DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Status of Claims
A reply was filed on 05/27/2026. The amendments to the claims have been entered. Claims 58-77 are pending in the application with claims 58-66 and 75-76 withdrawn. Claims 67-74 and 77 are examined herein.
The text of those sections of Title 35, U.S. Code not included in this action can be found in the prior Office action.
Claim Objections
Claims 67-69 are objected to because of the following informalities:
Claim 67: “a second state of a plasma” should be amended to recite “a second state of [[a]] the plasma”
Claim 67: “to reduce a risk” should be amended to recite “to reduce [[a]] the risk”
Claim 68: “a first warning level” should be amended to recite “[[a]] the first warning level”
Claim 69: “a first collection of events” should be amended to recite “[[a]] the first collection of events”
Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112(a)
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
Claims 69-74 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claims contain subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Claim 69, as currently presented, recites “determining the first warning level is further based, at least in part, on the chain criticality level satisfying a threshold criticality level”. There does not appear to be sufficient support for this feature in the original disclosure. For example, the claims as originally presented recite “determine that disruption of the plasma in the fusion device will occur or is likely to occur when the chain criticality level associated with the chain of events, satisfies a threshold criticality level” (original claim 69). There is nothing in the original claims to suggest that the “first warning level”, which represents a risk that a disruption of the plasma will occur when the plasma is in the “first state” as previously recited in parent claim 67, is determined based, at least in part, on “the chain criticality level satisfying a threshold criticality level”. Further, although the specification as originally presented discloses determining the “first warning level” (also referred to as a “criticality level”), which is determined based on the “first state” (i.e., the warning level associated with the state of the plasma at a particular time; see below discussion) as previously recited in parent claim 67, based on the “chain criticality level” ([0142]), the original specification does not appear to disclose this determination is based, at least in part, on the “chain criticality level satisfying a threshold criticality level” as recited in claim 69. Instead, the original specification discloses “determining whether a criticality [or warning] level of the first state satisfies a threshold criticality level” ([0143]) and “determining disruption of the plasma in the fusion device will occur when a difference between the criticality [or warning] level of the first state and the corresponding criticality [or warning] level of the most recent state fails to satisfy a threshold criticality level difference” ([0144]). Thus, while the original disclosure provides support for determining the “first warning level” based on the “chain criticality level” ([0142]), determining a disruption will occur based on the “chain criticality level” satisfying a “threshold criticality level” (claim 69), and determining a disruption will occur based on the “first warning level” satisfying a “threshold criticality level” ([0143]) or a difference between the “first warning level” and another “warning level” satisfying a “threshold criticality level difference” ([0144]), there does not appear to be sufficient support for “determining the first warning level ... based, at least in part, on the chain criticality level satisfying a threshold criticality level” as currently present in claim 69. This feature is therefore new matter.
Claim 70, as currently presented, recites “wherein the instructions, when executed by the at least on processor, further cause the system to: determine, based on the sequence of states of the plasma, a third warning level, wherein: instructing the control system to perform the one or more first actions is further based, at least in part, on the third warning level to reduce the risk that the disruption of the plasma will occur”. There does not appear to be sufficient support for this feature in the original disclosure. The claims as originally presented recite “determine a warning level is further based, at least in part, on the sequence of states of the plasma” (original claim 70). As noted in the prior Office action (see para. 28), it is unclear if the “warning level” is intending to refer to the previously recited “warning level” in original parent claim 67, which recites “determine, based on the state of the plasma, a warning level, wherein the warning level represents a risk that a disruption of the plasma will occur”. The specification as originally presented discloses determining a “criticality level” corresponding to a “first state” of a “sequence of states” and a “criticality level” corresponding to a “second state” of a “sequence of states” ([0144]). However, there does not appear to be anything in the original disclosure discussing determining another “criticality level” (i.e., a “third warning level”) based on the “sequence of states”. Similarly, regarding claim 71, which recites “determining the third warning level based, at least in part, on the first warning level and the second warning level”, the original disclosure does not appear to provide support for determining a “third warning level” or determining such a “warning level” based on the “first warning level” and the “second warning level”. These features are therefore new matter.
Any claim not explicitly addressed above is rejected because it is dependent on a rejected base claim.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112(b)
Claims 69-74 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
Claim 69 recites “determining ... the occurrence of a first collection of events having effects linked in time comprises identifying within the first collection of events, at least one chain of events including events linked in time, the at least one chain of events including a trigger event, a single point attractor event, and at least one intermediate event occurring between the trigger event and the single point attractor event”. Parent claim 67 previously recites “a first collection of events having effects linked in time” and “the first collection of events and the event criticality level associated with each event in the first collection of events represents a first state of a plasma within the fusion device”. As best understood by Examiner, in view of the disclosure, the “collection of events” refers to events which occur at a particular time (e.g., time “tj” in FIG. 11) and the “state” refers to the combination of the “collection of events” and the “criticality levels” (or “warning levels”) for each “event” in the “collection of events” at the particular time (e.g., state “State (tj)” in FIG. 11) ([0113], [0141]-[0142]). The “chain of events” (also referred to as an “event chain” or a “sequence of events” in the disclosure), including the “trigger event”, “single point attractor event”, and “at least one intermediate event”, as recited in claim 69, and as best understood by Examiner, appears to be intending to refer to a series of “events” which occur at different times (FIGS. 3 (element 302), 9A-9C (elements 930, 932), 10, 14 (element 1402), [0063]-[0066], [0107]-[0111], [0123], [0127]-[0129]). For example, the specification discloses Figure 9B shows a “time evolution of the events”, including a “trigger event” (“LTM”), “intermediate events” (“VDE”, “USD”), and a “single point attractor event” (“DIS”). Each of the “trigger event”, “intermediate event(s)”, and “single point attractor event” occur at different times. Thus, whereas “events” in a “collection of events” are “events” which occur at the same time, “events” in a “chain of events” would appear to be “events” which occur at different times. It is therefore unclear how a “chain of events” (i.e., “events” which occur at different times) can be “identif[ied]” within the “first collection of events” (i.e., “events” which occur at the same time). As best understood by Examiner, a “chain of events” which includes a “trigger event”, “a single point attractor event”, and “at least one intermediate event” would require at least three “collections of events” and a corresponding at least three “states” of the plasma.
