DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Status
Claims 1-18 are pending in the application and have been examined.
Claim Interpretation - Contingent Limitations
Claim(s) 9-10 and 15-16 contain conditional limitation(s) which include:
Claim 9: wherein when a rescued train corresponding to the “automatic rescued train protection” is a communication-positioned train, the ZC calculates the going-to-rescue coupling deceleration point for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the going-to-rescue state in consideration of a positioning error of the rescued train corresponding to the “automatic rescued train protection”.
Claim 10: wherein when a rescued train corresponding to the “automatic rescued train protection” is a non-communication train or a position-lost train, the ZC calculates the going-to-rescue coupling deceleration point for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the going-to-rescue state in consideration of an occupied state of a secondary detection device and a hanging distance of the rescued train in a zone in which the “automatic rescued train protection” is located, wherein the secondary detection device is an axle counter or a track circuit.
Claim 15: wherein in step E, if an identity of a rescued train corresponding to the “automatic rescued train protection” is determined, the ZC calculates a starting point of the pushing rescue MA for the “automatic rescue train protection” as minimum head coordinates of a rescue train corresponding to the “automatic rescue train protection” with the length of the rescued train in front.
Claim 16: wherein in step E, if an identity of a rescued train corresponding to the “automatic rescued train protection” is unknown, the ZC calculates a starting point of the pushing rescue MA for the “automatic rescue train protection” as minimum head coordinates of a rescue train corresponding to the “automatic rescue train protection” with a default length of the rescued train in front, wherein the length of a longest rescued train in a line is considered for the default length of the rescued train.
Emphasis added to show conditional verbiage.
The broadest reasonable interpretation of a method (or process) claim having contingent limitations requires only those steps that must be performed and does not include steps that are not required to be performed because the condition(s) precedent are not met. For example, assume a method claim requires step A if a first condition happens and step B if a second condition happens. If the claimed invention may be practiced without either the first or second condition happening, then neither step A or B is required by the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim. If the claimed invention requires the first condition to occur, then the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim requires step A. If the claimed invention requires both the first and second conditions to occur, then the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim requires both steps A and B. See MPEP § 2111.04(II).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claim(s) is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea) without significantly more.
In sum, claim(s) is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception to patentability (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) and do not include an inventive concept that is something “significantly more” than the judicial exception under the analysis which follows.
For purposes of compact prosecution and clarity, designations have been assigned to limitations of as follows:
(A) “”
(B) “”
(C) “”
(D) “”
(E) “”
Step 1 – Statutory Category Determination - MPEP § 2106.03
Under Eligibility Step 1 analysis, it must first be determined whether the claims are directed to one of the four statutory categories of invention (i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). Applying Eligibility Step 1 of the analysis for patentable subject matter to the claims, it is determined that the claims are directed to the statutory category of a . Therefore, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong One.
Step 2A, Prong One – Does the claim recite an abstract idea? - MPEP § 2106.04:
Under the Step 2A, Prong One analysis, it must be determined whether the claims recite an abstract idea that falls within one or more designated categories of patent ineligible subject matter (i.e., organizing human activity, mathematical concepts, and mental processes) that amount to a judicial exception to patentability.
Here, with respect to independent claim , the following claim limitation(s) recite abstract idea(s):
Abstract Ideas:
Claim limitation(s) ()-() fall within at least one of the three enumerated groupings of abstract ideas set forth in MPEP § 2106.04(a).
Mental Processes – MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III):
Claim limitation(s) ()-() fall within the mental process grouping of patent ineligible subject matter. Each limitation relates to functions that could be performed alternatively as mental processes, i.e., concepts performed in the human mind or using pen and paper (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion).
Specifically, a mental process, that can be performed in the human mind since each of the above steps could alternatively be performed in the human mind or with the aid of pen and paper. This conclusion follows from CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) where our reviewing court held that 35 U.S.C. § 101 did not embrace a process defined simply as using a computer to perform a series of mental steps that people, aware of each step, can and regularly do perform in their heads. See also In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840–41 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794–95 (CCPA 1982); Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F. 3d 1350, 1354–1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category”).
Claim limitations ()-() encompass concepts within the mental process abstract idea grouping in that that capable of being performed in the human mind, by a human using a pen and paper Limitations ()-() include concepts that exemplify processes performed in the human mind including observations, evaluations, judgments, and/or opinions.
