Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on 07/28/2025 was filed after the mailing date of the 07/23/2025 non-final rejection. The submission is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner.
Application Status
This action is in response to remarks and amendments received 10/23/2025.
Applicant has amended independent claims 1 and 11.
Applicant has canceled claims 23 and 24.
Claims 1, 4-11, and 14-24 are pending and have been examined.
This response is a Final Rejection.
Claim Rejections
Claims 1, 4-11, and 14-24 remain rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for being directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Acknowledgement of Issues Raised by Applicant
Applicant’s arguments drawn to the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejections have been fully considered, but are not persuasive. A complete response to these arguments is provided further below.
Response to Applicant Arguments
Response to Applicant’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 Arguments
With respect to 35 U.S.C. §101, Applicant asserts the claims are patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. §101 and Alice/Mayo analysis per the claims being directed to technological details indicating improvements to technology, not an abstract idea. The Examiner respectfully disagrees (analysis continues below).
As an initial matter, the relevant test to determine patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. §101 is the Alice/Mayo test (See MPEP §2106). The following analysis provided in this section results from the instant application’s claims being examined within the scope of the Alice/Mayo test framework. The Examiner notes there is no disagreement between the Office and Applicant for step 1 of Alice / Mayo analysis, and proceeds to address arguments drawn to step 2A Prong I, where the claims are evaluated to determine whether or not the claims recite an abstract idea.
As another initial matter, examiner, under broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, examiner interprets term “…signals …” may include the following, under broadest reasonable interpretation: i. Instances of the data used in an underwriting model, generally. This particular interpretation is supported by and consistent with Applicant specification, in view of limitations in claim 1 indicating the signal is “for” the underwriting models, Applicant specification, claims and remarks, failing to describe any particular structure of these signals beyond what they merely represent, and ¶48 of Applicant specification characterizing the signals as being analogous to qualification information needed as inputs to the (underwriting) models. I.e., the claimed signals are equivalent to data used to execute underwriting models, and, arguendo, even if successfully argued to amount to an additional element, are merely, at best, a placeholder for the abstract information and merely applied / merely limited to a particular technological environment. Keeping in mind the aforementioned signals are merely representative and/or a “stand-in” of information drawn to the abstract idea recited, examiner respectfully maintains that the manipulations to the signals (e.g., translation, organization, etc.,) of the signals is recitation of the abstract loan application processing recited. As previously explained in the 7/23/2025 Non-Final rejection1, the claims describe at a high degree of generality the translation, such that it is indistinguishable from mere textual formatting differences (e.g., YYYY/MM/DD vs., MM/DD/YYYY date formatting), and not anything limited to translation of data formats (e.g., JSON format to XML format), or any other form of translation necessarily rooted in technology or a technical field. This is at least partially why supporting arguments involving the manipulations / changes to the signals are not persuasive.
As another initial matter drawn to claim interpretation, the examiner respectfully disagrees with Applicant’s conclusion that the claims do not recite any intended use limitations. Examiner agrees in so far that the newly amended claim limitations now positively state the apparatus and method are …performing, via machine learning, a translation…, and no longer recite “…to translate…” for that portion of the claim drawn to the machine learning, as previously recited. However, the claims still include other recitations of intended use, such as, for example “…to determine that a new signal is needed for running the new underwriting model, …”, and “…to improve efficiency of the single platform…”, etc., of which have little patentable weight. Examiner notes Applicant has not provided an explanation for each of the previous limitations identified as intended use in the previous 7/23/2025 non-final rejection, as laid out on pages 3-4, and instead only addresses the performing step with respect to the machine learning claimed. Accordingly, examiner respectfully disagrees with Applicant’s conclusion and respectfully submits Applicant’s argument is cursory, when viewed in light of the 7/23/2025 Non-Final Rejection, as there a multitude of other intended use statements within the claims.
