DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement filed 5/5/26 fails to comply with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97, 1.98 and MPEP § 609 because Ahktar and Hu et al references were already cited art of record on the PTO-892 form mailed 5/7/26. Due to mailing delays the references were considered before the mail date. No action required by applicant as the art has already been considered. It has been placed in the application file, but the information referred to therein has not been considered as to the merits. Applicant is advised that the date of any re-submission of any item of information contained in this information disclosure statement or the submission of any missing element(s) will be the date of submission for purposes of determining compliance with the requirements based on the time of filing the statement, including all certification requirements for statements under 37 CFR 1.97(e). See MPEP § 609.05(a).
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments, see pg 9 third through fourth paragraph, filed 8/7/26, with respect to 35 USC 101 signal per se have been fully considered and are persuasive. The 35 USC 101 rejection of claims 15-20 with respect to a signal per se has been withdrawn.
Applicant's remaining arguments have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant argues pg 8 against 35 USC 112a rejection concerning unsupported “real-time” claim language. Applicant argues specification defines “real time.” However examiner finds real time is not defined by specification but merely used as an example without definition. Examiner suggests replacing “real-time” claim language with “current” consistent with applicant’s arguments.
Applicant argues pg 10 claim 15 is not an abstract idea of a mental process. However, examiner finds a human can write a reservation on a piece of paper, or keep a mental list of reservations in their mind.
Applicant argues pgs 11-12 that the amended limitations are not abstract and or are significantly more. However, examiner finds the amended limitations are also abstract.
Applicant argues pgs 12-13 that claim 15 is significantly more. However, examiner finds second penalty is optional. Applicant seems to argue more narrowly than claimed. Examiner finds, sending a signal in response to a current charger being available is not an improvement in the art.
In response to applicant's argument firstly pgs 14-15 that the references fail to show certain features of the invention, it is noted that the features upon which applicant relies (i.e.
that additional information may not be displayed until the passing of a temporal threshold "or upon relinquishing of a penalty (e.g., payment)."
"relinquishing 1507 either the first penalty or the second penalty to reserve (e.g., schedule) the connected private property 242 for use by the vehicle 100," and states that relinquishing "may be facilitated by the guest device 1058 through communication with a third-party application."
"upon selecting the connected private property 242 for reservation, the guest will be prompted to relinquish payment to reserve the connected private property 242."
The specification therefore uses "relinquish" as the guest giving up payment in exchange for a reservation.)
are not recited in the rejected claim(s). Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Examiner finds instant USPGPub states: [0154] The method 1500 may also include relinquishing 1507 either the first penalty or the second penalty to reserve (e.g., schedule) the connected private property 242 for use by the vehicle 100.” Consistent with examiners broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with instant disclosure. Visiting or using the charger asset includes being scheduled for and or reserving the asset.
Applicant argues pg 15 secondly amended claim language. However, see rejection below Whitaker in view of Uyeki.
In response to applicant’s third argument pgs 15-16 that there is no teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references, the examiner recognizes that obviousness may be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988), In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). In this case, prior art motivation is clearly cited and articulated in the prior art rejection.
Applicant’s remaining arguments depend on above refuted arguments and are therefore moot.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claim(s) is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea) without significantly more.
In sum, claim(s) is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception to patentability (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) and do not include an inventive concept that is something “significantly more” than the judicial exception under the analysis which follows.
For purposes of compact prosecution and clarity, designations have been assigned to limitations of Claim for purposes of evaluation under 35 USC § 101 as follows:
(A) “”
(B) “”
(C) “”
(D) “”
(E) “”
(F) “receive”, “relinquish”, “send […] signal”
Step 1 – Statutory Category Determination - MPEP § 2106.03
Under Eligibility Step 1 analysis, it must first be determined whether the claims are directed to one of the four statutory categories of invention (i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). Applying Eligibility Step 1 of the analysis for patentable subject matter to the claims, it is determined that the claims are directed to the statutory category of a . Therefore, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong One.
Step 2A, Prong One – Does the claim recite an abstract idea? - MPEP § 2106.04:
Under the Step 2A, Prong One analysis, it must be determined whether the claims recite an abstract idea that falls within one or more designated categories of patent ineligible subject matter (i.e., organizing human activity, mathematical concepts, and mental processes) that amount to a judicial exception to patentability.
