Prosecution Insights
Last updated: August 06, 2026
Application No. 18/882,891

COMPOSITIONS FOR IMPROVED CONCRETE PERFORMANCE

Non-Final OA §102§103§112
Filed
Sep 12, 2024
Priority
Mar 22, 2018 — provisional 62/761,393 +4 more
Examiner
GREEN, ANTHONY J
Art Unit
1731
Tech Center
1700 — Chemical & Materials Engineering
Assignee
E5 Incorporated
OA Round
4 (Non-Final)
85%
Grant Probability
Favorable
4-5
OA Rounds
0m
Est. Remaining
98%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 85% — above average
85%
Career Allowance Rate
1379 granted / 1621 resolved
+20.1% vs TC avg
Moderate +13% lift
Without
With
+13.3%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Fast prosecutor
1y 9m
Avg Prosecution
49 currently pending
Career history
1645
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
3.4%
-36.6% vs TC avg
§103
33.1%
-6.9% vs TC avg
§102
17.5%
-22.5% vs TC avg
§112
33.4%
-6.6% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 1621 resolved cases

Office Action

§102 §103 §112
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Response to Amendment This office action is in response to the amendment submitted on 06 July 2026. After entry of the amendment, claims 21, 23-30 and 38-51 are currently pending in the application with claims 38-44 withdrawn from consideration as being drawn to a non-elected invention. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112(a) The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a): (a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112: The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. Claims 21, 23-30 and 45-51 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. Upon further review, it appears that the preliminary amendment which added these claims was submitted after the filing date and therefore any subject matter not having support in the specification is considered new matter under 112(a). In claim 21, the phrase “for continued hydration without reliance upon traditional external curing techniques” lacks proper antecedent basis in the specification. In claim 23, the phrase “not receiving traditional external curing” lacks proper antecedent basis in the specification. In claim 24, the phrase “not receiving traditional external curing” lacks proper antecedent basis in the specification. In claim 25, the phrase “without a provision of traditional external curing techniques” lacks proper antecedent basis in the specification. In claim 26, the phrase “without requiring traditional external curing techniques” lacks proper antecedent basis in the specification. In claim 27, the phrase “not receiving traditional external curing” lacks proper antecedent basis in the specification. In claim 28, the phrase “not receiving traditional external curing” lacks proper antecedent basis in the specification. In claim 45, the phrase “for continued hydration without reliance upon traditional external curing techniques” lacks proper antecedent basis in the specification. In claim 46, the phrase “without a provision of traditional external curing techniques” lacks proper antecedent basis in the specification. In claim 47, the phrase “without requiring traditional external curing techniques” lacks proper antecedent basis in the specification. In claim 51, the phrase “for continued hydration without requiring the addition of surface water or evaporation controls” lack proper antecedent basis in the specification. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112(b) The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph: The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. Claims 21, 23-30 and 45-51 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention. In claims 21 and 45, the phrase “have become fully or nearly fully wetted” is vague and indefinite. What is meant by this phrase? It is unclear as to what is meant by the phrase “continued hydration without reliance upon traditional external curing techniques”. What does the phrase “traditional external curing techniques” represent? Also the phrase “without reliance upon traditional external curing techniques” is a negative limitation and according to MPEP 2173.05(i): Any negative limitation or exclusionary proviso must have basis in the original disclosure. If alternative elements are positively recited in the specification, they may be explicitly excluded in the claims. See In re Johnson, 558 F.2d 1008, 1019, 194 USPQ 187, 196 (CCPA 1977). Note that there appears to be no mention of “traditional external curing techniques”. Clarification is requested. In claim 41, it is unclear as to what is meant by “(internal curing)” as it is unclear as to whether or not this is intended to be part of the claim. In claim 46, it is unclear as to what is meant by “(internal curing)” as it is unclear as to whether or not this is intended to be part of the claim. In claim 47, the phrase “”the addition or retention of water” lacks proper antecedent basis. In claims 49 and 50, the phrase “full or near-full wetting” is vague and indefinite. In claim 51, the phrase “have become fully or nearly fully wetted” is vague and indefinite. What is meant by this phrase? It is unclear as to what is meant by the phrase “continued hydration without requiring the addition of surface water or evaporation controls”. Also the phrase “without requiring the addition of surface water or evaporation controls” is a negative limitation and according to MPEP 2173.05(i): Any negative limitation or exclusionary proviso must have basis in the original disclosure. If alternative elements are positively recited in the specification, they may be explicitly excluded in the claims. See In re Johnson, 558 F.2d 1008, 1019, 194 USPQ 187, 196 (CCPA 1977). Note that there appears to be no mention of “without requiring the addition of surface water or evaporation controls”. Clarification is requested. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102/103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action: A person shall be entitled to a patent unless – (a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. Claims 21, 23-30 and 45-51 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as anticipated by or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. 103 as obvious over International Publication Number WO 98/12149 A1. The reference teaches, in claims 1-5, a mixture of hydraulic binder, aggregates, water and colloidal silica. The silica particles have an average specific surface area below about 200 m2/g, preferably having an average specific surface area of from about 50 to about 170 m2/g. The silica particles have a mean particle size by numbers of from about 7 to about 50 nm. The hydraulic binder is preferably Portland cement (page 3, line 10). The instant claims are anticipated by and/or rendered obvious by the reference. The claims are product-by-process claims and patentability is determined by the product. As for claim 21, the reference teaches a composition comprising a colloidal silica, cement, water and aggregates. The colloidal silica meets both the specific surface area as well as the particle size. While the reference does not recite the same process steps it is believed that the result is the same. As stated in MPEP 2113 [R-1]: "[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process." In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Once a product appearing to be substantially identical is found and a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is made, the burden shifts to the applicant to show an unobvious difference "The Patent Office bears a lesser burden of proof in making out a case of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature" than when a product is claimed in the conventional fashion. In re Fessmann, 489 F.2d 742, 744, 180 USPQ 324, 326 (CCPA 1974). Once the examiner provides a rationale tending to show that the claimed product appears to be the same or similar to that of the prior art, although produced by a different process, the burden shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence establishing an unobvious difference between the claimed product and the prior art product. In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir.1983). Accordingly since the resulting product appears to be the same the instant claim is anticipated by and/or rendered obvious by the reference. Also as for the newly added limitation (last 4 lines of the claim), this appears to be possessed by the composition as the composition is the same. if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. As for claims 23-28, these claims contain property limitations. While the reference does not recite these properties, if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. As for claim 29, the reference teaches colloidal nanosilica. As for claim 30, this claim contains property limitations. While the reference does not recite these properties, if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. As for claim 45, the reference teaches a composition comprising a colloidal silica, cement, water and aggregates. While the reference does not recite the same process steps it is believed that the result is the same. As stated in MPEP 2113 [R-1]: "[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process." In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Once a product appearing to be substantially identical is found and a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is made, the burden shifts to the applicant to show an unobvious difference "The Patent Office bears a lesser burden of proof in making out a case of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature" than when a product is claimed in the conventional fashion. In re Fessmann, 489 F.2d 742, 744, 180 USPQ 324, 326 (CCPA 1974). Once the examiner provides a rationale tending to show that the claimed product appears to be the same or similar to that of the prior art, although produced by a different process, the burden shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence establishing an unobvious difference between the claimed product and the prior art product. In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir.1983). Accordingly since the resulting product appears to be the same the instant claim is anticipated by and/or rendered obvious by the reference. Also as for the newly added limitation (last 4 lines of the claim), this appears to be possessed by the composition as the composition is the same. if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. As for claims 46-47 and 49-50, these claims contain property limitations. While the reference does not recite these properties, if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. As for claim 48, the reference teaches colloidal nanosilica. As for claim 51, the reference teaches a composition comprising a colloidal silica, cement, water and aggregates. While the reference does not recite the same process steps it is believed that the result is the same. As stated in MPEP 2113 [R-1]: "[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process." In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Once a product appearing to be substantially identical is found and