Prosecution Insights
Last updated: July 17, 2026
Application No. 18/760,966

KEY PROVISION

Final Rejection §103
Filed
Jul 01, 2024
Priority
Aug 10, 2023 — IN 202341053590
Examiner
GERGISO, TECHANE
Art Unit
2408
Tech Center
2400 — Computer Networks
Assignee
Nokia Corporation
OA Round
2 (Final)
84%
Grant Probability
Favorable
3-4
OA Rounds
1y 0m
Est. Remaining
99%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 84% — above average
84%
Career Allowance Rate
718 granted / 850 resolved
+26.5% vs TC avg
Strong +24% interview lift
Without
With
+24.2%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
3y 1m
Avg Prosecution
22 currently pending
Career history
875
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
2.2%
-37.8% vs TC avg
§103
83.4%
+43.4% vs TC avg
§102
10.1%
-29.9% vs TC avg
§112
1.6%
-38.4% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 850 resolved cases

Office Action

§103
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Information Disclosure Statement The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on February 02, 2026, October 23, 2025 has been considered by the examiner. Response to Arguments Applicant’s arguments, see pages 6-8, filed on 01/21/2026, with respect to the rejection(s) of claim(s) 1-19 under U.S.C. @ 103 as being obvious over US2022/0394565 ("Rugeland") in view of US2022/0369415 ("Peng") have been fully considered and are persuasive. Therefore, the rejection has been withdrawn. However, upon further consideration, a new ground(s) of rejection is made in view of ISHII (US 20220394584 A1) in view of Guo et al. (US 20230388871 A1—hereinafter- Guo”). Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. Claim 1-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over ISHII (US 20220394584 A1) in view of Guo et al. (US 20230388871 A1—hereinafter- Guo”). As per claim 1. ISHII discloses an apparatus comprising: at least one processor; and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the apparatus at least to perform ([0010] In one example, a wireless terminal comprising: processor circuitry configured to establish, using a first Access Stratum (AS) master key, a first security context on a first radio connection with a master access node; receiver circuitry configured to receive a re-configuration message) obtaining at least one secondary node counter list ([0010]one or more conditional secondary cell group (SCG) configurations and at least one counter, each conditional SCG configuration comprising an identity of a candidate target primary cell of SCG (PSCell) and at least one triggering condition, the candidate target PSCell being used for Dual-Connectivity (DC), the at least one counter and the first AS master key being used for derivation of a second AS master key to be used for establishment of a second security context with a candidate target PSCell comprised in one of the one or more conditional SCG configurations; and the processor circuitry further configured to store the one or more conditional SCG configurations, wherein: the stored one or more conditional secondary cell configurations are released upon a change of the first AS master key), wherein the secondary node counter list corresponds to mutually different secondary nodes of a plurality of secondary nodes ([0273-0275] 6: Providing Secondary Cell Group Configuration for Dual Connectivity. FIG. 37 discloses Dual Connectivity (DC) scenarios in which a Master gNodeB 22 provides a secondary cell group (SCG) configuration to a wireless terminal for immediate use by the wireless terminal upon reception. An example of Dual Connectivity (DC) is depicted in FIG. 38. FIG. 38 shows that, when a UE is configured with a DC operation, the UE may be configured with a group of one or more cells served by a master node (MN), Master Cell Group (MCG) and a group of one or more cells served by a secondary node (SN), Secondary Cell Group (SCG). [0275] In a Dual Connectivity mode, a special cell may be defined among one or more cells in each of the cell groups (MCG or SCG). Such a special cell may be used for obtaining timing reference to be used for the corresponding cell group. The special cell for the MCG may be referred as PCell (Primary Cell), whereas the special cell for the SCG may be referred as PSCell (primary cell of SCG), or SpCell (Special Cell) of a SCG. The PCell may be a serving cell, operating a primary frequency, in which the UE may perform an initial connection establishment procedure and/or a connection reestablishment procedure. In addition, the PSCell may be a serving cell in which the UE may perform a random access procedure (e.g., in a case that the UE performs a reconfiguration with synchronization procedure). The cell(s) other than the special cell in each of the cell groups may be referred as SCell(s) (Secondary Cell(s)). Thus, with respect to dual connectivity, secondary cell group (SCG) is a term given to a group of serving cells which are associated with a secondary RAN node (Note that in the context of 5G and LTE Dual connectivity, mutually different secondary nodes are described as the architecture where a mobile device (UE) is connected to multiple physical cell towers (secondary nodes) that are distinct from one another as described above), obtaining an indication of a secondary node of the plurality of secondary nodes ([0284] FIG. 40 is a flowchart which shows representative, generic, steps or acts performed by wireless terminal 26 of FIG. 37. Act 40-1 comprises establishing a first radio connection with a master access node, e.g., with Master gNodeB 22. TABLE-US-00013 TABLE 1 1. For bearers requiring SCG radio resources the SN triggers UE Random Access