With respect to Applicant’s arguments asserting the claims are not abstract, the Examiner respectfully disagrees with the overall thrust of the arguments and fails to find them persuasive. With respect to Applicant’s arguments drawn to step 2A Prong I stating “The technical steps described demonstrate that the claimed invention is not an organization of human activity, and is also not abstract.”2, further stating, “"…independent claims 1 and 11 are each directed to applications or functions that avoid abstraction, …”, the Examiner respectfully submits that Applicant Remarks are implying that the claims indicate a clear improvement to technology or some computer functionality, and thus do not need to undergo the full eligibility analysis (See MPEP § 2106.06(b)). However, the Examiner respectfully submits that the claims do not provide such a clear improvement, and that a full eligibility analysis should be performed, consistent with MPEP § 2106.06(b). Furthermore, the Examiner respectfully maintains the Applicant’s claims recite the abstract idea as identified in the 101 rejections (further below). With respect to Applicant’s argument to step 2A analysis stating, “Perhaps a further commercial transaction may ensue thereafter, but that activity (even if abstract itself) is not the focus of the claimed invention, and is not what the recited independent claims are "directed to."”, the Examiner respectfully disagrees that Applicant’s claims merely involve an exception. The claims include multiple steps drawn to the abstract concept identified in the 101 rejection, including facilitating presentation of financial offers from multiple underwriting sources, including receiving an indication of a request from a customer for a financing offer, receiving qualification information associated with the request for provision to a plurality of underwriting models, running underwriting models to determine a listing of approved underwriters, selecting based on curation logic, one or more approving underwriters to receive a generated offer, and displaying the generated offer for each of the one or more of the approving underwriters, where the aforementioned involves tracking a listing of information defining the qualification information for all of the underwriting models and coordinating reuse of the same information within each of the underwriting models in which the same information is used, via translating information that is similar, but not identical, for usage in one of the underwriting models. See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(1): “Examiners should accordingly be careful to distinguish claims that recite an exception (which require further eligibility analysis) and claims that merely involve an exception (which are eligible and do not require further eligibility analysis”. The examiner respectfully maintains that the claims clearly recite commercial interactions of providing offers based on provisioning a plurality of underwriting models, not just mere involvement – this is supported by the following:
The preambles of independent claims 1 and 11 indicating the claimed apparatus and method is for facilitating presentation of financial offers […]
Applicant’s title of invention does not suggest the Applicant’s claimed invention is focused on anything other than the providing of financing offers online.
Similarly, ¶1 of Applicant Specification suggests the claimed invention is generally drawn to enabling merchants to offer multiple financing options to customers.
Regardless of Applicant’s asserted basis for eligibility drawn to the computer components / additional elements, Examiner fails to see how the aforementioned claim are not recitations of commercial interactions under step 2A Prong I. The Examiner does not contend that the claimed apparatus, processing circuitry, machine learning, etc., are abstract. However, the mere inclusion of claim limitations drawn to computer components / additional elements does not necessarily preclude the same aforementioned claims from being considered to recite an abstract idea under step 2A prong I of Alice/Mayo analysis – see Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 792 F.3d 1363, 1366, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015), emphasis added: ("An abstract idea does not become nonabstract by limiting the invention to a particular field of use or technological environment, such as the Internet [or] a computer").
Furthermore, with respect to Applicant assertion “…customer’s activity is not organized…”, Examiner respectfully disagrees with overall thrust of argument. At least ¶5 of Applicant specification conflicts with Applicant’s argued position, as it states: “embodiments … make provision of financing options to customers easier for the merchant, but also make it attractive and relatively automated for the individual entities that participate in the eco-system”. Arguendo, irrespective of whether or not the customer’s human activity is organized by the limitations of the claims (e.g., possibly the merchant’s or underwriters’ are instead), Examiner respectfully disagrees with Applicant’s implied assertion that the claims do not recite an abstract idea under Step 2A Prong I of Alice/Mayo analysis, as it is clearly drawn to the process of providing financing options, of which is a form of commercial activity and/or legal interactions.
Accordingly, for the reasons provided above, as well as the reasons listed in the 101 rejections further below, Applicant’s arguments drawn to step 2A Prong I are not persuasive (Step 2A Prong I: Yes – the claims recite an abstract idea).
