DETAILED ACTION
Response to Amendment
The Amendment filed February 26, 2026 has been entered. Claims 1-20 remain pending in the application.
Regarding the Objections to the Claims previously set forth in the Non-Final Office Action mailed January 27, 2026, Applicant’s amendments obviate the objections to claims 1-20. Accordingly, the objections are withdrawn.
Regarding the rejection of claims 1-3 and 10-12 under 35 U.S.C. 102, Applicant’s amendments to the Claims have modified the scope of the claims and warrant new grounds for rejection as set forth below.
Regarding the rejection of claims 4-9 and 13-20 under 35 U.S.C. 103, Applicant’s amendments to the Claims have modified the scope of the claims and warrant new grounds for rejection as set forth below.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments with respect to claims 1-20 have been considered but are moot because the new ground of rejection does not rely on any reference applied in the prior rejection of record for any teaching or matter specifically challenged in the argument.
Claim Interpretation
Claims 1 and 10 recite “ciphered data is ignored”. A person having ordinary skill in the art would not be able to ascertain what constitutes “ignoring ciphered data” from the claim language alone. Examiner turns to illustrative language within the specification, p. 23, lines 6-10, where encryption mode 1083 (which is not present in claims 1 or 10) is described such that “a MAC is not sent in a communication, or if sent, is ignored by the receiver.” Furthermore, lines 13-16 describe ignore integrity mode 1085 in ipsis verbis, saying “the ciphered data is ignored.” One of ordinary skill in the art would assume “ignoring” refers to the same acts, even if applied to different media, unless explicitly specified otherwise. Examiner, noting a lack of such guidance within the specification, finds support for ignore integrity mode “ignoring ciphertext” implicitly within the description of ignoring a MAC (which, in this context, may be considered the integrity analogue of ciphertext). Therefore, for purposes of examination of the instant application, the broadest reasonable interpretation of “ciphered data is ignored” shall be construed as “ciphered data is not sent, or if sent, is ignored by the receiver” consistent with the specification.
Additionally, claims 4-5 and 13-14 recite “NULL encryption” and “NULL integrity”. The term “NULL encryption” in claims 4-5 and 13-14 has at least 2 contradictory meanings known in the art of cybersecurity: “the trivial encryption scheme which produces the plaintext as the ciphertext” (R. Glenn, S. Kent, “RFC 2410: The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec”, November 1998, p. 3) and “the encryption scheme which produces a string of NULL values as the ciphertext for any plaintext.” (“3GPP TS 33.401 version 15.11.0 Release 15”, March 2020, p. 83). The specification’s description of NULL encryption and NULL integrity allows for either interpretation. Specification, p. 23, lines 16-17: “With a NULL encryption setting, combined algorithm 1000 does not output ciphered data.” Applicant uses similar language for “NULL integrity”. Because the number of definitions is finite and small, the claims are not rendered indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) since the metes and bounds are well-defined, if broad. Examiner notes that switching from one interpretation to another would not be sufficient to differentiate the invention from prior art with regards to a rejection under 35 U.S.C. §103 as presented below. For purposes of examination of the instant application, the broadest reasonable interpretation of “NULL encryption” and “NULL integrity” shall include either of the definitions put forth.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The text of those sections of Title 35, U.S. Code not included in this action can be found in a prior Office action.
Claims 1-3 and 10-12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over McGrew as previously made of record in view of NIST Special Publication 800-38b (hereinafter “NIST”).