so that synchronisation of the SN radio resource configuration can be performed. The SN decides for the PSCell and other SCG SCells and provides the new SCG radio resource configuration to the MN within an SN RRC configuration message contained in the SN Addition Request Acknowledge message), generating a secondary node key at least partially based on the at least one obtained secondary node counter list and the indication of the secondary node ([0234] A Key re-keying procedure may be initiated by the currently serving AMF. The AMF may create a new K.sub.gNB from the current K.sub.AMF using a fresh uplink NAS COUNT (a counter handled by the Non-Access Stratum (NAS) layer, shared by the UE and the AMF). The derived K.sub.gNB may be sent to the currently serving gNB, which may then send an RRC message (e.g. RRCReconfiguration) comprising (1) an indication indicating a need to generate a fresh K.sub.AMF (e.g. a field K.sub.AMF change flag included in nas-Container) and/or (2) indication indicating a need to generate a fresh K.sub.gNB based on the K.sub.AMF (e.g. KeySetChangeIndicator=TRUE). TABLE-US-00013 TABLE 1 1 The UE applies the new configuration and replies to MN with MN RRC reconfiguration complete message, including an SN RRC response message for SN, if needed. In case the UE is unable to comply with (part of) the configuration included in the MN RRC reconfiguration message, it performs the reconfiguration failure procedure. 5. The MN informs the SN that the UE has completed the reconfiguration procedure successfully via SN Reconfiguration Complete message, including the SN RRC response message, if received from the UE. 6. If configured with bearers requiring SCG radio resources, the UE performs synchronisation towards the PSCell configured by the SN), and accessing the secondary node using the generated secondary node key ([0292] FIG. 43 shows an example key derivation scheme for K.sub.SN. The example scheme of FIG. 43 may be used when the Master gNodeB 22 decides to newly add an secondary node, SN 160, or to newly add a secondary cell group, SCG, or when the Master gNodeB 22 updates the security keys used in the currently active SN/SCG. FIG. 43 shows Master gNodeB 22, for example secondary key generator 92(37) of Master gNodeB 22, which computes K.sub.SN. As shown in FIG. 43, the secondary key generator 92(37) may comprise secondary key derivation function 150 which may receive inputs in the form of the currently active AS master key 152 for Master gNodeB 22, K.sub.gNB, and a counter, such as SK Counter 154, as an input for a key derivation function (KDF). The secondary key derivation function 150 uses the inputs of the currently active AS master key 152 and the SK Counter 154 to derive secondary node key K.sub.SN 156. The SK Counter 154 may be also referred as an SN Counter or an SCG Counter. The SK Counter 154 may be selected by Master gNodeB 22 and be used as freshness input into K.sub.SN derivations to guarantee that other security keys further derived from K.sub.SN in the SN are not re-used with the same input parameters. The other security keys may be used for encryption and integrity protection of radio bearers for the SN. The secondary node key K.sub.SN 156 derived in the Master gNodeB 22 may be sent to the secondary node 160 using the SN Addition Request for SN addition, as shown in by way of example in FIG. 41, or the SN Modification Request for SN key updates as shown by way of example in FIG. 42). ISHII does not explicitly disclose the secondary node counter is a secondary node counter list. Guo, in analogous art however, discloses the secondary node counter is a secondary node counter list ([0394] Another option is the Rel-18 UE needs to maintain the security key derived from the SK counter for each SCG configuration. By doing so, there is no limit on the reuse of SK counter for each of the candidate SCG configurations (until the PDCP SN wraparound). However, this will require confirmation from SA3 whether they are fine with reusing the SK counter. If SA3 think that SK counter cannot be reused when the UE moves back and fore candidate PSCells, another option is that network can provide UE with a list of sk-counter values for a candidate PSCell for sequential use whenever the UE moves back to the same candidate cell. When all sk-counters is used, MN key will need to be changed. [0395] In both cases, PDCP SN wraparound happens, network will need to assign new sk-counter. Therefore, the following options for the sk-counter assignments can include a list of sk-counter values for sequential use when CPC happens (option 1) and one assigned sk-counter for each candidate PSCell (option2). [0396] Option 1 includes a list of sk-counter values for sequential use when CPC happens. In this option, the network will provide the UE 5402 a list of sk-counters, this list can be incremental or not. UE will use the next available sk-counter for the next activated cell. When all the sk-counters are used in the list, the network sends a new list to the UE. Or no more SCG can be activated which require a new sk-counter. The UE will need to fall back to legacy procedure. In this case, sk-counters may or may not be reused. For reuse cases, a UE can remember which sk-counter is used for the deactivated cell. If a newly activated cell (never activated from pre-configuration), a UE will use a new sk-counter from the list. [0397] Option 2 includes one assigned sk-counter for each candidate PSCell, wherein each candidate PSCell is associated with a pre-configured sk-counter, and the UE will use the associated sk-counter accordingly. Here, an sk-counter assigned to a candidate PSCell may be reused (this will be pending on SA confirm on security issue). If the sk-counter can be reused for deactivated PSCell, the UE will use the stored sk-counter. In the case where sk-counter is not allowed to be reused, the NW assigns new sk-counter to the deactivate cell. Additionally or alternatively, the UE may request sk-counter from network. Otherwise, the cell will need to be released). Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the claimed limitations of the secondary node counter disclosed by ISHII to is a secondary node counter list. This modification would have been obvious because a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated by the desire to provide network topologies, network and information security technologies, communication hardware implementations, and in particular, to various aspects of layer 1 (L1) and/or layer 2 (L2) based inter-cell mobility as suggested by Guo ([0052-0053]). As per claim 2. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the at least one secondary node counter list comprises at least two secondary counter lists ([0287] 3GPP TS 37.340 specifies a procedure for adding (newly configure) a secondary node (i.e. adding a new SCG configuration) as shown in FIG. 41. Messages, acts and signal of FIG. 40 are basically described in Table 1 below). As per claim 3. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the apparatus is further caused to perform: counting a number of accesses of the apparatus to a respective secondary node ([0201] The case of Key re-keying is initiated by the AMF. The AMF may create a new K.sub.gNB from the current K.sub.AMF using a fresh uplink NAS COUNT, a counter handled by the Non-Access Stratum (NAS) layer, which is shared by the UE and the AMF), wherein generating the secondary key is further based on the counted number of accesses ([0201] The derived K.sub.gNB may be sent to the gNB. The gNB may then send an RRC message (e.g., RRCReconfiguration) with the first security configuration comprising (1) an indication indicating a need to generate a fresh K.sub.AMF and/or (2) indication indicating a need to generate a fresh K.sub.gNB based on the K.sub.AMF (e.g. KeySetChangeIndicator=TRUE). As per claim 4. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 1, wherein at least one of the secondary node counter list comprises a non-monotonic sequence of secondary node counter values, or the secondary node counter list mutually differ from one another ([0283] The configuration message 138 is received by receiver circuitry 46 of wireless terminal 26, processed by message processor 70, which stores contents of the configuration message 138 in conditional secondary cell configuration memory 140(37). The configuration message 138 may include a secondary cell group configuration which in turn comprises an identity of a primary secondary cell (stored in PSCell field 144) which may be used for Dual-Connectivity (DC). The secondary cell group configuration included in the configuration message 138 is configured to instruct the wireless terminal 26 to establish a second radio connection with a secondary access node serving the primary secondary cell included in the secondary cell configuration upon receipt of the configuration message 138). As per claim 5. ISHII discloses an apparatus comprising: at least one processor; and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the apparatus at least to perform ([0274] An example embodiment and mode described with reference to FIG. 37 discloses Dual Connectivity (DC) scenarios in which a Master gNodeB 22 provides a secondary cell group (SCG) configuration to a wireless terminal for immediate use by the wireless terminal upon reception. An example illustration of Dual Connectivity (DC) is depicted in FIG. 38), generating at least one secondary node counter ([0274] FIG. 38 shows that, when a UE is configured with a DC operation, the UE may be configured with a group of one or more cells served by a master node (MN), Master Cell Group (MCG) and a group of one or more cells served by a secondary node (SN), Secondary Cell Group (SCG). In FIG. 38, the cells belonging to the Master Cell Group (MCG) are shown by solid lines, whereas the cells belonging to the Secondary Cell Group (SCG) are shown in dotted lines. The depictions of FIG. 38 are merely for sake of an example illustration and are not intended to specify any particular placement or number of cells), wherein the secondary node counter corresponds to mutually different secondary nodes of a plurality of secondary nodes ([0275] In a Dual Connectivity mode, a special cell may be defined among one or more cells in each of the cell groups (MCG or SCG). Such a special cell may be used for obtaining timing reference to be used for the corresponding cell group. The special cell for the MCG may be referred as PCell (Primary Cell), whereas the special cell for the SCG may be referred as PSCell (primary cell of SCG), or SpCell (Special Cell) of a SCG), providing an indication of at least one secondary node key to a secondary node of the plurality of secondary nodes ([0293] The Master gNodeB 22 may send the SK Counter to the wireless terminal 26 using the RRCReconfiguration message (see Listing 13). FIG. 43 further shows wireless terminal 26, and secondary key generator 96(37) in particular, as comprising key derivation function 170. The key derivation function 170 receives inputs including the SK Counter 172, received from Master gNodeB 22, e.g., in the RRCReconfiguration message, and the currently active AS key K.sub.gNB 174. Upon reception of the RRCReconfiguration message the secondary key generator 96(37) may use the currently