With respect to Applicant’s supporting arguments drawn to step 2A Prong II and step 2B Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner respectfully disagrees and fails to find them convincing for the following reasons:
With respect to Applicant’s supporting arguments drawn to the claims being directed to technological details and not an abstract idea, the Examiner respectfully disagrees. As an initial matter, the Examiner respectfully submits the claim limitations of “…perform a translation between a first signal and a second signal of a similar function, but not identical format to the first signal, to translate a formatting of the first signal to a formatting of the second signal for usage in an underwriting model employing the second signal…” are recitations of the abstract idea, and not additional elements. For example, the claimed “…translation between a first signal and a second signal of a similar function, but not identical format to the first signal, to translate a formatting of the first signal to a formatting of a second signal…” is described at a high degree of generality such that it is indistinguishable from mere textual formatting differences (e.g., YYYY/MM/DD vs., MM/DD/YYYY date formatting), and not anything limited to translation of data formats (e.g., JSON format to XML format), or any other form of translation necessarily rooted in technology or a technical field. Furthermore, Applicant’s specifications and claims fail to provide any technical details of how the translation is achieved, beyond merely stating “…performing, via machine learning…”, where the apparatus and processing circuitry are indistinguishable from a general-purpose computer and its corresponding components, respectively (MPEP § 2106.05(f)(1)). While the claim limitation drawn to the machine learning “performing” may not be an intended use limitation and instead positively recited after the received amendment, the amended limitations still do not provide sufficient details that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize as providing an improvement to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field (MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) & 2106.05(a)), as the machine learning, processing circuitry, and apparatus are all claimed at a high degree of generality and are generic in light of the technological environment of computers and the technical field of machine learning. I.e., of one ordinary skill in the art would still identify the machine learning, circuitry, etc., being merely applied (MPEP § 2106.05(f)(1)), even when the translation step is positively recited. See the following relevant case law and/or MPEP cites:
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 792 F.3d 1363, 1366, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015), emphasis added: ("An abstract idea does not become nonabstract by limiting the invention to a particular field of use or technological environment, such as the Internet [or] a computer").
MPEP §2106.05: “As the Supreme Court explained in Alice Corp., mere physical or tangible implementation of an exception is not in itself an inventive concept and does not guarantee eligibility”.
“Examples that the courts have indicated may not be sufficient to show an improvement to technology include: … iii. Gathering and analyzing information using conventional techniques and displaying the result, TLI Communications, 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48; …”.
The examiner respectfully disagrees with Applicant arguments stating “The claims are … directed … to the technological details of how to improve efficiency of a computing platform …” (emphasis added), as there no details of the claimed invention that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize as providing an improvement to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field (MPEP §§2106.04(d)(1) & 2106.05(a)). Both the problem, i.e., the problem of underwriting models needing to obtain the qualification information / signals, and the solution, i.e., the solution of obtaining those qualification information / signals, are rooted in considerations corresponding to the abstract idea recited, where the additional elements are merely applied at a high degree of generality and merely used as tools to carry out a solution to the abstract problem identified. To achieve this particular functionality drawn the abstract idea, the claims only require some form of non-descript configuration of the processing circuitry and non-descript machine learning algorithm simply performing the steps of the abstract idea at a high degree of generality. Accordingly, the limitations drawn to determinations of needing new signals via processing circuitry are indistinguishable from mere addition of general-purpose computers added to the abstract idea ‘after the fact’ / ‘post-hoc’, which is insufficient to indicate improvements to computer functionality3.
Applicant’s supporting argument stating general purpose computers cannot perform the claimed method are not persuasive, as Applicant has not provided any underlying reasoning or rationale for the assertion beyond mere conclusory statements. Furthermore, Applicant specification and does not provide details of the claimed “apparatus” and “processing circuitry”, such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the Applicant’s claimed invention as a particular machine distinguishable from a general-purpose computer (see MPEP §2106.05(b)). Furthermore, the Applicant’s argument is unconvincing in view of Applicant’s own arguments seemingly considering embodiments of the claimed invention as including general-purpose computers, per stating “Even if operated on a general-purpose computer, the claimed functions are clearly directed to ….”.
Examiner respectfully disagrees with Applicant assertion that the limitations drawn to the formatting are “… only possible with machine learning”, as the Applicant provides no underlying reasoning or rationale explaining as to why this is the case, beyond mere conclusory statements. Given the breadth of scope of the claimed “…translation…”, as explained above, Examiner fails to see as to how this problem is beyond all technology that is not machine learning technology. As further support for refuting Applicant’s argument, see ¶49 of Applicant specification stating “…translation tables…” as an adequate solution to perform the form of translation contemplated by Applicant.
Examiner respectfully disagrees with Applicant’s implied argument that “employing a new [underwriting] model that uses signaling [i.e., qualification information] not currently obtained…” is a technological solution to a technological problem. Both the problem, i.e., the problem of underwriting models needing to obtain the qualification information / signals, and the solution, i.e., the solution of obtaining those qualification information / signals, are rooted in considerations corresponding to the abstract idea recited, where the additional elements are merely applied at a high degree of generality and used as tools to merely carry out the solution to the abstract problem identified. For example, the “…processing circuitry…” itself is claimed at a high degree of generality and merely used as a tool so as to achieve desired results rooted in the abstract idea recited (i.e., “…to determine that a new signal is needed for running the new underwriting model”). To achieve this particular functionality drawn the abstract idea, the claims only require some form of non-descript configuration of the processing circuitry and a generic machine learning algorithm that merely acts as a black-box to achieve the desired transformation sought to carry out the abstract idea recited. Accordingly, the limitations drawn to determinations of needing new signals via processing circuitry are indistinguishable from mere addition of general-purpose computers added to the abstract idea ‘after the fact’ / ‘post-hoc’, which is insufficient to indicate improvements to computer functionality4.