Claim 71 is indefinite because it is unclear if the claim requires each “group of states” includes more than one “state” and, if so, if each of the “states” in each of the “groups of states” requires, for example, “determin[ing], based on the data and one or more physics-based models, an occurrence of a [] collection of events having effects linked in time and an event criticality level associated with each even in the [] collection of events” as previously recited in parent claim 67. Further, parent claim 67 previously recites “wherein the first warning level represents a risk that a disruption of the plasma will occur when the plasma is in the first state” and “wherein the second warning level represents a risk that a disruption of the plasma will occur when the plasma is in the second state”. Thus, the “first warning level” would appear to be specific to the “first state” and the “second warning level” would appear to be specific to the “second state”. It is therefore unclear how “states” other than the “first state” can have a same “first warning level” and “states” other than the “second state” can have a same “second warning level”.
Claim 72 recites “instructing the control system ... to perform the one or more first actions ... is further based, at least in part, on at least one state in the second group of states”. Parent claim 71 previously recites “the second group of states including the second state of the plasma”. Thus, claim 72 would appear to read on performing one or more actions based on the “second state” of the plasma. Parent claim 67 previously recites “instruct a control system ... to perform one or more first actions to change operation of the fusion device based, at least in part, on the first warning level and/or the second warning level” and “determin[ing], based on the second state of the plasma, a second warning level”. Thus, parent claim 67 appears to read on performing one or more actions based on the “second state” of the plasma. It is therefore unclear the relationship between the “instructing the control system” feature recited in claim 72 and the “instruct a control system” feature previously recited in parent claim 67.
Claim 72 is further indefinite because it is unclear the relationship between the “warning level” and the previously recited “warning levels” (e.g., “first warning level”, “second warning level”, “third warning level”).
Claim 73 recites “instructing the control system ... to perform the one or more first actions ... is further based, at least in part, on a time evolution of states of the plasma represented in the sequence of states of the plasma”. It is unclear if the “states of the plasma” are intending to refer to the previously recited “first state” and “second state”, or other “states”. It is further unclear the relationship between “revert[ing] the second state of the plasma to the first state of the plasma” and the previously recited “reduc[ing] a risk that the disruption of the plasma will occur” in parent claim 67.
Claim 74 is indefinite because it is unclear the relationship between the “warning level” and the previously recited “warning levels” (e.g., “first warning level”, “second warning level”, “third warning level”). Additionally, as previously discussed above, according to parent claim 67, the “first warning level represents a risk that a disruption of the plasma will occur when the plasma is in the first state”. It is unclear how the “first warning level”, which is associated with the “first state” of the plasma, can be “reduce[d]”. Perhaps the claim is intending to recite that the one or more second actions are selected to change a “state” of the plasma from the “first state” to another “state” which has an associated “warning level” that is lower than the “first warning level”.
Any claim not explicitly addressed above is rejected because it is dependent on a rejected base claim.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
Claims 67-68, 70-74, and 77, as best understood, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by “Integrated real-time supervisory management for off-normal-event handling and feedback control of tokamak plasmas” (“Vu”).
Regarding claim 67, Vu (previously cited) (see FIGS. 1-2, 6) discloses a system (“advanced tokamak plasma control system”, “PCS”) comprising:
at least one processor (p. 4: “The proposed PCS has been implemented in MATLAB/Simulink, from which C code was generated and included in the TCV digital real-time control system”); and
at least one memory including instructions (p. 4: “The proposed PCS has been implemented in MATLAB/Simulink, from which C code was generated and included in the TCV digital real-time control system”) that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the system to:
receive data corresponding to operation of a fusion device (p. 2: “This layer thus converts specific plant signals to generic continuous-value states of the plasma and actuators”);
determine, based on the data and one or more physics-based models, an occurrence of a first collection of events (“off-normal-event”, “ONE”, “dne edge”, “actuatorlim”) (e.g., events at time t = (1) in FIG. 6) having effects linked in time and an event criticality level (“danger level”) associated with each event in the first collection of events, wherein the first collection of events and the event criticality level associated with each event in the first collection of events represent a first state of a plasma within the fusion device (p. 1: “different ONEs categories are distinguished”, “a ONE monitor to classify the events”, “more stages are necessary to clearly classify the danger level , the reaction level for each ONE”; p. 2: “The tokamak-dependent layer includes various real-time (RT) state reconstruction codes for plasma and actuator states. This layer thus converts specific plant signals to generic continuous-value states of the plasma and actuators”, “a plasma and actuator event monitor categorizes the state representation of the plasma, the events and the actuators”; p. 3: “For each ONE, first the danger level and the ONE-reaction level are determined”, “The classification of a ONE danger level is based either on one generic state ... or on a combination of various generic states from the plasma event monitor. On the other hand, in order to avoid ambiguity while several ONEs simultaneously appear and their combination can significantly change the situation, a virtual ONE using their combination should be created as a new independent event. For example, a locked mode in low danger level will really become significant if there is also an observed increase in radiated power. In this case, a combined event must be considered separately from the lock mode and the radiated power events”);
