applicant first argues that the claims are eligible because they now recite a “telematics device” that communicates with another device practicing the method (or included in the system, in the case of claim 14). The Applicant contends the newly added limitations are “more than ‘generic computer components,’” (Response 2), but the Examiner respectfully disagrees.
With respect to the claimed “telematics device,” a careful read of the specification reveals that the Applicant does not mean “telematics” in the customary sense of tracking location, speed, milage, and driving behavior. Rather, the specification overrides this definition with its own special definition in which a “telematics device” is merely a basic communication module “configured to send and receive the charger properties 111 and the vehicle properties 121.” (Spec. 4 ll. 13–15 and 8 ll. 5–11). In other words, the telematics device is a stand-in for any and all means of communication between the vehicle and the charger. Merely reciting the means for passing data between entities in order to carry out a mental process does not transform a judicial exception into an eligible invention. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1316–18 (Fed. Cir. 2016); and Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241–42 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Accordingly, the Examiner is not persuaded that the telematics device transforms the judicial exception into an eligible invention.
The Applicant also argues that the telematics device adds “a clear improvement in the function of an electric work vehicle and a charging module” because the method communicates using the telematics devices to provide the charging information. (Response 2–3). Again, the Examiner respectfully disagrees.
This argument misunderstands what constitutes a technical improvement discussed in the 2024 Guidance cited by the Applicant (which is more formally discussed in MPEP 2106.05(a)). Merely adding a physical “telematics device” to the claim language does not transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application, nor does it constitute an improvement to the functioning of the vehicle itself, for a few reasons.
To qualify as an improvement to a computer or other technology under Alice Step 2A Prong 2 (or as “significantly more” under Step 2B), the claim must recite a specific solution to a technical problem. In this case, the claimed invention, with or without the telematics device, does not improve how the electric vehicle physically operates, how its battery chemically stores charge, or even how the telematics device transmits signals. The claims merely use a telematics device for its basic, intended purpose: transmitting and receiving data (charger properties and vehicle properties). Solving a logistical or workflow problem—like helping a driver find an available charger—is an improvement to the operator’s experience, not a technical improvement to the functioning of the machine.
Second, according to MPEP 2106.05(d), adding generic hardware to perform a judicial exception does not add significantly more to it. A telematics device is a standard, off-the-shelf component designed precisely to send and receive location and status data. By arguing that the telematics device improves the vehicle, the applicant is essentially arguing that it took an abstract data-collection process and applied it using a generic transmitter. The Supreme Court in Alice explicitly established that simply appending “apply it with a computer” (or in this case, a telematics device) to an abstract idea fails to overcome a § 101 rejection.
Finally, even if the Applicant had invented a novel way for vehicles and chargers to communicate, the claim language itself does not recite the specific means or rules that achieve this improvement. The independent claims broadly recite “communicating charger properties” and “communicating vehicle properties” to provide “charging information to an operator.” The claim recites the result (data is communicated) rather than a specific, non-conventional technical process for how that telematics device operates differently than prior art devices.
For these reasons, the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101 stand.
Prior Art Rejections
The rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102 based on Stichowski is hereby withdrawn in response to the amendment. In its place, a new ground of rejection is provided under 35 U.S.C. § 103, with another reference cited to show why the newly amended claims were obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Double Patenting
The provisional double patenting rejections of the claims are hereby withdrawn in light of the amendments, but are replaced with new grounds of rejection involving some of the newly cited prior art responsive to the change in scope of the claims.
Concluding Remarks
Since all of the claims stand rejected, the Applicant’s request for a notice of allowance (Response 6) is respectfully denied.
Claim Rejections – 35 U.S.C. § 101
35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1–8 and 11–21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Claim 1
Step 1. Claim 1 is directed to a method, which is considered a “process” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Step 2A, Prong One. Claim 1 recites the abstract idea of communicating charger properties from a charging module to an electric work vehicle; communicating vehicle properties from the electric work vehicle (120) to the charging module; and providing charging information to an operator, wherein the charging information is based on the charger properties and the vehicle properties. This mere exchange of information and displaying its results falls under the “mental processes” sub-category of abstract ideas, and abstract ideas are a judicial exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101. MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III.)(B.) (citing Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Claim 1 further describes the content of the information exchanged between the charging module and the electric work vehicle. This description of information, no matter how extensive, are not considered “additional elements” beyond the judicial exception, because the courts treat “collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which does not change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas.” Elec. Power Grp. 830 F.3d at 1353.