With respect to Applicant’s supporting arguments drawn to improved computational efficiency, per the claims purportedly realizing a technical form of data deduplication, the Examiner respectfully disagrees that the claim limitations indicate the claimed invention “solves a technical problem … avoiding data duplication … in a particular way” (emphasis added). Translating information into another form is recitation of the abstract idea recited, as previously stated above. See MPEP 2106.05(a), emphasis added: “… “it is important to keep in mind that an improvement in the abstract idea itself (e.g. a recited fundamental economic concept) is not an improvement in technology …. Merely adding generic computer components to perform the method is not sufficient [to show that the involvement of a computer assists in improving the technology]”. Furthermore, with respect to the “improvement of computational efficiency” portion of argument, the Examiner respectfully submits this aspect of argument is not persuasive, as utilizing machine learning is generally understood to typically be more computationally expensive relative to a simple look up of a translation (i.e., mapping) table, of which is clearly a valid alternative, per at least ¶49 of Applicant specification: “With respect to the translation, the signal manager144 may employ translation tables or machine learning to enable formatting or other technical differences to be modified so that similar signals in form or function can be shared between models […].”. Furthermore, the Examiner respectfully submits that, at any point of translation, an underlying mapping must exist and be either accessible to, or at least generated by, whatever is performing the translation. This accordingly brings into doubt the validity that any meaningful data deduplication is occurring with regards to the apparatus / platform claimed, regardless of Applicant Specification disclosure.
With respect to Applicant’s argument: “…generation of interfaces that are used to obtain new signals … The claims are therefore not directed to the abstract idea … and instead to the technological details of how to improve efficiency …”, the Examiner respectfully disagrees the limitations drawn to interface generation provide a technological solution to a technological problem under Alice/Mayo analysis. The limitations “… generate a new interface to obtain the signal…” describe the generating of the interface at a high degree of generality and simply in terms of desired results, with the intention to subsequently carry out a functionality rooted only in the abstract idea recited (i.e., obtaining a signal needed for running the new underwriting model); there are insufficient details to indicative a technological solution to a technological problem. I.e., the generating step is limited only in so far that it is achieved via some form of non-descript configuration of the processing circuitry of an apparatus and non-descript machine learning algorithm, where the apparatus and processing circuitry are indistinguishable from a general-purpose computer and its corresponding components generic to the technological environment of computers (See MPEP § 2106.05(f)(1)). Stated differently, the instant claims do not include any specific technological details as to how the generic processing circuitry generates the interface, beyond merely invoking the use of a non-descript machine learning algorithm executed on computer components indistinguishable from a general-purpose computer. This supports the aforementioned determination that the additional elements of the independent claims are merely applied. See MPEP §2106.05 (f)(1): “…claim limitations that attempt to cover any solution to an identified problem with no restriction on how the result is accomplished and no description of the mechanism for accomplishing the result, does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more because this type of recitation is equivalent to the words ‘apply it’”. In light of the above rationales, the additional elements, considered both individually and as an ordered combination, are indistinguishable from mere addition of general-purpose computers added to the abstract idea ‘after the fact’ / ‘post-hoc’, which is insufficient to indicate improvements to computer functionality. Accordingly, the examiner respectfully disagrees with Applicant arguments stating “The claims are therefore … directed … to the technological details of how to improve efficiency of a computing platform …” (emphasis added), and maintains there are no details of the claimed invention that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize as providing an improvement to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field (MPEP §§2106.04(d)(1) & 2106.05(a)).
Accordingly, for the reasons provided above, as well as in the 101 rejections further below, the Examiner respectfully maintains that the claims are directed to an abstract idea under step 2A Prong II (Step 2A Prong II: NO, the additional claimed elements are not integrated into a practical application), and maintains that the claims do not provide an inventive concept, i.e., amount to significantly more than the judicial exception (Step 2B: NO. The claims do not amount to significantly more), because the claims merely utilize computers as tools to generally apply the judicial exception within a particular technological environment, and do not provide details such that it would lead one of ordinary skill in the art to recognize the claims as providing an improvement to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field (MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1), 2106.05(a), 210605(h), and 2106.05(f)). The claims are not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. §101, when analyzed under the Alice/Mayo test.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1, 4-11, and 14-24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
As an initial matter, the relevant test is the Alice/Mayo test5. The following analysis provided in this section results from the instant application’s claims being examined within the scope of the Alice/Mayo test framework.