Regarding claim 1, McGrew discloses:
An apparatus of a network (McGrew Fig. 5: the apparatus is part of a network), the apparatus comprising:
a network element (McGrew Fig. 5, 500) operatively coupled to user equipment (McGrew Fig. 5, 524);
the network element, when operating as a sender of a sent message to the user equipment (McGrew Fig. 1 depicts the “sender” regardless of whether it is a network element or user equipment), comprises:
at least one processor (McGrew Fig. 1, 100 “PROCESSOR”) , and at least one memory including computer program code, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured, with the at least one processor (McGrew [0047]: “wherein each of the above steps is performed by one or more processors”), to cause the network element at least to perform:
identifying a combined integrity and encryption algorithm (McGrew [0059]: “AEAD with decryption context is defined as… encrypt-DC(K,A,N,P,D) = D || encrypt(K,A,P) = D || C = C’”, where K is a secret key, A is an associated data element, N is a nonce value/initialization vector, P is the plaintext message, and D is the decryption context. See also [0005]: “Authenticated encryption refers to a cryptographic transform which, in addition to providing confidentiality for the plaintext that is encrypted, provides a way to check its integrity and authenticity… Alternately, a dedicated Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm… can be used.”);
deriving a combined integrity and encryption key (McGrew Fig. 1, 110/Fig. 3, 306 “Generate data key K-D”) for the combined integrity and encryption algorithm (McGrew Fig. 1, 112 “Data Key”), wherein the combined integrity and encryption algorithm supports multiple operating modes (McGrew [0062]: “ …the approach herein can be used with regular encryption methods, such as AES-CBC, or authentication methods, such as HMAC-SHA1…in an embodiment, the method is used with AEAD algorithms such as AES-CCM… and AES-GCM … , for which only one key is used”), and the multiple operating modes at least comprise an integrity and encryption mode (McGrew [0176]: “Like all AEAD processes, AEAD-KT provides the security services of confidentiality and authenticity…”; see also [0005]: “Authenticated encryption refers to a cryptographic transform which, in addition to providing confidentiality for the plaintext that is encrypted, provides a way to check its integrity and authenticity… a dedicated Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm, such as Advanced Encryption Standard Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM) can be used.”).
McGrew does not disclose an “ignore integrity and encryption mode” as claimed.
However, NIST discloses:
an ignore integrity and encryption mode, where the combined integrity and encryption algorithm is configured to apply to apply integrity protection and encryption to the sent message (NIST p. 1: “…CMAC can be considered a mode of operation of the block cipher [Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)].”) using a key (NIST p. 8, Step 6: “
C
i
=
CIPH
K
C
i
-
1
⊕
M
i
”, where
CIPH
K
applies encryption using key
K
), but ciphered data is ignored (NIST p. 9: “In Steps 7 and 8, the final CBC output block is truncated according to the MAC length parameter that is associated with the key, and the result is returned as the MAC”; the cipher is not present in the output).
McGrew and NIST are art analogous to the claimed invention because all are directed to encryption of messages with integrity protection. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art, prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to ignore the ciphered data as taught by NIST because only integrity protection may be required.
Regarding claim 2, McGrew in view of NIST discloses:
The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the network element, when operating as a receiver of a received message from the user equipment (McGrew Fig. 2 depicts the “receiver” regardless of whether it is a network element or user equipment), comprises:
at least one processor, and at least one memory including computer program code, (McGrew Fig. 2, 200 “PROCESSOR”) wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured, with the at least one processor, to cause the network element at least to perform (McGrew [0051]: “ …a second processor [not the first processor that performed the encryption] functions to receive, decrypt, and verify the authenticity of the communication…”):
applying the combined integrity and encryption algorithm to the received message (McGrew Fig. 4, 402 is the received message, 404-410 are the decrypting operation) using the combined integrity and encryption key as an input parameter (McGrew Fig. 4, 410: DNKD uses the regenerated data key as input) to perform at least one of deciphering the received message and verifying integrity of the received message (McGrew Fig. 4, 410 “Regenerate plaintext”).
Regarding claim 3, McGrew in view of NIST discloses:
The apparatus of claim 1, wherein:
the identifying comprises identifying an operating mode of the multiple operating modes (McGrew [0156]: “This section defines two AEAD-KT processes, according to embodiments, based on Advanced Encryption Standard Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM), with key sizes of 128 and 256 bits…” Selection of one of these modes/embodiments is required); and
the applying comprises applying the combined integrity and encryption algorithm based on the operating mode (McGrew: application of any of the aforementioned algorithms consistent with the formulas recited in McGrew [0059]-[0060]).
Claim 10 recites essentially the same content as claim 1, where the user equipment is the sender of the sent message. As previously made of record, McGrew and NIST use the language of “sender” and “receiver” throughout, and because the actions taken by one device (e.g., user sending) are not significantly different from that used by the other (e.g., network sending). See Office Action mailed January 27, 2026, p. 6. Therefore, claim 10 recites essentially the same content as claim 1 and is rejected for similar reasons.
Claim 11 recites essentially the same content as claim 2, and is rejected for similar reasons.
Claim 12 recites essentially the same content as claim 3, and is rejected for similar reasons.
Claims 4-5 and 13-14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over McGrew in view of NIST as applied to claims 1-3 and 10-12 above, and further in view of 3GPP TS 33.401 version 15.11.0 Release 15, March 2020 (hereinafter “TS21”), or alternatively in view of R. Glenn, S. Kent, “RFC 2410: The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec”, November 1998 (hereinafter “Glenn”).
