Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
DETAILED ACTION
Response to Arguments
In communications filed on 1/7/2026, claims 1-20 are presented for examination. Claims 1, 11, and 20 are independent.
Amended claim(s): 1, 11, and 20.
Applicants’ arguments, see Applicant Arguments/Remarks filed 1/7/2026, with respect to claim(s) rejected under 35 USC 101 have been fully considered but are not persuasive. The present claims, as a whole, and individual limitations, are reciting abstract concept of data collection, categorization. As such the claims are analogous to FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1093-94 (concluding claims directed to "collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and notifying a user when misuse is detected" to be mental processes within the abstract-idea category); Electric Power Group; and TLI Comms. Looking at the steps of the claims, for each of the claims, data is simply being collected, analyzed. The invention is nothing more than “an idea of itself” such as concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgement, opinion) and “certain methods of organizing human activities” such as tracking, organizing, and sharing information as described in the claims that can be performed mentally (or with a pen and piece of paper). The steps are similar to concepts and ideas that have been identified as abstract by the courts. For example, collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis (Electric Power Group); collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and notifying a user when misuse is detected (FairWarning); and obtaining and comparing intangible data (Cybersource).
Applicants’ arguments, see Applicant Arguments/Remarks filed 1/7/2026, with respect to claim(s) rejected under prior art have been fully considered but are not persuasive. Brannon discloses the newly amended element of the claim “user-configurable consent preference category” (see, Brannon: Figs. 62-70, ¶54, ¶334, ¶381, the consent preferences are user-configurable)
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
The claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. Claim(s) 1, 11, and 20 is/are directed to a method and system (apparatus). The claim(s) do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea) without significantly more. Based upon consideration of all of the relevant factors with respect to the claims as a whole, claims are held to claim an unpatentable abstract idea, and are therefore rejected as ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Inventions for a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” generally constitute patent-eligible subject matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,216 (2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ - i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217-18 (alteration in original).
The USPTO published revised guidance on January 7, 2019, for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”). That guidance revised the USPTO's examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. 1
The first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is, thus, a two-prong test. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; MPEP §§ 2106.04(II)(A)(l), 2106.04(a). If so, we next determine, in Step 2A, Prong Two, whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of that exception, i.e., whether the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54-55; MPEP §§ 2106.04(II)(A)(2), 2106.04(d). Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54-55; MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A)(2).
If the claim is determined to be directed to a judicial exception under Step 2A, we next evaluate the additional elements, individually and in combination, in Step 2B, to determine whether they provide an inventive concept, i.e., whether the additional elements or combination of elements amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself; only then, is the claim patent eligible. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; MPEP § 2106.05.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A)
2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 1
The abstract idea to which claims 1, 11, 20 are directed to is “an idea of itself” such as concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgement, opinion) and “certain methods of organizing human activities” such as tracking, organizing, and sharing information. In particular, the claims recite the following abstract concepts:
(a) “receiving a request to transmit data to a destination, the data being associated with a consent preference,” (i.e., abstract idea of collecting data/information as found abstract by the Courts in Internet Patents, Content Extraction, Digitech, CyberSource, Electric Power Group, Classen, FairWarning)
(b) “identifying a user-configurable consent preference category assigned to the destination” (i.e., abstract idea of mental process of analyzing data as found abstract by the Courts in TLI Comms, Digitech, SmartGene, Bancorp Servs, Electric Power Group, Classen, FariWarning, Cybersource)
(c) “determining that the consent preference associated with the data corresponds to the user-configurable consent preference category” (i.e., abstract idea of mental process of analyzing data as found abstract by the Courts in TLI Comms, Digitech, SmartGene, Bancorp Servs, Electric Power Group, Classen, FariWarning, Cybersource)
(d) “in response to the determining of the consent preference, transmitting the data to the destination” (i.e., abstract idea of receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network)),
The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have identified abstract ideas in patent claims by making comparisons to concepts found in past decisions to be judicial exceptions to eligibility. The 2019 IEG summarizes concepts the courts have considered to be abstract ideas by associating eligibility decisions with judicial descriptors (e.g., “an idea of itself,” “certain methods of organizing human activities”, “mathematical relationships and formulas”) based on common characteristics. These associations define the judicial descriptors in a manner that stays within the confines of the judicial precedent, with the understanding that these associations are not mutually exclusive, i.e., some concepts may be associated with more than one judicial descriptor.