When analyzed under step 1 of the Alice/Mayo test6, claims 1, 4-10, 21, and 23 are directed to “An apparatus...comprising processing circuitry…” and claims 11, 14-20, 22, and 24 are directed to a “… method …”. Therefore, each of the claims are directed to one of the four statutory categories of invention (Step 1 of Alice/Mayo Test: YES).
In light of step 2A Alice/Mayo analysis performed on the instant claims7, claims 1, 4-11, and 14-24 have been determined to be directed to an abstract idea of loan application processing. The rationales for the aforementioned determination are explained further below.
When analyzed under prong I of revised step 2A, claims 1, 4-11, and 14-24 recite a method of organizing human activity8, because independent claims 1 and 11 recite:
“1. … facilitating presentation of financial offers from multiple sources … comprising [steps to]:
receive an indication of a request from a customer for a financing offer;
receive qualification information associated with the request for provision to a plurality of underwriting models, the underwriting models being associated with respective different underwriters;
… [use] each of the underwriting models to determine a listing of approving underwriters;
apply curation logic to the listing of approving underwriters;
select, based on the curation logic, one or more of the approving underwriters to receive a generated offer;
and direct display … of the generated offer for each of the one or more of the approving underwriters that is selected,
… track a listing of all signals defining the qualification information for all of the underwriting models;
and coordinate reuse of a same signal within each of the underwriting models in which the same signal is used,
and wherein the coordinating reuse of the same signal includes performing … a translation between a first signal and a second signal of similar function, but not identical format to the first signal, to translate a formatting of the first signal to a formatting the second signal for usage in an underwriting model employing the second signal …
… receive a new underwriting model to include in the running of the each of the underwriting models,
… generate a listing of required signals for running the new underwriting model to determine that a new signal is needed for running the new underwriting model, and … obtain the new signal.”
“11. A method for facilitating presentation of financial offers from multiple sources …, the method comprising:
receiving an indication of a request from a customer for a financing offer;
receiving qualification information associated with the request for provision to a plurality of underwriting models, the underwriting models being associated with respective different underwriters;
running each of the underwriting models to determine a listing of approving underwriters; applying curation logic to the listing of approving underwriters;
selecting, based on the curation logic, one or more of the approving underwriters to receive a generated offer; and
directing display, …, of the generated offer for each of the one or more of the approving underwriters that is selected,
wherein the method further comprises:
tracking a listing of all signals defining the qualification information for all of the underwriting models; and coordinating reuse of a same signal within each of the underwriting models in which the same signal is used, and
wherein the coordinating reuse of the same signal includes performing … a translation between a first signal and a second signal of similar function, but not identical format to the first signal, to translate a formatting of the first signal to a formatting of the second signal for usage in an underwriting model employing the second signal …, and
wherein the method further comprises receiving a new underwriting model to include in the running of the each of the underwriting models, generating a listing of required signals for running the new underwriting model to determine that a new signal is needed for running the new underwriting model, and … obtain[ing] the new signal.”
Under broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification9, the above claim limitations of claims 1 and 11 both recite commercial and/or legal interactions of loan application processing, including steps of (A) receiving an indication of a request for financing, (B) receiving qualification information, (C), coordinating reuse of the qualification information between underwriting models of underwriters by accounting for any translatable differences amongst one or more similar types of qualification information needed by the underwriting models, (D) receiving a new underwriting model, (E) determining whether new qualification information is needed for the underwriting model, (F) obtaining the new qualification information needed for the new underwriting model, (G), processing each of the underwriting models with used and/or reused qualification information, (H) determining loan approvals based on the processed qualification information used and/or reused in the underwriting models, (I) determining loan qualification data needed for each of the underwriting models, and (J), presenting offers corresponding to one or more loan approvals to a customer. (Step 2A Prong I of Alice/Mayo Test: Yes, the claims recite an abstract idea).
The aforementioned determination made under step 2A Prong I of Alice/Mayo analysis is supported by the following10:
Applicant specification’s “Technical Field” section suggests the claimed invention is generally drawn to enabling merchants to offer multiple financing options to customers: “Example embodiments generally relate to … apparatuses, systems, and methods for facilitating commerce by enabling merchants to offer multiple financing options to customers … without having to individually setup arrangements with each individual underwriter associated with those options”.
