Prosecution Insights
Last updated: October 16, 2026
Application No. 18/864,308

OPERATIONAL SUBSCRIPTION PROFILE DOWNLOAD

Non-Final OA §103§112
Filed
Nov 08, 2024
Priority
May 12, 2022 — provisional 63/341,100 +1 more
Examiner
CHOI, HAESHIL JESSICA
Art Unit
2479
Tech Center
2400 — Computer Networks
Assignee
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson
OA Round
1 (Non-Final)
76%
Grant Probability
Favorable
1-2
OA Rounds
1y 3m
Est. Remaining
75%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 76% — above average
76%
Career Allowance Rate
19 granted / 25 resolved
+18.0% vs TC avg
Minimal -1% lift
Without
With
+-1.2%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
3y 3m
Avg Prosecution
25 currently pending
Career history
65
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
1.1%
-38.9% vs TC avg
§103
61.6%
+21.6% vs TC avg
§102
28.1%
-11.9% vs TC avg
§112
8.7%
-31.3% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 25 resolved cases

Office Action

§103 §112
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (B) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph: The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. Claims 9, and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the applicant regards as the invention. Claim 9 depends on Claim 1 and recites “based on the subscriber module obtaining proof of the SM-DP+/SM-DS knowledge of…” However, Claim 1 does not recite a slashed composite term “a SM-DP+/SM-DS” resulting in a lack of antecedent basis for “the SM-DP+/SM-DS.” For the purpose of this examination, “the SM-DP+/SM-DS” in Claim 9 has been interpreted as “the SM-DP+ and/or the SM-DS.” Claim 11 recites “when the OID identified by the download information is of the SM-DS entity and wherein the SM-DS entity is given by the OID identified by the download information.” However, this phrasing is circular and redundant, making the scope of the conditional clause unclear. For the purpose of this examination, it has been interpreted as “wherein the SM-DS entity is identified by the OID contained in the download information.” Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows: 1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art. 2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. 3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness. Claims 1-17, 19-20 and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Di Girolamo et al. (US 2020/0322884 A1), hereinafter “DIGOROLAMO” in view of Johansson et al. (US 2020/0351656 A1), hereinafter “JOHANSSON”. Regarding claim 1, DIGIROLAMO teaches, ‘A method for operational subscription profile download and installation, the method being performed by a subscriber module, the subscriber module being provided in a communication device, the subscriber module being provided with subscription data for use in establishing initial cellular connectivity, the method comprising:’ (Paragraph [0076]: The eSIMs come pre-loaded with an eSIM provisioning profile. This is a default SIM profile that provides basic cellular connectivity to the eSIM after the hosting device is first powered on; Paragraph [0087]: In step 2, a device manufacturer buys eSIMs and installs these in the device. These eSIMs come provisioned with a default eSIM provisioning profile, and are capable of receiving one or more additional operating profiles. The provisioning profile allows the device hosting the eSIM to have some basic cellular connectivity; Paragraph [0091]: In step Sb: Using the provisioning profile, the device connects to a provisioning cellular network): ‘obtaining download information for the operational subscription profile from an eSIM server and over an initial cellular connectivity connection for the communication device,’ (Paragraph [0151]: In step 10, the M2M/IoT Service Provider cross references the device ID to determine the responsible Remote SIM Provisioning system entity. It issues a Download Profile message to CellNet1a with the address or identity of the Remote SIM Provisioning system. This message is forwarded to the operator subscription manager of CellNet1a; Paragraph [0153]: In step 11, through its operator subscription manager, CellNet1a issues a Profile Download request to the remote SIM provisioning system entity), ‘and wherein during cellular network access authentication to establish the initial cellular connectivity connection the subscriber module authenticates the eSIM server using the subscription data;’ (Paragraph [0079]: These operating profiles contain the IMSI/SUPI and the authentication key tied to the profile-and form the basis with which the cellular network does authentication and generates all the encryption and integrity protection keys used for communication; Paragraph [0087]: The provisioning profile allows the device hosting the eSIM to have some basic cellular connectivity. It provides the device a provisional IMSI, authentication key, and MSISDN); DIGIROLAMO does not explicitly teach but JOHANSSON teaches, ‘wherein the download information is used by the subscriber module when determining that subscription profile download is authorized for the subscriber module,’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraphs [0114]-[0116]: Authenticate server: LPApr 200a sends request for authentication of the server to the eUICC/iUICC in which server challenge, signature, and certificate (and possibly intermediate CA certificates) is included… The eUICC/iUICC then authenticates the SMDP+ 430 by validating the server certificate… and server signature and checking that the signed eUICC/iUICC challenge matches the sent one… AuthenticateClient:… In the present case the operation is profile download and the SM-DP+ provides