The abstract functions of the claims in the case are claim(s) is/are directed to system and method of data processing (i.e., abstract idea mental process) as defined by the claimed steps above.
The present claims, as a whole, and individual limitations, are reciting abstract concept of data collection, categorization. As such the claims are analogous to FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1093-94 (concluding claims directed to "collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and notifying a user when misuse is detected" to be mental processes within the abstract-idea category); Electric Power Group; and TLI Comms. Looking at the steps of the claims, for each of the claims, data is simply being collected, analyzed, to make a decision which was ruled abstract in:
a. Collecting and comparing known information (Classen);
b. Comparing information regarding a sample or test subject to a control or target data (Ambry/Myriad CAFC);
c. Collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and notifying a user when misuse is detected (FairWarning);
d. Data recognition and storage (Content Extraction);
e. Obtaining and comparing intangible data (Cybersource);
f. Collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis (Electric Power Group);
g. Organizing and manipulating information through mathematical correlations (Digitech);
h. Virus Screening (Int. Ventures v. Symantec ‘610 patent);
i. A mathematical formula for calculating parameters indicating an abnormal condition (Grams);
j. Collecting, selecting, categorizing, analysis, and display results of the analysis (Electric Power Group);
k. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network);
Furthermore, the invention is nothing more than “an idea of itself” such as concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgement, opinion) and “certain methods of organizing human activities” such as tracking, organizing, and sharing information as described in the claims that can be performed mentally (or with a pen and piece of paper). The steps are similar to concepts and ideas that have been identified as abstract by the courts. For example, collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis (Electric Power Group); collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and notifying a user when misuse is detected (FairWarning); and obtaining and comparing intangible data (Cybersource). While the specific facts of the case differ from these cases, the claims are still directed to collecting and categorizing data to predict a risk score. Further, each and every step can be performed mentally and with pen and paper. A computer is not necessary to generate, receive and correlate/compare data. Even further still, any steps that deal with generating, receiving, analyzing, storing are insignificant, extra solution activity because receiving, analyzing and transmitting data, analyzing and processing collected data are all well-known in the computer network security arts.
2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2
The 2019 Revised Guidance sets forth a non-exhaustive listing of considerations indicative that an additional element or combination of elements may have integrated a recited judicial exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; MPEP § 2106.04(d). In particular, the Guidance describes that an additional element may have integrated the judicial exception into a practical application if, inter alia, the additional element reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other technology or a technical field. Id. At the same time, the Guidance makes clear that merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea; adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception; or only generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field are not sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Id.
The abstract functions of the claims in the case are claim(s) is/are directed to apparatus and method of data processing (i.e., abstract idea mental process) to make a decision as defined by the claimed steps. The claims do not require an arguably inventive set of components, methods, or algorithms. The abstract idea is implemented using generic computing elements (“processor”, “machine-storage medium”) that do not integrate a practical application of the abstract idea in the claims (step 2A, prong 2). Accordingly, even in combination, these additional generic computing elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. The claims recite a mental process, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the abstract idea are no more than generic computer components used as tools to perform the recited abstract idea and insignificant extra-solution activity. As such, they do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223-24 ("[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[ e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)); 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (identifying “an additional element adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception” and “an additional element does no more than generally link the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use” as examples in which a judicial exception has not been integrated into a practical application).