At least ¶48 of Applicant specification characterizing “signals” as equivalent to qualification information used for underwriting (underline emphasis added): “Each individual underwriting model effectively encodes the business logic used by the corresponding underwriter to make credit determinations (e.g., whether or not to grant or deny credit to the customer being evaluated under the model). The encoding necessarily includes a set of qualification information or signals that are needed as inputs to the model. This, of course, means that different qualification information or signals must correspondingly be obtained by the underwriting model management module140 to enable the credit determination to be made”.
The preambles of independent claims 1 and 11 indicating the claimed apparatus and method is for facilitating presentation of financial offers […]
Applicant’s title of invention does not suggest the Applicant’s claimed invention is focused on anything other than the providing of financing offers online.
Case law precedent indicates that the specificity of the abstract idea does not make an abstract idea any less abstract – see the following:
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016): “A narrow claim directed to an abstract idea, however, is not necessarily patent-eligible …”.
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp, 839 F.3d at 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016): “… a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea”.
This judicial exception recited is not integrated into a practical application because, when analyzed under prong II of revised step 2A of the Alice/Mayo test11:
The additional elements “An apparatus for…”, “…on a single platform…”, “…the apparatus comprising processing circuitry configured to…”, “…run…”, “…at a communication device associated with the customer…”, “…wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to…”, “…employing machine learning to…”, “via machine learning”, “…wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to generate a new interface to…”, and “…automatically…” when evaluated both individually and as an ordered combination, amount to no more than mere instructions to implement the abstract idea and/or merely limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (MPEP §§ 2106.05 (f), (h)). Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it" (or an equivalent) is insufficient to impart patent eligibility under Alice. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208, 223-24 (2014): "… Stating an abstract idea "while adding the words ‘apply it’ " is not enough for patent eligibility. … Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea " ‘to a particular technological environment.’ … Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it with a computer" simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result”.
The claims merely invoke computers as tools to perform an abstract business process (e.g., the recited loan application processing – see MPEP §2106.05(f)(2)). This stance is supported by Applicant specification’s “Technical Field” section disclosing “Example embodiments generally relate to … apparatuses, systems, and methods for facilitating commerce by enabling merchants to offer multiple financing options to customers … without having to individually setup arrangements with each individual underwriter associated with those options” (emphasis added), Applicant remarks seemingly acknowledging the claimed computer components may include those of general purpose computers12, and Applicant specification describing embodiments of the claimed “apparatus” and “communication device” at a high degree of generality, such that the aforementioned are indistinguishable from general purpose computers and associated elements thereof. For example, Examiner notes that nearly every general-purpose computer generic to computer technology (e.g., the “apparatus”) includes processors and/or memory (e.g., “processing circuitry”) which can generally “receive…[data]”, “run…[programs]”, “apply…logic”, “select … [data]”, “…direct display, at …[another device]…[data]”, “track… [data]”, “coordinate reuse of … [data]”, “determine… [results of boolean logic]”, and “…generate a new interface to obtain [data]…”. Furthermore, the Applicant’s specification does not provide any technical descriptions of the processing circuitry that could be reasonably construed as providing functional and/or structural characteristics distinguishable from that of a generic computer processor (For example, see Fig. 2, ref 100 and ¶40). Therefore, the processing circuitry is understood to correspond to generic computer components that are so well-known in the art that it does not require additional delineation. Lastly, the “…employing [of] machine learning…” is claimed at a high degree of generality and merely used to process data drawn to the abstract idea13, so as to achieve desired results rooted in the abstract idea recited (i.e., “…to translate a formatting of the first signal to a formatting of the second signal for usage in an underwriting model employing the second signal”,). Accordingly, even when considered as an ordered combination, the claims’ additional elements are indistinguishable from mere addition of general-purpose computers added to the abstract idea ‘after the fact’ / ‘post-hoc’, which is insufficient to indicate improvements to computer functionality14.
Lastly, with respect to Applicant’s arguments asserting (A) the claims provide operations that impose meaningful limits and (B) the claimed functions are directed to a new application or function that were not known or obvious15, the Examiner respectfully disagrees with the overall thrust of the arguments. As evidenced by the reasoning above, and the explanations provided in the 101 rejections (further below), the claims do not provide any specific hardware or specific computerized functions, and instead merely apply the judicial exception at a high degree of generality. Mere computer implementation of the abstract idea via computer technology wholly generic to the technological environment of computers does not provide a “meaningful limitation”. Rather, it is indicative of limiting the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (MPEP § 2106.05(h)), and the computer technology being merely applied (MPEP § 2106.05(f)). Furthermore, the specificity and/or novelty of the recited abstract idea itself is not indicative of either a practical application or amounting to significantly more, even when implemented in a particular technological environment. See the following case law and MPEP cites:
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp, 839 F.3d at 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016): “… a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea”.