signed profile metadata and a certificate… for profile binding as a response. Prepare download: LPApr 200a sends prepare download request comprising the signed profile metadata and certificate… to the eUICC/iUICC that validates the signature and certificate(s)), ‘downloading the operational subscription profile from an enhanced Subscription Manager Data Preparation (SM-DP+) entity and in accordance with the download information, wherein the operational subscription profile is downloaded over the initial cellular connectivity connection for the communication device;’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraphs [0117]-[0118]: GetBoundProfilePackage: LPApr 200a provides signed data and signature in the GetBoundProfilePackage command to the SM-DP+ 430… and creates a bound profile package (BPP) using the session keys… The BPP includes… the encrypted and integrity protected profile… InstallBPP: The LPApr 200a triggers the installation of the BPP at the eUICC/iUICC… The eUICC/iUICC parses the BPP… decrypts the different BPP segments to obtain the UPP… and parses the UPP to extract the profile data); ‘and installing the operational subscription profile in the subscriber module.’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraph [0118]: InstallBPP: The LPApr 200a triggers the installation of the BPP at the eUICC/iUICC… Upon complete successful profile download… the to eUICC/iUICC responds… with the ProfileinstallationResponse structure; Paragraph [0120]: Enable profile:… LPApr 200a then sends command to device (eUICC/iUICC) to enable the profile). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have known to combine the teachings of JOHANSSON with DIGIROLAMO because both are in the same/similar field of endeavor. The advantage of incorporating the above limitation(s) of JOHANSSON into DIGIROLAMO is that JOHANSOON provides standardizing security and mutual trust during remote SIM provisioning using established GSMA RSP standards, preventing unauthorized or rogue profile downloads by requiring the subscriber module (eUICC/iUICC) to validate signed server certificates and profile metadata before accepting a profile, and ensuring end-to-end encryption and integrity protection of the operational subscription profile package as it travels over an initial cellular connectivity connection. This enables the remote SIM provisioning and cellular onboarding architecture of DIGIROLAMO, the specific SM-DP+ entity interaction, profile metadata verification, and Bound Profile Package (BPP) installation mechanisms (See Paragraphs, [0011], [0053], [0115]-[0118], JOHANSSON). Regarding claim 2, DIGIROLAMO and JOHANSSON teach, The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: DIGIROLAMO does not explicitly teach but JOHANSSON teaches, ‘enabling the operational subscription profile in the subscriber module upon having installed the operational subscription profile.’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraph [0118]: InstallBPP: The LPApr 200a triggers the installation of the BPP at the eUICC/iUICC… Upon complete successful profile download … the to eUICC/iUICC responds… with the ProfileinstallationResponse structure; Paragraph [0120]: Enable profile: The device owner/user might then trigger LPApr 200a to enable the new profile using the UI provided by the LPApr 200a. LPApr 200a then sends command to device (eUICC/iUICC) to enable the profile). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have known to combine the teachings of JOHANSSON with DIGIROLAMO because both are in the same/similar field of endeavor. The advantage of incorporating the above limitation(s) of JOHANSSON into DIGIROLAMO is that JOHANSOON provides standardizing security and mutual trust during remote SIM provisioning using established GSMA RSP standards, preventing unauthorized or rogue profile downloads by requiring the subscriber module (eUICC/iUICC) to validate signed server certificates and profile metadata before accepting a profile, and ensuring end-to-end encryption and integrity protection of the operational subscription profile package as it travels over an initial cellular connectivity connection. This enables the remote SIM provisioning and cellular onboarding architecture of DIGIROLAMO, the specific SM-DP+ entity interaction, profile metadata verification, and Bound Profile Package (BPP) installation mechanisms (See Paragraphs, [0011], [0053], [0115]-[0118], JOHANSSON). Regarding claims 3 and 15, DIGIROLAMO and JOHANSSON teach, The method of claim 1, DIGIROLAMO further teaches, ‘wherein the authentication of the eSIM server is performed using a secret shared with the eSIM server contained in, or derivable from, the subscription data.’ (Paragraph [0079]: These operating profiles contain the IMSI/SUPI and the authentication key tied to the profile-and form the basis with which the cellular network does authentication and generates all the encryption and integrity protection keys used for communication; Paragraph [0087]: The provisioning profile allows the device hosting the eSIM to have some basic cellular connectivity. It provides the device a provisional IMSI, authentication key, and MSISDN; Paragraph [0067]: The Home Subscriber Server (HSS)… stores operator subscription information… includes the subscriber identity (in the form of an IMSI) and security keys used for authentication, encryption, and data integrity). Regarding claim 4, DIGIROLAMO and JOHANSSON teach, The method of claim 3, DIGIROLAMO further teaches, ‘wherein the subscription data is contained in a provisioning subscription profile installed in the subscriber module.’ (Paragraph [0076]: The eSIMs come pre-loaded with an eSIM provisioning profile. This is a default SIM profile that provides basic cellular connectivity to the eSIM after the hosting device is first powered on; Paragraph [0087]: In step 2, a device manufacturer buys eSIMs and installs these in the device. These eSIMs come provisioned with a default eSIM provisioning profile, and are capable of receiving one or more additional operating profiles. The provisioning profile allows the device hosting the eSIM to have some basic cellular connectivity. It provides the device a provisional IMSI, authentication key, and MSISDN). Regarding claim 5, DIGIROLAMO and JOHANSSON teach, The method of claim 3, DIGIROLAMO further teaches, ‘wherein the subscription data is contained as part of the subscriber module operating system,’ (Paragraph [0078]: The SIM and eSIM are examples of dedicated applications that can be stored on the (e)UICC; Paragraph [0043]: The eSIM Operating Profile contains one or more Network Access Applications and associated Network Access Credentials (e.g., Kand IMSI) and MN O's application identities and 3rd party application identities. The profile contains a combination of a file structure, data and applications to be provisioned onto, or present on, an eUICC), DIGIROLAMO does not explicitly teach but JOHANSSON teaches, ‘and wherein the subscriber module when no subscription profile is installed in the subscriber module uses the subscription data to act towards the communication device as a provisioning profile being present.’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraph [0102]: Depending on the type of connectivity the eUICC/iUICC may need to be provisioned at manufacturing or system integration with a provisioning profile allowing initial connectivity such that provisioning of an operational profile can be made [Note: In the absence of an operational subscription profile, the subscriber module uses pre-stored subscription/provisioning data as a provisioning profile to enable initial network access/connectivity to perform profile provisioning]). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have known to combine the teachings of JOHANSSON with DIGIROLAMO because both are in the same/similar field of endeavor. The advantage of incorporating the above limitation(s) of JOHANSSON into DIGIROLAMO is that JOHANSOON provides standardizing security and mutual trust during remote SIM provisioning using established GSMA RSP standards, preventing unauthorized or rogue profile downloads by requiring the subscriber module (eUICC/iUICC) to validate signed server certificates and profile metadata before accepting a profile, and ensuring end-to-end encryption and integrity protection of the operational subscription profile package as it travels over an initial cellular connectivity connection. This enables the remote SIM provisioning and cellular onboarding architecture of DIGIROLAMO, the specific SM-DP+ entity interaction, profile metadata verification, and Bound Profile Package (BPP) installation mechanisms (See Paragraphs, [0011], [0053], [0115]-[0118], JOHANSSON). Regarding claims 6 and 16, DIGIROLAMO and JOHANSSON teach, The method of claim 1, DIGIROLAMO further teaches, ‘wherein a secret shared with the eSIM server for securing transfer of the download information from the eSIM server to the subscriber module over the initial cellular connectivity connection for the communication device is contained in, or derivable from, the subscription data.’ (Paragraph [0087]: In step 2, a device manufacturer buys eSIMs and installs these in the device. These eSIMs come provisioned with a default eSIM provisioning profile, and are capable of receiving one or more additional operating profiles. The provisioning profile allows the device hosting the eSIM to have some basic cellular connectivity. It provides the device a provisional IMSI, authentication key, and MSISDN; Paragraph [0165]: In step 5 of FIG. 16, the operator subscription manager creates the eSIM operating profile for the device. For the device SUPI/IMSI, it replaces the PLMN ID associated with the provisioning profile with its own PLMN ID. For example, consider the case that CellNet1a has a PLMN ID=310 013 (Verizon) and CellNet1b has a PLMN ID=310 090 (AT&T). If the provisioning profile assigned the device an MSIN=123456789, then the provisioning IMSI/SUPI would be: 310 013 123456789, while the operating profile IMSI/SUPI would be: 310 090 123456789. In other words, the device would retain its MSIN and authentication key from the provisioning profile. This eliminates the need of sending the authentication key over the air; Paragraph [0043]: The eSIM operating profile has an un-personalized part that contains operator information that would be common across all eSIM profiles using the operator network (things like SMS service center). The eSIM operating profile also has a personalized part that includes information that is unique to the profile (for example the assigned IMSI and authentication key)). Regarding claims 7 and 17, DIGIROLAMO and JOHANSSON teach, The method of claim 3, DIGIROLAMO does not explicitly teach but JOHANSSON teaches, ‘wherein the secret shared with the eSIM server is derivable from the subscription data based on a private key of a private-public key pair of the subscriber module and a public key of a private-public key pair of the eSIM server,’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraphs [0117]-[0118]: GetBoundProfilePackage: LPApr 200a provides signed data and signature in the GetBoundProfilePackage command to the SM-DP+ 430. The SM-DP+ 430 verifies the signature and, upon successful verification, generates the SM-DP+ 430 ephemeral EC key pair, derives the session keys (e.g. using Diffie-Hellman key agreement) and