Step 2A, Prong Two The additional elements unencompassed by the abstract idea include a charging module, controllers, telematics modules, and an electric work vehicle. These additional elements fail to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because the additional elements merely serve as the field of use in which the abstract idea is implemented.
Step 2B. The claim does not include limitations sufficient, either alone or in combination, to amount to significantly more than the claimed abstract idea because the aforementioned additional elements merely serve as generic computer components on which the abstract idea is implemented. See MPEP 2106.05(f).
Claims 2 and 3
Claims 2 and 3 recite nothing more than an additional description of the data exchanged as part of the judicial exception. Claim limitations that merely describe the content of information are not considered “additional elements” in the 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis. See Elec. Power Grp. 830 F.3d at 1353. Accordingly, claims 2 and 3 are rejected over the same findings and rationale as provided above for claim 1.
Claim 4
Step 1. Claim 4 is directed to a method, which is considered a “process” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Step 2A, Prong One. Claim 4 recites the abstract idea of communicating charger properties from a charging module to an electric work vehicle; including, within those charger properties, a “predicted charging end time” in cases where the charging module is in use; communicating vehicle properties from the electric work vehicle to the charging module; and providing charging information to an operator, wherein the charging information is based on the charger properties and the vehicle properties. This mere exchange of information and displaying its results falls under the “mental processes” sub-category of abstract ideas, and abstract ideas are a judicial exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101. MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III.)(B.) (citing Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Claim 4 further describes the content of the information exchanged between the charging module and the electric work vehicle. This Examiner does not consider this description of information, no matter how extensive, to be “additional elements” beyond the judicial exception, because the courts treat “collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which does not change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas.” Elec. Power Grp. 830 F.3d at 1353.
Step 2A, Prong Two The additional elements unencompassed by the abstract idea include a charging module, controllers, and an electric work vehicle. These additional elements fail to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because the additional elements merely serve as the field of use in which the abstract idea is implemented.
Step 2B. The claim does not include limitations sufficient, either alone or in combination, to amount to significantly more than the claimed abstract idea because the aforementioned additional elements merely serve as generic computer components on which the abstract idea is implemented. See MPEP 2106.05(f).
Claims 6–8
Claims 6–8 recite nothing more than an additional description of the data exchanged as part of the judicial exception. Claim limitations that merely describe the content of information are not considered “additional elements” in the 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis. See Elec. Power Grp. 830 F.3d at 1353. Accordingly, claims 6–8 are rejected over the same findings and rationale as provided above for claim 1 (or claim 4, in the case of claim 5).
Claims 11 and 12
Claims 11 and 12 recite nothing more than an additional description of the data exchanged as part of the judicial exception. Note that this is true even though the data mentioned in claim 11 describes a speed limit. Claim 11 does not require the electric work vehicle to do anything after the information is transmitted; it merely describes data about a speed limit.
Claim limitations that merely describe the content of information are not considered “additional elements” in the 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis. See Elec. Power Grp. 830 F.3d at 1353. Accordingly, claims 11 and 12 are rejected over the same findings and rationale as provided above for claim 1.
Claim 13
Step 1. Claim 13 is directed to a method, which is considered a “process” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Step 2A, Prong One. Claim 13 recites the abstract idea of communicating charger properties from a charging module to an electric work vehicle; communicating vehicle properties from the electric work vehicle (120) to the charging module; providing charging information to an operator, wherein the charging information is based on the charger properties and the vehicle properties, and making a reservation of the charging module. This mere exchange of information and displaying its results falls under the “mental processes” sub-category of abstract ideas, and abstract ideas are a judicial exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101. MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III.)(B.) (citing Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Claim 13 further describes the content of the information exchanged between the charging module and the electric work vehicle. This Examiner does not consider this description of information, no matter how extensive, to be “additional elements” beyond the judicial exception, because the courts treat “collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which does not change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas.” Elec. Power Grp. 830 F.3d at 1353.