Furthermore, mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
Step 2A, Prong Two - Does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application? - MPEP § 2106.04:
Under the Step 2A, Prong Two analysis, the identified abstract idea to which the claim is directed does not include limitations that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, since the recited features of the abstract idea are being applied on a computer or computing device or via software programming that is simply being used as a tool (“apply it”) to implement the abstract idea. See MPEP §2106.05(f). This conclusion follows from the claim limitations which only recite a generic outside of the abstract idea.
In addition, merely “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“simply appending generic computer functionality to lend speed or efficiency to the performance of an otherwise abstract concept does not meaningfully limit claim scope for purposes of patent eligibility.”), aff’d, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Accordingly, the additional element(s) of a(n) do(es) not transform the abstract idea into a practical application of the abstract idea.
A plain reading of the figures and associated descriptions in the specification reveals that generic processors may be used to execute the claimed steps. The additional elements are recited at a high level of generality (i.e., as a generic processor performing generic computer functions) such that it amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using generic computer components (See MPEP 2106.05(f)) and limits the judicial exception to a particular environment (See MPEP 2106.05(h)). Mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component and limiting the judicial exception to a particular environment doesn’t integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A. Accordingly, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. Hence, independent claim is directed to an abstract idea.
Extra-solution activity – See MPEP §2106.05(g)
In addition, limitation(s) (A) constitute(s) insignificant pre-solution activity that merely gathers data and, therefore, do not integrate the exception into a practical application. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity); see also CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371–72 (noting that even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (presenting offers and gathering statistics amounted to mere data gathering). Accord Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
Step 2B – Whether a Claim Amounts to Significantly More – See MPEP § 2106.05:
Under the Step 2B analysis, the additional elements are evaluated to determine whether they amount to something “significantly more” than the recited abstract idea. (i.e., an innovative concept). Here, the additional elements, such as a(n) ” does/do not amount to an innovative concept since, as stated above in the Step 2A, Prong Two analysis, the claims are simply using the additional elements as a tool to carry out the abstract idea (i.e., “apply it”) on a computer or computing device and/or via software programming. See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05(f). The additional elements are specified at a high level of generality to simply implement the abstract idea and are not themselves being technologically improved. See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05 I.A; Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Thus, these elements, taken individually or together, do not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract ideas themselves.
The additional elements of the rejected dependent claims merely refine and further limit the abstract idea of the independent claims and do not add any feature that is an “inventive concept” which cures the deficiencies of their respective parent claim. None of the rejected dependent claims considered individually, including their respective limitations, include an “inventive concept” of some additional element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claims in practice amount to something “significantly more” than patent-ineligible subject matter to which the claims are directed.
The elements of the instant process steps when taken in combination do not offer substantially more than the sum of the functions of the elements when each is taken alone. The claims as a whole, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself because the claims do not effect an improvement to another technology or technical field; the claims do not amount to an improvement to the functioning of an electronic device itself which implements the abstract idea (e.g., the general purpose computer and/or the computer system which implements the process are not made more efficient or technologically improved); the claims do not perform a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (i.e., the claims do not use the abstract idea in the claimed process to bring about a physical change. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was imparted by the claimed process; contrast, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was not imparted by the claimed process); and the claims do not move beyond a general link of the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (e.g., “” in Claim ).
Regarding Claims : These claims depend from Claim and only add further details to the steps in that independent claim and do not recite any further limitations that cause the claim(s) to be patent eligible. Rather, the limitations of dependent claims are directed toward additional aspects of the judicial exception and/or well-understood, routine and conventional additional elements that do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The dependent claims are merely going into more detail regarding . Therefore, dependent claims are not patent eligible and are also rejected on the same grounds provided for in the rejection of Claim .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 1-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Regarding Claim 1, the claim recites, “.”
Regarding Claim 4, the claim recites, “calculates ineffective MA for all non-rescue “automatic train protection”
Regarding Claim 6, the claim recites, “calculates effective MA in an activated train rescue zone for the “automatic rescue train protection””
Regarding Claim 7, the claim recites, “calculates the going-to-rescue MA for the “automatic rescue train protection””
Regarding Claim 9, the claim recites, “calculates the going-to-rescue coupling deceleration point”
Regarding Claim 10, the claim recites, “calculates the going-to-rescue coupling deceleration point”
Regarding Claim 11, the claim recites, “calculates ineffective MA for the “automatic rescue train protection””
Regarding Claim 13, the claim recites, “calculates effective pushing rescue MA for the “automatic rescue train protection””
Regarding Claim 15, the claim recites, “calculates a starting point of the pushing rescue MA”
Regarding Claim 16, the claim recites, “calculates a starting point of the pushing rescue MA”
The specification does not provide adequate written description of how ow a pushing rescue movement authority is calculated in Claim 1 or similarly how any of the other calculations are performed in Claims 4, 6-11, 13, 15, or 16.
