DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114
A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 24 October 2025 has been entered.
Election/Restrictions
Claims 18-20 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b) as being drawn to a nonelected invention, there being no allowable generic or linking claim. Election was made without traverse in the reply filed on 13 March 2025.
Drawings
The drawings were received on 13 March 2025. These drawings are acceptable.
Claim Interpretation
Attention is directed to MPEP 904.01 [R-08.2012].
The breadth of the claims in the application should always be carefully noted; that is, the examiner should be fully aware of what the claims do not call for, as well as what they do require. During patent examination, the claims are given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 44 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See MPEP § 2111 - § 2116.01 for case law pertinent to claim analysis.
It is noted with particularity that narrowing limitations found in the specification cannot be inferred in the claims where the elements not set forth in the claims are linchpin of patentability. In re Philips Industries v. State Stove & Mfg. Co, Inc., 186 USPQ 458 (CA6 1975). While the claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification, it does not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into the claims. On the contrary, claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow. See Ex parte Oetiker, 23 USPQ2d 1641 (BPAI, 1992). In added support of this position, attention is directed to MPEP 2111 [R-11.2013], where, citing In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969), is stated:
The court explained that “reading a claim in light of the specification, to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from ‘reading limitations of the specification into a claim,’ to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis in the claim.” The court found that applicant was advocating the latter, i.e., the impermissible importation of subject matter from the specification into the claim.
Additionally, attention is directed to MPEP 2111.01 [R-01.2024], wherein is stated:
II. IT IS IMPROPER TO IMPORT CLAIM LIMITATIONS FROM THE SPECIFICATION
“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875, 69 USPQ2d 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2111.02 II [R-07.2022]. As stated herein:
II. PREAMBLE STATEMENTS RECITING PURPOSE OR INTENDED USE
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The claim preamble must be read in the context of the entire claim. The determination of whether preamble recitations are structural limitations or mere statements of purpose or use "can be resolved only on review of the entirety of the [record] to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim" as drafted without importing "'extraneous' limitations from the specification." Corning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at 1257, 9 USPQ2d at 1966. If the body of a claim fully and intrinsically sets forth all of the limitations of the claimed invention, and the preamble merely states, for example, the purpose or intended use of the invention, rather than any distinct definition of any of the claimed invention’s limitations, then the preamble is not considered a limitation and is of no significance to claim construction. Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Grp., LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 2020 USPQ2d 10701 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (The court found that the preamble in one patent’s claim is limiting but is not in a related patent); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478, 42 USPQ2d 1550, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation")… (Emphasis added)
Attention is directed to MPEP 2111 [R-10.2019]. As stated therein:
During patent examination, the pending claims must be "given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification." The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) expressly recognized that the USPTO employs the "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard:
The Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") determines the scope of claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of the claim language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable construction "in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art." In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364[, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1830] (Fed. Cir. 2004). Indeed, the rules of the PTO require that application claims must "conform to the invention as set forth in the remainder of the specification and the terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear support or antecedent basis in the description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims may be ascertainable by reference to the description." 37 CFR 1.75(d)(1). (Emphasis added).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, (b) / Second Paragraph
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Standard for Definiteness.
Attention is directed to MPEP 2171 [R-11.2013]:
Two separate requirements are set forth in 35 U.S.C. 112(b) and pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, namely that:
(A) the claims must set forth the subject matter that the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention; and
(B) the claims must particularly point out and distinctly define the metes and bounds of the subject matter to be protected by the patent grant.
The first requirement is a subjective one because it is dependent on what the inventor or a joint inventor for a patent regards as his or her invention. Note that although pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, uses the phrase "which applicant regards as his invention," pre-AIA 37 CFR 1.41(a) provides that a patent is applied for in the name or names of the actual inventor or inventors.
The second requirement is an objective one because it is not dependent on the views of the inventor or any particular individual, but is evaluated in the context of whether the claim is definite — i.e., whether the scope of the claim is clear to a hypothetical person possessing the ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art.
Attention is directed to MPEP 2173.02 I [R-07.2022]:
During prosecution, applicant has an opportunity and a duty to amend ambiguous claims to clearly and precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention. The claim places the public on notice of the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston Assoc. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052, 62 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). As the Federal Circuit stated in Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008):
“We note that the patent drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the patent claims, and it is highly desirable that patent examiners demand that applicants do so in appropriate circumstances so that the patent can be amended during prosecution rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity in litigation.”