Abstract Ideas:
With respect to Independent Claim , claim limitations ()-() recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the three enumerated groupings of abstract ideas set forth in MPEP § 2106.04(a).
Mental Processes – MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III):
Claim limitation(s) ()-() fall within the mental process grouping of patent ineligible subject matter. Each limitation relates to functions that could be performed alternatively as mental processes, i.e., concepts performed in the human mind or using pen and paper (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion).
Specifically, a mental process, that can be performed in the human mind since each of the above steps could alternatively be performed in the human mind or with the aid of pen and paper. This conclusion follows from CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) where our reviewing court held that 35 U.S.C. § 101 did not embrace a process defined simply as using a computer to perform a series of mental steps that people, aware of each step, can and regularly do perform in their heads. See also In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840–41 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794–95 (CCPA 1982); Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F. 3d 1350, 1354–1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category”).
Claim limitations ()-() encompass concepts within the mental process abstract idea grouping in that that capable of being performed in the human mind, by a human using a pen and paper. Limitations ()-() include concepts that exemplify processes performed in the human mind including observations, evaluations, judgments, and/or opinions.
Furthermore, mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
These steps are common computer processing functions that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known generic computers were capable of performing and would have associated with generic computers. .
“A mathematical relationship may be expressed in words or using mathematical symbols . . . [t]here is no particular word or set of words that indicates a claim recites a mathematical calculation. That is, a claim does not have to recite the word “calculating” in order to be considered a mathematical calculation. For example, a step of “determining” a variable or number using mathematical methods or “performing” a mathematical operation may also be considered mathematical calculations when the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim in light of the specification encompasses a mathematical calculation.”) citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89, 209 USPQ 1, 9 (1981), Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972), Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978), and Burnett v. Panasonic Corp., 741 Fed. Appx. 777, 780 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“using a formula to convert geospatial coordinates into natural numbers”).
Step 2A, Prong Two - Does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application? - MPEP § 2106.04:
Under the Step 2A, Prong Two analysis, the identified abstract idea to which the claim is directed does not include limitations that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, since the recited features of the abstract idea are being applied on a computer or computing device or via software programming that is simply being used as a tool (“apply it”) to implement the abstract idea. See MPEP §2106.05(f). This conclusion follows from the claim limitations which only recite a generic outside of the abstract idea.
In addition, merely “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“simply appending generic computer functionality to lend speed or efficiency to the performance of an otherwise abstract concept does not meaningfully limit claim scope for purposes of patent eligibility.”), aff’d, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Accordingly, the additional element(s) of a(n) do(es) not transform the abstract idea into a practical application of the abstract idea.
A plain reading of the figures and associated descriptions in the specification reveals that generic processors may be used to execute the claimed steps. The additional elements are recited at a high level of generality (i.e., as a generic processor performing generic computer functions) such that it amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using generic computer components (See MPEP 2106.05(f)) and limits the judicial exception to a particular environment (See MPEP 2106.05(h)). Mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component and limiting the judicial exception to a particular environment doesn’t integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A. Accordingly, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. Hence, independent claim is directed to an abstract idea.
Extra-solution activity – See MPEP §2106.05(g)
In addition, limitation(s) () constitute(s) insignificant pre-solution activity that merely gathers data and, therefore, do not integrate the exception into a practical application. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity); see also CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371–72 (noting that even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (presenting offers and gathering statistics amounted to mere data gathering). Accord Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
Furthermore, limitation(s) () constitute(s) insignificant post-solution activity. The Supreme Court guides that the “prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or [by] adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92).
Step 2B – Whether a Claim Amounts to Significantly More – See MPEP § 2106.05:
Under the Step 2B analysis, the additional elements are evaluated to determine whether they amount to something “significantly more” than the recited abstract idea. (i.e., an innovative concept). Here, the additional elements, such as a(n) ” does/do not amount to an innovative concept since, as stated above in the Step 2A, Prong Two analysis, the claims are simply using the additional elements as a tool to carry out the abstract idea (i.e., “apply it”) on a computer or computing device and/or via software programming. See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05(f). The additional elements are specified at a high level of generality to simply implement the abstract idea and are not themselves being technologically improved. See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05 I.A; Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Thus, these elements, taken individually or together, do not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract ideas themselves.