active AS key, K.sub.gNB 174, shared with Master gNodeB 22, and the received SK Counter 172 as inputs to the key derivation function 170 to derive secondary key K.sub.SN, 176, which may be used for deriving other security key to be used for encryption and integrity protection of radio bearers for the secondary node SN 160), wherein the at least one secondary node key of the indication of at least one secondary node key corresponds to a secondary node counter value comprised by the generated secondary node counter corresponding to the secondary node of the plurality of secondary nodes ([0292] The secondary key derivation function 150 uses the inputs of the currently active AS master key 152 and the SK Counter 154 to derive secondary node key K.sub.SN 156. The SK Counter 154 may be also referred as an SN Counter or an SCG Counter. The SK Counter 154 may be selected by Master gNodeB 22 and be used as freshness input into K.sub.SN derivations to guarantee that other security keys further derived from K.sub.SN in the SN are not re-used with the same input parameters. The other security keys may be used for encryption and integrity protection of radio bearers for the SN. The secondary node key K.sub.SN 156 derived in the Master gNodeB 22 may be sent to the secondary node 160 using the SN Addition Request for SN addition, as shown in by way of example in FIG. 41, or the SN Modification Request for SN key updates as shown by way of example in FIG. 42), providing at least one of the generated secondary node counter to a user equipment ([0304] The Master gNodeB 22 thus comprises message generator 54 that may generate and transmit to the wireless terminal 26 the configuration message 138(44) that may include an SCG configuration with a PSCell configuration. The SCG configuration is preferably stored in conditional secondary cell configuration memory 140(44). The secondary cell group connectivity control logic 134 of the UE that receives the configuration message may start synchronization with the configured PSCell, and then establish radio connection/bearers with the SCells in the SCG after the wireless terminal 26 determines that the triggering condition associated with the SCG configuration is satisfied), and providing an indication of the secondary node of the plurality of secondary nodes to the user equipment ([0304] The Master gNodeB 22 thus comprises message generator 54 that may generate and transmit to the wireless terminal 26 the configuration message 138(44) that may include an SCG configuration with a PSCell configuration. The SCG configuration is preferably stored in conditional secondary cell configuration memory 140(44). The secondary cell group connectivity control logic 134 of the UE that receives the configuration message may start synchronization with the configured PSCell, and then establish radio connection/bearers with the SCells in the SCG after the wireless terminal 26 determines that the triggering condition associated with the SCG configuration is satisfied). ISHII does not explicitly disclose the secondary node counter is a secondary node counter list. Guo, in analogous art however, discloses the secondary node counter is a secondary node counter list ([0394] Another option is the Rel-18 UE needs to maintain the security key derived from the SK counter for each SCG configuration. By doing so, there is no limit on the reuse of SK counter for each of the candidate SCG configurations (until the PDCP SN wraparound). However, this will require confirmation from SA3 whether they are fine with reusing the SK counter. If SA3 think that SK counter cannot be reused when the UE moves back and fore candidate PSCells, another option is that network can provide UE with a list of sk-counter values for a candidate PSCell for sequential use whenever the UE moves back to the same candidate cell. When all sk-counters is used, MN key will need to be changed. [0395] In both cases, PDCP SN wraparound happens, network will need to assign new sk-counter. Therefore, the following options for the sk-counter assignments can include a list of sk-counter values for sequential use when CPC happens (option 1) and one assigned sk-counter for each candidate PSCell (option2). [0396] Option 1 includes a list of sk-counter values for sequential use when CPC happens. In this option, the network will provide the UE 5402 a list of sk-counters, this list can be incremental or not. UE will use the next available sk-counter for the next activated cell. When all the sk-counters are used in the list, the network sends a new list to the UE. Or no more SCG can be activated which require a new sk-counter. The UE will need to fall back to legacy procedure. In this case, sk-counters may or may not be reused. For reuse cases, a UE can remember which sk-counter is used for the deactivated cell. If a newly activated cell (never activated from pre-configuration), a UE will use a new sk-counter from the list. [0397] Option 2 includes one assigned sk-counter for each candidate PSCell, wherein each candidate PSCell is associated with a pre-configured sk-counter, and the UE will use the associated sk-counter accordingly. Here, an sk-counter assigned to a candidate PSCell may be reused (this will be pending on SA confirm on security issue). If the sk-counter can be reused for deactivated PSCell, the UE will use the stored sk-counter. In the case where sk-counter is not allowed to be reused, the NW assigns new sk-counter to the deactivate cell. Additionally or alternatively, the UE may request sk-counter from network. Otherwise, the cell will need to be released). Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the claimed limitations of the secondary node counter disclosed by ISHII to is a secondary node counter list. This modification would have been obvious because a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated by the desire to provide network topologies, network and information security technologies, communication hardware implementations, and in particular, to various aspects of layer 1 (L1) and/or layer 2 (L2) based inter-cell mobility as suggested by Guo ([0052-0053]). As per claim 6. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 5, wherein the at least one secondary node counter list comprises at least two secondary counter lists ([0310] Listing 14 shows an example format of the configuration for conditional PSCell addition/modification, where the MN RRCReconfiguration message that encapsulates the SN RRCReconfiguration message may comprise a list of triggering conditions. It should be understood that the MN RRCReconfiguration message may be essentially as disclosed for the FIG. 37 embodiment and mode, but additionally includes the list of triggering conditions). As per claim 7. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 5, wherein at least one of providing the indication of at least one secondary node key before receiving an indication of an imminent access to the secondary node by the user equipment using the secondary node key indicated by the indication of at least one secondary node key ([0234] A Key re-keying procedure may be initiated by the currently serving AMF. The AMF may create a new K.sub.gNB from the current K.sub.AMF using a fresh uplink NAS COUNT (a counter handled by the Non-Access Stratum (NAS) layer, shared by the UE and the AMF). The derived K.sub.gNB may be sent to the currently serving gNB, which may then send an RRC message (e.g. RRCReconfiguration) comprising (1) an indication indicating a need to generate a fresh K.sub.AMF (e.g. a field K.sub.AMF change flag included in nas-Container) and/or (2) indication indicating a need to generate a fresh K.sub.gNB based on the K.sub.AMF (e.g. KeySetChangeIndicator=TRUE). As per claim 8. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 5, wherein the indication of at least one secondary node key corresponds to a secondary node key list corresponding to the generated secondary node counter list corresponding to the secondary network node ([0235] A Key refresh procedure may be initiated by the currently serving gNB. The gNB may generate a new K.sub.gNB from NH if an unused {NH, NCC} pair is available, given by the AMF, i.e. vertical derivation. Otherwise the currently serving gNB may generate a new K.sub.gNB from the currently used K.sub.gNB, i.e., horizontal derivation), and providing as part of at least one of a secondary node modification request, or a secondary node addition request ([0235]The gNB may then send an RRC message, e.g. RRCReconfiguration, including NCC and KeySetChangeIndicator=FALSE. The UE receiving the RRC message may generate a new K.sub.gNB with either the vertical or horizontal derivation, based on the received NCC value and the saved NCC value). As per claim 9. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 5, wherein the indication of at least one secondary node key corresponds to a secondary node key for the access by the user equipment to the secondary network node and providing as part of at least one of a secondary node addition request, or a secondary node release request ([0234] A Key re-keying procedure may be initiated by the currently serving AMF. The AMF may create a new K.sub.gNB from the current K.sub.AMF using a fresh uplink NAS COUNT (a counter handled by the Non-Access Stratum (NAS) layer, shared by the UE and the AMF). The derived K.sub.gNB may be sent to the currently serving gNB, which may then send an RRC message (e.g. RRCReconfiguration) comprising (1) an indication indicating a need to generate a fresh K.sub.AMF (e.g. a field K.sub.AMF change flag included in nas-Container) and/or (2) indication indicating a need to generate a fresh K.sub.gNB based on the K.sub.AMF (e.g. KeySetChangeIndicator=TRUE). As per claim 10. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 5, wherein at least one of providing the indication of at least one secondary node key after receiving an indication of an imminent access to the secondary node by the user equipment using the secondary node key of the indication of at least one secondary node key or providing the indication of at least one secondary node key before receiving an indication of an imminent access to the secondary node by the user equipment using the secondary node key of the indication of at least one secondary node key, wherein at least one of the indication of at least one secondary node key comprises the secondary node key for the access by the user equipment to the secondary network node or providing as part of a secondary node reconfiguration complete message ([0223]FIG. 28 shows system 20 as comprising source gNodeB 22, wireless terminal 26, and candidate target node 28. The source gNodeB 22, wireless terminal 26, and node processor 30 of the communications system 20 of FIG. 28 are similar to those of FIG. 6, FIG. 11, FIG. 15, and FIG. 19, with like units and functionalities having like reference numbers. As shown in FIG. 28, the source gNodeB 22 comprises node processor circuitry (“node processor 30”) and node transceiver circuitry 32, with node transceiver circuitry 32 comprising node transmitter 34 and node receiver 36. The node processor 30 comprises node frame/signal scheduler/handler 50, message generator 54, RRC state machine 56, handover controller 60, security context manager 90. As in previous example embodiment and modes, the handover controller 60 may comprise measurement analyzer 62, conditional handover (CHO) determination unit 64, and conditional handover configuration information generator 66(28). As per claim 11. