Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Information Disclosure Statement
Acknowledgment is made of the information disclosure statements filed on May 13, 2025, November 4, 2025, January 21, 2026, February 25, 2026, June 15, 2026, and July 10, 2026. U.S. patent applications, foreign patents, and non-patent literature documents have been considered.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being unpatentable by "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals;Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for 5G System (5GS);Stage 3 (Release 15)", 3GPP TS 24.501, V15.1.0, September 2018, pp. 1-338; herein referred to as “3GPP TS 24.501”. This reference is provided in the information disclosure statement dated May 13, 2025.
Regarding Claim 1,
3GPP TS 24.501 discloses: An access and mobility management function of a 5G system, comprising: at least one processor and at least one memory including computer program code, the at least one memory and the computer program code configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the access and mobility management function at least to perform: in an idle mode inter-system change of user equipment while in single registration mode: receiving from the user equipment a registration request message without integrity protection and encryption
(§ 4.4.2.5, p. 32-33) When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection, has no current 5G NAS security context and performs a registration procedure after an inter-system change in idle mode from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall send the REGISTRATION REQUEST message without integrity protection and encryption. The AMF may create a fresh mapped 5G NAS security context or may trigger a primary authentication and key agreement procedure to create a fresh native 5G NAS security context. The newly created 5G NAS security context is taken into use by initiating a security mode control procedure and this context becomes the current 5G NAS security context in both the UE and the AMF. This re-establishes the secure exchange of NAS messages.
(§ 4.8.1, p. 53) In order to interwork with E-UTRAN connected to EPC, the UE supporting both S1 mode and N1 mode can operate in single-registration mode or dual-registration mode (see 3GPP TS 23.501 [8]). Support of single-registration mode is mandatory for UEs supporting both S1 mode and N1 mode.
and deriving a fresh 5G non-access stratum security context when interworking without a signaling channel between mobility management entities of an evolved packet system and the 5G system is not supported
(§ 4.4.2.5, p. 32-33) When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection, has no current 5G NAS security context and performs a registration procedure after an inter-system change in idle mode from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall send the REGISTRATION REQUEST message without integrity protection and encryption. The AMF may create a fresh mapped 5G NAS security context or may trigger a primary authentication and key agreement procedure to create a fresh native 5G NAS security context. The newly created 5G NAS security context is taken into use by initiating a security mode control procedure and this context becomes the current 5G NAS security context in both the UE and the AMF. This re-establishes the secure exchange of NAS messages.
Note: Per Applicant’s specification paragraphs [0082] and [0083], after the reception of the registration request message without integrity protection and encryption (as shown here in the reference applied), having the AMF creating a fresh mapped security context or trigger an authentication and agreement is indicative of having internetworking without N26 not being supported.
and an evolved packet system security context received from a source mobility management entity of the evolved packet system does not include non-access stratum security algorithms set to a null integrity protection algorithm and a null ciphering algorithm.
(§ 4.4.2.5, p. 32-33) When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection, has no current 5G NAS security context and performs a registration procedure after an inter-system change in idle mode from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall send the REGISTRATION REQUEST message without integrity protection and encryption. The AMF may create a fresh mapped 5G NAS security context or may trigger a primary authentication and key agreement procedure to create a fresh native 5G NAS security context. The newly created 5G NAS security context is taken into use by initiating a security mode control procedure and this context becomes the current 5G NAS security context in both the UE and the AMF. This re-establishes the secure exchange of NAS messages.
Note: Since there is no integrity protection or encryption, the are no algorithms able to be set.
Regarding Claim 2,
3GPP TS 24.501 discloses: The access and mobility management function of claim 1, wherein the deriving comprises: creating a fresh mapped non-access stratum security context.
(§ 4.4.2.5, p. 32-33) When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection, has no current 5G NAS security context and performs a registration procedure after an inter-system change in idle mode from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall send the REGISTRATION REQUEST message without integrity protection and encryption. The AMF may create a fresh mapped 5G NAS security context or may trigger a primary authentication and key agreement procedure to create a fresh native 5G NAS security context. The newly created 5G NAS security context is taken into use by initiating a security mode control procedure and this context becomes the current 5G NAS security context in both the UE and the AMF. This re-establishes the secure exchange of NAS messages.