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B)
The relevant question under Step 2B is whether claim includes an additional element or combination of elements adds specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry to the judicial exception. Here, the additional elements of claim beyond the abstract idea, namely, a “processor”, “machine-storage medium” are conventional computing equipment and algorithm used in a well-understood, routine, and conventional manner. These additional elements do not provide an inventive concept; rather, they simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry to the judicial exception.
Applying the test to the claims in the application, the structural elements of the claims, which include a computing element when taken in combination with the functional elements claim(s) is/are directed to apparatus and method to collect data collecting and categorizing data to make a decision to store or delete certain data, together do not offer “significantly more” than the abstract idea itself because the claims do not recite an improvement to another technology or technical field, an improvement to the functioning of any computer itself, or provide meaningful limitations beyond generally linking an abstract idea to a particular technological environment (a general purpose computer and/or environment of the user). When considered as an ordered combination, the Examiner does not find any combination of the additional elements that amounts to more than the sum of the parts. The Examiner finds that the individual elements of the claims are performing their intended roles and functions. In most cases, the additional elements are applied merely to carry out data processing, as discussed above, fall under well-understood, routine, and conventional functions of generic computers – in our common day-to-day interactions. Note: Applicant’s disclosure states a generic hardware and/or software is used to execute the algorithms (¶36-¶38); note also cited art of record discloses processors; devices, programs, shift registers for shifting bits left/right, flip-flops in performing mathematical operations such as exponentiation operations (see, e.g., US 20200004986 A1: Fig. 1, ¶4-¶14). Therefore, the claimed interactions of the various generically recited methods / devices lacks an unconventional step that confines the claim to a particular useful application in the sense that the result is equivalent to purely mental activity, e.g., data categorization to make a decision.
Dependent claims do not add an inventive step to the abstract idea of the independent claims and are therefore rejected based on the aforementioned rationale discussed in the rejection.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claim(s) 1-20 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by US 20200004986 A1 (hereinafter ‘Brannon’).
As regards claim 1, Brannon (US 20200004986 A1) discloses: A method comprising: receiving a request to transmit data to a destination, the data being associated with a consent preference; (Brannon: Figs. 39, 49, ¶4-¶19, ¶304, ¶334 i.e., request for data associated with consent wherein the consent/permission defines destination of where data may be transferred)
identifying a user-configurable consent preference category assigned to the destination; (Brannon: Figs. 1, 3-5, 29, ¶226-¶227, i.e., identifying the categories of data, wherein, Figs. 62-70, ¶54, ¶334, ¶381, the consent preferences are user-configurable)
determining that the consent preference associated with the data corresponds to the user-configurable consent preference category; and (Brannon: Figs. 1, 3-5, 29, 39, 49, ¶226-¶227, ¶286, i.e., identifying the data associated with preference categories with consent, wherein, Figs. 62-70, ¶54, ¶334, ¶381, the consent preferences are user-configurable)
in response to the determining of the consent preference, transmitting the data to the destination. (Brannon: Figs. 39, 49, ¶4-¶19, ¶304, ¶334 i.e., request for data associated with consent wherein the consent/permission defines destination of where data may be transferred)
Claims 11 and 20 recite substantially the same features recited in claim 1 above, and are rejected based on the aforementioned rationale discussed in the rejection.
As regards claim 2, Brannon discloses the method of claim 1, wherein the consent preference category is configured by a customer entity associated with the request. (Branon: Figs. 14-25, ¶36, ¶65, ¶68, ¶76-¶77, i.e., GUI for configuring data model and consent settings)
Claim 12 recites substantially the same features recited in claim 2 above, and is rejected based on the aforementioned rationale discussed in the rejection.
As regards claim 3, Brannon discloses the method of claim 1, comprising: determining that the data corresponds to an event type associated with a predefined service, the event type corresponding to a condition that affects transmission of one or more events of the event type to the destination. (Branon: ¶329, i.e., the triggering events that affects consent and associated data to be collected and provided to the recipient)
Claim 13 recites substantially the same features recited in claim 3 above, and is rejected based on the aforementioned rationale discussed in the rejection.