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 5, wherein the apparatus is further configured to perform: counting a number of accesses by a respective user equipment to a respective secondary node, wherein the indication of at least one secondary key is at least partially based on the counted number of accesses ([0276] As shown in FIG. 37, the Master gNodeB 22 comprises node processor circuitry (“node processor 30”) and node transceiver circuitry 32, with node transceiver circuitry 32 comprising node transmitter 34 and node receiver 36. The node processor 30 comprises node frame/signal scheduler/handler 50; message generator 54; RRC state machine 56; handover controller 60; security context manager 90(37). As in previous example embodiment and modes, the handover controller 60 may comprise measurement analyzer 62, conditional handover (CHO) determination unit 64, and handover configuration information generator 66. In the FIG. 37 embodiment and mode, the message generator 54 may also be known as configuration message generator 54 since it generates a configuration message that includes configuration information for immediate handover to one or more cells of the secondary cell group (SCG) to which wireless terminal 26 may belong or have access). As per claim 12. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 5, wherein at least one of the secondary node counter lists comprise a non-monotonic sequence of secondary node counter values respectively or the secondary node counter lists mutually differ from one another ([0283] The configuration message 138 is received by receiver circuitry 46 of wireless terminal 26, processed by message processor 70, which stores contents of the configuration message 138 in conditional secondary cell configuration memory 140(37). The configuration message 138 may include a secondary cell group configuration which in turn comprises an identity of a primary secondary cell (stored in PSCell field 144) which may be used for Dual-Connectivity (DC). The secondary cell group configuration included in the configuration message 138 is configured to instruct the wireless terminal 26 to establish a second radio connection with a secondary access node serving the primary secondary cell included in the secondary cell configuration upon receipt of the configuration message 138). As per claim 13. ISHII discloses an apparatus comprising: at least one processor; and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the apparatus at least to perform ([0157] The source gNodeB 22, wireless terminal 26, and node processor 30 of the communications system 20 of FIG. 11 are similar to those of FIG. 6, with like units and functionalities having like reference numbers. As shown in FIG. 11, the source gNodeB 22 comprises node processor circuitry (“node processor 30”) and node transceiver circuitry 32, with node transceiver circuitry 32 comprising node transmitter 34 and node receiver 36), obtaining an indication of at least one secondary node key from a master node ([0284] FIG. 40 is a flowchart which shows representative, generic, steps or acts performed by wireless terminal 26 of FIG. 37. Act 40-1 comprises establishing a first radio connection with a master access node, e.g., with Master gNodeB 22. TABLE-US-00013 TABLE 1 1. For bearers requiring SCG radio resources the SN triggers UE Random Access so that synchronisation of the SN radio resource configuration can be performed. The SN decides for the PSCell and other SCG SCells and provides the new SCG radio resource configuration to the MN within an SN RRC configuration message contained in the SN Addition Request Acknowledge message), wherein the at least one secondary node key corresponds to a secondary node counter value comprised by a generated secondary node counter corresponding to the apparatus, each secondary node counter being mutually different from one another ([0275] In a Dual Connectivity mode, a special cell may be defined among one or more cells in each of the cell groups (MCG or SCG). Such a special cell may be used for obtaining timing reference to be used for the corresponding cell group. The special cell for the MCG may be referred as PCell (Primary Cell), whereas the special cell for the SCG may be referred as PSCell (primary cell of SCG), or SpCell (Special Cell) of a SCG. The PCell may be a serving cell, operating a primary frequency, in which the UE may perform an initial connection establishment procedure and/or a connection reestablishment procedure. In addition, the PSCell may be a serving cell in which the UE may perform a random access procedure (e.g., in a case that the UE performs a reconfiguration with synchronization procedure). The cell(s) other than the special cell in each of the cell groups may be referred as SCell(s) (Secondary Cell(s)). Thus, with respect to dual connectivity, secondary cell group (SCG) is a term given to a group of serving cells which are associated with a secondary RAN node (Note that in the context of 5G and LTE Dual connectivity, mutually different secondary nodes are described as the architecture where a mobile device (UE) is connected to multiple physical cell towers (secondary nodes) that are distinct from one another as described above), and performing an access of a user equipment using one of the at least one secondary node key of the obtained indication of at least one secondary node key ([304] The Master gNodeB 22 thus