Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
DETAILED ACTION
Claim Rejections – 35 USC § 102/103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to A1A 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre – A1A 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to A1A 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre – A1A 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
MPEP 2112 Section III.
Where applicant claims a composition in terms of a function, property or characteristic and the composition of the prior art is the same as that of the claim but the function is not explicitly disclosed by the reference, the examiner may make a rejection under both 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, expressed as a 102/ 103 rejection. “There is nothing inconsistent in concurrent rejections for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 and for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102.” In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 n.4, 195 USPQ 430, 433 n.4 (CCPA 1977). This same rationale should also apply to product, apparatus, and process claims claimed in terms of function, property or characteristic. Therefore, a 35 U.S.C. 102/ 103 rejection is appropriate for these types of claims as well as for composition claims.
Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102/103 as being unpatentable over Fernandez (A Navigation Message Authentication Proposal for the Galileo Open Service, 2016, pp. 85-102)
Per claim 1, Fernandez (A Navigation Message Authentication Proposal for the Galileo Open Service, 2016, pp. 85-102) is relied upon to teach a method for certifying the geolocation of a receiver (reads on “This paper presents a Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) scheme based on the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol and a novel concept based on a single one-way chain for all senders and cross authentication,” see Fernandez p. 85 Abstract. This is the paper’s own framing of its subject matter: a scheme whose entire purpose is authenticating navigation data, which is the functional equivalent of “certifying” a geolocation under the claim’s BRI, since the geolocation is computed from that same navigation data. In addition, reads on “The paper presents an NMA implementation in the Galileo Open Service (OS) navigation message that should provide similar navigation performance to data-authenticated users and standard non-authenticated users in terms of time to first fix, accuracy, and availability even in difficult reception conditions,” see Fernandez p. 85 Abstract. This confirms the receiver-side, position-adjacent character of the scheme: “data-authenticated users” obtain a “first fix,” i.e., a computed position, that carries an authentication status), comprising, prior to said certification, receiving (reads on “The receiver receives the navigation data and the MAC,” see Fernandez p. 87 first column and first bullet. This is the first step in Fernandez’s disclosed four-step TESLA receiver procedure; it establishes that reception of the additional (MAC) signal occurs as the threshold act, before any authentication decision is made; and reads on[AltContent: ] ”The receiver later receives a key from which the MAC can be generated,” see Fernandez p. 87 first column and second bullet. This is the second disclosed step, confirming that a further additional signal, the delayed key, is also received prior to the authenticity determination performed in the subsequent two steps. The word “later” in Fernandez’s own text is an explicit temporal marker matching the claim’s “prior to said certification” ordering requirement), at predetermined times (reads on “the MAC and key transmission occurs with a certain cadence controlled by the system specification,” see Fernandez p. 91 first full paragraph. This is a direct, near-verbatim reading on “predetermined times”: the MAC/key transmission cadence is fixed by the “system specification,” i.e., known and scheduled in advance), in addition to the geolocation signals emitted by a plurality of emitters (reads on “The authentication of data from some satellites by other satellites, or cross-authentication,” see Fernandez p. 86 second column first bullet. Fernandez’s own text expressly names “satellites” (plural) as the ranging emitters that also carry authentication cross-references, directly and without inferential bridging closing the “plurality of emitters” reading independently of the SIS ICD framing. Fernandez’s own multi-satellite language supplies the explicit plurality reading) and used to compute said geolocation (reads on “in a fully backward-compatible way with the current Signal In Space Interface Control Document (SIS ICD) [8],” see Fernandez p. 85 second column last full paragraph. Galileo’s Signal In Space is inherently a multi-satellite ranging system; Fernandez’s stated design constraint of full backward compatibility with the SIS ICD confirms the scheme sits on top of the pre-existing multi-satellite position-computation architecture, i.e., the “plurality of emitters” limitation, without altering it; and reads on “TTFAF, i.e., the time to calculate a first position based on data-authenticated satellites,” see Fernandez p. 86 first full paragraph. This is a direct, near-verbatim confirmation that Fernandez’s receiver computes “a first position” (the claimed geolocation) “based on ... satellites” (plural), i.e., from a plurality of emitters. Fernandez’s own “satellites” (plural, TTFAF definition) language bridges directly to the claim’s “plurality of emitters”), a predetermined number of additional electromagnetic signals (reads on “Every subframe is divided into 15 2-second pages, each of which contains one word and some other fields,” see Fernandez p. 92 second column first paragraph, together with “This field provides a bandwidth of 40 bits every other second,” see Fernandez p. 92 second column second paragraph. These two passages jointly disclose the “predetermined number” component: the Reserved 1 NMA field is a fixed, countable allocation ( 40 bits every 2-second page) within a fixed subframe structure, i.e., a predetermined quantity of additional signal content transmitted at a scheduled cadence by the same Galileo satellites already broadcasting the I/NAV ranging pages) emitted by the same emitters (reads on “The authentication of data from some satellites by other satellites, or cross-authentication,” see Fernandez p. 86 second column first bullet. This establishes the “same emitters” limitation directly: the satellites that broadcast the ranging signal are themselves the same emitters that broadcast/participate in the authentication chain, precisely the coupling the claim requires between geolocation signals and additional signals) and comprising data used to authenticate the geolocation (reads on “TESLA is based on the transmission of a Message Authentication Code (MAC) to authenticate the plaintext message and the delayed transmission of the key used to compute the MAC,” see Fernandez p. 86 Section: The TESLA protocol Features. A MAC is expressly included within the spec’s own broad definition of “digital signature” at para 0014 (“a hash of said message, encrypted by a cryptographic key ... or a key shared between the author and the intended recipient”); Fernandez’s MAC-plus-delayed-key payload is therefore squarely within the BRI of “data used to authenticate the geolocation”; and reads on “We propose to use the field ‘Reserved 1’ in the ICD [8] to transmit NMA information,” see Fernandez p. 92 Section: Implementation Example: NMA in Galileo E1-B I/NAV. This is a second, independent confirmation that the authenticating datum (NMA information, i.e., the MAC/key material) is physically carried inside an additional electromagnetic signal field distinct from the core ranging payload, matching the claim’s structure of “additional electromagnetic signals ... comprising data used to authenticate”), the method comprising determining the authenticity of the geolocation on the basis of the additional electromagnetic signals (reads on “The receiver authenticates the key with a previous key from the chain that is considered authentic, or the root key, by performing function F the required number of times,” see Fernandez p. 87 – 88 4 bullet points. This is the third disclosed step of Fernandez’s TESLA receiver procedure: an authenticity decision (key authentication) computed directly from the received additional signals (the key chain material), which is the exact operation the claim recites; and[AltContent: ] reads on “The receiver re-generates the MAC with the key and the data, which should coincide with the previously received MAC,” see Fernandez p. 87 – 88 4 bullet points. This is the fourth and final disclosed step: the receiver’s authenticity determination for the navigation data underlying the computed geolocation is completed by comparing a re-generated MAC against the previously received MAC, i.e., “on the basis of” the additional electromagnetic signals received in steps one and two above).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to A1A 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-A1A 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to A1A 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-A1A 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Fernandez in view of Kuhn (An Asymmetric Security Mechanism for Navigation Signals, 2004).