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During examination, after applying the broadest reasonable interpretation to the claim, if the metes and bounds of the claimed invention are not clear, the claim is indefinite and should be rejected. Packard, 751 F.3d at 1310 (“[W]hen the USPTO has initially issued a well-grounded rejection that identifies ways in which language in a claim is ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the claimed invention, and thereafter the applicant fails to provide a satisfactory response, the USPTO can properly reject the claim as failing to meet the statutory requirements of § 112(b).”); Zletz, 893 F.2d at 322, 13 USPQ2d at 1322.
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2173.02 III B, which states in part:
To comply with 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, applicants are required to make the terms that are used to define the invention clear and precise, so that the metes and bounds of the subject matter that will be protected by the patent grant can be ascertained. See MPEP § 2173.05(a), subsection I. It is important that a person of ordinary skill in the art be able to interpret the metes and bounds of the claims so as to understand how to avoid infringement of the patent that ultimately issues from the application being examined. See MPEP § 2173.02, subsection II (citing Morton Int ’l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see also Halliburton Energy Servs., 514 F.3d at 1249, 85 USPQ2d at 1658 (“Otherwise, competitors cannot avoid infringement, defeating the public notice function of patent claims.”). Examiners should bear in mind that “[a]n essential purpose of patent examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous. Only in this way can uncertainties of claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during the administrative process.” Zletz, 893 F.2d at 322, 13 USPQ2d at 1322 [Fed. Cir. 1989]. (Emphasis added)
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2173.04 [R-10.2019], which states in part:
A broad claim is not indefinite merely because it encompasses a wide scope of subject matter provided the scope is clearly defined. But a claim is indefinite when the boundaries of the protected subject matter are not clearly delineated and the scope is unclear. For example, a genus claim that covers multiple species is broad, but is not indefinite because of its breadth, which is otherwise clear. But a genus claim that could be interpreted in such a way that it is not clear which species are covered would be indefinite (e.g., because there is more than one reasonable interpretation of what species are included in the claim). (Emphasis added)
Holding and Rationale
Claims 1-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 2 is indefinite with respect to just which species of protein and carbohydrate are encompassed by the claim.
Claims 3, 4, 5, 15, and 17 are indefinite with respect to which proteins are encompassed by the claims.
Claim 4 is indefinite with respect to just which cells of which organism(s) is / are encompassed.
Claim 5 is indefinite with respect to just which tissue(s) is / are encompassed by the claim.
Claim 7 is indefinite with respect to which antibodies, produced by which organism(s), and which part(s), if any, of said antibodies are encompassed by the claim. As noted in US 6,300,093 B1 (Kindsvogel et al.) at column 22, last paragraph:
Antibodies of the present invention may be produced by immunizing an animal, a wide variety of warm-blooded animals such as horses, cows, goats, sheep, dogs, chickens, rabbits, mice, and rats can be used, with a recombinant or synthetic islet cell antigen polypeptide or a selected portion thereof (e.g., a peptide).
Attention is also directed to US 2003/0092624 A1 (Wang et al.). As disclosed at paragraph [0194]:
[0194] According to yet an additional aspect of the present invention there is provided an antibody, either polyclonal or monoclonal antibody, recognizing at least one epitope of the polypeptide described herein. The present invention can utilize serum immunoglobulins, polyclonal antibodies or fragments thereof, (i.e., immunoreactive derivative of an antibody), or monoclonal antibodies or fragments thereof. Monoclonal antibodies or purified fragments of the monoclonal antibodies having at least a portion of an antigen binding region, including, such as, Fv, F(ab1)2, Fab fragments (Harlow and Lane, 1988 Antibody, Cold Spring Harbor), single chain antibodies (U.S. Pat. No. 4,946,778), chimeric or humanized antibodies and complementarily determining regions (CDR)… Antibodies of the IgG class are made up of four polypeptide chains linked together by disulfide bonds. The four chains of intact IgG molecules are two identical heavy chains referred to as H-chains and two identical light chains referred to as L-chains. Additional classes includes IgD, IgE, IgA, IgM and related proteins. (Emphasis added)
Attention is also directed to US 2013/0338038 A1 (DuBridge et al.), which teaches the following at paragraph [0061]:
[0061] Examples of suitable sources for immunoglobulin genes include, but are not limited to, humans, primates, rodents (e.g., rat, mouse, hamster, guinea pig, etc.), non-rodents such as sheep, donkey, goat, horse, cow, pig, chicken, llama, camel, dog, cat, rabbit, fish, and birds. In addition to immunoglobulins obtained from various organisms, variant forms of known antibodies can be used, including humanized, chimeric, and monoclonal antibodies. Further, the immunoglobulin molecules or antibodies of the invention can be of any type (e.g., IgG, IgE, IgM, IgD, IgA, and IgY), class (e.g., IgG1, IgG2, IgG3, IgG4, IgA1, and IgA2), or subclass of immunoglobulin molecule. (Emphasis added)
Claims 1, 3, 4, 8, and 15 are indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of the “first target molecule” and the “second target molecule”.