To satisfy the written description requirement, the Specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Specifically, to have “possession,” the Specification must describe the claimed invention in a manner understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the art and show that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Id.; Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Original claims may fail to satisfy the written description requirement when the invention is claimed and described in functional language but the specification does not sufficiently identify how the invention achieves the claimed function. Id. This can occur when the algorithm or steps for performing the computer function are not explained at all or are not explained in sufficient detail. Additionally, it is not enough that one skilled in the art could write a program to achieve the claimed function because the specification must explain how the inventor intends to achieve the claimed function to satisfy the written description requirement. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 681–683 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 84 Fed. Reg. 57, 62 (Jan. 7, 2019).
At best, the Specification vaguely and generically describes (See at least Instant PgPub ¶¶). There is no description of what the steps / procedure actually entail. They are simply treated as black boxes that accept certain inputs () and output a . As noted in the MPEP, “original claims may lack written description when the claims define the invention in functional language specifying a desired result but the specification does not sufficiently describe how the function is performed or the result is achieved” (See MPEP § 2161.01 I.) In particular, the MPEP requires description of “an algorithm or steps/procedure taken to perform the function."
Claimed subject matter should be described in the specification in such a manner as to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention. The specification does not at all describe the steps / procedure involved in which would necessarily involve some calculations or steps that have not been described.
Claims 2-3, 5, 8, 12, 14, 17, and 18 are rejected for being dependent on a rejected base claim lacking written description.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 11 recites the limitation, “wherein in step C, the ZC calculates ineffective MA for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the going-to-rescue state with a head in a non-coupled state.” It’s not clear if it's referring to the head being in an uncoupled state or the train is in an uncoupled state. For the purposes of examination it’s assumed to be when the train is in an uncoupled state.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim(s) 1-18 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kozaki et al. (US 2023/0373543 A1) hereinafter Kozaki, Liu et al. (CN106428126B) hereinafter Liu, and Weitersberger et al. (US 2019/0389492 A1) hereinafter Weitersberger. Note: Kozaki is an English translation of WO2022102127A1 published 5/19/2022.
Claim 1:
Kozaki discloses a
Kozaki doesn’t explicitly disclose step C: calculating, by the ZC, going-to-rescue movement authority (MA) for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the to “automatic rescued train protection”; step D: updating, by the ZC, the “automatic rescue train protection” to a performing-rescue state; and step E: calculating, by the ZC, pushing rescue MA for the “automatic rescue train protection”.
However, Liu discloses step C: calculating, by the ZC, going-to-rescue movement authority (MA) for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the to “automatic rescued train protection”; [¶10; "rescue train," "coupling command," and "operating commands"] step D: updating, by the ZC, the “automatic rescue train protection” to a performing-rescue state; and [¶13; "coupling operation command" is performed after coupling] step E: calculating, by the ZC,
Further, Weitersberger discloses the rescue is a pushing rescue [¶6].
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to combine the rescue train system of Kozaki with the rescue operation of Liu to remove the stranded train from the track thus improving operational efficiency.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to combine the rescue train system of Kozaki and Liu with the push rescue of Weitersberger to provide an additional direction to rescue trains thus improving operational efficiency.