a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is made, the burden shifts to the applicant to show an unobvious difference "The Patent Office bears a lesser burden of proof in making out a case of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature" than when a product is claimed in the conventional fashion. In re Fessmann, 489 F.2d 742, 744, 180 USPQ 324, 326 (CCPA 1974). Once the examiner provides a rationale tending to show that the claimed product appears to be the same or similar to that of the prior art, although produced by a different process, the burden shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence establishing an unobvious difference between the claimed product and the prior art product. In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir.1983). Accordingly since the resulting product appears to be the same the instant claim is anticipated by and/or rendered obvious by the reference. Also as for the newly added limitation (last 4 lines of the claim), this appears to be possessed by the composition as the composition is the same. if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. Claims 21, 23-28, 45-47 and 49-51 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as anticipated by or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. 103 as obvious over International Publication Number WO 2016/114796 A1. The reference teaches, in Example 1, a composition comprising: (i) 133.04 kg, 133.25 liters (293.3 pounds, 35.2 gallons) of water; (ii) 310 grams of nano-sized silica (AkzoNobel CEMBINDER™ 25) mixed in 1 .18 liters (40 fluid ounces) water); (iii) 460 grams of citric acid powder dissolved in 1.1 1 lifers (37.5 fluid ounces) water; (iv) 255.8 kg (584 pounds) of Type I Portland cement; (v) 877.7 kg (1,494 pounds) of common sand; and (vi) 775.8 kg (1,710 pounds) of Number 57 aggregate stone. According to paragraph [0049], CEMBINDER™ 25 has a nominal particle size of 25 nm, ranging from about 10 nm to about 40 nm. The instant claims are anticipated by and/or rendered obvious by the reference. The claims are product-by-process claims and patentability is determined by the product. As for claim 21, the reference teaches a composition that comprises cement, sand, aggregate, water, and nano-sized silica. The nano-sized silica (AkzoNobei CEMBINDER™ 25) meets the particle size. While the reference does not recite the same process steps it is believed that the result is the same. As stated in MPEP 2113 [R-1]: "[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process." In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Once a product appearing to be substantially identical is found and a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is made, the burden shifts to the applicant to show an unobvious difference "The Patent Office bears a lesser burden of proof in making out a case of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature" than when a product is claimed in the conventional fashion. In re Fessmann, 489 F.2d 742, 744, 180 USPQ 324, 326 (CCPA 1974). Once the examiner provides a rationale tending to show that the claimed product appears to be the same or similar to that of the prior art, although produced by a different process, the burden shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence establishing an unobvious difference between the claimed product and the prior art product. In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir.1983). Accordingly since the resulting product appears to be the same the instant claim is anticipated by and/or rendered obvious by the reference. Also as for the newly added limitation (last 4 lines of the claim), this appears to be possessed by the composition as the composition is the same. if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. As for claims 23-28, these claims contain property limitations. While the reference does not recite these properties, if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. As for claim 45, the reference teaches a composition comprising cement, sand, aggregate, water, and nano-sized silica. The nano-sized silica (AkzoNobei CEMBINDER™ 25) meets the particle size. While the reference does not recite the same process steps it is believed that the result is the same. As stated in MPEP 2113 [R-1]: "[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process." In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Once a product appearing to be substantially identical is found and a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is made, the burden shifts to the applicant to show an unobvious difference "The Patent Office bears a lesser burden of proof in making out a case of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature" than when a product is claimed in the conventional fashion. In re Fessmann, 489 F.2d 742, 744, 180 USPQ 324, 326 (CCPA 1974). Once the examiner provides a rationale tending to show that the claimed product appears to be the same or similar to that of the prior art, although produced by a different process, the burden shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence establishing an unobvious difference between the claimed product and the prior art product. In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir.1983). Accordingly since the resulting product appears to be the same the instant claim is anticipated by and/or rendered obvious by the reference. Also as for the newly added limitation (last 4 lines of the claim), this appears to be possessed by the composition as the composition is the same. if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. As