Step 2A, Prong Two The additional elements unencompassed by the abstract idea include a charging module, controllers, and an electric work vehicle. These additional elements fail to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because the additional elements merely serve as the field of use in which the abstract idea is implemented.
Step 2B. The claim does not include limitations sufficient, either alone or in combination, to amount to significantly more than the claimed abstract idea because the aforementioned additional elements merely serve as generic computer components on which the abstract idea is implemented. See MPEP 2106.05(f).
Claims 14 and 15
Claims 14 and 15 are rejected according to the same findings and rationale provided above in claims 1 and 2, except that at step 1, the Examiner finds the claimed invention to be directed to a machine, rather than a process, within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 16–21
Each one of claims 16–18 provide a further description of the input of the invention (i.e., the information contemplated or calculated as part of the abstract idea), or a further description of the output of the invention (i.e., the end-result of the abstract idea), or both, and therefore, are ineligible for the same reasons as given in the rejection of their parent claims. That is, each of claims 16–18 simply add to the description of the judicial exception itself, or, to merely the content of the information considered as part of that judicial exception. Descriptions of information, no matter how extensive are not “additional elements” beyond the judicial exception, because the courts treat “collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which does not change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas.” Elec. Power Grp. 830 F.3d at 1353.
Claims 18–21 are rejected for the same reasons as claims 16–18, but taken in conjunction with the findings from the rejection of their parent claim 14 rather than claim 1.
Claim Rejections – 35 U.S.C. § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned at the time any inventions covered therein were effectively filed absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned at the time a later invention was effectively filed in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
I. Stichowski and Konrardy teach claims 1–5, 7, and 12–21.
Claims 1–5, 7, and 12–21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over European Patent Office Application No. 3726455 A21 (“Stichowski”) in view of U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2021/0039513 A1 (“Konrardy”).
Claim 1
Stichowski teaches:
A method of charge management for electric work vehicles, the method comprising:
Stichowski proposes a method for predicting the availability of charging stations for an electric vehicle, involving the vehicle and the charging stations exchanging certain information (discussed below, where claimed). See Stichowski ¶ 6.
communicating charger properties from a charging module to a telematics device of an electric work vehicle, wherein the charging module comprises a controller including a telematics device communicating with the telematics device of the charging module,
As part of Stichowski’s method, at least one charging station issues a response to a request from a vehicle. Stichowski ¶ 22. The contents of the response will be discussed in greater detail below, in conjunction with claim 1’s actual recitation of those properties.
With respect to the vehicle receiving the response via “a telematics device,” a careful read of the specification reveals that the Applicant does not mean “telematics” in the customary sense of tracking location, speed, milage, and driving behavior, but rather, the specification overrides this definition with its own special definition in which a “telematics device” is merely a basic communication module “configured to send and receive the charger properties 111 and the vehicle properties 121.” (Spec. 4 ll. 13–15 and 8 ll. 5–11).
To that end, Stichowski likewise discloses that the electric vehicle has its own “corresponding communication system” for communicating with the charging stations (or a central control system that manages them). Stichowski ¶ 8.
wherein the charger properties comprise: a location of the charging module; and an availability of the charging module;
The probability of availability for the at least one charging station is estimated and is issued as a response to the request. Stichowski ¶ 22. This response at least inherently identifies the location of the charging station (in addition to its explicit availability) because it specifically identifies which charging station has the availability described in the response transmission. For example, the response may include a recommendation to visit a particular charging station 16b instead of a particular other charging station 16a. Stichowski ¶¶ 32–33.
communicating vehicle properties from the telematics device of the electric work vehicle to the telematics device of the charging module,
As mentioned above, the one or more electric vehicles practicing this method transmit requests 20a to use the charging stations. Stichowski ¶ 22.
wherein the vehicle properties comprise: a current state of charge of a battery of the electric work vehicle;
The requests 20a that the vehicles send to the charging station include both the request itself, as well as “the information that the determined concrete charging requirement on which the request 20a is based was estimated.” Stichowski ¶ 31. Regarding the latter, each electric vehicle determines its charging requirements in part based on “the current charge level” of the electric vehicle. Stichowski ¶ 10. Thus, this is one of the properties sent with the request 20a.