determine, based on the first state of the plasma, a first warning level (“control scenario”, e.g., “normal”, “recovery”, “backup”, “soft-shutdown”, “disruption-mitigation”), wherein the first warning level represents a risk that a disruption of the plasma will occur when the plasma is in the first state (FIGS. 3-4, Table III, p. 2: “a strategy of supervisor decision to deal with ONEs ... which can lead to plasma disruption or plasma performance deterioration”; p. 3: “The classification of a ONE danger level is based either on one generic state ... or on a combination of various generic states from the plasma event monitor. On the other hand, in order to avoid ambiguity while several ONEs simultaneously appear and their combination can significantly change the situation, a virtual ONE using their combination should be created as a new independent event. For example, a locked mode in low danger level will really become significant if there is also an observed increase in radiated power. In this case, a combined event must be considered separately from the lock mode and the radiated power events”; p. 4: “an OS mapping [] based on the combination of the ONE-reaction levels of all active ONEs is thus necessary”; p. 5: “we derive the distance dne edge between the system states ... and the empirical disruption limit.... This distance is a key factor used by the supervisory layer to determine an appropriate control scenario”);
determine, based on the data and the one or more physics-based models, an occurrence of a second collection of events (“off-normal-event”, “ONE”, “dne edge”, “actuatorlim”) (e.g., at time t = (2) in FIG. 6) having effects linked in time and an event criticality level (“danger level”) associated with each event in the second collection of events, wherein the second collection of events and the event criticality level associated with each event in the second collection of events represent a second state of the plasma within the fusion device (p. 1: “different ONEs categories are distinguished”, “a ONE monitor to classify the events”, “more stages are necessary to clearly classify the danger level , the reaction level for each ONE”; p. 2: “The tokamak-dependent layer includes various real-time (RT) state reconstruction codes for plasma and actuator states. This layer thus converts specific plant signals to generic continuous-value states of the plasma and actuators”, “a plasma and actuator event monitor categorizes the state representation of the plasma, the events and the actuators”; p. 3: “For each ONE, first the danger level and the ONE-reaction level are determined”, “The classification of a ONE danger level is based either on one generic state ... or on a combination of various generic states from the plasma event monitor. On the other hand, in order to avoid ambiguity while several ONEs simultaneously appear and their combination can significantly change the situation, a virtual ONE using their combination should be created as a new independent event. For example, a locked mode in low danger level will really become significant if there is also an observed increase in radiated power. In this case, a combined event must be considered separately from the lock mode and the radiated power events”);
determine, based on the second state of the plasma, a second warning level (“control scenario”, e.g., “normal”, “recovery”, “backup”, “soft-shutdown”, “disruption-mitigation”), wherein the second warning level represents a risk that a disruption of the plasma will occur when the plasma is in the second state, wherein the first state of the plasma and the second state of the plasma are linked in time as a sequence of states of the plasma (FIGS. 3-4, Table III, p. 2: “a strategy of supervisor decision to deal with ONEs ... which can lead to plasma disruption or plasma performance deterioration”; p. 3: “The classification of a ONE danger level is based either on one generic state ... or on a combination of various generic states from the plasma event monitor. On the other hand, in order to avoid ambiguity while several ONEs simultaneously appear and their combination can significantly change the situation, a virtual ONE using their combination should be created as a new independent event. For example, a locked mode in low danger level will really become significant if there is also an observed increase in radiated power. In this case, a combined event must be considered separately from the lock mode and the radiated power events”; p. 4: “an OS mapping [] based on the combination of the ONE-reaction levels of all active ONEs is thus necessary”; p. 5: “we derive the distance dne edge between the system states ... and the empirical disruption limit.... This distance is a key factor used by the supervisory layer to determine an appropriate control scenario”); and
instruct a control system associated with the fusion device to perform one or more first actions to change operation of the fusion device based, at least in part, on the first warning level and/or the second warning level to reduce the risk that the disruption of the plasma will occur (p. 1: “the actions to deal with ONEs, once they are detected, are (flexibly) customized as a list of prioritized control tasks in different control scenarios. This leads to an automatic actuator resource assignment of the actuator manager and control (feedback) actions of the controllers”; p. 2: “A control scenario ... becomes a list of prioritized control tasks, which will ensure the plasma evolution is as close to the target scenario as possible”; p. 4: “Once the appropriate control scenario is selected based on the actual plasma situation, the relevant control tasks will be activated.... Depending on the reaction level associated with these ONEs as well as the pre-defined OS mapping, the control scenarios are different”; p. 5: “The control scenario [] is based on the combination of the reaction levels of the two ONEs.... According to the chosen scenario, different control tasks are activated and prioritized”; p. 6: “At (1), dne,edge violates the first critical distance [], which activates DA tasks in the scenario normal. At (2), dne,edge goes below the second critical distance []; the supervisor switches the scenario to recovery and activates the corresponding tasks”).
Regarding claim 68, Vu discloses the system of claim 67 and further discloses determining, based on the first state of the plasma, the first warning level comprises: determining that disruption of the plasma in the fusion device will occur or is likely to occur when the event criticality level of at least one event in the first collection of events, satisfies a threshold criticality level (FIG. 5, Table III, p. 5: “we derive the distance dne edge between the system states ... and the empirical disruption limit”, “the danger level of the dne,edge is low ... when the distance is below the first critical threshold dcritical1, and is medium ... when the distance is below the second threshold dcritical2”).