Acknowledgement is made of dependent claims reciting limitations not found in the independent claim, claim 1. Given that all dependent claims depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1, claim 1 must encompass the embodiments recited in dependent claims. Given such, claim 1, and an intervening claim, is similarly rejected.
Response to traversal
Applicant’s representative, at pages 6-8 of the response of 24 October 2025, hereinafter the response, traverses the rejection of claims under 35 USC 112(b). As is asserted therein:
The Final Office Action asserts that claims 2-5 and 7 are indefinite because they employ genera without specifying particular species. Breadth of scope is not, by itself, a basis for indefiniteness. See MPEP § 2173.02(I); SmithKline Beecham Corp. V. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Here, the claims use standard terms of the art, and the method defines the structural and functional roles of these genera within a concrete workflow: two distinct target molecules are bound by two distinct probes bearing barcoded oligonucleotides; a single circular oligonucleotide comprising complements of both barcode sequences is formed via the recited hybridization, extension, and ligation steps; the circle is amplified; and both barcode sequences are sequenced from a single amplification product. This functional context provides an objective measure of scope that reasonably apprises a skilled artisan of claim boundaries. See MPEP § 2173.05(e). The Final Office Action references non-limiting statements in the specification and cautions against importing limitations from the written description into the claims. Applicant agrees that the claim language governs. As amended, the claims themselves supply the relevant boundaries. Read in view of the specification and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill, the claims particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded as the invention.
The above argument has been considered and has not been found persuasive. While applicant may be using standard terms, e.g., “first target molecule”, “second target molecule”, “carbohydrate”, “protein “, “cell”, “antibody”, and “tissue”, it is less than clear as to just which species of these various genera are encompassed.
Attention is directed to MPEP 904.01 [R-08.2012].
The breadth of the claims in the application should always be carefully noted; that is, the examiner should be fully aware of what the claims do not call for, as well as what they do require. During patent examination, the claims are given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 44 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See MPEP § 2111 - § 2116.01 for case law pertinent to claim analysis. (Emphasis added)
Attention is directed to page 6, paragraph [0015], of the disclosure. As is asserted to therein:
It is to be understood that this disclosure is not limited to the particular methodology, protocols, and reagents described, as these may vary, depending upon the context in which they are used by those of skill in the art. (Emphasis added)
In applying the guidance of MPEP 904.01 [R-08.2012], it is readily apparent that the claimed methods are not limited to that which has been disclosed. It remains unclear as to just which species of the various genera are actually encompassed by the claims. As noted previously, it is unclear if the methods and related reagents encompass that which will be discovered at some point in the future, or whether they are limited to that which was known as of the effective filing date (17 October 2023), or whether some other date should be applied.
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing argument to the contrary, claims 1-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, Written Description
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Standard for Written Description.
Attention is directed to MPEP 2163.02 Standard for Determining Compliance With the Written Description Requirement [R-07-2022]:
An objective standard for determining compliance with the written description requirement is, "does the description clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that he or she invented what is claimed." In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012, 10 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Under Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991), to satisfy the written description requirement, an applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention, and that the invention, in that context, is whatever is now claimed. (Emphasis added)
Attention is also set directed to MPEP 2161.01 I [R-07-2022], wherein is stated:
For instance, generic claim language in the original disclosure does not satisfy the written description requirement if it fails to support the scope of the genus claimed. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349-50, 94 USPQ2d at 1171 ("[A]n adequate written description of a claimed genus requires more than a generic statement of an invention’s boundaries.") (citing Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1405-06); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968, 63 USPQ2d 1609, 1616 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that generic claim language appearing in ipsis verbis in the original specification did not satisfy the written description requirement because it failed to support the scope of the genus claimed); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170, 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that "only similar language in the specification or original claims is necessary to satisfy the written description requirement").