a capacity of the battery of the electric work vehicle;
Another factor the vehicles use for determining their charging requirements include “the resulting maximum range” of a vehicle, e.g., based on the current charge level and the planned route. Stichowskki ¶ 10. Again, since “the information that the determined concrete charging requirement” are sent with the request 20a, this maximum range, which necessarily describes the capacity of the vehicle’s battery, is communicated to the charging station.
an available time period for charging based on a return-to-work time of the electric work vehicle; and
The charging requirements sent with request 20a may be further refined by “data which has been noted by the driver in an electronic appointment calendar,” as this will indicate the likely route and timing of the electric vehicle, in order for the driver to arrive at an appointment. Stichowski ¶ 16.
a predicted time before charging is required, wherein the predicted time is based on
Finally, yet another charging requirement sent with the request 20a may include “additional information or justified” or data about “statistically justifiable assumptions,” such as a constraint that specifies “charging is only carried out below a certain charge level because, for technical reasons, it is desirable to empty the battery as completely as possible.” Stichowski ¶ 10. In other words, yet another piece of information included with the request 20a is information about the extent to which all of the other factors mentioned above will be delayed due to the driver performing the task of sufficiently discharging the battery, rather than simply visiting the most convenient charging station along the route.
providing charging information to the operator of the electric work vehicle, wherein the charging information is based on the charger properties and the vehicle properties,
Based on the needs of the vehicles (per their requests) and demand for the charging stations (as ascertained by the probabilities in the charging stations’ responses), the operators of the vehicles are offered “a binding booking” to reserve a respective charging station. Stichowski ¶¶ 22 and 33.
wherein the charging information is
The binding booking “is proposed for confirmation or carried out immediately by a communication device of the electric vehicle.” Stichowski ¶ 22.
Stichowski thus differs from amended claim 1 in two respects. First, while the information that the vehicle sends to the charging station includes a predicted time before charging is required that is based on a task that involves discharging the battery to a certain extent, the predicted time is not based on the rate of discharge of the battery while performing that task, let alone either of the other two factors recited in the claim (discharge rates at different states of charge or discharge rates for an operator).
Second, although Stichowski discloses communicating the booking information to the driver, Stichowski never affirmatively says that the vehicles have a “screen” to display the booking information.
Konrardy, however, teaches predicting a time when charging of an electric vehicle will be required,
wherein the predicted time is based on data from previous discharging of the battery of the electric work vehicle comprising one or more of: discharge rates at different states of charge; discharge rates for an operator; and discharge rates for performing various tasks with the electric work vehicle;
“At block 906, the on-board computer 114 may predict future use of the vehicle 108. Such prediction may be based upon data regarding past vehicle operation, location data, vehicle operator calendar data, route data, or other information related to the vehicle 108 or vehicle operators associated with the vehicle 108. For example, a use profile may be generated during vehicle use to indicate patterns of repeated vehicle use, such as usual commuting routes and hours. Similarly, location data (such as long-term parking at an airport) or calendar data for a vehicle operator (such as a schedule of meetings) may indicate the vehicle will likely not be used for a period of time.” Konrardy ¶ 181. As another example, “the predicted use profile may include predictions of use periods and/or non-use period, such as breaks during vehicle operation. Route data may be used to predict such breaks, as the route may indicate the purpose or extend of a current vehicle trip.” Konrardy ¶ 182.
Konrardy further teaches displaying recommended information to a user on a screen of the vehicle. See Konrardy ¶ 147; see also Konrardy ¶¶ 63, 72, and 122.
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to enhance Stichowski’s method (and the data provided by Stichowski’s vehicles to the charging stations) with Konrardy’s technique of predicting a time when charging will be necessary, and to use Konrardy’s display screen in Stichowski’s vehicle as well. One would have been motivated to combine Konrardy with Stichowski because “[c]urrently, vehicle operators must manually determine when to refuel or recharge vehicles” by “observ[ing] fuel or charge gauges on a vehicle dashboard and estimate when to refuel based upon knowledge or guesses about availability of fueling or charging stations,” a process which is both inconvenient and sometimes difficult. See Konrardy ¶ 176.
Claim 2
Stichowski and Konrardy teach the method of claim 1
wherein the charger properties further comprise one or more of: a health status of the charging module; a charging capacity of the charging module; a charging rate; or charging module connection type.