Regarding claim 70, Vu discloses the system of claim 67 and further discloses the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, further cause the system to: determine, based on the sequence of states of the plasma, a third warning level, wherein: instructing the control system to perform the one or more first actions is further based, at least in part, on the third warning level to reduce the risk that the disruption of the plasma will occur (p. 3: “The classification of a ONE danger level is based either on one generic state ... or on a combination of various generic states from the plasma event monitor. On the other hand, in order to avoid ambiguity while several ONEs simultaneously appear and their combination can significantly change the situation, a virtual ONE using their combination should be created as a new independent event. For example, a locked mode in low danger level will really become significant if there is also an observed increase in radiated power. In this case, a combined event must be considered separately from the lock mode and the radiated power events”; p. 4: “an OS mapping [] based on the combination of the ONE-reaction levels of all active ONEs is thus necessary”; p. 5: “The control scenario (third panel) is based on the combination of the reaction levels of the two ONEs, which is recovery if the highest danger level reaches medium from (2), otherwise it remains normal”).
Regarding claim 71, Vu discloses the system of claim 70 and further discloses determining based, at least in part, on the sequence of states of the plasma, the third warning level comprises (see FIG. 6):
determining a first group of states (e.g., states from time = (1) to time = (2)) in the sequence of states, the first group of states including the first state of the plasma, wherein all states in the first group of states have the first warning level (e.g., “normal”);
determining a second group of states (e.g., states from time = (2) to time = (3)) in the sequence of states, the second group of states including the second state of the plasma, wherein all states in the second group of states have the second warning level (e.g., “recovery”), wherein the second warning level is higher than the first warning level; and
determining the third warning level based, at least in part, on the first warning level and the second warning level (FIGS. 5-6, p. 3: “The classification of a ONE danger level is based either on one generic state ... or on a combination of various generic states from the plasma event monitor. On the other hand, in order to avoid ambiguity while several ONEs simultaneously appear and their combination can significantly change the situation, a virtual ONE using their combination should be created as a new independent event. For example, a locked mode in low danger level will really become significant if there is also an observed increase in radiated power. In this case, a combined event must be considered separately from the lock mode and the radiated power events”; p. 4: “an OS mapping [] based on the combination of the ONE-reaction levels of all active ONEs is thus necessary”; p. 5: “The control scenario (third panel) is based on the combination of the reaction levels of the two ONEs, which is recovery if the highest danger level reaches medium from (2), otherwise it remains normal”).
Regarding claim 72, Vu discloses the system of claim 71 and further discloses (see FIGS. 1-2, 6):
instructing the control system associated with the fusion device to perform the one or more first actions to change the operation of the fusion device is further based, at least in part, on at least one state in the second group of states (p. 1: “the actions to deal with ONEs, once they are detected, are (flexibly) customized as a list of prioritized control tasks in different control scenarios. This leads to an automatic actuator resource assignment of the actuator manager and control (feedback) actions of the controllers”; p. 2: “A control scenario ... becomes a list of prioritized control tasks, which will ensure the plasma evolution is as close to the target scenario as possible”; p. 4: “Once the appropriate control scenario is selected based on the actual plasma situation, the relevant control tasks will be activated.... Depending on the reaction level associated with these ONEs as well as the pre-defined OS mapping, the control scenarios are different”; p. 5: “The control scenario [] is based on the combination of the reaction levels of the two ONEs.... According to the chosen scenario, different control tasks are activated and prioritized”; p. 6: “At (1), dne,edge violates the first critical distance [], which activates DA tasks in the scenario normal. At (2), dne,edge goes below the second critical distance []; the supervisor switches the scenario to recovery and activates the corresponding tasks”),
wherein the one or more first actions are selected to reduce a warning level for the plasma from the second warning level to the first warning level (p. 2: “A control scenario ... becomes a list of prioritized control tasks, which will ensure the plasma evolution is as close to the target scenario as possible”; p. 4: “Once the appropriate control scenario is selected based on the actual plasma situation, the relevant control tasks will be activated.... Depending on the reaction level associated with these ONEs as well as the pre-defined OS mapping, the control scenarios are different”).
Regarding claim 73, Vu discloses the system of claim 70 and further discloses (see FIGS. 1-2, 6):
instructing the control system associated with the fusion device to perform the one or more first actions to change the operation of the fusion device is further based, at least in part, on a time evolution of states of the plasma represented in the sequence of states of the plasma (p. 1: “the actions to deal with ONEs, once they are detected, are (flexibly) customized as a list of prioritized control tasks in different control scenarios. This leads to an automatic actuator resource assignment of the actuator manager and control (feedback) actions of the controllers”; p. 2: “A control scenario ... becomes a list of prioritized control tasks, which will ensure the plasma evolution is as close to the target scenario as possible”; p. 4: “Once the appropriate control scenario is selected based on the actual plasma situation, the relevant control tasks will be activated.... Depending on the reaction level associated with these ONEs as well as the pre-defined OS mapping, the control scenarios are different”; p. 5: “The control scenario [] is based on the combination of the reaction levels of the two ONEs”),
wherein the one or more first actions are selected to control the fusion device to revert the second state of the plasma to the first state of the plasma, the second state occurring later in time than the first state in the sequence of states of the plasma (p. 2: “A control scenario ... becomes a list of prioritized control tasks, which will ensure the plasma evolution is as close to the target scenario as possible”; p. 4: “Once the appropriate control scenario is selected based on the actual plasma situation, the relevant control tasks will be activated.... Depending on the reaction level associated with these ONEs as well as the pre-defined OS mapping, the control scenarios are different”).
