DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments, filed 3/5/2026, have been fully considered and the examiner’s responses are given below.
The claim objections are withdrawn.
The claim interpretations are withdrawn.
The 35 U.S.C. 112(b) rejections are withdrawn.
The 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejections are withdrawn, however new grounds are presented below.
Applicant’s amendments to the independent claims alter the scope of the claims, therefore new prior art has been applied and applicant’s arguments are moot.
Claim Interpretation
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitation(s) is/are: a “first determination section” in claims 1 and 2; a “second determination section” in claims 1 and 3; a “control section” in claims 1, 4, and 5.
Because this/these claim limitation(s) is/are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, it/they is/are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof: a “first determination section in specification [0020]; a “second determination section” in specification [0020]; a “control section” in specification [0020].
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-2 and 7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Miller (US 20170349164 A1, cited in a previous office action) in view of Kenji (JP 2010265854 A, cited in a previous office action).
Claim 1
Miller teaches:
a hybrid vehicle comprising (Miller - Paragraph 0016-0017)
an engine (Miller - Paragraphs 0017-0023)
a turbocharger connected to an intake/exhaust system of the engine (Miller - Paragraph 0019)
an electric drive motor assisting the engine (Miller - Paragraphs 0018-0022)
and a processor configured to achieve functions of (Miller - Paragraph 0034) “Controller 12 is shown in FIG. 2 as a conventional microcomputer including: microprocessor unit”
and a control section that controls the engine and the electric drive motor, based on determination results of the first determination section and the second determination section (Miller - Paragraphs 0046-0051, Fig. 3)
Miller does not teach:
Determining whether the turbocharger is in a surge state based on engine parameters; A second determination section that determines turbocharger surge in a case that the first determination section determines turbocharger surge; A second determination section that does not determine whether the turbocharger is surging based on the first determination section determining that the turbocharger is not surging.
However, Kenji teaches:
a first determination section that determines whether or not the turbocharger is in a surge state based on at least one parameter of the engine (Kenji - Abstract, Page 7 Paragraph 5 – Page 8 Paragraph 1) “compressor 3b is in the surging state based on information from the engine rotational speed sensor 6 and the accelerator opening sensor”
The combination of Miller and Kenji teaches:
a second determination section that determines whether or not the turbocharger is in the surge state based on at least one parameter of the turbocharger in a case that the first determination section determines that the turbocharger is in the surge state (Miller - Paragraphs 0046-0051, Fig. 3; Kenji - Abstract, Page 7 Paragraph 5 – Page 8 Paragraph 1) Miller’s method step 314 (Tip-out?) corresponds to the first determination section and Miller’s method step 316 (Surge?) corresponds to the second determination section. The first determination section determining that the turbocharger is in the surge state is further taught by Kenji, which detects tip-out surge by using the accelerator opening sensor.
wherein the second determination section does not determine whether or not the turbocharger is in the surge state based on at least one parameter of the turbocharger in a case that the first determination section determines that the turbocharger is not in the surge state (Miller - Paragraph 0046, Fig. 3 (Elements 314 and 318); Kenji - Abstract, Page 7 Paragraph 5 – Page 8 Paragraph 1) Miller’s method step 314 (Tip-out?) corresponds to the first determination section and Miller’s method step 316 (Surge?) corresponds to the second determination section. The first determination section determining that the turbocharger is not in the surge state is further taught by Kenji, which detects whether there is tip-out surge by using the accelerator opening sensor.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Miller with determining whether the turbocharger is in the surge state based on engine parameters of Kenji with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that both Miller and Kenji are in the field of turbocharger surge control. One would have been motivated to combine as this improves turbo durability and passenger comfort (Kenji - Page 8 Paragraph 5 – Page 9 Paragraph 1).
Claim 2
Miller teaches:
the hybrid vehicle according to claim 1 (Miller - Paragraph 0016-0017).
Miller does not teach:
the first determination section determines whether or not the turbocharger is in the surge state based on a rotation speed of the engine and a fuel flow rate or an accelerator opening degree.