Regarding Claim 3,
3GPP TS 24.501 discloses: The access and mobility management function of claim 1, wherein the deriving comprises: creating a fresh native non-access stratum security context by triggering a primary authentication and key agreement procedure.
(§ 4.4.2.5, p. 32-33) When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection, has no current 5G NAS security context and performs a registration procedure after an inter-system change in idle mode from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall send the REGISTRATION REQUEST message without integrity protection and encryption. The AMF may create a fresh mapped 5G NAS security context or may trigger a primary authentication and key agreement procedure to create a fresh native 5G NAS security context. The newly created 5G NAS security context is taken into use by initiating a security mode control procedure and this context becomes the current 5G NAS security context in both the UE and the AMF. This re-establishes the secure exchange of NAS messages.
Regarding Claim 4,
3GPP TS 24.501 discloses: The access and mobility management function of claim 1, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are further configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the access and mobility management function at least to perform: creating a fresh native non-access stratum security context by triggering a primary authentication and key agreement procedure when interworking without the signaling channel between the mobility management entities of the evolved packet system and the 5G system is not supported,
(§ 4.4.2.5, p. 32-33) When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection, has no current 5G NAS security context and performs a registration procedure after an inter-system change in idle mode from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall send the REGISTRATION REQUEST message without integrity protection and encryption. The AMF may create a fresh mapped 5G NAS security context or may trigger a primary authentication and key agreement procedure to create a fresh native 5G NAS security context. The newly created 5G NAS security context is taken into use by initiating a security mode control procedure and this context becomes the current 5G NAS security context in both the UE and the AMF. This re-establishes the secure exchange of NAS messages.
Note: Per Applicant’s specification paragraphs [0082] and [0083], after the reception of the registration request message without integrity protection and encryption (as shown here in the reference applied), having the AMF creating a fresh mapped security context or trigger an authentication and agreement is indicative of having internetworking without N26 not being supported.
and the evolved packet system security context received from the source mobility management entity of the evolved packet system includes the non-access stratum security algorithms set to the null integrity protection algorithm and the null ciphering algorithm.
(§ 4.4.2.1, pages 29- 30) As described in the subclause 4.8 in order to interwork with E-UTRAN connected to EPC, the UE supporting both S1 mode and N1 mode can operate in either single-registration mode or dual-registration mode. A UE operating in dual-registration mode shall independently maintain and use both EPS security context (see 3GPP TS 24.301 [15]) and 5G NAS security context. During inter-system change to S1 mode, the UE operating in dual-registration mode shall take into use an EPS security context and follow the handling of this security context as specified in 3GPP TS 24.301 [15].
c) When the AMF and the UE create a 5G NAS security context using null integrity and null ciphering algorithm during an initial registration procedure for emergency services, or a registration procedure for mobility and periodic registration update for a UE that has a PDU session for emergency services (see subclause 5.4.2.2), the AMF and the UE shall delete the previous current 5G NAS security context;
d) When a new mapped 5G NAS security context or 5G NAS security context created using null integrity and null ciphering algorithm is taken into use during the inter-system change from S1 mode to N1 mode, the AMF and the UE shall not delete the previously current native 5G NAS security context, if any. Instead, the previously current native 5G NAS security context shall become a non-current native 5G NASs security context, and the AMF and the UE shall delete any partial native 5G NAS security context;
Regarding Claim 5,
3GPP TS 24.501 discloses: The access and mobility management function of claim 1, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are further configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the access and mobility management function at least to perform: triggering a primary authentication and key agreement procedure when interworking without the signaling channel between the mobility management entities of the evolved packet system and the 5G system is supported.
(§ 4.4.2.5, p. 32-33) When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection, has no current 5G NAS security context and performs a registration procedure after an inter-system change in idle mode from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall send the REGISTRATION REQUEST message without integrity protection and encryption. The AMF may create a fresh mapped 5G NAS security context or may trigger a primary authentication and key agreement procedure to create a fresh native 5G NAS security context. The newly created 5G NAS security context is taken into use by initiating a security mode control procedure and this context becomes the current 5G NAS security context in both the UE and the AMF. This re-establishes the secure exchange of NAS messages.