creates a bound profile package (BPP) using the session keys… The eUICC/iUICC parses the BPP, extracts the SM-DP+ 430 ephemeral EC public key (after verifying the SM-DP+ 430 signature), derives the session keys, verifies and decrypts the different BPP segments to obtain the UPP [Note: deriving a shared secret/session key on both sides (the eSIM/eUICC and the eSIM server/SM-DP+) via Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which uses the private key of the subscriber module and the public key of the eSIM server]), ‘wherein the public key of the private-public key pair of the eSIM server is part of the subscription data. (JOHANSSON – Paragraphs [ 0117]-[0118]: The BPP includes the SM-DP+ 430 ephemeral EC key pair [public key], the encrypted and integrity protected profile, and a signature of the SM-DP+ 430 on the ephemeral EC public key. The BPP is then provided as a response to the LPApr 200a. InstallBPP: The LPApr 200a triggers the installation of the BPP at the eUICC/iUICC… The eUICC/iUICC parses the BPP, extracts the SM-DP+ 430 ephemeral EC public key [Note: the ephemeral public key of the eSIM server (SM-DP+) is transmitted inside the Bound Profile Package (BPP) (the subscription data package) to allow key derivation at the subscriber module]). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have known to combine the teachings of JOHANSSON with DIGIROLAMO because both are in the same/similar field of endeavor. The advantage of incorporating the above limitation(s) of JOHANSSON into DIGIROLAMO is that JOHANSOON provides standardizing security and mutual trust during remote SIM provisioning using established GSMA RSP standards, preventing unauthorized or rogue profile downloads by requiring the subscriber module (eUICC/iUICC) to validate signed server certificates and profile metadata before accepting a profile, and ensuring end-to-end encryption and integrity protection of the operational subscription profile package as it travels over an initial cellular connectivity connection. This enables the remote SIM provisioning and cellular onboarding architecture of DIGIROLAMO, the specific SM-DP+ entity interaction, profile metadata verification, and Bound Profile Package (BPP) installation mechanisms (See Paragraphs, [0011], [0053], [0115]-[0118], JOHANSSON). Regarding claim 8, DIGIROLAMO and JOHANSSON teach, The method of claim 1, DIGIROLAMO further teaches, ‘wherein the download information is securely transferred from the eSIM server to the subscriber module’ (Paragraph [0094]: In step 8, the remote SIM provisioning system creates a secure tunnel between itself and the eUICC in the device, downloads the newly created profile, and enables it) ‘using a SIM OTA procedure.’ (Paragraph [0076]: The eSIMs can change eSIM operating profile using over-the-air signaling, effectively being re-programmed. This allows a 3rd party to add an eSIM operating profile to an eSIM, delete stored eSIM operating profiles, to enable/disable an operating profile, etc. This is done through a remote SIM provisioning architecture that is briefly described in a subsequent section). Regarding claims 9 and 19, DIGIROLAMO and JOHANSSON teach, The method of claim 1, DIGIROLAMO does not explicitly teach but JOHANSSON teaches, ‘wherein the download information specifies an authorization secret used by the subscriber module to determine that the download of the operational subscription profile from the SM-DP+ entity is authorized for the subscriber module, and/or to determine that the download of SM-DP+ information from a Subscription Manager Discovery Service, (SM-DS) entity specifying the SM-DP+ entity from which the operational subscription profile is to be downloaded is authorized,’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraph [0110]-[0111]: Order new profile, download preparation, and response back to device owner: The device owner/user 410 contacts the MNO 420 and orders a new subscription. This triggers the MNO 420 to interact with the SM-DP+ 430 to prepare the profile download. The MNO 420 obtains the SM-DP+ 430 address and an activation code token which is provided back to the device owner/user. Optionally the confirmation code is also received. Trigger profile download: The device owner/user 410 triggers the profile download via the LPApr 200a and provides the activation code token and SM-DP+ 430 address (and possibly confirmation code); Paragraph [0144]: To prevent an attacker to trigger profile download of an already agreed and prepared profile at the SM-DP+ 430 a confirmation code might be presented. Since the confirmation code is only known to the legitimate proxy device 200 (via the device owner) only this proxy device 200 can trigger profile download to the communications device 300 [Note: download information specifying an authorization secret (activation code token / confirmation code) used to verify/determine that downloading the operational profile from the SM-DP+ entity (or discovering via SM-DS) is authorized for the target subscriber module]), ‘and wherein determining that the download is authorized is based on the subscriber module obtaining proof of the SM-DP+/SM-DS knowledge of the authorization secret as obtained during profile download preparation for the operational subscription profile.’