The additional elements of the rejected dependent claims merely refine and further limit the abstract idea of the independent claims and do not add any feature that is an “inventive concept” which cures the deficiencies of their respective parent claim. None of the rejected dependent claims considered individually, including their respective limitations, include an “inventive concept” of some additional element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claims in practice amount to something “significantly more” than patent-ineligible subject matter to which the claims are directed.
The elements of the instant process steps when taken in combination do not offer substantially more than the sum of the functions of the elements when each is taken alone. The claims as a whole, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself because the claims do not effect an improvement to another technology or technical field; the claims do not amount to an improvement to the functioning of an electronic device itself which implements the abstract idea (e.g., the general purpose computer and/or the computer system which implements the process are not made more efficient or technologically improved); the claims do not perform a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (i.e., the claims do not use the abstract idea in the claimed process to bring about a physical change. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was imparted by the claimed process; contrast, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was not imparted by the claimed process); and the claims do not move beyond a general link of the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment “A device associated with a vehicle, the vehicle including a battery configured to provide power to control an operation of the vehicle” in Claim ).
Regarding Claims : These claims depend from Claim and only add further details to the steps in that independent claim and do not recite any further limitations that cause the claim(s) to be patent eligible. Rather, the limitations of dependent claims are directed toward additional aspects of the judicial exception and/or well-understood, routine and conventional additional elements that do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The dependent claims are merely going into more detail regarding . Therefore, dependent claims are not patent eligible and are also rejected on the same grounds provided for in the rejection of Claim .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claim(s) 15-20 rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Claims 15 l 7, 16 l 1, 17 l 3, 19 l 1 recites “real-time” determinations/calculations/communications. Besides the presence of the word “real-time” in claim 1 and instant US PGPub paras there is no definition or description provided in the original disclosure of how these calculations and determinations are actually provided in “real-time.” Real-time computing, as known in the art, see “Shin KG Ramanathan P Jan 1994 Real-time computing, Proceedings of the IEEE” see section I A “what is real-time computing” requires strict, critical, and deliberate deadlines to be programed and met in order to provide real-time computing. None of the instant disclosure supports or describes criticality of calculation or deadlines required for “real-time” computation. A real-time algorithm is not disclosed or described. The claims contain subject matter which was not described in the original specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the art that the inventor at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention as pertaining to claimed “real-time” calculations or determinations.
Examiner suggests replacing “real-time” with “current.”
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claim(s) 15-19 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Whitaker et al US 2022/0414567 in view of Uyeki US 2014/0316939.
In Re 15, Whitaker teaches A device associated with a vehicle, the vehicle including a battery configured to provide power to control an operation of the vehicle (title abstract figs 1-2), the device comprising:
one or more memories; and one or more processors that are configured to execute instructions that are stored in the one or more memories (fig 2), wherein the instructions, when executed, cause the one or more processors to:
acquire data indicative of a availability (312 fig 3 current) and a future availability (312 fig 3 anticipated) for using each of one or more units of charging infrastructure;
determine a first penalty (candidate rank using current EVSE 408 fig 4) for using each of the one or more units of charging infrastructure within a temporal threshold (current) based at least on the availability of each of the one or more units of charging infrastructure;
determine a second penalty (candidate rank using future EVSE 408 fig 4 and or 412) for using each of the one or more units of charging infrastructure at a future time beyond the temporal threshold based at least on the future availability of the one or more units of charging infrastructure (construed as if no current availability data available and only future availability data available for a candidate);
continuously update (note closed loop 410 NO into 412 into 408 again, continuously ranking candidates based on matching score as user does not select candidate) the second penalty for using each of the one or more units of charging infrastructure at the future time beyond the temporal threshold based at least on the future availability for using each of the one or more units of charging infrastructure (construed as if no current availability data available and only future availability data available for a candidate);
and display (paras 22-23, especially para 34 “the computing platform 150 may present the one or more candidates via the display 214“) identifying information for at least one of the one or more units of charging infrastructure and at least one of the first penalty or the second penalty for using the at least one of the one or more units of charging infrastructure;
receive a selection of a unit of charging infrastructure of the one or more units of charging infrastructure (410 user selects a candidate);
relinquish at least one of the first penalty (Whitaker 418 yes and or following steps 420-424, “relinquish” is supported under broadest reasonable interpretation as an abstract concept of some form of visit or transaction see instant USPGPub para 141,154) or (optional) the second penalty based on the selection; and
send (414 notify selected business entity, 416 and or 418 user visits selected business entity, and especially 424 provide invoice to business entity, invoice being a transaction or record of transaction, 420 incentives being a transaction), in response to the at least one of the first penalty or the second penalty being relinquished, a signal to a controller associated with the unit of charging infrastructure to schedule a charging appointment between the vehicle and the unit of charging infrastructure (at least all figs and paras).