Regarding claim 74, Vu discloses the system of claim 73 and further discloses the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, further cause the system to (see FIGS. 1-2, 6):
instruct the control system to perform one or more second actions to change an operation of the fusion device based, at least in part, on the time evolution of states of the plasma represented in the sequence of states of the plasma (p. 1: “the actions to deal with ONEs, once they are detected, are (flexibly) customized as a list of prioritized control tasks in different control scenarios. This leads to an automatic actuator resource assignment of the actuator manager and control (feedback) actions of the controllers”; p. 2: “A control scenario ... becomes a list of prioritized control tasks, which will ensure the plasma evolution is as close to the target scenario as possible”; p. 4: “Once the appropriate control scenario is selected based on the actual plasma situation, the relevant control tasks will be activated.... Depending on the reaction level associated with these ONEs as well as the pre-defined OS mapping, the control scenarios are different”; p. 5: “The control scenario [] is based on the combination of the reaction levels of the two ONEs.... According to the chosen scenario, different control tasks are activated and prioritized”; p. 6: “At (1), dne,edge violates the first critical distance [], which activates DA tasks in the scenario normal. At (2), dne,edge goes below the second critical distance []; the supervisor switches the scenario to recovery and activates the corresponding tasks”),
wherein the one or more second actions are selected to reduce the first warning level associated with the first state of the plasma to a lower warning level (p. 2: “A control scenario ... becomes a list of prioritized control tasks, which will ensure the plasma evolution is as close to the target scenario as possible”; p. 4: “Once the appropriate control scenario is selected based on the actual plasma situation, the relevant control tasks will be activated.... Depending on the reaction level associated with these ONEs as well as the pre-defined OS mapping, the control scenarios are different”).
Regarding claim 77, Vu discloses the system of claim 67 and further discloses the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, further cause the system to: output to a computing device, an indication identifying the first collection of events, the second collection of events, the first warning level and the second warning level (FIGS. 1, 6, p. 1: “the actions to deal with ONEs, once they are detected, are (flexibly) customized as a list of prioritized control tasks in different control scenarios. This leads to an automatic actuator resource assignment of the actuator manager and control (feedback) actions of the controllers”; p. 2: “a supervisor evaluates the occurrence of ONEs and decides the appropriate control scenario (list of control tasks), then activates and priorities relevant tasks[;] an actuator manager defines the best actuator resource allocation to active tasks by solving an optimization problem based on the available actuator resources and the resource requests from controllers; and later distributes commands to corresponding actuators”).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
Claims 67-74 and 77, as best understood, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over “Achievements and lessons learned from the operation of KSTAR plasma control system upgrade” (“Hahn”) in view of “Disruption Event Characterization and Forecasting in Tokamaks” (“Sabbagh”).
Regarding claim 67, Hahn (previously cited) discloses a system comprising:
at least one processor (“CPU”); and
at least one memory (“RAM”) including instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the system to:
receive data corresponding to operation of a fusion device (Abstract).
Hahn does not appear to disclose the instructions cause the system to determine an occurrence of a first collection of events and an event criticality level associated with each event as recited in claim 67. However, Hahn discloses the system is a plasma control system designed with high flexibility to add or change software, algorithms, and commands (p. 16: the PCS software continues changing in order to fulfill the various requests on suitable controls.... [T]he PCS was required to have a very high flexibility to add/remove new signals, add/modify algorithms, and add new commands to the newly connected actuators”).
Sabbagh (previously cited) (see FIGS. 1, 4) is similarly directed towards plasma control and teaches instructions for enhancing plasma control (Abstract). Sabbagh teaches instructions that, when executed by at least one processor, cause the system to:
receive data corresponding to operation of a fusion device (“tokamak”) (p. 3: “The radiated power profile (Ploss) can either be measured directly or can be estimated”; p. 4: “The information analysed for these modes along with plasma rotation profile and other plasma measurements produces predictive warnings for the individual modes, along with a total MHD event warning signal”);
determine, based on the data and one or more physics-based models, an occurrence of a first collection of events (“events”) (e.g., events at time t = 0.2s in FIG. 4) having effects linked in time and an event criticality level associated with each event in the first collection of events, wherein the first collection of events and the event criticality level associated with each event in the first collection of events represents a first state of a plasma within the fusion device (p. 1: “DECAF further aims to automatically determine the relation of the events and quantify their appearance to characterize the most probable and deleterious event chains, and also to forecast the onset of the events and chains”; p. 3: “DECAF event warning levels are determined by a flexible diagnostic and physics model ‘point’ system”, “The Greenwald density limit (event GWL) is included in DECAF as a universal empirical model for disruption forecasting.... This model has been added to the DECAF code including the radiated power, resistivity, and current density profiles as inputs”; p. 4: “The information analysed for these modes along with plasma rotation profile and other plasma measurements produces predictive warnings for the individual modes, along with a total MHD event warning signal”; p. 6: “the analysis produces the equivalent of ‘disruptivity diagrams’ showing the probability of a disruption occurring within a given parameter space of tokamak operation”);
