DETAILED ACTION
Notice of AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
This action is responsive to the following communications: the Amendment filed June 17, 2026.
Claims 1-20 are pending. Claims 1, 1 and 20 are independent.
Information Disclosure Statement
Acknowledgment is made of applicant’s Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) filed on April 22, 2026. This IDS has been considered.
Drawings
The drawings are objected to because:
Figure 4 should be designated by a legend such as --Prior Art-- because only that which is old is illustrated. See MPEP § 608.02(g).
Applicant’s Figure 4 is identical to U.S. 2022/0180933 Figure 3.
Corrected drawings in compliance with 37 CFR 1.121(d) are required in reply to the Office action to avoid abandonment of the application. The replacement sheet(s) should be labeled “Replacement Sheet” in the page header (as per 37 CFR 1.84(c)) so as not to obstruct any portion of the drawing figures. If the changes are not accepted by the examiner, the applicant will be notified and informed of any required corrective action in the next Office action. The objection to the drawings will not be held in abeyance.
Corrected drawing sheets in compliance with 37 CFR 1.121(d) are required in reply to the Office action to avoid abandonment of the application. Any amended replacement drawing sheet should include all of the figures appearing on the immediate prior version of the sheet, even if only one figure is being amended. The figure or figure number of an amended drawing should not be labeled as “amended.” If a drawing figure is to be canceled, the appropriate figure must be removed from the replacement sheet, and where necessary, the remaining figures must be renumbered and appropriate changes made to the brief description of the several views of the drawings for consistency. Additional replacement sheets may be necessary to show the renumbering of the remaining figures. Each drawing sheet submitted after the filing date of an application must be labeled in the top margin as either “Replacement Sheet” or “New Sheet” pursuant to 37 CFR 1.121(d). If the changes are not accepted by the examiner, the applicant will be notified and informed of any required corrective action in the next Office action. The objection to the drawings will not be held in abeyance.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-10 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Choi (U.S. 2022/0180941).
Regarding independent claim 1, Choi discloses a memory device (Fig. 1), comprising:
memory cells (Fig. 3: MCs) arranged as an array of memory strings (Fig. 3: CSs);
word lines (Fig. 3: WLs) coupled to the memory cells (Fig. 3: MCs); and
a peripheral circuit (Fig. 3: 120-150) coupled to the word lines (Fig. 3: WLs) and configured to:
perform a first read operation (Fig. 17: 1st Read) comprising a first pre-read phase (Fig. 17: Bit Line Precharge), a first read phase (Fig. 17: Evaluation), and a first post-read phase (Fig. 17: Sensing); and
perform a second read operation (Fig. 17: 2nd Read) comprising a second pre-read phase (Fig. 17: Bit Line Precharge), a second read phase (Fig. 17: Evaluation), and a second post-read phase (Fig. 17: Sensing).
As discussed above, Choi’s memory device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “memory device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “a first time duration of the first pre-read phase is larger than a second time duration time of the second pre-read phase.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Choi’s memory device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 2, Choi discloses the limitations with respect to claim 1.
As discussed above, Choi’s memory device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “memory device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “ramping up selected word line from a ground voltage to a first pass voltage, and after a first time period, ramping down the selected word line from the first pass voltage to the ground voltage.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Choi’s memory device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 3, Choi discloses the limitations with respect to claim 2.
As discussed above, Choi’s memory device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “memory device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “ramping up the selected word line from the ground voltage to the first pass voltage, and after a second time period, ramping down the selected word line from the first pass voltage to the ground voltage, wherein the first time period is larger than the second time period.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Choi’s memory device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 4, Choi discloses the limitations with respect to claim 3.
As discussed above, Choi’s memory device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “memory device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “wherein the first time period is at least two times of the second time period.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Choi’s memory device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 5, Choi discloses the limitations with respect to claim 4.
As discussed above, Choi’s memory device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “memory device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “wherein the first time period is about two times to five times of the second time period.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Choi’s memory device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 6, Choi discloses the limitations with respect to claim 2.
As discussed above, Choi’s memory device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “memory device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “wherein the first time period is in a range from about 5 µs to 50 µs.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Choi’s memory device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 7, Choi discloses the limitations with respect to claim 2.
Furthermore, Choi discloses a bottom select line and a top select line.
As discussed above, Choi’s memory device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “memory device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “ramping up a bottom select line and a top select line in unselected memory string from the ground voltage to a second pass voltage, and after the first time period, ramping down the bottom select line and the top select line in the unselected memory string from the second pass voltage to the ground voltage.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Choi’s memory device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 8, Choi discloses the limitations with respect to claim 1.
As discussed above, Choi’s memory device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “memory device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “the first read operation is a first time read operation after recovering from an idle state or after a power being turned on after a power-off state, and the second read operation is a non-first time read operation after recovering from an idle state or after a power being turned on after a power-off state.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Choi’s memory device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 9, Choi discloses the limitations with respect to claim 2.
As discussed above, Choi’s memory device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “memory device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “wherein the first time duration of the first pre-read phase is at least two times of a third time duration of the first post-read phase.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Choi’s memory device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding claim 10, Choi discloses the limitations with respect to claim 9.