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89): “"[t]he `novelty' of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter."”.
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016): “A narrow claim directed to an abstract idea, however, is not necessarily patent-eligible …”.
MPEP § 2106 I: “…eligibility should not be evaluated based on whether the claimed invention has utility, because "[u]tility is not the test for patent-eligible subject matter." Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1380, 118 USPQ2d 1541, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 2016).”
In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009): “The Court rejected the notion that mere recitation of a practical application of an abstract idea makes it patentable”.
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 792 F.3d 1363, 1366, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("An abstract idea does not become nonabstract by limiting the invention to a particular field of use or technological environment, such as the Internet [or] a computer").
BSG Tech LLC vs. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018): “It has been clear since Alice that a Claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept”
MPEP §2106.05: “As the Supreme Court explained in Alice Corp., mere physical or tangible implementation of an exception is not in itself an inventive concept and does not guarantee eligibility”.
Accordingly, for the reasons provided above, as well as in the 101 rejections further below, the Examiner respectfully maintains that the claims are directed to an abstract idea under step 2A Prong II (Step 2A Prong II: NO, the additional claimed elements are not integrated into a practical application), and maintains that the claims do not provide an inventive concept, i.e., amount to significantly more than the judicial exception (Step 2B: NO. The claims do not amount to significantly more), because the claims merely utilize computers as tools to generally apply the judicial exception within a particular technological environment, and do not provide details such that it would lead one of ordinary skill in the art to recognize the claims as providing an improvement to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field (MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1), 2106.05(a), 210605(h), and 2106.05(f)). The claims are not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. §101, when analyzed under the Alice/Mayo test.
The Applicant’s claims fail to provide sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field (MPEP §§2106.04(d)(1) & 2106.05(a)). For example, the instant claims do not include any specific technical details as to how the claimed machine learning model is specifically employed, so as to “…translate a formatting of the first signal to a formatting of the second signal...” beyond merely stating “… employing machine learning…” (emphasis added). Similarly, the instant claims do not include any specific technical details as to how the processing circuitry is “configured to determine a new signal is needed”, or how the processing circuitry “is further configured to generate a new interface …”, and instead merely states the desired results. This supports the aforementioned determination that the additional elements of the independent claims are merely applied. See MPEP §2106.05 (f)(1): “…claim limitations that attempt to cover any solution to an identified problem with no restriction on how the result is accomplished and no description of the mechanism for accomplishing the result, does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more because this type of recitation is equivalent to the words ‘apply it’”.
The judicial exception alone cannot provide the improvement under Alice/Mayo analysis, and an improvement in the abstract idea itself is not a technological solution to a technological problem (MPEP §§ 2106.05 (a), (a) II). The purported improvements discussed in Applicant specification are squarely drawn to the abstract idea itself – what is purportedly improved is (A) the access of merchants to customers and (B) “outcomes for all members or participants in the ecosystem”, not anything rooted in computer functionality or any other technology or technical field – see ¶6 and ¶38 of Applicant specification. Furthermore, merely adding computer functionality to increase the speed or efficiency of the abstract idea does not confer patent eligibility. See MPEP 2106.05(a) II: “… it is important to keep in mind that an improvement in the abstract idea itself (e.g. a recited fundamental economic concept) is not an improvement in technology … Merely adding generic computer components to perform the method is not sufficient”.
The claim limitations “…to improve efficiency of the single platform…” are recitations of intended use that do not carry any patentable weight and do not result in any meaningful distinctions for the claimed translating limitations under Alice/Mayo analysis.
In light of the above rationales provided for step 2A Prong II analysis, the Examiner respectfully submits the focus of the claims is not on an improvement in computers as tools, but rather on an abstract idea that uses computers as tools. Considered both separately and as an ordered combination, the additional elements of the independent claims do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, as they do no more than represent computers performing functions that correspond to (i.e., implement,) the acts of the abstract loan application processing, and do not provide details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claims as reflecting an improvement to the functioning of a computer or any other technology or technical field. (Step 2A Prong II of Alice/Mayo Test: NO, the additional elements do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application). Accordingly, claims 1 and 11 are determined to be directed to an abstract idea.