Of the foregoing alternatives, the “one or more” that Stichowski discloses is the “charging capacity of the charging module,” because Stichowski discloses that the charging station’s response includes “the probability of availability for the at least one charging station.” Stichowski ¶ 22. This falls within the scope of “charging capacity” because the availability of a charging station is tantamount to its capacity to charge the vehicle (e.g., an unavailable charging station lacks the capacity to service the vehicle, because its capacity is fully occupied by other vehicles).
Claim 3
Stichowski and Konrardy teach the method of claim 1
wherein the availability of the charging module comprises at least one of: an indication of whether the charging module is in use; or a reservation status of the charging module.
The “probability of actual availability of the requested charging station at a future point in time” is “based on a plurality of received requests regarding availability of at least one of the charging stations, if the plurality of requests were each made by electric vehicles as a result of a determined, specific charging requirement.” Stichowski ¶ 24.
Claim 4
Stichowski and Konrardy teach the method of claim 3,
wherein the availability of the charging module comprises a predicted charging end time.
The plurality of received requests that the charging station uses to predict its availability at a given period of time may be requests that specify restrictions to “a specific period of time or a specific time window.” Stichowski ¶ 7.
Claim 5
Stichowski and Konrardy teach the method of claim 4,
wherein the predicted charging end time is either: communicated from the charging module to the electric work vehicle; or calculated by the electric work vehicle based on a current state of charge of the battery being charged, a target state of charge of the battery being charged, and a charging rate of the charging module.
With respect to at least the first half of the “or” disjunctive statement in claim 5, Stichowski discloses that the requests 20a the vehicles send to the charging station include both the request itself, as well as “the information that the determined concrete charging requirement on which the request 20a is based was estimated.” Stichowski ¶ 31. As mentioned in the rejection of parent claim 4, those “concrete charging requirements” include requirements about “a specific period of time or a specific time window.” Stichowski ¶ 7. Hence, Stichowski teaches, if not at least suggests, that the requests 20a include an end time, since the requests at least include a time “window” or “period.”
Claim 7
Stichowski and Konrardy teach the method of claim 1,
wherein the vehicle properties further comprise at least one of: an available time period for charging; or a target state of charge for charging.
The charging requirements may be further refined by “data which has been noted by the driver in an electronic appointment calendar,” as this will indicate the likely route and timing of the electric vehicle, in order for the driver to arrive at an appointment. Stichowski ¶ 16.
Claim 12
Stichowski and Konrardy teach the method of claim 1
wherein the charging information comprises a result of a charging decision made by the controller.
In some embodiments a central control unit 22 considers the demand across a network of charging stations (including the charging station in this method), and makes suggestions about which electric vehicle should recharge at which respective stations, communicating that information as part of the charging properties. See Stichowski ¶ 32.
Claim 13
Stichowski and Konrardy teach the method of claim 1 further comprising
reserving the charging module based on the charging information.
“[A] binding booking corresponding to the specific charging requirement is proposed for confirmation or carried out immediately by a communication device of the electric vehicle if the probability of availability of the charging station is below a limit value.” Stichowski ¶ 22.
Claims 14 and 15
Claims 14 and 15 recite a generic device that performs exactly the same method as recited in claims 1 and 2. Stichowski discloses the method recited in claims 1 and 2 for the reasons given in their respective rejections, and further discloses a device for performing the same, which was also mentioned in the findings for those rejections.
Accordingly, claims 14 and 15 are hereby rejected over the same findings and rationale as provided above for claims 1 and 2.
Claim 16
Stichowski and Konrardy teach the method of claim 1,
wherein the predicted time before charging is required is based on a distance between the electric work vehicle and the charging module.
“In a similar way to the first electric vehicle 1, the respective distance of the second electric vehicle 2 from the respective charging station 16a, b can now be determined and, based on the average driving speed, a corresponding time for arrival at the respective charging station 16a, b can be determined.” Stichowski ¶ 30.
Claim 17
Stichowski and Konrardy teach the method of claim 1, further comprising:
receiving an input from the operator of the electric work vehicle indicating whether the operator accepts or rejects a reservation at the charging module, and wherein the reservation is based on the charging information displayed on the screen of the electric work vehicle.