Note: Per Applicant’s specification paragraphs [0082] and [0084], after the reception of the registration request message without integrity protection and encryption (as shown here in the reference applied), having the AMF trigger an authentication and agreement is indicative of having internetworking without N26 being supported.
Regarding Claim 6,
3GPP TS 24.501 discloses: The access and mobility management function of claim 1, wherein the signaling channel comprises an N26 interface.
(§ 5.1.4.2, p. 65) Coordination between 5GMM and EMM with N26 interface
At inter-system change from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall enter substates 5GMM-REGISTERED.NORMAL-SERVICE and EMM-REGISTERED.NO-CELL-AVAILABLE and initiate a registration procedure for mobility and periodic registration update indicating "mobility registration updating" in the 5GS registration type IE of the REGISTRATION REQUEST message (see subclause 5.5.1.3). (§ 5.1.4.2, p. 65).
Regarding Claim 7,
Claim 7 is rejected on the same grounds of rejection set forth in claim 1.
3GPP TS 24.501 discloses: A method in an access and mobility management function of a 5G system, the method comprising: in an idle mode inter-system change of user equipment while in single registration mode: receiving, at the access and mobility management function from the user equipment, a registration request message without integrity protection and encryption
(§ 4.4.2.5, p. 32-33) When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection, has no current 5G NAS security context and performs a registration procedure after an inter-system change in idle mode from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall send the REGISTRATION REQUEST message without integrity protection and encryption. The AMF may create a fresh mapped 5G NAS security context or may trigger a primary authentication and key agreement procedure to create a fresh native 5G NAS security context. The newly created 5G NAS security context is taken into use by initiating a security mode control procedure and this context becomes the current 5G NAS security context in both the UE and the AMF. This re-establishes the secure exchange of NAS messages.
(§ 4.8.1, p. 53) In order to interwork with E-UTRAN connected to EPC, the UE supporting both S1 mode and N1 mode can operate in single-registration mode or dual-registration mode (see 3GPP TS 23.501 [8]). Support of single-registration mode is mandatory for UEs supporting both S1 mode and N1 mode.
deriving, at the access and mobility management function, a fresh 5G non-access stratum security context when interworking without a signaling channel between mobility management entities of an evolved packet system and the 5G system is not supported
(§ 4.4.2.5, p. 32-33) When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection, has no current 5G NAS security context and performs a registration procedure after an inter-system change in idle mode from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall send the REGISTRATION REQUEST message without integrity protection and encryption. The AMF may create a fresh mapped 5G NAS security context or may trigger a primary authentication and key agreement procedure to create a fresh native 5G NAS security context. The newly created 5G NAS security context is taken into use by initiating a security mode control procedure and this context becomes the current 5G NAS security context in both the UE and the AMF. This re-establishes the secure exchange of NAS messages.
Note: Per Applicant’s specification paragraphs [0082] and [0083], after the reception of the registration request message without integrity protection and encryption (as shown here in the reference applied), having the AMF creating a fresh mapped security context or trigger an authentication and agreement is indicative of having internetworking without N26 not being supported.
and an evolved packet system security context received from a source mobility management entity of the evolved packet system does not include non-access stratum security algorithms set to a null integrity protection algorithm and a null ciphering algorithm.
(§ 4.4.2.5, p. 32-33) When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection, has no current 5G NAS security context and performs a registration procedure after an inter-system change in idle mode from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall send the REGISTRATION REQUEST message without integrity protection and encryption. The AMF may create a fresh mapped 5G NAS security context or may trigger a primary authentication and key agreement procedure to create a fresh native 5G NAS security context. The newly created 5G NAS security context is taken into use by initiating a security mode control procedure and this context becomes the current 5G NAS security context in both the UE and the AMF. This re-establishes the secure exchange of NAS messages.
Note: Since there is no integrity protection or encryption, the are no algorithms able to be set.
Regarding Claim 8,
Claim 8 is rejected on the same grounds of rejection set forth in claim 2.
Regarding Claim 9,
Claim 9 is rejected on the same grounds of rejection set forth in claim 3.