Whitaker does not teach although Uyeki teaches real-time (408 fig 4). Uyeki further teaches determining availability of charger based on real time data (abstract). It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (pre-AIA ) or before the effective filing date of the invention (AIA ) to add Uyeki’s real time data to Whitaker’s device to determine charger availability.
In Re 16, Whitaker in view of Uyeki, teaches wherein the future time (as related by velocity = distance over time, solving for time, and Whitaker’s future data includes time and distance component) is based at least on a real-time (Uyeki real time) distance (Whitaker “predefined maximum distance of a target charging station” abstract para 3, note the distance is from the moving electric vehicle to be charged) between the device and each of the one or more units of charging infrastructure.
In Re 17, Whitaker in view of Uyeki teaches the instructions, when executed, further cause the one or more processors to: continuously update the future time (Whitaker the navigation systems updates time to arrival para 32) based on the real-time (Uyeki real time) distance between the device and each of the one or more units of charging infrastructure.
In Re 18, Whitaker in view of Uyeki teaches the at least one of the first or second penalty that is relinquished (Whitaker 418 yes and or following steps 420-424, “relinquish” is supported under broadest reasonable interpretation as an abstract concept of some form of visit or transaction see instant USPGPub para 141,154) is the second penalty, and wherein the charging appointment is scheduled at the future time (time is linear, scheduling occurs for future times).
In Re 19, Whitaker in view of Uyeki teaches, the temporal threshold (construed as Whitaker current availability) is based on a real-time (Uyeki real time) distance (302 business location, 304 Distance from EVSEs, as relative to vehicle) between the device and each of the one or more units of charging infrastructure (para 30 “The server 238 may match the vehicle 112 with the business entity 252 by comparing the user walking distance preference entry 334 of the user with the distance from the EVSE entry 304. For instance, responsive to determining the business distance to the EVSE is within the user walking distance preference, the server 238 may list the business as a candidate to present to the user. The user profile 248 may further include user calendar entry 336 configured to access the calendar of the user such that the server 238 may access the location and time of past and future events of the user to plan the driving and charging”).
Claim(s) 20 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Whitaker et al US 2022/0414567 in view of Uyeki US 2014/0316939 and Wu et al US 2024/0294088.
In Re 20 Whitaker in view of Uyeki teaches the identifying information for the at least one of the one or more units of charging infrastructure is displayed on a graphical representation (para 34 “the computing platform 150 may present the one or more candidates via the display 214” including map data para 23, para 26 “in response to the navigation controller 222 setting a charging station as a navigation destination”).
Whitaker does not teach however Wu teaches of a map (fig 8). Wu further- teaches customer centric dynamic chargin station assessment includes locations and maps paras 1-5,108-109. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (pre-AIA ) or before the effective filing date of the invention (AIA ) to add Wu’s map to display Whitakers identifying information to improve customer experience through centricity.
Examiners Note
The Examiner has cited particular paragraphs or columns and line numbers in the reference(s) applied to the claims above for the convenience of the applicant. Although the specified citations are representative of the teachings of the art and are adopted to specific limitations within the individual claim, other passages and figures may apply as well. It is respectfully requested of the applicant in preparing responses, to fully consider the references in their entirety as potentially teaching all or part of the claimed invention, as well as the context of the passage as taught by the prior art or disclosed by the Examiner. SEE MPEP 2149.02 VI. PRIOR ART MUST BE CONSIDERED IN ITS ENTIRETY, INCLUDING DISCLOSURES THAT TEACH AWAY FROM THE CLAIMS: A prior art reference must be considered in its entirety, i.e. as a whole, including portions that would lead away from the claimed invention. WL Gore & Associates, inc. v. Garlock, inc., 721 F.2d 1540,220 USPQ303 (Fed, Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 489 US 851 (1984). See also MPEP 2123.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to CARL C STAUBACH whose telephone number is (571)272-3748. The examiner can normally be reached Monday - Thursday 7:00 AM to 5:00 PM. Interview Agendas can be faxed to examiner at (571)273-3748.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Logan Kraft can be reached at 571-270-5065. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/CARL C STAUBACH/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3747
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