for claims 46-47 and 49-50, these claims contain property limitations. While the reference does not recite these properties, if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. As for claim 51, the reference teaches a composition comprising a colloidal silica, cement, water and aggregates. While the reference does not recite the same process steps it is believed that the result is the same. As stated in MPEP 2113 [R-1]: "[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process." In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Once a product appearing to be substantially identical is found and a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is made, the burden shifts to the applicant to show an unobvious difference "The Patent Office bears a lesser burden of proof in making out a case of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature" than when a product is claimed in the conventional fashion. In re Fessmann, 489 F.2d 742, 744, 180 USPQ 324, 326 (CCPA 1974). Once the examiner provides a rationale tending to show that the claimed product appears to be the same or similar to that of the prior art, although produced by a different process, the burden shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence establishing an unobvious difference between the claimed product and the prior art product. In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir.1983). Also as for the newly added limitation (last 4 lines of the claim) this appears to be possessed by the composition as the composition is the same. if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. Accordingly since the resulting product appears to be the same the instant claim is anticipated by and/or rendered obvious by the reference. Claims 21, 23-28, 45-47 and 49-51 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as anticipated by or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. 103 as obvious over Haruehansapong et al “Effect of Nanosilica Particle Size on the Water Permeability, Abrasion Resistance, Drying Shrinkage, and Repair Work Properties of Cement Mortar Containing Nano-SiO2”. The reference teaches, in Table 2, various compositions comprising cement and nanosilica: PNG media_image1.png 215 911 media_image1.png Greyscale In the Table, NS 12 nm represents 12 nm nanosilica, NS 20 nm represents 20 nm nanosilica, and NS 40 nm represents 40 nm nanosilica. The instant claims are anticipated by and/or rendered obvious by the reference. The claims are product-by-process claims and patentability is determined by the product. As for claim 21, the reference teaches a composition that comprises cement, sand, water, and nanosilica. The nanosilica meets the particle size. While the reference does not recite the same process steps it is believed that the result is the same. As stated in MPEP 2113 [R-1]: "[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process." In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Once a product appearing to be substantially identical is found and a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is made, the burden shifts to the applicant to show an unobvious difference "The Patent Office bears a lesser burden of proof in making out a case of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature" than when a product is claimed in the conventional fashion. In re Fessmann, 489 F.2d 742, 744, 180 USPQ 324, 326 (CCPA 1974). Once the examiner provides a rationale tending to show that the claimed product appears to be the same or similar to that of the prior art, although produced by a different process, the burden shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence establishing an unobvious difference between the claimed product and the prior art product. In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir.1983). Accordingly since the resulting product appears to be the same the instant claim is anticipated by and/or rendered obvious by the reference. Also as for the newly added limitation (last 4 lines of the claim), this appears to be possessed by the composition as the composition is the same. if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. As for claims 23-28, these claims contain property limitations. While the reference does not recite these properties, if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. As for claim 45, the reference teaches a composition that comprises cement, sand, water, and nanosilica. The nanosilica meets the particle size. While the reference does not recite the same process steps it is believed that the result is the same. As stated in MPEP 2113 [R-1]: "[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process." In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Once a product appearing to be substantially identical is found and a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is made, the burden shifts to the applicant to show an unobvious difference "The Patent Office bears a lesser burden of proof in making out a case of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature" than when a product is claimed in the conventional fashion. In re Fessmann, 489 F.2d 742, 744, 180 USPQ 324, 326 (CCPA 1974). Once the examiner provides a rationale tending to show that the claimed product appears to be the same or similar to that of the prior art, although produced by a different process, the burden shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence establishing an unobvious difference between the claimed product and the prior art product. In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir.1983). Accordingly