CTNF 18/791,362 CTNF 83556 DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status 07-03-aia AIA 15-10-aia The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 07-06 AIA 15-10-15 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. 07-20-aia AIA The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. 07-23-aia AIA The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows: 1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art. 2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. 3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness. 07-21-aia AIA Claim (s) 1, 10, 19-20 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Giraud et al. (US 2021/0377025 A1) (Giraud herein after) in view of Gray et al. (US 2022/0209950 A1) (Gray herein after) . Re Claim 1, Giraud discloses a terminal device comprising: at least one processor; and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor (processor, memory, [0206]), cause the terminal device at least to: generate, a subscription concealed identifier, SUCI, of the terminal device based on a subscription permanent identifier, SUPI, of the terminal device (5G provides in particular cryptographic processing events which are implemented by the embedded subscriber identity modules (for example of SIM, “eSIM” card type for is “embedded SIM”, or others) to encrypt the identifiers (SUPI for “Subscription Permanent Identifier”) of subscribers. SUPI identifiers are sent in encrypted form from the embedded subscriber identity modules to the associated 5G networks [0006]; terminal utilises an embedded subscriber identity module 3 to generate (S4) an encrypted identifier SUCI in response to the receiving (S2) of a request RQ1 coming from the access point 4 [0008]); and transmit, to a network device, the SUCI (The encrypted identifier SUCI is sent (S6) in a message MSG1 to the access point 4 [0008]). Giraud discloses the claimed invention except wherein the SUCI comprises a SUPI type indicating that both elliptic curve cryptography, ECC, and post quantum cryptography, PQC are used in the generating of the SUCI. However, Gray discloses a hybrid key derivation to secure data wherein hybrid key derivation module 110 is configured to publish a traditional public key in a traditional certificate and a PQC public key in a PQC certificate. Hybrid key derivation module 110 may generate a traditional key pair. The traditional key pair may include a traditional private key and the traditional public key. In an example, the traditional key pair may be an RSA key pair. The RSA key pair may be used to encrypt and decrypt data 104. An RSA public key may be known to anyone. An RSA private key needs to be kept private. Messages encrypted using the public key can be decrypted with the private key. In another example, the traditional key pair may be an ECDH key pair. ECDH can be a key agreement protocol that allows two parties, each having an elliptic-curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel. This shared secret may be directly used as a key, or to derive another key. The key, or the derived key, can then be used to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric-key cipher. In an example, hybrid key derivation module 110 may generate a Diffie-Hellman ephemeral (DHE) key pair. DHE may be a modification of the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange that uses static keys. A cryptographic key may be called ephemeral if the cryptographic key is generated for each execution of a key-exchange process. In some examples, ephemeral keys may be used more than once, within a single session (e.g., in broadcast applications) where the sender generates only one ephemeral key pair per message and the private key is combined separately with each recipient's public key. Hybrid key derivation module 110 may generate a PQC key pair. The PQC key pair may include a PQC private key and the PQC public key. PQC may refer to cryptographic algorithms that may be secure against an attack by a quantum computer. In an example, PQC may be a secure key encapsulation mechanism (e.g. Kyber), whose security is based on the hardness of solving the learning-with-errors problem over module lattices ([0023]). Therefore, it would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify method and system of Giraud, by making use of the technique taught by Gray, in order to improve the data security. Both references are within the same field of telecommunication, and in particular of communication security, the modification does not change a fundamental operating principle of Giraud, nor does Giraud teach away from the modification (Giraud merely discloses a preferred embodiment). The combination has a reasonable expectation of success in that the modifications can be made using conventional and well known engineering and/or programming techniques, the key derivation taught by Gray is not altered and continues to perform the same function as separately, and the resultant combination produces the highly predictable result of wherein the SUCI comprises a SUPI type indicating that both elliptic curve cryptography, ECC, and post quantum cryptography, PQC are used in the generating of the SUCI. Re Claim 10, Giraud discloses a network device comprising: at least one processor; and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor (processor, memory, [0134]), cause the network device at least to: receive, from a terminal device, a subscription concealed identifier, SUCI, for concealing a subscription permanent identifier, SUPI, for the terminal device (5G provides in particular cryptographic processing events which are implemented by the embedded subscriber identity modules (for example of SIM, “eSIM” card type for is “embedded SIM”, or others) to encrypt the identifiers (SUPI for “Subscription Permanent Identifier”) of subscribers. SUPI identifiers are sent in encrypted form from the embedded subscriber identity modules to the associated 5G networks [0006]; terminal utilises an embedded subscriber identity module 3 to generate (S4) an encrypted identifier SUCI in response to the receiving (S2) of a request RQ1 coming from the access point 4 [0008]); and determine the SUPI by decrypting the SUCI (access point 4 sends (S10) the encrypted identifier SUCI (with other associated information) to the network 6 which then deciphers (S12) the encrypted identifier SUCI to deduce the SUPI identifier of the subscriber from it [0009]). Giraud discloses the claimed invention except wherein the SUCI comprises a SUPI type indicating that both elliptic curve cryptography, ECC, and