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraph [0116]: Prepare download: LPApr 200a sends prepare download request comprising the signed profile metadata and certificate (and possibly intermediate CA certificates) to the eUICC/iUICC that validates the signature and certificate(s). The request may also include the hashed confirmation code. Upon successful verification, the eUICC/iUICC generates an ephemeral EC key pair that is signed by the eUICC/iUICC (together with confirmation code hash and some additional data); Paragraph [0153]: The PrepareDownloadResponse upon successful download preparation contains the transaction ID and the hash of the confirmation code (optional) that are both also part of PrepareDownloadRequest… The LPApr 200a can then reconstruct the full response [Note: determining download authorization is based on checking and obtaining proof of knowledge of the authorization secret (hashed confirmation code) generated and validated during profile download preparation]). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have known to combine the teachings of JOHANSSON with DIGIROLAMO because both are in the same/similar field of endeavor. The advantage of incorporating the above limitation(s) of JOHANSSON into DIGIROLAMO is that JOHANSOON provides standardizing security and mutual trust during remote SIM provisioning using established GSMA RSP standards, preventing unauthorized or rogue profile downloads by requiring the subscriber module (eUICC/iUICC) to validate signed server certificates and profile metadata before accepting a profile, and ensuring end-to-end encryption and integrity protection of the operational subscription profile package as it travels over an initial cellular connectivity connection. This enables the remote SIM provisioning and cellular onboarding architecture of DIGIROLAMO, the specific SM-DP+ entity interaction, profile metadata verification, and Bound Profile Package (BPP) installation mechanisms (See Paragraphs, [0011], [0053], [0115]-[0118], JOHANSSON). Regarding claims 10 and 20, DIGIROLAMO and JOHANSSON teach, The method of claim 1, DIGIROLAMO does not explicitly teach but JOHANSSON teaches, ‘wherein the download information identifies an object identifier, (OID) of the SM-DP+ entity and/or an SM-DS entity,’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraph [0154]: In case of ProfileinstallationResult indicating successful installation it is enough to send the following bytes (77 bytes in the present example) to the LPApr 200a that then can reconstruct the full ProfileinstallationResult structure:… Other data such as transaction ID, profile management operation information, notification address, and object identifier of the SM-DP+ is information that is known to the LPApr 200a or can be obtained from other messages by the LPApr 200a. Examples of sequence number, ICCID, ISD-P AID, eUICC/iUICC signature, transaction ID, profile management operation information, notification address, and object identifier of the SM-DP+, when using ASN.1 notation of ProfileinstallationResult message/structure, are seqNumber, iccid, aid, euiccSignPIR, transactionld, profileManagementOperation, notificationAddress, and smdpOid, respectively[Note: the download information/profile management structure identifies an object identifier (OID) of the SM-DP+ entity (e.g., smdpOid)]), ‘for the subscriber module to use when downloading and installing the operational subscription profile.’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraph [0115]: AuthenticateClient: The LPApr 200a provides the signed data, signature, the eUICC/iUICC certificate, and the EUM certificate (and possibly other intermediate CA certificates) in theAuthenticateClient command to the SM-DP+ 430 that authenticates the client by verifying the certificates and eUICC/iUICC signature (and check that signed server challenge matches sent challenge). Upon successful authentication, the SM-DP+ 430 determines the operation to be performed (based on the operation parameter or default value if not present). In the present case the operation is profile download and the SM-DP+ provides signed profile metadata and a certificate (and possibly intermediate CA certificates chaining back to the root CA certificate) for profile binding as a response; Paragraph [0154]: In case of ProfileinstallationResult indicating successful Installation… Other data such as transaction ID, profile management operation information, notification address, and object identifier of the SM-DP+ is information that is known to the LPApr 200a or can be obtained from other messages by the LPApr 200a… when using ASN.1 notation of ProfileinstallationResult message/structure, are… smdpOid, respectively[Note: using the SM-DP+ object identifier (smdpOid) as part of the operational data structures for the subscriber module (eUICC/iUICC) to use when downloading, verifying, and installing the operational subscription profile]). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have known to combine the teachings of JOHANSSON with DIGIROLAMO because both are in the same/similar field of endeavor. The advantage of incorporating the above limitation(s) of JOHANSSON into DIGIROLAMO is that JOHANSOON provides standardizing security and mutual trust during remote SIM provisioning using established GSMA RSP standards, preventing unauthorized or rogue profile downloads by requiring the subscriber module (eUICC/iUICC) to validate signed server certificates and profile metadata before accepting a profile, and ensuring end-to-end encryption and integrity protection of the operational subscription profile package as it travels over an initial cellular connectivity connection. This enables the remote SIM provisioning and cellular onboarding architecture of DIGIROLAMO, the specific SM-DP+ entity interaction, profile metadata verification, and Bound Profile Package (BPP) installation mechanisms (See Paragraphs, [0011], [0053], [0115]-[0118], JOHANSSON). Regarding claim 11, DIGIROLAMO and JOHANSSON teach, The method of claim 10, DIGIROLOAMO does not explicitly teach but JOHANSSON teaches, ‘wherein