However, Kenji teaches:
the first determination section determines whether or not the turbocharger is in the surge state based on a rotation speed of the engine and a fuel flow rate or an accelerator opening degree (Kenji - Abstract, Page 7 Paragraph 5 – Page 8 Paragraph 1).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Miller with determining turbocharger surge based on the engine speed and the accelerator opening degree of Kenji with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that turbocharger surge damages the compressor and causes an uncomfortable pulsation and noise. It is important to determine turbocharger surging based on the engine speed and accelerator opening degree in order to prevent surging. One would have been motivated to combine Miller with Kenji as this achieves determining when turbocharger surging occurs. As stated in Kenji, “it is possible to avoid the problem that the compressed air A1 blows back to the compressor 3b side due to surging and the compressor 3b is damaged by vibration or heat, so that the durability performance of the supercharger 3 can be improved. it can. Moreover, since the pulsation wave resulting from surging can be prevented, the noise in a vehicle can be reduced and the comfort in a vehicle can be improved” (Page 8 Paragraph 4 – Page 9 Paragraph 1).
Claim 7
Miller teaches:
a method for controlling a hybrid vehicle that includes (Miller - Paragraphs 0037-0038).
All other limitations have been examined with respect to claim 1. Please see the rejection above.
Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Miller and Kenji, as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Hanna (US 20180340544 A1, cited in a previous office action).
Claim 3
Miller teaches:
the second determination section determines whether or not the turbocharger is in the surge state based on pressures at an outlet and an inlet of a compressor of the turbocharger (Paragraph 0007, 0047)
and based on an amount of intake air sucked by the compressor (Paragraphs 0007, 0047).
Miller does not teach:
and based on a rotation number of a turbine.
However, Hanna teaches:
and based on a rotation number of a turbine (Paragraph 0109).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Miller with determining turbocharger surge based on a rotation number of a turbine of Hanna with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that turbocharger surge damages the compressor and causes uncomfortable noise and vibration. It is possible to determine turbocharger surge based on a rotation number of the turbine in order to prevent surges. One would have been motivated to combine Miller with Hanna as this achieves improves turbo durability and vehicle performances. As stated in Miller, “Surge can lead to NVH issues such as undesirable noise from the engine intake system” (Paragraph 0002).
Claims 4-5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Miller and Kenji, as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Haruo (JP 2015182725 A, cited in a previous office action).
Claim 4
Miller teaches:
when both the first determination section and the second determination section determine that the turbocharger is in the surge state (Paragraphs 0046-0048, Fig. 3)
and suppresses a fuel flow rate (Paragraph 0050)
and causes the electric drive motor to assist the engine (Paragraphs 0051-0052).
Miller does not teach:
the control section suppresses a rotation speed of the engine.
However, Haruo teaches:
the control section suppresses a rotation speed of the engine (Page 11 Paragraph 5 – Page 12 Paragraph 3).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Miller with suppressing a rotation speed of the engine during turbocharger surge of Haruo with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that when a vehicle decelerates, the engine speed drops which may cause turbocharger surge. In order to prevent the surges, the rotation speed of the engine can be decreased slower. One would have been motivated to combine Miller with Haruo as this prevents turbocharger surge. As stated in Haruo, “the rotation speed Ne of the engine3 is maintained in the surge phenomenon non-occurrence region R, that is, the rotation speed Ne of the engine 3 is gradually decreased from the rotation speed N1 to the rotation speed N3” (Page 8 Paragraph 6 – Page 9 Paragraph 1).
Claim 5
Miller teaches:
the control section calculates a difference between a required torque and an engine torque and controls the electric drive motor to output a torque corresponding to the difference, the engine torque being an engine torque (Paragraph 0051)
and the fuel flow rate are suppressed (Paragraph 0050).
Miller does not teach:
after the rotation speed of the engine is suppressed.
However, Haruo teaches:
after the rotation speed of the engine is suppressed (Page 11 Paragraph 5 – Page 12 Paragraph 3).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Miller with suppressing a rotation speed of the engine of Haruo with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that when a vehicle decelerates, the engine speed drops and there is a risk of turbocharger surge. It is possible to apply a negative torque with the electric motor to reduce the speed of the vehicle while decreasing the engine speed at a slower rate to prevent turbocharger surge. One would have been motivated to combine Miller with Haruo as this prevents turbocharger surge during vehicle deceleration. As stated in Haruo, “the rotation speed Ne of the engine3 is maintained in the surge phenomenon non-occurrence region R, that is, the rotation speed Ne of the engine 3 is gradually decreased from the rotation speed N1 to the rotation speed N3” (Page 8 Paragraph 6 – Page 9 Paragraph 1).
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner
should be directed to Matthew Ho whose telephone number is (571) 272-1388. The examiner can
normally be reached on Mon-Thurs 9:00-5:30 EST.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Navid Z Mehdizadeh can be reached on (571)-272-7691. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/MATTHEW HO/ Examiner, Art Unit 3669
/NAVID Z. MEHDIZADEH/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3669
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