determine, based on the first state of the plasma, a first warning level, wherein the first warning level represents a risk that a disruption of the plasma will occur when the plasma is in the first state (p. 1: “The Disruption Event Characterization and Forecasting Code (DECAF) ... is used to automate analysis of tokamak data to determine chains of events that lead to disruptions and to forecast their evolution to inform plasma profile and mode control systems aimed to avoid, or if needed to mitigate the deleterious effects of a disruption”; p. 3: “several event criteria can be used in conglomerate to determine combined ‘levels’ that allow DECAF to issue event warnings”; p. 4: “A single ‘total’ MHD warning signal that varies with time is also shown. This warning is created by a set of criteria and can be used as a disruption predictor”; p. 5: “A total warning level of 4 indicates close proximity to the disruption for this model”);
determine, based on the data and the one or more physics-based models, an occurrence of a second collection of events (“events”) (e.g., events at time t = 0.6s in FIG. 4) having effects linked in time and an event criticality level associated with each event in the second collection of events, wherein the second collection of events and the event criticality level associated with each event in the second collection of events represents a second state of a plasma within the fusion device (p. 1: “DECAF further aims to automatically determine the relation of the events and quantify their appearance to characterize the most probable and deleterious event chains, and also to forecast the onset of the events and chains”; p. 3: “DECAF event warning levels are determined by a flexible diagnostic and physics model ‘point’ system”, “The Greenwald density limit (event GWL) is included in DECAF as a universal empirical model for disruption forecasting.... This model has been added to the DECAF code including the radiated power, resistivity, and current density profiles as inputs”; p. 4: “The information analysed for these modes along with plasma rotation profile and other plasma measurements produces predictive warnings for the individual modes, along with a total MHD event warning signal”; p. 6: “the analysis produces the equivalent of ‘disruptivity diagrams’ showing the probability of a disruption occurring within a given parameter space of tokamak operation”);
determine, based on the second state of the plasma, a second warning level, wherein the second warning level represents a risk that a disruption of the plasma will occur when the plasma is in the second state, wherein the first state of the plasma and the second state of the plasma are linked in time as a sequence of states of the plasma (p. 1: “The Disruption Event Characterization and Forecasting Code (DECAF) ... is used to automate analysis of tokamak data to determine chains of events that lead to disruptions and to forecast their evolution to inform plasma profile and mode control systems aimed to avoid, or if needed to mitigate the deleterious effects of a disruption”; p. 3: “several event criteria can be used in conglomerate to determine combined ‘levels’ that allow DECAF to issue event warnings”; p. 4: “A single ‘total’ MHD warning signal that varies with time is also shown. This warning is created by a set of criteria and can be used as a disruption predictor”; p. 5: “A total warning level of 4 indicates close proximity to the disruption for this model”); and
instruct a control system associated with the fusion device to perform one or more first actions to change operation of the fusion device based, at least in part, on the first warning level and/or the second warning level to reduce the risk that the disruption of the plasma will occur (Abstract, p. 1: “The Disruption Event Characterization and Forecasting Code (DECAF) ... is used to automate analysis of tokamak data to determine chains of events that lead to disruptions and to forecast their evolution to inform plasma profile and mode control systems aimed to avoid, or if needed to mitigate the deleterious effects of a disruption”; p. 5: “the DECAF analysis starts to show a significant change in the total MHD warning level about 180 ms earlier, providing far better advanced notice of the potential disruption allowing the potential for control systems to alter plasma stability to avoid disruption”, “forecasting such events to cue profile control systems”).
Sabbagh further teaches the instructions provide the advantages of determining chains of events that lead to disruptions and forecasting their evolution, allowing sufficient time for mitigation or full avoidance (Abstract). It would have therefore been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date (“POSA”) to include Sabbagh’s disruption risk instructions in Hahn’s system for the benefits thereof. Thus, modification of Hahn in order to enhance plasma stability, as suggested by Sabbagh, would have been obvious to a POSA.
Regarding claim 68, Hahn in view of Sabbagh teaches the system of claim 67. Sabbagh teaches determining, based on the first state of the plasma, the first warning level comprises: determining that disruption of the plasma in the fusion device will occur or is likely to occur when the event criticality level of at least one event in the first collection of events, satisfies a threshold criticality level (FIGS. 1, 4, 8, p. 2: “a global magnetohydrodynamic instability (resistive wall mode, RWM) is identified by DECAF as the event chain trigger”; p. 3: “If the density at the island exceeds this limit ... then the island grows and can lead to plasma disruption”; p. 4: “The power balance model is a local condition for island growth, therefore mode marginal stability would occur when Ploss/Pinput > 1 at the location of the island. This defines the DECAF event ‘island power balance’ (IPB)”; p. 5: “Near t ~ 0.7s more negative criteria occur: mode frequencies are blow past computed bifurcation frequency levels, the modes drop to very low frequency, and core plasma rotation is critically low. Late in the evolution in close time proximity to the disruption (t ~ 0.8s), a critical level of locked mode amplitude occurs.... [T]he DECAF analysis starts to show a significant change in the total MHD warning level about 180 ms earlier”; p. 7: “a critical warning for the individual n = 1 rotating MHD mode (MHD-n1) as a starting point for the chain”). Thus, Hahn, modified to include Sabbagh’s disruption risk instructions, would have resulted in the features of claim 68.