the SM- DP+ entity from which the operational subscription profile is downloaded is either given by the OID identified by the download information when the OID is of the SM-DP+ entity,’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraph [0154]: In case of ProfileinstallationResult indicating successful installation it is enough to send the following bytes (77 bytes in the present example) to the LPApr 200a that then can reconstruct the full ProfileinstallationResult structure:… Other data such as transaction ID, profile management operation information, notification address, and object identifier of the SM-DP+ is information that is known to the LPApr 200a or can be obtained from other messages by the LPApr 200a. Examples of sequence number, ICCID, ISD-P AID, eUICC/iUICC signature, transaction ID, profile management operation information, notification address, and object identifier of the SM-DP+, when using ASN.1 notation of ProfileinstallationResult message/structure, are seqNumber, iccid, aid, euiccSignPIR, transactionld, profileManagementOperation, notificationAddress, and smdpOid, respectively [Note: the target SM-DP+ entity from which the operational subscription profile is downloaded is directly specified/given by the Object Identifier (smdpOid) identified in the download/profile message information]), ‘or is given by an event record received by the subscriber module from the SM-DS entity when the OID identified by the download information is of the SM-DS entity and wherein the SM-DS entity is given by the OID identified by the download information.’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraph [0143]: Since there might not be any client authentication when setting up the HTTPS connection with the SM-DP+ 430/SM-DS 440 there is then a way for any server (without access to a legitimate eUICC/iUICC) to put some workload on a SM-DP+ 430 (or SM-DS 440). It is not until the SM-DP+ 430 (or SM-DS 440) evaluates the AuthenticateClient command that it can reject to the communication. In case a server has authenticated a legitimate eUICC/iUICC, such that all verifications of the AuthenticateClient command are successful, the SM-DP+ 430 (or SM-DS 440) can at this point obtain the EID from the eUICC/iUICC certificate and conclude that there is no profile download prepared or no event available for this particular eUICC/iUICC [Note: when connecting to a Subscription Manager Discovery Service (SM-DS entity) identified via server parameters/OIDs, the subscriber module (eUICC/iUICC) queries the SM-DS to locate pending event records (“no event available for this particular eUICC/iUICC”), which are then used to resolve and identify the target SM-DP+ entity containing the prepared profile]). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have known to combine the teachings of JOHANSSON with DIGIROLAMO because both are in the same/similar field of endeavor. The advantage of incorporating the above limitation(s) of JOHANSSON into DIGIROLAMO is that JOHANSOON provides standardizing security and mutual trust during remote SIM provisioning using established GSMA RSP standards, preventing unauthorized or rogue profile downloads by requiring the subscriber module (eUICC/iUICC) to validate signed server certificates and profile metadata before accepting a profile, and ensuring end-to-end encryption and integrity protection of the operational subscription profile package as it travels over an initial cellular connectivity connection. This enables the remote SIM provisioning and cellular onboarding architecture of DIGIROLAMO, the specific SM-DP+ entity interaction, profile metadata verification, and Bound Profile Package (BPP) installation mechanisms (See Paragraphs, [0011], [0053], [0115]-[0118], JOHANSSON). Regarding claim 12, DIGIROLAMO and JOHANSSON teach, The method of claim 1, DIGOROLAMO further teaches, ‘wherein the download information is obtained as part of performing network access authentication,’ (Paragraph [0174]: In step 11, the PEI (e.g., IMEI) is used to query the EIR/5G-EIR to determine the PLMN to which this device should be retargeted to… The central EIR returns the PLMN ID of the home network through an Identity Check response; Paragraph [0177]: In step 14, IoT device begins searching for cells on the cellular network CellNet1b. After finding a cell, it attempts to register with the CellNet1b. As part of the registration accept message, the device is provided with the rest of the cellular operating profile included in the HSS/UDR of CellNet1b [Note: profile/download information is provided to and obtained by the device during network attachment/registration and authentication exchanges with the cellular network core]), DIGIROLAMO does not explicitly teach but JOHANSSON teaches, ‘using an AKA protocol, when establishing the initial cellular connectivity connection.’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraph [0007]: The so-called 3GPP identity technology… is a well-proven identity technology that might be leveraged as identity technology for constrained devices… The 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol is agnostic to the underlying network and can for example be tunneled in the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) using the EAP-AKA. EAP is a commonly used authentication and key agreement protocol as part of network attachment, e.g. for WiFi network access). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have known to combine the teachings of JOHANSSON with DIGIROLAMO because both are in the same/similar field of endeavor. The advantage of incorporating the above limitation(s) of JOHANSSON into DIGIROLAMO is that JOHANSOON provides standardizing security and mutual trust during remote SIM provisioning using established GSMA RSP standards, preventing unauthorized or rogue profile downloads by requiring the subscriber module (eUICC/iUICC) to validate signed server certificates and profile metadata before accepting a profile, and ensuring end-to-end encryption and integrity protection of the operational subscription profile package as it travels over an initial cellular connectivity connection. This enables the remote SIM provisioning and cellular onboarding architecture of DIGIROLAMO, the specific SM-DP+ entity interaction, profile metadata verification, and Bound Profile Package (BPP) installation mechanisms (See Paragraphs, [0011], [0053], [0115]-[0118], JOHANSSON). Regarding claim 13, DIGIROLAMO teaches, ‘A method for enabling operational subscription profile download and installation to a subscriber module, the method being performed by an eSIM server, the method comprising:’ (Paragraph [0062]: The operator subscription manager: Entity or function in a cellular network that issues guidance to the remote SIM provisioning system [eSIM server], generates the operator subscription profile from the eSIM operating profile and local preferences, and pushes this operator subscription profile information to the relevant entities/network functions within the cellular network; Paragraph [0082]: The SM-DP entity is responsible for eSIM Operating Profile generation): ‘obtaining a trigger for the operational subscription profile to be downloaded to the subscriber module;’ (Paragraphs [0148]-[0149]: This may be a new 3GPP monitoring event which is based on the SCEF /NEF being informed by the MME/AMF about a specific UE with a specific IMEI/PEI or IMSI/SUPI registers to the network. At some later time, an IoT device (Device ID1) is powered on, and it attempts to register with CellNet1a, as defined through its default provisioning profile; Paragraph [0151]: In step 10, the M2M/IoT Service Provider cross references the device ID to determine the responsible Remote SIM Provisioning system entity. It issues a Download Profile message to CellNet1a with the address or identity of the Remote SIM Provisioning system. This message is forwarded to the operator subscription manager of CellNet1a); ‘providing, towards the subscriber module and over an initial cellular connectivity connection for a communication device in which the subscriber module is provided, download information for the operational subscription profile,’ (Paragraphs [0153]-[0154]: In step 11, through its operator subscription manager, CellNet1a issues a Profile Download request to the remote SIM provisioning system entity… In step 12 of FIG. 14, the remote SIM provisioning system entity creates a secure channel between itself and the IoT device and downloads the cellular operating profile), ‘and wherein during cellular network access authentication to establish the initial cellular connectivity connection the eSIM server provides authentication data towards the subscriber module for the subscriber module to authenticate the eSIM server.’ (Paragraph [0079]: These operating profiles contain the IMSI/SUPI and the authentication key tied to the profile-and form the basis with which the cellular network does authentication and generates all the encryption and integrity protection keys used for communication; Paragraph [0067]: The Home Subscriber Server (HSS)… stores operator subscription information… includes the subscriber identity (in the form of an IMSI) and security keys used for authentication… In the following document, we use the term HSS to include functionality of the Authentication Center (AuC)). DIGIROLAMO does not explicitly teach but JOHANSSON teaches, ‘wherein the download information is specified for the subscriber module to determine that subscription profile download is authorized for the subscriber module,’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraphs [0115]-[0116]: AuthenticateClient:… In the present case the operation is profile download and the SM-DP+ provides signed profile metadata and a certificate (and possibly intermediate CA certificates chaining back to the root CA certificate) for profile binding as a response. Prepare download: LPApr 200a sends prepare download request comprising the signed profile metadata and certificate (and possibly intermediate CA certificates) to the eUICC/iUICC that validates the signature and certificate(s)). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have known to combine the teachings of JOHANSSON with DIGIROLAMO because both are in the same/similar field of endeavor. The advantage of incorporating the above limitation(s) of JOHANSSON into DIGIROLAMO is that JOHANSOON provides standardizing security and mutual trust during remote SIM provisioning using established GSMA RSP standards, preventing unauthorized or rogue profile downloads by requiring the subscriber module (eUICC/iUICC) to validate signed server certificates and profile metadata before accepting a profile, and ensuring end-to-end encryption and integrity protection of the operational subscription profile package as it travels over an initial cellular connectivity connection. This enables the remote SIM provisioning and cellular onboarding architecture of DIGIROLAMO, the specific SM-DP+ entity interaction, profile metadata verification, and Bound Profile Package (BPP) installation mechanisms (See Paragraphs, [0011], [0053], [0115]-[0118], JOHANSSON). Regarding claim 14, DIGIROLAMO and JOHANSSON teach, The method of claim 13, DIGIROLAMO does not explicitly teach but JOHANSSON teaches, ‘wherein the method further comprises: determining the download information during profile download preparation for the operational subscription profile.’