As set forth in Fiers v. Revel 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1604-5 (CAFC, January 1993):
We thus determined that, irrespective of the complexity or simplicity of the method of isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like conception of any chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance other than by its functional utility.
Fiers' attempt to distinguish Amgen therefore is incorrect. We also reject Fiers' argument that the existence of a workable method for preparing a DNA establishes conception of that material. (Emphasis added)
Conception of a substance claimed per se without reference to a process requires conception of its structure, name, formula, or definitive chemical or physical properties...
The difficulty that would arise if we were to hold that a conception occurs when one has only an idea of a compound, defining it by its hoped-for function, is that would-be inventors would file patent applications before they had made their inventions and before they could describe them. That is not consistent with the statute or the policy behind the statute, which is to promote disclosure of inventions.
As set forth in the en banc decision in Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Company, 94 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2010) at 1171:
We held that a sufficient description of a genus instead requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can “visualize or recognize” the members of the genus. Id. at 1568-69. We explained that an adequate written description requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, physical properties, or other properties, of species falling within the genus sufficient to distinguish the genus from other materials. Id. at 1568 (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 [25 USPQ2d 1601] (Fed. Cir. 1993)). We have also held that functional claim language can meet the written description requirement when the art has established a correlation between structure and function. See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 964 (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001)). But merely drawing a fence around the outer limits of a purported genus is not an adequate substitute for describing a variety of materials constituting the genus and showing that one has invented a genus and not just a species.
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In Fiers, we rejected the argument that “only similar language in the specification or original claim is necessary to satisfy the written description requirement.” 984 F.2d at 1170 (emphasis added). Rather, we held that original claim language to “a DNA coding for interferon activity” failed to provide an adequate written description as it amounted to no more than a “wish” or “plan” for obtaining the claimed DNA rather than a description of the DNA itself. Id. at 1170-71. That Fiers applied § 112, first paragraph, during an interference is irrelevant for, as we stated above, the statute contains no basis for ignoring the description requirement outside of this context. And again in Enzo we held that generic claim language appearing in ipsis verbis in the original specification does not satisfy the written description requirement if it fails to support the scope of the genus claimed. 323 F.3d at 968. We concluded that “[a] claim does not become more descriptive by its repetition, or its longevity.” Id. at 969.
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The written description requirement also ensures that when a patent claims a genus by its function or result, the specification recites sufficient materials to accomplish that function—a problem that is particularly acute in the biological arts.
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2163 Guidelines for the Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, “Written Description” Requirement [R-01-2024], at part II ii):
The written description requirement for a claimed genus may be satisfied through sufficient description of a representative number of species by actual reduction to practice (see i)(A) above), reduction to drawings (see i)(B) above), or by disclosure of relevant, identifying characteristics, i.e., structure or other physical and/or chemical properties, by functional characteristics coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or by a combination of such identifying characteristics, sufficient to show the inventor was in possession of the claimed genus (see i)(C) above). See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1406. See Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma, Inc., 10 F.4th 1330, 1337, 2021 USPQ2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ( "[T]he written description must lead a person of ordinary skill in the art to understand that the inventor possessed the entire scope of the claimed invention. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353–54 ('[T]he purpose of the written description requirement is to ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor's contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification.' (internal quotation marks omitted).") (Emphasis added)
Attention is also directed to the decision of University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co. (CA FC, July 1997) 43 USPQ2d 1398 wherein is stated:
In claims involving chemical materials, generic formulas usually indicate with specificity what the generic claims encompass. One skilled in the art can distinguish such a formula from others and can identify many of the species that the claims encompass. Accordingly, such a formula is normally an adequate written description of the claimed genus. In claims to genetic material, however, a generic statement such as “vertebrate insulin cDNA” or “mammalian cDNA,” without more, is not an adequate written description of the genus because it does not distinguish the claimed genus from others, except by function. It does not specifically define any of the genes that fall within its definition. It does not define any structural features commonly possessed by members of the genus that distinguish them from others. One skilled in the art therefore cannot, as one can do with a fully described genus, visualize or recognize the identity of the members of the genus. A definition by function, as we have previously indicated, does not suffice to define the genus because it is only an indication of what the gene does, rather than what it is See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169-71, 25 USPQ2d at 1605-06 (discussing Amgen). It is only a definition of a useful result rather than a definition of what it achieves as a result. Many such genes may achieve that result. The description requirement of the patent statute requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention. See In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 222 USPQ 369, 372-373 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming rejection because the specification does “little more than outlin[e] goals appellants hope the claimed invention achieves and the problems the invention will hopefully ameliorate.”). Accordingly, naming a type of material generally known to exist, in the absence of knowledge as to what that material consists of, is not a description of that material.