Regarding claim 4, McGrew in view of NIST discloses:
The apparatus of claim 3, wherein the multiple operating modes at least further comprise:
an integrity and encryption mode (McGrew [0176]: “Like all AEAD processes, AEAD-KT provides the security services of confidentiality and authenticity…”).
McGrew in view of NIST does not disclose the further operating modes.
However, TS2 discloses:
an encryption mode (TS2 p. 84, B.1.2-B.1.4 describe non-NULL encryption algorithms. These, when paired with the EIA0 algorithm, form an encryption mode. TS2 p. 83, B.0 Null ciphering and integrity protection algorithms: “The EIA0 algorithm shall be implemented in such way that it shall generate a 32 bit [MAC for integrity protection] of all zeroes.”); and
NULL encryption and NULL integrity mode (TS2 p. 83, B.0 Null ciphering and integrity protection algorithms: “The EEA0 algorithm shall be implemented such that it has the same effect as if it generates a KEYSTREAM of all zeroes… The EIA0 algorithm shall be implemented in such way that it shall generate a 32 bit [MAC for integrity protection] of all zeroes.”).
TS2 is art analogous to the claimed invention because both are directed to secure 5G communications. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art, prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to implement the operating modes taught by TS2 in order to allow for increased flexibility in message security configurations.
Regarding claim 5, McGrew in view of NIST further in view of TS2 discloses:
The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the integrity mode further comprises a NULL encryption and integrity mode, where the combined integrity and encryption algorithm is configured to apply integrity protection and NULL encryption to the sent message using the combined integrity and encryption key (TS2 p. 83, B.0 Null ciphering and integrity protection algorithms: “The EEA0 algorithm shall be implemented such that it has the same effect as if it generates a KEYSTREAM of all zeroes…” along with any of B.2.2-B.2.4 as found in TS2 pp. 85-86.).
Claim 13 recites essentially the same content as claim 4, and is rejected for similar reasons.
Claim 14 recites essentially the same content as claim 5, and is rejected for similar reasons.
Claims 6 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over McGrew in view of NIST as applied to claims 1 and 10 above, and further in view of Ben Henda as previously made of record as well as TS1 as previously made of record.
Regarding claim 6, over McGrew in view of NIST discloses:
The apparatus of claim 1, wherein:
the deriving comprises deriving the combined integrity and encryption key with an algorithm key derivation function (McGrew [0049]: “…the data key is encrypted into an encrypted data key. The encryption function for the data key is determined from a key encrypting key and the nonce…”; the KDF is a function of the KEK and the nonce (IV)).
McGrew in view of NIST does not disclose using an algorithm type distinguisher as input to the KDF or a NAS algorithm type distinguisher.
However, Ben Henda discloses:
using an algorithm type distinguisher (Ben Henda Fig. 14/p. 16, 5th paragraph: “The process type identifiers are NAS-enc-alg for NAS encryption process and NAS-int-alg for NAS integrity protection process (see Figure A.7-1). [Figure] 14 is a diagram illustrating a process type identifier”) as an input parameter (Ben Henda p. 15, last paragraph– p. 16, paragraphs 1-4: P0 is the “process” type identifier);
the combined integrity and encryption algorithm comprises one of a non-access stratum combined algorithm (Ben Henda p. 16, 5th paragraph: “NAS encryption process… NAS integrity protection”) and an access stratum combined algorithm.
Ben Henda is art analogous to the claimed invention because both are directed towards authentication and encryption methods in 5G communications. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art, prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to use a combined algorithm as taught by McGrew in view of NIST in conjunction with the algorithm type distinguisher as input as taught by Ben Henda to make valid messages harder to forge and to allow for a wider class of algorithms to be used.
Neither McGrew in view of NIST nor Ben Henda disclose combined NAS, RRC, or UP algorithm type distinguishers.
However, TS1 discloses:
a non-access stratum algorithm type distinguisher is defined for the non-access stratum integrity algorithm (TS1 p. 215, Table A.8-1: N-NAS-int-alg) and the non-access stratum encryption algorithm (TS1 p. 215, Table A.8-1: N-NAS-enc-alg);
a radio resource control algorithm type distinguisher is defined for the access stratum integrity algorithm (TS1 p. 215, Table A.8-1: N-AS-int-alg) and the access stratum encryption algorithm (TS1 p. 215, Table A.8-1: N-AS-enc-alg) when used for protection of radio resource control signaling, and a user plane algorithm type distinguisher is defined for the access stratum integrity algorithm (TS1 p. 215, Table A.8-1: N-UP-int-alg) and the access stratum encryption algorithm (TS1 p. 215, Table A.8-1: N-UP-enc-alg) when used for protection of user plane traffic.