since the resulting product appears to be the same the instant claim is anticipated by and/or rendered obvious by the reference. Also as for the newly added limitation (last 4 lines of the claim), this appears to be possessed by the composition as the composition is the same. if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. As for claims 46-47 and 49-50, these claims contain property limitations. While the reference does not recite these properties, if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. As for claim 51, the reference teaches a composition that comprises cement, sand, water, and nanosilica. The nanosilica meets the particle size. While the reference does not recite the same process steps it is believed that the result is the same. As stated in MPEP 2113 [R-1]: "[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process." In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Once a product appearing to be substantially identical is found and a 35 U.S.C. 102/103 rejection is made, the burden shifts to the applicant to show an unobvious difference "The Patent Office bears a lesser burden of proof in making out a case of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature" than when a product is claimed in the conventional fashion. In re Fessmann, 489 F.2d 742, 744, 180 USPQ 324, 326 (CCPA 1974). Once the examiner provides a rationale tending to show that the claimed product appears to be the same or similar to that of the prior art, although produced by a different process, the burden shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence establishing an unobvious difference between the claimed product and the prior art product. In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir.1983). Accordingly since the resulting product appears to be the same the instant claim is anticipated by and/or rendered obvious by the reference. Also as for the newly added limitation, this appears to be possessed by the composition as the composition is the same. if the composition is physically the same, it must have the same properties. It is well settled that when a claimed composition appears to be substantially the same as a composition disclosed in the prior art, the burden is properly upon the applicant to prove by way of tangible evidence that the prior art composition does not necessarily possess characteristics attributed to the CLAIMED composition. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Circ. 1990); In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 2109, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971) and also Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also MPEP 2112.01 [R-3] I and II. Response to Arguments Applicant's arguments 06 July 2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant argues that the instant concrete mixture is different from the prior art as the evidence of record demonstrates that the addition of nanosilica after the other components are wetted produces a concrete composition having different hydration products, a different internal microstructure and different hydration characteristics. To this the examiner respectfully disagrees. The instant independent claims now recite a limitation of “continued hydration without reliance upon traditional external curing techniques (claims 21 and 45) and “continued hydration without requiring the addition of surface water or evaporation controls” (claim 51) and as stated above in the 112(a) rejection “traditional external curing techniques” is not supported by the specification and therefore it is indefinite. As stated in the 112(b) rejection above, it is unclear as to what is meant by the limitations of “continued hydration without reliance upon traditional external curing techniques (claims 21 and 45) and “continued hydration without requiring the addition of surface water or evaporation controls” (claim 51) ”. Further, the evidence of record (including the submitted declaration), while showing that the instantly composition has different properties than the prior art does not appear to be directed to the limitations that appear in the independent claims as it is directed to properties other than what is being claimed (microstructure, reduced capillary and void formation and significantly improved physical properties, etc.). Accordingly applicant has not adequately shown that the compositions of the reference differ from the claimed composition. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ANTHONY J GREEN whose telephone number is (571)272-1367. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Thursday from 6:30-5. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Amber R. Orlando can be reached at (571) 270-3149. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /ANTHONY J GREEN/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1731 ajg July 29, 2026
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Prosecution Timeline

Show 10 earlier events
Feb 25, 2026
Response after Non-Final Action
Feb 25, 2026
Request for Continued Examination
Mar 04, 2026
Response after Non-Final Action
Mar 06, 2026
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §102, §103, §112
Jul 06, 2026
Applicant Interview (Telephonic)
Jul 06, 2026
Response Filed
Jul 06, 2026
Examiner Interview Summary
Jul 31, 2026
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §102, §103, §112 (current)

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Expected OA Rounds
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1y 9m (~0m remaining)
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