Thus, as we have previously held, a cDNA is not defined or described by the mere name cDNA,” even if accompanied by the name of the protein that it encodes, but requires a kind of specificity usually achieved by means of the recitation of the sequence of nucleotides that make up the cDNA. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171, 25 USPQ2d at 1606.
Acknowledgement is made of the fact that the claims are to a method and not to a product. However, it is well settled that in order to satisfy the written description for a method, one must also disclose the molecules required to perform the method. In support of this position attention is directed to University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. 68 USPQ2D 1424 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) at 1433 (affirmed; University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. 69 USPQ2d 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2004)):
Plaintiff also argues that the requirements for written descriptions of claims to chemical compounds are irrelevant to this case because the '850 patent does not claim a compound, but a method of treatment by targeting PGHS-2 activity over PGHS-1 activity. Virtually any compound claim could be transformed into a method claim, however, simply by means of wording the claim in terms of a method of using the compound. With respect to the issue before the Court, then, this is little more than a semantic distinction without a difference. The claimed method depends upon finding a compound that selectively inhibits PGHS-2 activity. Without such a compound, it is impossible to practice the claimed method of treatment. It means little to “invent” a method if one does not have possession of a substance that is essential to practicing that method. Without that substance, the claimed invention is more theoretical than real; it is, as defendants argue, akin to “inventing” a cure for cancer by utilizing a substance that attacks and destroys cancer cells while leaving healthy cells alone. Without possession of such a substance, such a “cure” is illusory, and there is no meaningful possession of the method.
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What the inventors did not do, however, is succeed in taking the last, critical step of actually isolating such a compound, or at least of developing a process through which one skilled in the art would be directly led to such a compound. Absent that step, their discoveries, valuable though they might have been, did not blossom into a full-fledged, complete invention. Scientific discoveries, and theories based on those discoveries, frequently lay the groundwork for later inventions, but that does not make the discoverer the inventor as well.
Attention is also directed to the decision in Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.
(Fed. Cir. 2010) 94 USPQ2d 1161, 1175, which teaches:
In accordance with Rochester, the ?516 patent must adequately describe the claimed methods for reducing NF-?B activity, including adequate description of the molecules that Ariad admits are necessary to perform the methods. (Emphasis added)
Holding and Rationale
Claims 1-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 12, 14, and 16 are deemed to be representative and, for convenience, are reproduced below.
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As is evidenced above, the claimed method requires the use of first and second probes that are attached to oligonucleotides. As seen in claim 1, the oligonucleotides are to circularize and are subsequently amplified and hybridized using “a sequencing primer”. As seen in claim 2, the target can be protein and carbohydrate. As seen in claim 7, the first and second probes are antibodies.