As regards claim 4, Brannon discloses the method of claim 3, comprising: determining that the condition is satisfied; and (Branon: ¶304 ¶329-¶329) in response to determining that the condition is satisfied and that the consent preference corresponds to the consent preference category, transmitting the data to the destination. (Branon: ¶304 ¶329-¶329, i.e., the triggering events that affects consent and associated data to be collected and provided to the recipient and collecting data in response to the changes)
Claim 14 recites substantially the same features recited in claim 4 above and is rejected based on the aforementioned rationale discussed in the rejection.
As regards claim 5, Brannon discloses the method of claim 3, wherein the condition corresponds to a change of a trait value in a user profile associated with the data in the request, and wherein the condition corresponds to a user cohort condition or a group condition. (Branon: ¶68, ¶84, ¶304 ¶329-¶329)
Claim 15 recites substantially the same features recited in claim 5 above and is rejected based on the aforementioned rationale discussed in the rejection.
As regards claim 6, Brannon discloses the method of claim 3, wherein the condition corresponds to a change of consent preference by a user associated with the data in the request. (Branon: ¶84, ¶304 ¶329-¶329)
Claim 16 recites substantially the same features recited in claim 6 above and is rejected based on the aforementioned rationale discussed in the rejection.
As regards claim 7, Brannon discloses the method of claim 6, comprising: identifying a user profile associated with the user based on the data in the request; (Brannon: Figs. 39, 49, ¶4-¶19, ¶304) determining that the consent preference is different from a current consent preference of a same data type in the user profile; and (Brannon: ¶96, ¶228, ¶329-¶333, i.e., changes to the preference to the type of data being captured) in response to determining that the consent preference is different, determining that the condition corresponding to a change of consent preference is satisfied. (Brannon: ¶96, ¶228, ¶329-¶333, i.e., changes to the preference to the type of data being captured and updating the preference and collecting the data)
Claim 17 recites substantially the same features recited in claim 7 above and is rejected based on the aforementioned rationale discussed in the rejection.
As regards claim 8, Brannon discloses the method of claim 7, comprising: in response to determining that the condition corresponding to a change of consent preference is satisfied and that the consent preference corresponds to the consent preference category, transmitting the data to the destination. (Brannon: Figs. 39, 49, ¶4-¶19, ¶96, ¶228, ¶304, ¶329-¶333, i.e., request for data associated with consent wherein the consent/permission defines destination of where data may be transferred)
Claim 18 recites substantially the same features recited in claim 8 above and is rejected based on the aforementioned rationale discussed in the rejection.
As regards claim 9, Brannon discloses the method of claim 1, comprising: receiving the consent preference as a user input via a device; (Brannon: ¶16, i.e., the consent data received from a device associated with the user) identifying a user profile based on a device identifier associated with the device; and (Brannon: ¶16, i.e., the consent data received from a device associated with the user) saving the consent preference in the user profile, the consent preference being associated with a timestamp indicating a time when the consent preference is received via the device. (Brannon: ¶16, ¶77, i.e., the consent data received from a device associated with the user and recorded based on time/date of the consent)
Claim 19 recites substantially the same features recited in claim 9 above and is rejected based on the aforementioned rationale discussed in the rejection.
As regards claim 10, Brannon discloses the method of claim 9, comprising: determining that the consent preference is different from a consent preference of a same data type in the user profile; and (Brannon: ¶96, ¶228, ¶329-¶333, i.e., changes to the preference to the type of data being captured) updating the consent preference of data associated with the same data type based on the consent preference. (Brannon: ¶96, ¶228, ¶329-¶333, i.e., changes to the preference to the type of data being captured and updating the preference and collecting the data)
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/SYED A ZAIDI/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2432
1 The MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) incorporates the revised guidance and subsequent updates at § 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020).