Regarding Claim 10,
Claim 10 is rejected on the same grounds of rejection set forth in claim 4.
Regarding Claim 11,
Claim 11 is rejected on the same grounds of rejection set forth in claim 5.
Regarding Claim 12,
Claim 12 is rejected on the same grounds of rejection set forth in claim 6.
Regarding Claim 13,
Claim 13 is rejected on the same grounds of rejection set forth in claim 1.
3GPP TS 24.501 discloses: A computer readable medium embodying programmed instructions which, when executed by a processor, are operable for performing a method in an access and mobility management function of a 5G system, the method comprising:
in an idle mode inter-system change of user equipment while in single registration mode:
receiving, at the access and mobility management function from the user equipment, a registration request message without integrity protection and encryption;
(§ 4.4.2.5, p. 32-33) When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection, has no current 5G NAS security context and performs a registration procedure after an inter-system change in idle mode from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall send the REGISTRATION REQUEST message without integrity protection and encryption. The AMF may create a fresh mapped 5G NAS security context or may trigger a primary authentication and key agreement procedure to create a fresh native 5G NAS security context. The newly created 5G NAS security context is taken into use by initiating a security mode control procedure and this context becomes the current 5G NAS security context in both the UE and the AMF. This re-establishes the secure exchange of NAS messages.
(§ 4.8.1, p. 53) In order to interwork with E-UTRAN connected to EPC, the UE supporting both S1 mode and N1 mode can operate in single-registration mode or dual-registration mode (see 3GPP TS 23.501 [8]). Support of single-registration mode is mandatory for UEs supporting both S1 mode and N1 mode.
deriving, at the access and mobility management function, a fresh 5G non-access stratum security context when interworking without a signaling channel between mobility management entities of an evolved packet system and the 5G system is not supported
(§ 4.4.2.5, p. 32-33) When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection, has no current 5G NAS security context and performs a registration procedure after an inter-system change in idle mode from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall send the REGISTRATION REQUEST message without integrity protection and encryption. The AMF may create a fresh mapped 5G NAS security context or may trigger a primary authentication and key agreement procedure to create a fresh native 5G NAS security context. The newly created 5G NAS security context is taken into use by initiating a security mode control procedure and this context becomes the current 5G NAS security context in both the UE and the AMF. This re-establishes the secure exchange of NAS messages.
Note: Per Applicant’s specification paragraphs [0082] and [0083], after the reception of the registration request message without integrity protection and encryption (as shown here in the reference applied), having the AMF creating a fresh mapped security context or trigger an authentication and agreement is indicative of having internetworking without N26 not being supported.
and an evolved packet system security context received from a source mobility management entity of the evolved packet system does not include non-access stratum security algorithms set to a null integrity protection algorithm and a null ciphering algorithm.
(§ 4.4.2.5, p. 32-33) When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection, has no current 5G NAS security context and performs a registration procedure after an inter-system change in idle mode from S1 mode to N1 mode, the UE shall send the REGISTRATION REQUEST message without integrity protection and encryption. The AMF may create a fresh mapped 5G NAS security context or may trigger a primary authentication and key agreement procedure to create a fresh native 5G NAS security context. The newly created 5G NAS security context is taken into use by initiating a security mode control procedure and this context becomes the current 5G NAS security context in both the UE and the AMF. This re-establishes the secure exchange of NAS messages.
Note: Since there is no integrity protection or encryption, the are no algorithms able to be set.
Regarding Claim 14,
Claim 14 is rejected on the same grounds of rejection set forth in claim 2.
Regarding Claim 15,
Claim 15 is rejected on the same grounds of rejection set forth in claim 3.
Regarding Claim 16,
Claim 16 is rejected on the same grounds of rejection set forth in claim 4.
Regarding Claim 17,
Claim 17 is rejected on the same grounds of rejection set forth in claim 5.
Regarding Claim 18,
Claim 18 is rejected on the same grounds of rejection set forth in claim 6.
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JESSE P. SAMLUK whose telephone number is (571)270-5607. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 9-5.
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/JESSE P. SAMLUK/Examiner, Art Unit 2411
/DERRICK W FERRIS/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2411
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