Applicant, at page 32, paragraph [0060], teaches:
In embodiments, the specific binding reagent comprises an antibody, single-chain Fv fragment (scFv), antibody fragment-antigen binding (Fab), or an aptamer. In embodiments, the specific binding reagent is a peptide, a cell penetrating peptide,
an aptamer, a DNA aptamer, an RNA aptamer, an antibody, an antibody fragment, a light chain antibody fragment, a single-chain variable fragment (scFv), a lipid, a lipid derivative a phospholipid, a fatty acid, a triglyceride, a glycerolipid, a glycerophospholipid, a sphingolipid, a saccharolipid, a polyketide, a polylysine, polyethyleneimine, diethylaminoethyl (DEAE)-dextran, cholesterol, or a sterol moiety. In embodiments, the specific binding reagent interacts (e.g., contacts, or binds) with one or more specific binding reagents on the cell surface. (Emphasis added)
Applicant, at page 40, paragraph [0078], teaches:
[0078] A subject can be any living or non-living organism, including but not limited
to a human, non-human animal, plant, bacterium, fungus, virus, or protist. A subject may be any age (e.g., an embryo, a fetus, infant, child, adult). A subject can be of any sex (e.g., male, female, or combination thereof). A subject may be pregnant. In some embodiments, a subject is a mammal. In some embodiments, a subject is a human subject. A subject can be a patient (e.g., a human patient). In some embodiments a subject is suspected of having a genetic variation or a disease or condition
associated with a genetic variation. (Emphasis added)
Attention is directed to the following publications which teach of the enormity of the genera of virus, plants, insects, bacteria, mammals, and species encompassed by the subfamily Murinae as the detection of any and all genes from all members of the various genera are encompassed by the instant claims.
“Viruses” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
An enormous variety of genomic structures can be seen among viral species; as a group, they contain more structural genomic diversity than plants, animals, archaea, or bacteria. There are millions of different types of viruses, although fewer than 7,000 types have been described in detail. (Emphasis added)
“How many species of bacteria are there” (wisegeek.com; accessed 21 January 2014) teaches:
Currently, estimates of the total number of species of bacteria range from about 10 million to a billion, but these estimates are tentative, and may be off by many orders of magnitude. By comparison, there are probably between 10 and 30 million species of animals, the vast majority of them insects. The number of scientifically recognized species of animals is about 1,250,000. There are almost 300,000 recognized species of plants.
“Fungi,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
As of 2020, around 148,000 species of fungi have been described by taxonomists,[6] but the global biodiversity of the fungus kingdom is not fully understood.[48] A 2017 estimate suggests there may be between 2.2 and 3.8 million species.[5]
“Insect”, (Wikipedia.com; accessed 09/10/2020) teaches:
Insects are the most diverse group of animals; they include more than a million described species and represent more than half of all known living organisms. The total number of extant species is estimated at between six and ten million; potentially over 90% of the animal life forms on Earth are insects.
“Plant,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
There are about 380,000 known species of plants, of which the majority, some 260,000, produce seeds.
“Mammal,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
According to Mammal Species of the World, which is updated through periodic editions, 5,416 species were identified in 2006. These were grouped into 1,229 genera, 153 families and 29 orders.[5]
“Murinae,” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 10 June 2024) teaches:
The Old World rats and mice, part of the subfamily Murinae in the family Muridae, comprise at least 519 species. Members of this subfamily are called murines. In terms of species richness, this subfamily is larger than all mammal families except the Cricetidae and Muridae, and is larger than all mammal orders except the bats and the remainder of the rodents.
“Fish,” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
Fish are abundant in most bodies of water. They can be found in nearly all aquatic environments, from high mountain streams (e.g., char and gudgeon) to the abyssal and even hadal depths of the deepest oceans (e.g., cush-eels and snailfish), although no species has yet been documented in the deepest 25% of the ocean.[4] At 34,300 described species, fish exhibit greater species diversity than any other group of vertebrates.[5]
“Archaea,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
The classification of archaea into species is also controversial. Ernst Mayr defined a species as a group of interbreeding organisms which are reproductively isolated, but this is of no help since archaea only reproduce asexually.[37]
Archaea show high levels of horizontal gene transfer between lineages. Some researchers suggest that individuals can be grouped into species-like populations given highly similar genomes and infrequent gene transfer to/from cells with less-related genomes, as in the genus Ferroplasma.[38] On the other hand, studies in Halorubrum found significant genetic transfer to/from less-related populations, limiting the criterion's applicability. Some researchers question whether such species designations have practical meaning.[40]
Current knowledge on genetic diversity is fragmentary, so the total number of species cannot be estimated with any accuracy.[22] (Emphasis added)
“Algae,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 03-04-2016) teaches:
The most recent estimate suggests 72,500 algal species worldwide.
“Protozoa,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 05-11-2016), teaches:
The classification of protozoa has been and remains a problematic area of taxonomy. Where they are available, DNA sequences are used as the basis for classification; however, for the majority of described protozoa, such material is not available. (Emphasis added)
Attention is directed to “Eukaryotic Genome Complexity” (Pray, Nature Education, 1(1):36, 2008, pages 1-4.). As seen therein, a table of estimated protein encoding genes in different genomes is provided.