As discussed above, Choi’s memory device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “memory device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “ramping up selected word line from the ground voltage to a third pass voltage, and after a third time period, ramping down the selected word line from the third pass voltage to the ground voltage, wherein the first time period is at least two times of the third time period.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Choi’s memory device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Regarding independent claim 20, Choi discloses a memory system (Fig. 23), comprising:
a memory device (Fig. 1: 100), comprising:
memory cells (Fig. 3: MCs) arranged as an array of memory strings (Fig. 3: CSs);
word lines (Fig. 3: WLs) coupled to the memory cells (Fig. 3: MCs); and
a peripheral circuit (Fig. 3: 120-150) coupled to the word lines (Fig. 3: WLs) and configured to:
perform a first read operation (Fig. 17: 1st Read) comprising a first pre-read phase (Fig. 17: Bit Line Precharge), a first read phase (Fig. 17: Evaluation), and a first post-read phase (Fig. 17: Sensing); and
perform a second read operation (Fig. 17: 2nd Read) comprising a second pre-read phase (Fig. 17: Bit Line Precharge), a second read phase (Fig. 17: Evaluation), and a second post-read phase (Fig. 17: Sensing); and
a memory controller (Fig. 23: 2200), coupled to the memory device (Fig. 1: 100).
As discussed above, Choi’s memory device is substantially identical in structure to the claimed “memory device,” where the differences reside only in the remaining limitations relating to function of “a first time duration of the first pre-read phase is larger than a second time duration time of the second pre-read phase.”
The MPEP explains that examiners are to presume claimed functions are inherent when the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to the claimed apparatus. See esp. MPEP 2112.01(I) (Product and Apparatus Claims – When the Structure Recited in the Reference is Substantially Identically to that of the Claims, Claimed Properties or Functions Are Presumed to be Inherent). Choi’s memory device appears to be identical to applicant’s device, and thus the prior art apparatus is substantially identical to claimed apparatus, for which the claimed functions are presumed inherent. See MPEP 2112.01(I).
This presumption is rebuttable by applicant either (1) showing the prior art device and claimed device are not the same or (2) proving prior art device is incapable of performing the claimed functions. In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); see MPEP 2112.01(I)(quoting In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 for “When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the application and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Applicant is reminded that argument of counsel is not evidence. MPEP 2145(I). Applicant is also reminded that claim limitations directed to the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II) (“Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art”).
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 11-19 are allowed.
The following is an examiner’s statement of reasons for allowance:
With respect to independent claim 11, there is no teaching or suggestion in the prior art of record to provide the recited step of performing a second read operation comprising a second pre-read phase, a second read phase, and a second post-read phase, wherein a first time duration of the first pre-read phase is larger than a second time duration time of the second pre-read phase, in combination with the other limitations.
Any comments considered necessary by applicant must be submitted no later than the payment of the issue fee and, to avoid processing delays, should preferably accompany the issue fee. Such submissions should be clearly labeled “Comments on Statement of Reasons for Allowance.”
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed with respect to drawing objection have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Regarding drawing objection of Figure 4, Applicant asserts that Figure 4 should not be labeled “Prior Art” because the claims recites the memory array structure shown in Figure 4 configured to perform novel operation and the structure of Figure 4 is not to be viewed in isolation, but rather in context with the remainder of the disclosure in which the subject matter of Figure 4 is included in the novelty of the claimed memory device and memory system, see Applicant’s Remarks page 8. This particular remark is not considered persuasive.
The requirement to designate Figure 4 as “Prior Art” is based on the subject matter actually illustrated in the figure, rather than on whether the claims, when considered as a whole, may recite patentable operations involving the illustrated apparatus. The fact that the present claims recite the illustrated apparatus as being “configured to” perform allegedly novel operations does not, by itself, render the preexisting structure shown in the figure new. Likewise, discussing the old structure in the context of additional disclosure does not change the character of the structure actually depicted. Any novelty arising from the claimed configuration or operations may be considered when determining the patentability of the claims, but it does not establish that the unchanged apparatus illustrated in Figure 4 is itself new.
Accordingly, because Figure 4, viewed on its face, illustrates only previously known subject matter, the requirement that the figure be designated by a legend such as “Prior Art” is maintained.
Applicant's arguments filed with respect to claims 1-10 and 20 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Regarding claims 1-10 and 20, Applicant asserts that apparatus claims 1-10 and 20 discloses identical limitations of the allowable subject matter of the method claims 11-19 and therefore the rejection of claims 1-10 and 20 should be withdrawn, see Applicant’s Remarks pages 8-9. This particular remark is not considered persuasive.
The allowance of the method claims does not establish the patentability of the apparatus claims. Although the apparatus claims may recite language similar to the allowed method claims, the patentability of an apparatus is determined by its claimed structure, not by the particular manner in which the apparatus is operated or used. The prior art discloses the same apparatus structure recited in the rejected claims. Accordingly, when the structure recited in the reference is substantially identically to that of the claims, claimed properties or functions are presumed to be inherent, see 2112.01(I). Furthermore, Applicant is reminded that the manner of operating do not distinguish an apparatus claim from the prior art apparatus. MPEP 2114(II).
Applicant has not identified any structural limitation in the apparatus claims that distinguishes the claimed apparatus from the prior art, nor provided evidence showing that the prior art apparatus is incapable of performing the claimed function.
For the above reasons, the previously applied rejection is considered proper and maintained.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ALFREDO BERMUDEZ LOZADA whose telephone number is (571)272-0877. The examiner can normally be reached 7:00AM-3:30PM EST.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Alexander G Sofocleous can be reached at 571-272-0635. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/Alfredo Bermudez Lozada/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2825
Prosecution Insights