“[A] binding booking corresponding to the specific charging requirement is proposed for confirmation.” Stichowski ¶ 22. Stichowski does not explicitly say whether the proposal is “displayed on the screen,” but Konrardy further teaches displaying recommended information to a user on a screen of the vehicle. See Konrardy ¶ 147; see also Konrardy ¶¶ 63, 72, and 122.
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to enhance Stichowski’s method (and the data provided by Stichowski’s vehicles to the charging stations) with Konrardy’s technique of predicting a time when charging will be necessary, and to use Konrardy’s display screen in Stichowski’s vehicle as well. One would have been motivated to combine Konrardy with Stichowski because “[c]urrently, vehicle operators must manually determine when to refuel or recharge vehicles” by “observ[ing] fuel or charge gauges on a vehicle dashboard and estimate when to refuel based upon knowledge or guesses about availability of fueling or charging stations,” a process which is both inconvenient and sometimes difficult. See Konrardy ¶ 176.
Claim 18
Stichowski and Konrardy teach the method of claim 1,
wherein the charging information displayed on the screen includes at least one of a location of the charging module or an availability of the charging module.
“[A] binding booking corresponding to the specific charging requirement is proposed for confirmation.” Stichowski ¶ 22. Since the user is able to confirm whether he wishes to “book” the charger, it follows that this confirmation at least teaches if not suggests providing an “availability of the charging module.” Stichowski does not explicitly say whether the proposal is “displayed on the screen,” but Konrardy further teaches displaying recommended information to a user on a screen of the vehicle. See Konrardy ¶ 147; see also Konrardy ¶¶ 63, 72, and 122.
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to enhance Stichowski’s method (and the data provided by Stichowski’s vehicles to the charging stations) with Konrardy’s technique of predicting a time when charging will be necessary, and to use Konrardy’s display screen in Stichowski’s vehicle as well. One would have been motivated to combine Konrardy with Stichowski because “[c]urrently, vehicle operators must manually determine when to refuel or recharge vehicles” by “observ[ing] fuel or charge gauges on a vehicle dashboard and estimate when to refuel based upon knowledge or guesses about availability of fueling or charging stations,” a process which is both inconvenient and sometimes difficult. See Konrardy ¶ 176.
Claims 19–21
Claims 19–21 recite a generic device that performs exactly the same method as recited in claims 16–18. Stichowski discloses the method recited in claims 16–18 for the reasons given in their respective rejections, and further discloses a device for performing the same, which was also mentioned in the findings for those rejections.
Accordingly, claims 19–21 are hereby rejected over the same findings and rationale as provided above for claims 16–18.
II. Stichowski, Konrardy, and Teske teach claim 6.
Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Stichowski and Konrardy as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2019/0383637 A1 (“Teske”).
Claim 6
Stichowski teaches the method of claim 1, but does not explicitly disclose whether its charging stations use direct current, let alone including information about the same in the charger properties.
Teske, however, teaches a method comprising both this and several other overlapping elements that claim 6 incorporates by reference to claim 1. For the sake of context, and to provide additional evidence as to the strength of this conclusion of obviousness, Teske’s teaching of those overlapping elements from claim 1 will be discussed together with Teske’s teaching of claim 6.
Teske teaches:
A method of charge management for electric work vehicles, the method comprising:
“FIG. 6 shows an example communication diagram 600 illustrating an example division of processing and communications between a client device 602 and a server 604 during a charging station query servicing scenario.” Teske ¶ 50.
communicating charger properties from a charging module to an electric work vehicle,
At steps 612–618, server 604 gathers “connector codes” and mapping data describing a plurality of charging stations, and transmits them to client device 602. Teske ¶¶ 51–52. As required by the claim language, all of the foregoing data is obtained from the charging stations. See Teske ¶ 25.
wherein the charging module comprises a DC charger;
The charging stations may include one or several “DC fast charging connectors.” Teske ¶ 51.
communicating vehicle properties from the electric work vehicle (120) to the charging module; and
“The client device 602 then transmits the input vehicle information and the location information to the server 604 as a charging station query, as indicated at 610.” Teske ¶ 50.
providing charging information to an operator, wherein the charging information is based on the charger properties and the vehicle properties;
“At 620, the client device 602 displays, based on the mapping data from the server, a map populated with indicators of the first group of charging station.” Teske ¶ 53.
wherein the charger properties comprise: a location of the charging module, and a DC voltage; and
The mapping data may include a list of geolocations of the identified charging stations, which is usable by a client device to generate or populate a map for display showing the locations of the identified charging stations.” Teske ¶ 49.