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraph [0110]: Order new profile, download preparation, and response back to device owner: The device owner/user 410 contacts the MNO 420 and orders a new subscription. This triggers the MNO 420 to interact with the SM-DP+ 430 to prepare the profile download. The MNO 420 obtains the SM-DP+ 430 address and an activation code token which is provided back to the device owner/user. Optionally the confirmation code is also received [Note: the eSIM server / SM-DP+ entity determining and generating the download information (e.g., SM-DP+ server address, activation code token, and confirmation code) during the profile download preparation phase prior to profile transfer]). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have known to combine the teachings of JOHANSSON with DIGIROLAMO because both are in the same/similar field of endeavor. The advantage of incorporating the above limitation(s) of JOHANSSON into DIGIROLAMO is that JOHANSOON provides standardizing security and mutual trust during remote SIM provisioning using established GSMA RSP standards, preventing unauthorized or rogue profile downloads by requiring the subscriber module (eUICC/iUICC) to validate signed server certificates and profile metadata before accepting a profile, and ensuring end-to-end encryption and integrity protection of the operational subscription profile package as it travels over an initial cellular connectivity connection. This enables the remote SIM provisioning and cellular onboarding architecture of DIGIROLAMO, the specific SM-DP+ entity interaction, profile metadata verification, and Bound Profile Package (BPP) installation mechanisms (See Paragraphs, [0011], [0053], [0115]-[0118], JOHANSSON). Regarding claim 24, the claim includes features identical to the subject matter mentioned in the rejection to claim 1. The claim is mere reformulation of claim 1 in order to define the corresponding apparatus, and the rejection to claim 1 is applied hereto. DIGIROLAMO teaches, ‘A subscriber module for operational subscription profile download and installation, the subscriber module being provided in a communication device, the subscriber module being provided with subscription data for use in establishing initial cellular connectivity,’ (Paragraph [0076]: The eSIMs come pre-loaded with an eSIM provisioning profile. This is a default SIM profile that provides basic cellular connectivity to the eSIM after the hosting device is first powered on; Paragraph [0087]: In step 2, a device manufacturer buys eSIMs and installs these in the device… The provisioning profile allows the device hosting the eSIM to have some basic cellular connectivity), DIGIROLAMO does not explicitly teach but JOHANSOON teaches, ‘the subscriber module comprising processing circuitry, the processing circuitry being configured to cause the subscriber module to:’ (JOHANSSON – Paragraph [0010]: The next phase in the UICC evolution is the integrated UICC (iUICC) in which the UICC is integrated into the System-on-Chip of the modem/application processor… a dedicated central processing unit (CPU) core with its own dedicated memory and peripherals might constitute the iUICC; Paragraphs [0171]-[0172]: FIG. 11 schematically illustrates, in terms of a number of functional units, the components of a communications device 300 according to an embodiment. Processing circuitry 310 is provided using any combination of one or more of a suitable central processing unit (CPU), multiprocessor, microcontroller… Particularly, the processing circuitry 310 is configured to cause the communications device 300 to perform a set of operations; Paragraph [0175]: Particularly, the processing circuitry 310 might implement the functionality of the LPAdv 300a): It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have known to combine the teachings of JOHANSSON with DIGIROLAMO because both are in the same/similar field of endeavor. The advantage of incorporating the above limitation(s) of JOHANSSON into DIGIROLAMO is that JOHANSOON provides standardizing security and mutual trust during remote SIM provisioning using established GSMA RSP standards, preventing unauthorized or rogue profile downloads by requiring the subscriber module (eUICC/iUICC) to validate signed server certificates and profile metadata before accepting a profile, and ensuring end-to-end encryption and integrity protection of the operational subscription profile package as it travels over an initial cellular connectivity connection. This enables the remote SIM provisioning and cellular onboarding architecture of DIGIROLAMO, the specific SM-DP+ entity interaction, profile metadata verification, and Bound Profile Package (BPP) installation mechanisms (See Paragraphs, [0011], [0053], [0115]-[0118], JOHANSSON). Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to HAESHIL J CHOI whose telephone number is (703)756-5409. The examiner can normally be reached Monday through Friday ET. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Jae Y Lee can be reached on 571-270-3936. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /HAESHIL JESSICA CHOI/Examiner, Art Unit 2479 /JAE Y LEE/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2479
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Prosecution Timeline

Nov 08, 2024
Application Filed
Sep 30, 2026
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §103, §112 (current)

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Prosecution Projections

1-2
Expected OA Rounds
76%
Grant Probability
75%
With Interview (-1.2%)
3y 3m (~1y 3m remaining)
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