Regarding claim 69, Hahn in view of Sabbagh teaches the system of claim 67. Sabbagh teaches (see FIGS. 1, 4, 8):
identifying at least one chain of events (“chain of individual events”, “chain of events”) including a trigger event (“trigger event”), a single point attractor event (“disruption”, “DIS”), and at least one intermediate event (“adverse event”) occurring between the trigger event and the single point attractor event,
the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, further cause the system to:
determine a chain criticality level associated with the at least one chain of events (Abstract, p. 2: “automated evaluation of the disruption event chain”, “at some point this ‘normal’ operational plasma state can be altered by many different ‘events’.... This alteration is considered as a chain of individual events, starting with a trigger event and evolving toward the plasma disruption.... DECAF analysis of device databases aims to automatically determine and provide understanding of this chain of events”), and
determine a disruption will occur based on the chain criticality level satisfying a threshold criticality level (Abstract, p. 1: “DECAF further aims to automatically determine the relation of the events and quantify their appearance to characterize the most probable and deleterious event chains, and also to forecast the onset of the events and chains”; p. 2: “automated evaluation of the disruption event chain”; p. 5: “The warning model shown in Fig. 4 is comprised of 15 separate criteria.... A total warning level of 4 indicates close proximity to the disruption for this model”).
Thus, Hahn, modified to include Sabbagh’s disruption risk instructions, would have resulted in the features of claim 69.
Regarding claim 70, Hahn in view of Sabbagh teaches the system of claim 67. Sabbagh teaches the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, further cause the system to: determine, based on the sequence of states of the plasma, a third warning level, wherein: instructing the control system to perform the one or more first actions is further based, at least in part, on the third warning level to reduce the risk that the disruption of the plasma will occur (FIGS. 1, 4, 8, p. 1: “The Disruption Event Characterization and Forecasting Code (DECAF) ... is used to automate analysis of tokamak data to determine chains of events that lead to disruptions and to forecast their evolution to inform plasma profile and mode control systems aimed to avoid, or if needed to mitigate the deleterious effects of a disruption”; p. 5: “Early in the discharge, MHD modes are also found, and core plasma rotation is low.... However, the mode frequencies are relatively high at this time, which is generally a safe condition. Later, near t = 0.25 s, the MHD warning level increases.... However, these frequencies are not critically low (no mode bifurcations are found) and plasma rotation is not low, so the warning level remains low.... Near t ~ 0.7s more negative criteria occur.... [T]he DECAF analysis starts to show a significant change in the total MHD warning level about 180 ms earlier”). Thus, Hahn, modified to include Sabbagh’s disruption risk instructions, would have resulted in the features of claim 70.
Regarding claim 71, Hahn in view of Sabbagh teaches the system of claim 70. Sabbagh teaches determining based, at least in part, on the sequence of states of the plasma comprises, the third warning level comprises (see FIGS. 4, 8):
determining a first group of states (e.g., states having a warning level of ~ 0) in the sequence of states, the first group of states including the first state of the plasma, wherein all states in the first group of states have the first warning level (e.g., ~ 0);
determining a second group of states (e.g., states having a warning level of ~ 4.5) in the sequence of states, the second group of states including the second state of the plasma, wherein all states in the second group of states have the second warning level (e.g., ~ 4.5), wherein the second warning level is higher than the first warning level; and
determining the third warning level based, at least in part, on the first warning level and the second warning level (p. 1: “The Disruption Event Characterization and Forecasting Code (DECAF) ... is used to automate analysis of tokamak data to determine chains of events that lead to disruptions and to forecast their evolution to inform plasma profile and mode control systems aimed to avoid, or if needed to mitigate the deleterious effects of a disruption”; p. 5: “Early in the discharge, MHD modes are also found, and core plasma rotation is low.... However, the mode frequencies are relatively high at this time, which is generally a safe condition. Later, near t = 0.25 s, the MHD warning level increases.... However, these frequencies are not critically low (no mode bifurcations are found) and plasma rotation is not low, so the warning level remains low.... Near t ~ 0.7s more negative criteria occur.... [T]he DECAF analysis starts to show a significant change in the total MHD warning level about 180 ms earlier”).
Thus, Hahn, modified to include Sabbagh’s disruption risk instruction, would have resulted in the features of claim 71.
Regarding claim 72, Hahn in view of Sabbagh teaches the system of claim 71. Sabbagh teaches (see FIGS. 1, 4):
instructing the control system associated with the fusion device to perform the one or more first actions to change the operation of the fusion device is further based, at least in part, on the at least one state in the second group of states (Abstract, p. 1: “The Disruption Event Characterization and Forecasting Code (DECAF) ... is used to automate analysis of tokamak data to determine chains of events that lead to disruptions and to forecast their evolution to inform plasma profile and mode control systems aimed to avoid, or if needed to mitigate the deleterious effects of a disruption”; p. 5: “the DECAF analysis starts to show a significant change in the total MHD warning level about 180 ms earlier, providing far better advanced notice of the potential disruption allowing the potential for control systems to alter plasma stability to avoid disruption”, “forecasting such events to cue profile control systems”),
wherein the one or more first actions are selected to reduce a warning level for the plasma from the second warning level to the first warning level (Abstract, p. 1: “The Disruption Event Characterization and Forecasting Code (DECAF) ... inform[s] plasma profile and mode control systems aimed to avoid, or if needed to mitigate the deleterious effects of a disruption”; p. 5: “allowing the potential for control systems to alter plasma stability to avoid disruption”, “forecasting such events to cue profile control systems”).
Thus, Hahn, modified to include Sabbagh’s disruption risk instruction, would have resulted in the features of claim 72.