As shown in FIG. 4, the connector codes are standardized in a way that distinguishes AC voltage from DC voltage. See Teske ¶ 44.
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to improve Stichowski’s method with Teske’s technique of including DC voltage information in the search for a compatible charger. One would have been motivated to include this information because it ensures that the vehicle will find a compatible charger when it arrives at the charging station. See Teske ¶ 3.
III. Stichowski, Konrardy and Maruno teach claim 8.
Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Stichowski and Konrardy as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2021/0323419 A1 (“Maruno”).
Claim 8
Stichowski teaches the method of claim 1, but does not explicitly disclose whether the vehicle properties further comprise at least one of: a battery voltage; a maximum charge rate of the battery; a state of health of the battery; and a temperature of the battery.
Maruno, however, teaches a method that involves communicating vehicle properties to a remote computer, wherein the vehicle properties further comprise at least one of:
a battery voltage; a maximum charge rate of the battery; a state of health of the battery; and a temperature of the battery.
A communication device 50 onboard a vehicle 10 “acquires battery usage status information such as a current value, a voltage value, and a temperature output from the battery sensor 42, and transmits the battery usage status information to the center server 100 via the network NW illustrated in FIG. 1.” Maruno ¶ 49.
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to supplement Stichowski’s method with Maruno’s data measuring a current value, a voltage value, and a temperature output. One would have been motivated to supplement Stichowski’s method with Maruno’s data because Maruno’s data helps vehicle owners better understand how to maintain the health of their vehicles’ batteries. Maruno ¶¶ 7–8.
IV. Stichowski, Konrardy, and Whitaker teach claim 11.
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Stichowski and Konrardy as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2020/0089237 A1 (“Whitaker”).
Claim 11
Stichowski teaches the method of claim 1, but does not mention “a radius around the charging module in which a speed of the electric work vehicle is limited to below a threshold speed” as one of the pieces of data in the charger properties.
Whitaker, however, teaches a method that includes a charging station and electric vehicle exchanging information,
wherein the charger properties further comprise a radius around the charging module in which a speed of the electric work vehicle is limited to below a threshold speed.
“Also shown in FIG. 9, a charging zone 905 can specify a predetermined radius extending from a single boundary point 905a to form a circular zone shape surrounding one or more charging stations,” within which there will be “a relatively low speed limit.” Whitaker ¶ 64. The data describing the foregoing is shown in FIG. 10. See Whitaker ¶¶ 66–68. Note that while Whitaker uses robots as an example of its method, Whitaker’s disclosure “is not limited to that application.” Whitaker ¶ 31.
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to improve Stichowski’s system and method for charging electric vehicles with Whitaker’s enforcement of a reduced speed limit around the charging station. One would have been motivated to improve Stichowski’s system with Whitaker’s enforced speed limit because, as a robot 18 (or autonomous vehicle) “approaches a charging station, a more precise navigation approach may be activated to provide for the finer positional adjustments required to dock the robot with the charging station.” Whitaker ¶ 64.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 C.F.R. § 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 1–8 and 11–21 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims of copending Application Nos. 18/715,806 and 18/715,939 (reference applications). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claimed limitations in the pending application are claimed in the reference applications.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Justin R. Blaufeld whose telephone number is (571)272-4372. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 9:00am - 4:00pm ET.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, James K Trujillo can be reached at (571) 272-3677. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
Justin R. Blaufeld
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 2151
/Justin R. Blaufeld/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2151
1 The paragraphs and text in this rejection are from the European Patent Office’s machine translation offered at <https://translationportal.epo.org/emtp/translate/?ACTION=description-retrieval&COUNTRY=EP&ENGINE=google&FORMAT=docdb&KIND=A2&LOCALE=en_EP&NUMBER=3726455&SRCLANG=de&TRGLANG=en>. A copy of the translation document was included with the First Action on the Merits.
Prosecution Insights