comprises message generator 54 that may generate and transmit to the wireless terminal 26 the configuration message 138(44) that may include an SCG configuration with a PSCell configuration. The SCG configuration is preferably stored in conditional secondary cell configuration memory 140(44). The secondary cell group connectivity control logic 134 of the UE that receives the configuration message may start synchronization with the configured PSCell, and then establish radio connection/bearers with the SCells in the SCG after the wireless terminal 26 determines that the triggering condition associated with the SCG configuration is satisfied). ISHII does not explicitly disclose the secondary node counter is a secondary node counter list. Guo, in analogous art however, discloses the secondary node counter is a secondary node counter list ([0394] Another option is the Rel-18 UE needs to maintain the security key derived from the SK counter for each SCG configuration. By doing so, there is no limit on the reuse of SK counter for each of the candidate SCG configurations (until the PDCP SN wraparound). However, this will require confirmation from SA3 whether they are fine with reusing the SK counter. If SA3 think that SK counter cannot be reused when the UE moves back and fore candidate PSCells, another option is that network can provide UE with a list of sk-counter values for a candidate PSCell for sequential use whenever the UE moves back to the same candidate cell. When all sk-counters is used, MN key will need to be changed. [0395] In both cases, PDCP SN wraparound happens, network will need to assign new sk-counter. Therefore, the following options for the sk-counter assignments can include a list of sk-counter values for sequential use when CPC happens (option 1) and one assigned sk-counter for each candidate PSCell (option2). [0396] Option 1 includes a list of sk-counter values for sequential use when CPC happens. In this option, the network will provide the UE 5402 a list of sk-counters, this list can be incremental or not. UE will use the next available sk-counter for the next activated cell. When all the sk-counters are used in the list, the network sends a new list to the UE. Or no more SCG can be activated which require a new sk-counter. The UE will need to fall back to legacy procedure. In this case, sk-counters may or may not be reused. For reuse cases, a UE can remember which sk-counter is used for the deactivated cell. If a newly activated cell (never activated from pre-configuration), a UE will use a new sk-counter from the list. [0397] Option 2 includes one assigned sk-counter for each candidate PSCell, wherein each candidate PSCell is associated with a pre-configured sk-counter, and the UE will use the associated sk-counter accordingly. Here, an sk-counter assigned to a candidate PSCell may be reused (this will be pending on SA confirm on security issue). If the sk-counter can be reused for deactivated PSCell, the UE will use the stored sk-counter. In the case where sk-counter is not allowed to be reused, the NW assigns new sk-counter to the deactivate cell. Additionally or alternatively, the UE may request sk-counter from network. Otherwise, the cell will need to be released). Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the claimed limitations of the secondary node counter disclosed by ISHII to is a secondary node counter list. This modification would have been obvious because a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated by the desire to provide network topologies, network and information security technologies, communication hardware implementations, and in particular, to various aspects of layer 1 (L1) and/or layer 2 (L2) based inter-cell mobility as suggested by Guo ([0052-0053]). As per claim 14. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 13, wherein at least one of obtaining the indication of at least one secondary node key as part of a secondary node modification request or a secondary node addition request, or obtaining the indication of at least one secondary node key as part of a secondary node modification request or a secondary node addition request, wherein the indication of at least one secondary node key corresponds to a secondary node key list corresponding to the generated secondary node counter list corresponding to the apparatus ([0292] The secondary key derivation function 150 uses the inputs of the currently active AS master key 152 and the SK Counter 154 to derive secondary node key K.sub.SN 156. The SK Counter 154 may be also referred as an SN Counter or an SCG Counter. The SK Counter 154 may be selected by Master gNodeB 22 and be used as freshness input into K.sub.SN derivations to guarantee that other security keys further derived from K.sub.SN in the SN are not re-used with the same input parameters. The other security keys may be used for encryption and integrity protection of radio bearers for the SN. The secondary node key K.sub.SN 156 derived in the Master gNodeB 22 may be sent to the secondary node 160 using the SN Addition Request for SN addition, as shown in by way of example in FIG. 41, or the SN Modification Request for SN key updates as shown by way of example in FIG. 42). As per claim 15. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 13, wherein at least one of obtaining the indication of at least one secondary node key at least one of after a secondary node addition request or as part of a secondary node reconfiguration complete message, or obtaining the indication of at least one secondary node key as part of a secondary node reconfiguration complete message, wherein the indication of at least one secondary node key corresponds to a secondary node key for an access by the user equipment to the apparatus ([0223]FIG. 28 shows system 20 as comprising source gNodeB 22, wireless terminal 26, and candidate target node 28. The source gNodeB 22, wireless terminal 26, and node processor 30 of the communications system 20 of FIG. 28 are similar to those of FIG. 6, FIG. 11, FIG. 15, and FIG. 19, with like units and functionalities having like reference numbers. As shown in FIG. 28, the source gNodeB 22 comprises node processor circuitry (“node processor 30”) and node transceiver circuitry 32, with node transceiver circuitry 32 comprising node transmitter 34 and node receiver 36. The node processor 30 comprises node frame/signal scheduler/handler 50, message generator 54, RRC state machine 56, handover controller 60, security context manager 90. As in previous example embodiment and modes, the handover controller 60 may comprise measurement analyzer 62, conditional handover (CHO) determination unit 64, and conditional handover configuration information generator 66(28)). As per claim 16. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 13, wherein at least one of obtaining the indication of at least one secondary node key as part of a secondary node addition request or a secondary node release request, or obtaining the indication of at least one secondary node key as part of a secondary node addition request or a secondary node release request, wherein the indication of at least one secondary node key corresponds to a secondary node key for an access by the user equipment to the apparatus ([0283] The configuration message 138 is received by receiver circuitry 46 of wireless terminal 26, processed by message processor 70, which stores contents of the configuration message 138 in conditional secondary cell configuration memory 140(37). The configuration message 138 may include a secondary cell group configuration which in turn comprises an identity of a primary secondary cell (stored in PSCell field 144) which may be used for Dual-Connectivity (DC). The secondary cell group configuration included in the configuration message 138 is configured to instruct the wireless terminal 26 to establish a second radio connection with a secondary access node serving the primary secondary cell included in the secondary cell configuration upon receipt of the configuration message 138). As per claim 17. ISHII discloses the apparatus according to claim 13, of any preceding claim wherein the apparatus is further configured to perform: counting a number of accesses by a respective user equipment to the apparatus, and selecting the secondary node key from the secondary node key list based on the counted number of accesses ([0201] The case of Key re-keying is initiated by the AMF. The AMF may create a new K.sub.gNB from the current K.sub.AMF using a fresh uplink NAS COUNT, a counter handled by the Non-Access Stratum (NAS) layer, which is shared by the UE and the AMF. The derived K.sub.gNB may be sent to the gNB. The gNB may then send an RRC message (e.g., RRCReconfiguration) with the first security configuration comprising (1) an indication indicating a need to generate a fresh K.sub.AMF and/or (2) indication indicating a need to generate a fresh K.sub.gNB based on the K.sub.AMF (e.g. KeySetChangeIndicator=TRUE)). As per claim 18. Guo discloses the apparatus according to claim 13, wherein at least one of the secondary node counter lists comprise a non-monotonic sequence of secondary node counter values respectively or the secondary node counter lists mutually differ from one another ([0413] The MN sets the SN counter to ‘0’ when a new AS root key (K.sub.NG-RAN) in the associated AS security context is established. The MN sets the SN counter to ‘1’ after the first calculated K.sub.SN, and monotonically increment it for each additional calculated K.sub.SN. The SN counter value ‘0’ is used to calculate the first K.sub.SN. If the MN decides to release the offloaded connections to the SN and later decides to re-start the offloading to the same SN, the SN counter value keeps increasing, which keeps the computed K.sub.SN fresh). Conclusion The prior arts made of record and not relied upon are considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. See the notice of reference cited in form PTO-892 for additional prior arts. Applicant's submission of an information disclosure statement under 37 CFR 1.97(c) with the timing fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(p) on 02/05/2026 (18/911,897 CTFR 12/30/2025 1449 Cite No: 1 and 3) prompted the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 609.04(b). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action. Contact Information Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to TECHANE GERGISO whose telephone number is (571)272-3784. The examiner can normally be reached 9:30am to 6:30pm. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, LINGLAN EDWARDS can be reached at (571) 270-5440. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /TECHANE GERGISO/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2408
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Prosecution Timeline

Jul 01, 2024
Application Filed
Oct 22, 2025
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §103
Jan 21, 2026
Response Filed
May 12, 2026
Final Rejection mailed — §103 (current)

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Prosecution Projections

3-4
Expected OA Rounds
84%
Grant Probability
99%
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3y 1m (~1y 0m remaining)
Median Time to Grant
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