Regarding claim 73, Hahn in view of Sabbagh teaches the system of claim 72. Sabbagh teaches (see FIGS. 1, 4):
instructing the control system associated with the fusion device to perform the one or more first actions to change the operation of the fusion device is further based, at least in part, on a time evolution of states of the plasma represented in the sequence of states of the plasma (Abstract, p. 1: “The Disruption Event Characterization and Forecasting Code (DECAF) ... is used to automate analysis of tokamak data to determine chains of events that lead to disruptions and to forecast their evolution to inform plasma profile and mode control systems aimed to avoid, or if needed to mitigate the deleterious effects of a disruption”; p. 5: “the DECAF analysis starts to show a significant change in the total MHD warning level about 180 ms earlier, providing far better advanced notice of the potential disruption allowing the potential for control systems to alter plasma stability to avoid disruption”, “forecasting such events to cue profile control systems”),
wherein the one or more first actions are selected to control the fusion device to revert the second state of the plasma to the first state of the plasma, the second state occurring later in time than the first state in the sequence of states of the plasma (Abstract, p. 1: “The Disruption Event Characterization and Forecasting Code (DECAF) ... inform[s] plasma profile and mode control systems aimed to avoid, or if needed to mitigate the deleterious effects of a disruption”; p. 5: “allowing the potential for control systems to alter plasma stability to avoid disruption”, “forecasting such events to cue profile control systems”).
Thus, Hahn, modified to include Sabbagh’s disruption risk instruction, would have resulted in the features of claim 73.
Regarding claim 74, Hahn in view of Sabbagh teaches the system of claim 73. Sabbagh teaches the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, further cause the system to (see FIGS. 1, 4):
instruct the control system to perform one or more second actions to change an operation of the fusion device based, at least in part, on the time evolution of states of the plasma represented in the sequence of states of the plasma (Abstract, p. 1: “The Disruption Event Characterization and Forecasting Code (DECAF) ... is used to automate analysis of tokamak data to determine chains of events that lead to disruptions and to forecast their evolution to inform plasma profile and mode control systems aimed to avoid, or if needed to mitigate the deleterious effects of a disruption”; p. 5: “the DECAF analysis starts to show a significant change in the total MHD warning level about 180 ms earlier, providing far better advanced notice of the potential disruption allowing the potential for control systems to alter plasma stability to avoid disruption”, “forecasting such events to cue profile control systems”),
wherein the one or more second actions are selected to reduce the first warning level associated with the first state of the plasma to a lower warning level (Abstract, p. 1: “The Disruption Event Characterization and Forecasting Code (DECAF) ... inform[s] plasma profile and mode control systems aimed to avoid, or if needed to mitigate the deleterious effects of a disruption”; p. 5: “allowing the potential for control systems to alter plasma stability to avoid disruption”, “forecasting such events to cue profile control systems”).
Thus, Hahn, modified to include Sabbagh’s disruption risk instruction, would have resulted in the features of claim 74.
Regarding claim 77, Hahn in view of Sabbagh teaches the system of claim 73. Sabbagh teaches the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, further cause the system to: output to a computing device, an indication identifying the first collection of events, the second collection of events, the first warning level and the second warning level (FIGS. 4, 8).
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s amendments to the claims overcome the prior 35 U.S.C. 101 rejection.
Applicant’s amendments to the claims overcome the prior claim objections and some, but not all, of the prior 35 U.S.C. 112(b) rejections and have created new issues as discussed above.
Applicant argues “Vu does not describe that the ONEs in the set of ONEs have effects that are related in any way, much less ‘having effects linked in time,’ as recited in amended claim 67” (Remarks, pp. 11-12). However, as noted by Applicant, “Vu merely describes that those two events are considered to be simultaneously detected” (Remarks, p. 12). Thus, Vu’s “events” are “linked in time” in that they occur simultaneously (i.e., at the same time). Examiner further notes, as best understood and as discussed above, the “first collection of events” would appear to refer to “events” which occur at a same time. Thus, in the event the phrase “linked in time” is intending to require that the “events” occur at different times, the relationship between the “events”, “collection of events”, and “states” is unclear.
Applicant further argues “Vu fails to describe instructing a control system associated with a fusion device to perform one or more actions to change operation of the fusion device based on one or more warning levels associated with one or more states of the plasma in a sequence of states” and “Vu describes analyzing a set of events including a single ONE or multiple ONEs when they occur simultaneously to characterize a single ‘state’ of the plasma for which a control strategy is determined” (Remarks, pp. 12-13). Claim 67, as currently presented, requires “instruct[ing] a control system associated with the fusion device to perform one or more first actions to change operation of the fusion device based, at least in part, on the first warning level and/or the second warning level to reduce a risk that the disruption of the plasma will occur”. The claim therefore allows for the one or more first actions to be based at least in part on (1) the first warning level, (2) the second warning level, or (3) both the first warning level and the second warning level. Thus, if Vu discloses determining the control strategy based on a “single ‘state’ of the plasma”, as asserted by Applicant, Vu discloses at least the one or more first actions are based at least in part on the first warning level or the second warning level, i.e., the features of claim 67.
Applicant’s remaining arguments have been fully considered, but are directed towards newly added and/or amended claim language and are therefore addressed in the rejections above.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Prosecution on the merits is closed. See MPEP 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.
RCE Eligibility
Since prosecution is closed, this application is now eligible for a request for continued examination (RCE) under 37 CFR 1.114. Filing an RCE helps to ensure entry of an amendment to the claims, specification, and/or drawings.
Interview Information
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, Applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
Contact Information
Examiner Jinney Kil can be reached at (571) 270-5217, on Monday-Thursday from 8:30AM-6:30PM ET. Supervisor Jack Keith (SPE) can be reached at (571) 272-6878.
/JINNEY KIL/Examiner, Art Unit 3646
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