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A review of the disclosure fails to find where applicant has provided antibodies to the genus of target molecules as found in millions of organisms.
As evidenced above, claim 1 requires circularizing oligonucleotides, and that claims 12 and 14 specify that the oligonucleotides can range from “50 to 500 nucleotides” (claim 12), and from “20 to 100 nucleotides” (claim 14), while claim 6, as amended, recites the limitation that “said coupling oligonucleotide is 50 to 1000 nucleotides”. A review of the disclosure fails to locate any Sequence Listing whereby applicant has identified the nucleotide sequence of any oligonucleotide of any length, much less the amino acid sequence of any protein target, the composition of any carbohydrate, and lesser still the epitopes of same, be it found on or in any cell or tissue of any organism as well as on or in any virus.
Applicant’s non-disclosure of such essential materials has not been found to reasonably suggest that applicant, as of the effective priority date (17 October 2023) was in possession of the generic method claimed.
In addition to the above, the limitation to claim 6 which specifies that the upper limit of the “coupling oligonucleotide is “1000 nucleotides” is not supported by the disclosure. In support of this position it is noted that the disclosure at page 14, paragraph [0032], teaches:
As may be used herein, the terms "nucleic acid oligomer" and "oligonucleotide" are used
interchangeably and are intended to include, but are not limited to, nucleic acids having a length of 200 nucleotides or less. In some embodiments, an oligonucleotide is a nucleic acid having a length of 2 to 200 nucleotides, 2 to 150 nucleotides, 5 to 150 nucleotides or 5 to 100 nucleotides. The terms "polynucleotide," "oligonucleotide," "oligo" or the like refer, in the usual and customary sense, to a linear sequence of nucleotides. Oligonucleotides are typically from about 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 25,
30, 40, 50 or more nucleotides in length, up to about 100 nucleotides in length. (Emphasis added)
Attention is also directed to claim 12, which, for convenience, is reproduced blow.
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As evidenced above, the as-filed disclosure does provide support for coupling oligonucleotides that are up to 500 nucleotides in length. A review of the disclosure fails to find where applicant had identified coupling oligonucleotides could be up to “1000 nucleotides” as is specified in amended claim 6. Given such, the amendment is deemed to constitute new matter.
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 1-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Response to argument
Applicant’s representative, at pages 8-10 of the response traverses the rejection of claims under 35 USC 112 for not satisfying the written description requirement. At page 8, last paragraph, bridging to page 9 of the disclosure, said representative asserts:
Here, the claims are directed to a method. The invention lies in the integration of defined nucleic-acid domains and operations into a generalizable workflow that labels two distinct targets with barcoded oligonucleotides, forms a single circular template comprising complements of both barcode sequences by a specified hybridize-extend-ligate choreography, amplifies that circle, and sequences both barcode sequences from one amplification product. The claim language itself now supplies objective structural boundaries that reflect what the inventors possessed: claim 1 requires that the first and second oligonucleotides are each 20-200 nucleotides; claim 6 recites the coupling oligonucleotide is 50-1,000 nucleotides and the bridge oligonucleotide is 20-250 nucleotides; and claims 11 and 13 require that the binding arms of the coupling and bridge oligonucleotides are 100% complementary to their counterparts. These are common structural features and arrangements that permit a skilled artisan to visualize and recognize members of the genus of oligonucleotide constructs suitable for the workflow, which is one of the two avenues that the Federal Circuit has expressly endorsed for satisfying written description for genera. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350-51; MPEP § 2163(II)(ii).
The specification text and figures reinforce that possession. The application does not describe the components in abstract terms; it sets out their domain architecture and roles: 5'-3' orientation, barcoding region, coupling and bridge regions, primer-binding sites, and spacers; the spatial and sequence relationships among these domains; and the ordered operations by which complementary regions hybridize, are extended by polymerase, and are ligated to yield a single circle that carries the complements of two barcodes. See, for example, FIGS. 1A-1E. The disclosure further maps, in words and in figures, the base-pairing relationships between the first/second oligonucleotides and the universal coupling and bridge elements, and it describes the coupling oligonucleotide in a 5' to 3' arrangement that the amended claims now require, with complementary arms separated by a spacer and with length ranges that match the claims.