Per claim 2, the prior art of record is relied upon to teach the method of claim 1 and some of the additional electromagnetic signals accompanying the geolocation signals (reads on “Every subframe is divided into 15 2-second pages, each of which contains one word and some other fields,” see Fernandez p. 92 Section: Implementation Example: NMA in Galileo E1-B I/NAV. The Galileo I/NAV subframe structure carries the ranging/navigation data and the Reserved 1 NMA field within the identical broadcast subframe, i.e., the additional (NMA) data physically accompanies the geolocation (I/NAV navigation) data on the same schedule), called information signals (reads on “We propose to use the field ‘Reserved 1’ in the ICD to transmit NMA information,” see Fernandez p. 92 Section: Implementation Example: NMA in Galileo E1-B 1/NAV. The Reserved 1 field is the disclosed vehicle for exactly this kind of accompanying informational payload). The prior art of record is silent on explicitly stating signal accompanying a geolocation signal comprising data relating to the position of the emitter of said geolocation signal and/or comprising an identifier providing information about the position of the emitter.
Kuhn (An Asymmetric Security Mechanism for Navigation Signals, 2004) is relied upon to teach the information signal accompanying a geolocation signal comprising data relating to the position of the emitter of said geolocation signal and/or comprising an identifier providing information about the position of the emitter (reads on “the identifier Xi and exact location xi (tm) of the transmitter,” see Kuhn p. 246 Section 5.2. This is a direct, near-verbatim match: Kuhn’s signed message explicitly carries both a transmitter identifier (Xi) and the transmitter’s exact location (xi(tm)), matching the disjunctive claim language “data relating to the position ... and/or ... an identifier” in full).
Before the effective filing date of the invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the Galileo I/NAV Reserved 1 NMA architecture of Fernandez, in which “We propose to use the field ‘Reserved 1 ‘in the ICD to transmit NMA information”(see Fernandez, p.92); by incorporating the transmitter-identity/location payload of Kuhn’s signed hidden-marker message (see Kuhn p. 246: “the identifier Xi and exact location xi (tm) of the transmitter” to realize the instant limitations. One or more of the underpinning rationales discussed in KSR MPEP 2141 {Rationale A; Rationale G}, support this conclusion. It would have been obvious to have included, within the same scheduled information field that Fernandez already allocates for authentication-related data, a transmitter-position/identifier datum of the kind Kuhn expressly teaches, because both references already transmit auxiliary navigation-message content (satellite ephemeris/PRN identifiers in the Galileo I/NAV frame, and marker/transmitter-identity fields in Kuhn’s signed message) via the same broadcast channel used for ranging. As Kuhn states: “which is a message that is cryptographically signed with the private key” (see Kuhn p. 246), which addresses the well-recognized technical problem of allowing a receiver to associate authenticating information with the specific transmitting emitter’s identity and location. One of ordinary skill would have recognized that Fernandez’s Reserved 1 field is a general-purpose scheduled data channel ready to carry exactly this kind of transmitter-position/identifier datum, requiring no change to the underlying Galileo I/NAV frame structure. The combination is further supported by MPEP 2141 Rationale A and Rationale G. The motivation to combine applies to all claims under this heading.
Claims 3 and 5 – 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Fernandez in view of Kuhn in view of Wesson (Practical Cryptographic Civil GPS Signal Authentication, 2012).
Per claim 3, the prior art of record suggests the method of claim 2, the certification and information signals each (reads on “which is a message that is cryptographically signed with the private key,” see Kuhn p. 246 Section 5.2. Kuhn’s Mi,m message is the disclosed certification-analog signal (it verifies/reveals a previously transmitted hidden marker) and it is expressly signed with the navigation system’s private key, i.e., a digital signature of the transported (marker-revealing) data). The prior art of record is silent on explicitly stating comprising a digital signature of the transported data.
Wesson (Practical Cryptographic Civil GPS Signal Authentication, 2012) is relied upon to teach comprising a digital signature of the transported data (reads on “incorporating digital signatures into the extensible GPS civil navigation (CNAV) message,” see Wesson p. 1 Abstract. The CNAV message carries navigation/ephemeris-type content analogous to the claimed “information signal,” and Wesson expressly proposes to add a digital signature covering that transported content).