TS1 is art analogous to the claimed invention because both are directed towards secure 5G communications. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art, prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to use algorithm identifiers as taught by TS1 along with the combined encryption and integrity algorithm of McGrew in order to ensure that a message cannot be replicated or spoofed in a different setting (e.g., a message purporting to be from the UP but that uses a NAS identifier may be flagged for further investigation).
Claim 15 recites essentially the same content as claim 6, and is rejected for similar reasons.
Claims 7 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over McGrew in view of NIST as applied to claims 1 and 10 above in view of “The fragility of AES-GCM authentication algorithm” by S. Gueron & V. Krasnov, 2014 11th International Conference on Information Technology: New Generations (hereinafter “Gueron”).
Regarding claim 7, McGrew in view of NIST discloses:
The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured, with the at least one processor, to cause the network element to perform:
identifying additional authenticated data (McGrew Fig. 1, 148 “Associated Data”/[0059]: A); and
identifying extra entropy data (McGrew Fig. 1, 122 “Nonce”);
herein the applying the combined integrity and encryption algorithm to the sent message comprises applying the combined integrity and encryption algorithm using at least one of the additional authenticated data and the extra entropy data as input parameters to generate a message authentication code (McGrew [0059]: Associated Data A is an input to functions encrypt-DC and encrypt).
McGrew in view of NIST does not disclose at least one of the additional authenticated data and the extra entropy being used to generate a message authentication code.
However, Gueron teaches additional authenticated data being used as input to a combined integrity and encryption algorithm (Gueron p. 1: AES-GCM) to generate a message authentication code (Gueron p. 1, §II. Preliminaries: “The data that is authenticated by AES GCM is the ciphertext, and optionally some additional clear-text (called Additional Authenticated Data and denoted AAD hereafter). In the final steps of the GHASH computations, the lengths of the ciphertext and the AAD are concatenated, formatted as a 16- bytes block, and consumed into the GHASH computations (to prevent length extension attacks).”)
Gueron is art analogous to the claimed invention because both are directed to authenticated encryption methods. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art, prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to use the authenticated data in the generation of the message authentication code as taught by Gueron in order to increase the difficulty of forging valid messages.
Claim 16 recites essentially the same content as claim 7, and is rejected for similar reasons.
Claims 8 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over McGrew in NIST further in view of Gueron as applied to claims 7 and 16 above in view of Ferdi as previously made of record.
Regarding claim 8, McGrew in view NIST further in view of Gueron discloses:
The apparatus of claim 7 and identifying extra entropy data (McGrew Fig. 1, 122 “Nonce”).
McGrew in view NIST further in view of Gueron does not disclose the sharing of the entropy data.
However, Ferdi discloses:
at least the extra entropy data is shared between the user equipment and the network element during a security mode command procedure (Ferdi [0181]: “…The (e.g., selected) protection mechanisms may be negotiated between the WTRU and the RAN during an AS Security Mode Command (SMC) procedure…” Examiner notes that WTRU includes mobile devices and other user equipment, cf. Ferdi [0019]).
Ferdi is art analogous to the claimed invention because both are directed towards secure mobile communications. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art, prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to share the random non-authenticated data of McGrew (“extra entropy”) during the SMC as taught by Ferdi in order to ensure both the sender and receiver can accurately arrive at the same authentication code (McGrew [0007]: “In many security protocols, such as AES-GCM-ESP, the nonce is carried in an Initialization Vector (IV)”).
Claim 17 recites essentially the same content as claim 8, and is rejected for similar reasons.
Claims 9 and 18 are rejected as being unpatentable over McGrew in view of NIST as applied to claims 1 and 10 above in view of US 20210297861 by Nakarmi et al. (hereinafter “Nakarmi”).
Regarding claim 1, McGrew in view of NIST discloses:
The apparatus of claim 1, wherein:
the identifying comprises identifying a combined integrity and encryption algorithm (McGrew Fig. 1, 112/Fig. 2, 232);
the deriving comprises deriving a combined integrity and encryption key (McGrew Fig. 1, 112/Fig. 2, 232) for the combined integrity and encryption algorithm (McGrew [0059]); and
the applying comprises applying the combined integrity and encryption algorithm to signaling (McGrew [0059]) using the combined integrity and encryption key as the input parameter (McGrew Fig. 3, 310).