post quantum cryptography, PQC are used in the generating of the SUCI. However, Gray discloses a hybrid key derivation to secure data wherein hybrid key derivation module 110 is configured to publish a traditional public key in a traditional certificate and a PQC public key in a PQC certificate. Hybrid key derivation module 110 may generate a traditional key pair. The traditional key pair may include a traditional private key and the traditional public key. In an example, the traditional key pair may be an RSA key pair. The RSA key pair may be used to encrypt and decrypt data 104. An RSA public key may be known to anyone. An RSA private key needs to be kept private. Messages encrypted using the public key can be decrypted with the private key. In another example, the traditional key pair may be an ECDH key pair. ECDH can be a key agreement protocol that allows two parties, each having an elliptic-curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel. This shared secret may be directly used as a key, or to derive another key. The key, or the derived key, can then be used to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric-key cipher. In an example, hybrid key derivation module 110 may generate a Diffie-Hellman ephemeral (DHE) key pair. DHE may be a modification of the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange that uses static keys. A cryptographic key may be called ephemeral if the cryptographic key is generated for each execution of a key-exchange process. In some examples, ephemeral keys may be used more than once, within a single session (e.g., in broadcast applications) where the sender generates only one ephemeral key pair per message and the private key is combined separately with each recipient's public key. Hybrid key derivation module 110 may generate a PQC key pair. The PQC key pair may include a PQC private key and the PQC public key. PQC may refer to cryptographic algorithms that may be secure against an attack by a quantum computer. In an example, PQC may be a secure key encapsulation mechanism (e.g. Kyber), whose security is based on the hardness of solving the learning-with-errors problem over module lattices ([0023]). Therefore, it would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify method and system of Giraud, by making use of the technique taught by Gray, in order to improve the data security. Both references are within the same field of telecommunication, and in particular of communication security, the modification does not change a fundamental operating principle of Giraud, nor does Giraud teach away from the modification (Giraud merely discloses a preferred embodiment). The combination has a reasonable expectation of success in that the modifications can be made using conventional and well known engineering and/or programming techniques, the key derivation taught by Gray is not altered and continues to perform the same function as separately, and the resultant combination produces the highly predictable result of wherein the SUCI comprises a SUPI type indicating that both elliptic curve cryptography, ECC, and post quantum cryptography, PQC are used in the generating of the SUCI. Re Claim 19, Giraud discloses a method comprising: generating, at a terminal device, a subscription concealed identifier, SUCI, of the terminal device based on a subscription permanent identifier, SUPI, of the terminal device (5G provides in particular cryptographic processing events which are implemented by the embedded subscriber identity modules (for example of SIM, “eSIM” card type for is “embedded SIM”, or others) to encrypt the identifiers (SUPI for “Subscription Permanent Identifier”) of subscribers. SUPI identifiers are sent in encrypted form from the embedded subscriber identity modules to the associated 5G networks [0006]; terminal utilises an embedded subscriber identity module 3 to generate (S4) an encrypted identifier SUCI in response to the receiving (S2) of a request RQ1 coming from the access point 4 [0008]); and transmitting, from the terminal device, the SUCI to a network device (The encrypted identifier SUCI is sent (S6) in a message MSG1 to the access point 4 [0008]). Giraud discloses the claimed invention except wherein the SUCI comprises a SUPI type indicating that both elliptic curve cryptography, ECC, and post quantum cryptography, PQC are used in the generating of the SUCI. However, Gray discloses a hybrid key derivation to secure data wherein hybrid key derivation module 110 is configured to publish a traditional public key in a traditional certificate and a PQC public key in a PQC certificate. Hybrid key derivation module 110 may generate a traditional key pair. The traditional key pair may include a traditional private key and the traditional public key. In an example, the traditional key pair may be an RSA key pair. The RSA key pair may be used to encrypt and decrypt data 104. An RSA public key may be known to anyone. An RSA private key needs to be kept private. Messages encrypted using the public key can be decrypted with the private key. In another example, the traditional key pair may be an ECDH key pair. ECDH can be a key agreement protocol that allows two parties, each having an elliptic-curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel. This shared secret may be directly used as a key, or to derive another key. The key, or the derived key, can then be used to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric-key cipher. In an example, hybrid key derivation module 110 may generate a Diffie-Hellman ephemeral (DHE) key pair. DHE may be a modification of the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange that uses static keys. A cryptographic key may be called ephemeral if the cryptographic key is generated for each execution of a key-exchange process. In some examples, ephemeral keys may be used more than once, within a single session (e.g., in broadcast applications) where the sender generates only one ephemeral key pair per message and the private key is combined separately with each recipient's public key. Hybrid key derivation module 110 may generate a PQC key pair. The PQC key pair may include a PQC private key and the PQC public key. PQC may refer to cryptographic algorithms that may be secure against an attack by a quantum computer. In an example, PQC may be a secure key encapsulation mechanism (e.g. Kyber), whose security is based on the hardness of solving the learning-with-errors problem over module lattices ([0023]). Therefore, it would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify method and system of Giraud, by making use of the technique taught by Gray, in order to improve the data security. Both references are within the same field of telecommunication, and in particular of communication security, the modification does not change a fundamental operating principle of Giraud, nor does Giraud teach away from the modification (Giraud merely discloses a preferred embodiment). The combination has a reasonable expectation of success in that the modifications can be made using conventional and well known engineering and/or programming techniques, the key derivation taught by Gray is not altered and continues to perform the same function as separately, and the resultant combination produces the highly predictable result of wherein the SUCI comprises a SUPI type indicating that both elliptic curve cryptography, ECC, and post quantum cryptography, PQC are used in the generating of the SUCI. Re Claim 20, Giraud discloses a method comprising: receiving, at a network device and from a terminal device, a subscription concealed identifier, SUCI, for concealing a subscription permanent identifier, SUPI, for the terminal device (5G provides in particular cryptographic processing events which are implemented by the embedded subscriber identity modules (for example of SIM, “eSIM” card type for is “embedded SIM”, or others) to encrypt the identifiers (SUPI for “Subscription Permanent Identifier”) of subscribers. SUPI identifiers are sent in encrypted form from the embedded subscriber identity modules to the associated 5G networks [0006]; terminal utilises an embedded subscriber identity module 3 to generate (S4) an encrypted identifier SUCI in response to the receiving (S2) of a request RQ1 coming from the access point 4 [0008]); and determining the SUPI by decrypting the SUCI (access point 4 sends (S10) the encrypted identifier SUCI (with other associated information) to the network 6 which then deciphers (S12) the encrypted identifier SUCI to deduce the SUPI identifier of the subscriber from it [0009]). Giraud discloses the claimed invention except wherein the SUCI comprises a SUPI type indicating that both elliptic curve cryptography, ECC, and post quantum cryptography, PQC are used in the generating of the SUCI. However, Gray discloses a hybrid key derivation to secure data wherein hybrid key derivation module 110 is configured to publish a traditional public key in a traditional certificate and a PQC public key in a PQC certificate. Hybrid key derivation module 110 may generate a traditional key pair. The traditional key pair may include a traditional private key and the traditional public key. In an example, the traditional key pair may be an RSA key pair. The RSA key pair may be used to encrypt and decrypt data 104. An RSA public key may be known to anyone. An RSA private key needs to be kept private. Messages encrypted using the public key can be decrypted with the private key. In another example, the traditional key pair may be an ECDH key pair. ECDH can be a key agreement protocol that allows two parties, each having an elliptic-curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel. This shared secret may be directly used as a key, or to derive another key. The key, or the derived key, can then be used to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric-key cipher. In an example, hybrid key derivation module 110 may generate a Diffie-Hellman ephemeral (DHE) key pair. DHE may be a modification of the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange that uses static keys. A cryptographic key may be called ephemeral if the cryptographic key is generated for each execution of a key-exchange process. In some examples, ephemeral keys may be used more than once, within a single session (e.g., in broadcast applications) where the sender generates only one ephemeral key pair per message and the private key is combined separately with each recipient's public key. Hybrid key derivation module 110 may generate a PQC key pair. The PQC key pair may include a PQC private key and the PQC public key. PQC may refer to cryptographic algorithms that may be secure against an attack by a quantum computer. In an example, PQC may be a secure key encapsulation mechanism (e.g. Kyber), whose security is based on the hardness of solving the learning-with-errors problem over module lattices ([0023]). Therefore, it would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify method and system of Giraud, by making use of the technique taught by Gray, in order to improve the data security. Both references are within the same field of telecommunication, and in particular of communication security, the modification does not change a fundamental operating principle of Giraud, nor does Giraud teach away from the modification (Giraud merely discloses a preferred embodiment). The combination has a reasonable expectation of success in that the modifications can be made using conventional and well known engineering and/or programming techniques, the key derivation taught by Gray is not altered and continues to perform the same function as separately, and the resultant combination produces the highly predictable result of wherein the SUCI comprises a SUPI type indicating that both elliptic curve cryptography, ECC, and post quantum cryptography, PQC are used in the generating of the SUCI . Allowable Subject Matter 12-151-08 AIA 07-43 12-51-08 Claim 2-9, 11-18 objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. Conclusion 07-96 AIA The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. Ji et al. (US 2025/0184138 A1) – method for verifying access request, user terminal, and base station Lei et al. (US 2025/0063348 A1) – key management method and communication apparatus Vuppala et al. (US 2024/0283780 A1) – method and apparatus for dynamic data encryption in a communication system with forward secrecy Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to KENNETH T LAM whose telephone number is (571)270-1862. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 8:30-5:00 PM. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Hannah S. Wang can be reached at (571) 272-9018. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /KENNETH T LAM/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2631 Application/Control Number: 18/791,362 Page 2 Art Unit: 2631 Application/Control Number: 18/791,362 Page 3 Art Unit: 2631 Application/Control Number: 18/791,362 Page 4 Art Unit: 2631 Application/Control Number: 18/791,362 Page 5 Art Unit: 2631
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