Before the effective filing date of the invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the CNAV digital signature scheme of Wesson: ‘‘incorporating digital signatures into the extensible GPS civil navigation (CNAV) message” (see Wesson Abstract p. 1); by applying the identical signing technique to both the information-carrying and certification-carrying signal types disclosed in Kuhn’s signed hidden-marker scheme (see Kuhn p. 246: “which is a message that is cryptographically signed with the private key”) to realize the instant limitations. One or more of the underpinning rationales discussed in KSR MPEP 2141 {Rationale B[AltContent: ] and Rationale A}, support this conclusion. It would have been obvious to apply digital signing uniformly to both the information signal and the certification signal because both Wesson and Kuhn already establish digital signing as the default authentication technique for scheduled navigation-adjacent data, and extending an already adopted signature technique to a second co-scheduled data channel is a routine, predictable application of the same cryptographic primitive. As Kuhn states, the signed message “reveals a full description of the previously transmitted hidden marker” including transmitter identity and location (Kuhn p. 246, in relevant part), demonstrating that signing an entire family of scheduled auxiliary messages (not merely one) was already understood in the art. One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized Wesson’s CNAV signature architecture is directly extensible to a second co-scheduled signal type without any change to the underlying signing primitive. The combination is further supported by MPEP 2141 Rationale B and Rationale A. Digital signature verification is a self-contained cryptographic operation applied independently to each signed payload; Wesson and Kuhn both demonstrate the identical primitive (asymmetric/private-key signing) applied to scheduled navigation-adjacent messages, so one of ordinary skill in the art would expect the same signing technique to apply equally well to a second scheduled channel (the information signal) as it does to the first (the certification signal), with no interaction effects between the two applications. The motivation to combine applies to all claims under this heading.
Per claim 5, the prior art of record further suggests at least one of the following actions being performed before the certification (reads on “The receiver re-generates the MAC with the key and the data, which should coincide with the previously received MAC,” see Fernandez p. 87. Regenerating and comparing the MAC is TESLA’s functional equivalent of verifying a digital signature over the transported data; both operations authenticate the origin/integrity of a scheduled signal before any downstream certification decision is made): verifying, on the basis of the information and certification signals, that said certification signals are certification signals certifying the geolocation signal (reads on “which is a message that is cryptographically signed with the private key,” see Kuhn p. 246, in the context of Kuhn’s Mi,m disclosure that the signed message “reveals a full description of the previously transmitted hidden marker” (Kuhn p. 246, same passage), i.e., the receiver cross-references the later signed certification-type message against the earlier marker-type (geolocation-adjacent) signal to confirm the certification message actually pertains to that earlier signal, which is the operational essence of the claimed cross-referencing check).”
Claim 6 is analyzed with respect to claim 5. The prior art of record further suggests before certifying a geolocation, it is furthermore verified that at least one certification signal has been received at times compatible with (reads on “the MAC and key transmission occurs with a certain cadence controlled by the system specification,” see Fernandez p. 91. TESLA’s scheduled cadence establishes the expected arrival-time window for the certification-analog (MAC/key) signal; a receiver checking a received signal against that scheduled cadence is performing the same category of pre-certification timing-compatibility check the claim recites, albeit expressed in the vocabulary of a fixed broadcast schedule rather than the claim’s clock-offset/distance vocabulary): ii. the distance between the receiver and the emitter (reads on “signal timing authentication based on statistical hypothesis tests,” see Wesson p. 1. Statistical hypothesis testing on GPS signal timing is, as a matter of GNSS signal-processing fundamentals confirmed by this passage, necessarily a function of expected propagation delay (a function of distance) and clock synchronization (clock offset); Wesson’s timing-authentication technique directly reads on checking compatibility with these quantities).
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Brian Shaw whose telephone number is (571)270-5191. The examiner can normally be reached on Mon-Thurs from 6:00 AM-3:30 PM.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Jeff Nickerson can be reached on (469) 295-9235. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 703-872-9306.
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/BR1AN F SHAW/
Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2432
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