McGrew in view of NIST does not disclose algorithm being an access stratum algorithm, the key being an access stratum key, or the signaling being non-access stratum signaling.
However, Nakarmi discloses:
the sent message comprises non-access stratum signaling (Nakarmi [0006]: “ …The NAS security keys are used to provide ciphering and integrity protection of NAS messages (mostly control plane).”) between the user equipment and an access and mobility management function (Nakarmi [0006]: “The logical aspects between the UE and the CN (in particular the AMF in 5G CN) is referred to as NAS (non-access stratum)…”).
Nakarmi is art analogous to the claimed invention both are directed towards secure 5G communications. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art, prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to apply McGrew in view of NIST’s algorithm to a NAS context as taught by Nakarmi in order to provide authenticated encryption capabilities to control plane messages. Examiner notes that any algorithm applied in a non-access stratum context becomes a “non-access stratum algorithm” and a key for said algorithm becomes a “non-access stratum algorithm key”.
Claim 18 recites essentially the same content as claim 9, and is rejected for similar reasons.
Claims 19 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over McGrew in view of NIST as applied to claim 10 above further in view of Ferdi.
Regarding claim 19, McGrew in view of NIST discloses:
The apparatus of claim 10, wherein:
the identifying comprises identifying a combined integrity and encryption algorithm (McGrew [0059]);
the deriving comprises deriving a combined integrity and encryption key (McGrew Fig. 1, 112/Fig. 2, 232) for the combined integrity and encryption algorithm (McGrew [0059]); and the applying comprises applying the combined integrity and encryption algorithm to signaling (McGrew [0059]) using the combined integrity and encryption key as the input parameter (McGrew Fig. 3, 310).
McGrew in view of NIST does not disclose algorithm being a radio resource control algorithm, the key being a radio resource control key, or the signaling being radio resource control signaling.
However, Ferdi discloses:
the sent message comprises radio resource control signaling (Ferdi Fig. 4: “5. Registration Request… RRC layer…”) between the user equipment and a radio access network node (Ferdi Fig. 4: UE and NG-RAN are labeled).
It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art, prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to apply McGrew in view of NIST’s algorithm to an RRC context as taught by Ferdi to “secure access control for a next-generation radio access network (NG-RAN) that is part of 5G new radio (NR) system” (Ferdi [0002]). Examiner notes that any algorithm applied in an RRC context becomes an “RRC algorithm” and a key for said algorithm becomes an “RRC algorithm key”.
Regarding claim 20, McGrew in view of NIST discloses:
The apparatus of claim 10, wherein:
the identifying comprises identifying a combined integrity and encryption algorithm (McGrew [0059]);
the deriving comprises deriving a combined integrity and encryption key (McGrew Fig. 1, 112/Fig. 2, 232) for the combined integrity and encryption algorithm (McGrew [0059]); and
the applying comprises applying the combined integrity and encryption algorithm to traffic (McGrew [0059]) using the combined integrity and encryption key as the input parameter (McGrew Fig. 3, 310).
McGrew does not disclose algorithm being an access stratum algorithm, the key being an access stratum key, or the traffic being user plane traffic.
However, Ferdi discloses:
the sent message comprises user plane traffic (Ferdi Fig. 1A) between the user equipment (Ferdi Fig. 1A,102a-d) and a radio access network node (Ferdi Fig. 1A, 104/113).
It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art, prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to apply McGrew in view of NIST’s algorithm to an RRC context as taught by Ferdi to “secure access control for a next-generation radio access network (NG-RAN) that is part of 5G new radio (NR) system” (Ferdi [0002]). Examiner notes that any algorithm applied in an access stratum context becomes an “access stratum algorithm” and a key for said algorithm becomes an “access stratum algorithm key”.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to DANIEL HABASHI whose telephone number is (571)272-2245. The examiner can normally be reached M-F: 9 AM-6 PM.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Catherine Thiaw can be reached at (571)270-1138. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
DH
Examiner
Art Unit 2407
/Catherine Thiaw/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2407 6/23/2026
1 Labeled TS2 to distinguish from the previously used TS 33.501 v.18.2.0, line item 13 of the non-patent literature section of IDS submitted on 9 July, 2024, which remains relied upon for claims 6 and 15
Prosecution Insights