The above cited arguments have been considered and have not been found persuasive towards the withdrawal of the rejection. Acknowledgement is made of the amendments to claims where ranges in lengths of nucleotides are now recited. Using claim 1 as an example, it specifies that “said second oligonucleotide is 20 to 200 nucleotide” in length. Said claim is wholly silent as to what the “first probe” and “second probe” are, much less any chemical composition. To the degree that the “second oligonucleotide “ can be, at a minimum, 20 nucleotides in length, it is noted that, in using the 4 common dNTPs, there are some 420, or 1.0995 x 1012 different sequences. The disclosure is silent as to just which sequence(s) would work as an oligonucleotide, much less which may work as a primer and/or probe.
In addition to the above, the disclosure has not been found to teach the epitope of any “first protein”, “second protein”, or carbohydrate. The disclosure has not been found to teach the epitope of any target, be it protein or carbohydrate, much less disclose the epitopes for same and which have utility under 35 USC 101. Such nondisclosure of all aspects of the claimed method has not been found to reasonably suggest that applicant, as of the effective filing date, was in possession of the claimed invention.
It is well settled that in order to satisfy the written description for a method, one must also disclose the molecules required to perform the method. In support of this position attention is directed to University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. 68 USPQ2D 1424 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) at 1433 (affirmed; University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. 69 USPQ2d 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2004)):
Plaintiff also argues that the requirements for written descriptions of claims to chemical compounds are irrelevant to this case because the '850 patent does not claim a compound, but a method of treatment by targeting PGHS-2 activity over PGHS-1 activity. Virtually any compound claim could be transformed into a method claim, however, simply by means of wording the claim in terms of a method of using the compound. With respect to the issue before the Court, then, this is little more than a semantic distinction without a difference. The claimed method depends upon finding a compound that selectively inhibits PGHS-2 activity. Without such a compound, it is impossible to practice the claimed method of treatment. It means little to “invent” a method if one does not have possession of a substance that is essential to practicing that method. Without that substance, the claimed invention is more theoretical than real; it is, as defendants argue, akin to “inventing” a cure for cancer by utilizing a substance that attacks and destroys cancer cells while leaving healthy cells alone. Without possession of such a substance, such a “cure” is illusory, and there is no meaningful possession of the method.
***
What the inventors did not do, however, is succeed in taking the last, critical step of actually isolating such a compound, or at least of developing a process through which one skilled in the art would be directly led to such a compound. Absent that step, their discoveries, valuable though they might have been, did not blossom into a full-fledged, complete invention. Scientific discoveries, and theories based on those discoveries, frequently lay the groundwork for later inventions, but that does not make the discoverer the inventor as well.
Attention is also directed to the decision in Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.
(Fed. Cir. 2010) 94 USPQ2d 1161, 1175, which teaches:
In accordance with Rochester, the ?516 patent must adequately describe the claimed methods for reducing NF-?B activity, including adequate description of the molecules that Ariad admits are necessary to perform the methods. (Emphasis added)
As noted above, a review of the disclosure fails to find where applicant has provided a Sequence Listing that provides the nucleotide sequence any target or oligonucleotide, much less a probe to same, and lesser still a “coupling oligonucleotide” that is “1000 nucleotides” in length. Likewise, the disclosure has not been found to provide the epitopes for any protein or carbohydrate, much less the hybridomas that would produce any antibody or antibody fragment that would bind specifically to said protein or carbohydrate. Such nondisclosure by applicant has not been found to reasonably suggest that applicant, as of the effective filing date (17 October 2023) was in possession of all aspects of the claimed methods.
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 1-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Conclusion
Objections and/or rejections which appeared in the prior Office action and which have not been repeated hereinabove have been withdrawn.
All claims are identical to or patentably indistinct from, or have unity of invention with claims in the application prior to the entry of the submission under 37 CFR 1.114 (that is, restriction (including a lack of unity of invention) would not be proper) and all claims could have been finally rejected on the grounds and art of record in the next Office action if they had been entered in the application prior to entry under 37 CFR 1.114. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL even though it is a first action after the filing of a request for continued examination and the submission under 37 CFR 1.114. See MPEP § 706.07(b). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Bradley L. Sisson whose telephone number is (571)272-0751. The examiner can normally be reached Monday to Thursday, from 6:30 AM to 5 PM.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
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/Bradley L. Sisson/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1682