Claim 2:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Kozaki also discloses wherein the activating the train rescue zone in the ZC in step A is used to complete pushing rescue by the “automatic rescue train protection” for the “automatic rescued train protection”. [¶31; "protective section"; Figs. 1, 4-6; Item 10]
Claim 3:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Kozaki also discloses wherein an activated train rescue zone in step A needs to comprise a section of a train corresponding to the “automatic rescued train protection”. [¶31; "protective section"; Figs. 1, 4-6; Items 4a, 10; failed train 4a is at the protective section]
Claim 4:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Kozaki also discloses wherein in step A, the ZC calculates ineffective MA for all non-rescue “automatic train protection” that intersects with an activated train rescue zone, to prevent the non-rescue “automatic train protection” outside the activated train rescue zone from entering the activated train rescue zone. [¶31; "protective section"; Figs. 1, 4-6; Item 10]
Claim 5:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Kozaki also discloses wherein in step B, the ZC sets the “automatic rescue train protection” to the going-to-rescue state based on the going-to-rescue state of a rescue train corresponding to the “automatic rescue train protection”. [Fig. 1, Items 4b; ¶31; "relief train"]
Claim 6:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Kozaki also discloses wherein in step B, the ZC calculates effective MA in an activated train rescue zone for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the going-to-rescue state that intersects with the activated train rescue zone; and the ZC calculates the effective MA for entering the activated train rescue zone for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the going-to-rescue state outside the activated train rescue zone. [¶31; "protective section"; Figs. 1, 4-6; Item 10]
Claim 7:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Kozaki doesn’t explicitly disclose wherein in step C, the ZC calculates the going-to-rescue MA for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the going-to-rescue state to perform coupling rescue on the “automatic rescued train protection”, wherein the going-to-rescue MA comprises going-to-rescue collision-allowable MA and a going-to-rescue collision-allowable speed.
However, Liu discloses wherein in step C, the ZC calculates the going-to-rescue MA for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the going-to-rescue state to perform coupling rescue on the “automatic rescued train protection”, wherein the going-to-rescue MA comprises going-to-rescue collision-allowable MA and a going-to-rescue collision-allowable speed. [¶¶12, 73-75]
Claim 8:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Kozaki doesn’t explicitly disclose wherein in step C, the going-to-rescue MA calculated by the ZC for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the going-to-rescue state comprises a going-to-rescue coupling deceleration point and a going-to-rescue coupling safety limit point.
However, Liu discloses wherein in step C, the going-to-rescue MA calculated by the ZC for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the going-to-rescue state comprises a going-to-rescue coupling deceleration point and a going-to-rescue coupling safety limit point. [¶¶10-12, 73-75; the train slows down as it approaches until it stops to couple]
Claim 9:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 8.
Claim 9 is a contingent limitation, see the Claim Interpretation section..
Claim 10:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 8.
Claim 10 is a contingent limitation, see the Claim Interpretation section..
Claim 11:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Kozaki also discloses wherein in step C, the ZC calculates ineffective MA for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the going-to-rescue state with a head in a non-coupled state. [¶31; "protective section"; Figs. 1, 4-6; Item 10; train 4a is only moving in the protective section]
Claim 12:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Kozaki doesn’t explicitly disclose wherein in step D, the ZC sets the “automatic rescue train protection” to the performing-rescue state based on the performing-rescue state of a rescue train corresponding to the “automatic rescue train protection”.
However, Liu does disclose wherein in step D, the ZC sets the “automatic rescue train protection” to the performing-rescue state based on the performing-rescue state of a rescue train corresponding to the “automatic rescue train protection”. [¶¶10-15]
Claim 13:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Kozaki also discloses wherein in step D, the ZC calculates effective pushing rescue MA for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the performing-rescue state with a head in a non-coupled state in an activated train rescue zone. [¶31; "protective section"; Figs. 1, 4-6; Item 10; train 4a is allowed to move within protective section]
Claim 14:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Kozaki also discloses wherein in step E, the effective pushing rescue MA calculated by the ZC for the “automatic rescue train protection” in the performing-rescue state with a head in a non-coupled state in an activated train rescue zone is not beyond the activated train rescue zone. [¶31; "protective section"; Figs. 1, 4-6; Item 10; train 4a is allowed to move within protective section]
Claim 15:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Claim 15 is a contingent limitation, see the Claim Interpretation section..
Claim 16:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Claim 16 is a contingent limitation, see the Claim Interpretation section.
Claim 17:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Kozaki also discloses An electronic device, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the program, the method according to claim 1 is implemented. [Fig. 8, Item 90; see above]
Claim 18:
Kozaki, Liu, and Weitersberger, as shown in the rejection above, disclose all the limitations of claim 1.
Kozaki also discloses A computer-readable storage medium, storing a computer program, wherein when the program is executed by a processor, the method according to claim 1 is implemented. [Fig. 8, Item 90; see above]
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
Liu (US 2024/0051587 A1) discloses a system which recovers a train which has had lost communication and controlling the train with a zone controller.
Gao (US 10,259,478 B1) discloses a train control system which dispatches a virtual coupling system.
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KURT P. LIETHEN
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 3747
/KURT PHILIP LIETHEN/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3747
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