When analyzed under step 2B16, claims 1 and 11 do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. Claims 1 and 11, each when viewed as a whole, do not include additional elements amounting to significantly more, as their additional elements, each viewed both individually and as an ordered combination, amount to no more than mere instructions to implement the abstract loan application processing concept within a particular technological environment – see MPEP §§ 2106.05 (f), (h) and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208, 223-24 (2014). Accordingly, when considered both separately and as an ordered combination, none of the elements of the claims add significantly more to the abstract idea itself (i.e., an inventive concept), as merely employing computers as tools to automate and/or implement the abstract idea cannot provide significantly more than the judicial exception itself – see BSG Tech LLC vs. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018): “It has been clear since Alice that a Claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept” and MPEP § 2106.05: “As the Supreme Court explained in Alice Corp., mere physical or tangible implementation of an exception is not in itself an inventive concept …” (Step 2B: No. The claims do not amount to significantly more).
Hence, independent claims 1 and 11 are not patent eligible.
With respect to the dependent claims, they have each been given the full Alice/Mayo analysis, including analyzing the additional elements both individually and as an ordered combination (if any). The dependent claims are also held patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because of the same reasoning as above, and because the claim limitations of the dependent claims fail to establish that the claims are integrated into a practical application or amount to significantly more. The rationales for the aforementioned determinations are explained further below.
With respect to dependent claims 4-7, 9, 10, 14-17, 19, and 20, their limitations each fail to provide any further additional elements outside the abstract idea, and only further specify the abstract loan application processing concept. Furthermore, their limitations do not indicate that the previously mentioned additional elements of their respective parent claims successfully integrate the judicial exception into a practical application or amount to significantly more than the judicial exception itself, either individually or as an ordered combination. Accordingly, claims 4-7, 9, 10, 14-17, 19, and 20 do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application or amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. Therefore, dependent claims 4-7, 9, 10, 14-17, 19, and 20 are also not patent eligible.
With respect to dependent claims 8 and 18, they recite further details of the abstract loan application processing, per reciting limitations “…wherein all of the underwriting models are received from external sources associated with the respective different underwriters, and wherein each of the underwriting models is stored at a location commonly accessible …”. The additional element, “…by the processing circuitry to enable simultaneous running of the … models by the processing circuitry…” does no more than represent the use of computers as tools to perform the abstract idea and/or merely limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (MPEP §§ 2106.05(f) & 2106.05(h)). Merely automating the loan application processing to try to make the abstract process faster or more efficient via techniques conventional to the technological environment of computers (, e.g., parallel processing,) does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application or amount to significantly more. See Customedia Techs. V. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, (Fed. Cir. 2020): “We have held that ‘claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer’ was insufficient to render the claims patent eligible as an improvement to computer functionality.” and Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commce’n Tech. Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2020): “Even assuming this collection of elements led to a more efficient way of controlling resource access, ‘our precedent is clear that merely adding computer functionality to increase the speed or efficiency of the process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea …’’. Accordingly, when considered as a whole, these claims do not improve the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical field, do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, and do not amount to significantly more. Therefore, dependent claims 8 and 18 are also not patent eligible.
With respect to dependent claims 21 and 22, they recite further details of the abstract loan application processing, per reciting limitations “…evaluate signal effectiveness in relation to model strength for predicting offer acceptance and loan repayment …”. The additional elements, “…wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to” and “employing another instance of machine learning to” do no more than represent the use of computers as tools to perform the abstract idea and merely limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (MPEP §§ 2106.05(f) & 2106.05(h)). Accordingly, when considered as a whole, these claims do not improve the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical field, do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, and do not amount to significantly more. Therefore, dependent claims 21 and 22 are also not patent eligible.
With respect to dependent claims 23 and 24, they do not provide any further recitation of the abstract loan application processing concept under step 2A Prong I analysis. However, under step 2A Prong II and step 2B analysis, the additional element “…wherein generating the new interface comprises generating a new technical interface for automatically obtaining the new signal” does no more than represent the use of computers as tools to perform the abstract idea and/or merely limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (MPEP §§ 2106.05(f) & 2106.05(h)). Merely automating the loan application processing to try to make the process faster or more efficient does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application or amount to significantly more. Furthermore, the label “technical” does not further limit claim scope of the claimed “…new technical interface…” to any meaningful use of the judicial exception, as the label “…technical…” does not impart any particular limiting definition to the “…new technical interface…”, does not limit the claimed “…new technical interface…” to perform any particular additional technical functionality, and does not limit the claimed “…new technical interface…” to any particular structure, even when read in light of Applicant’s specification (see ¶50). Stated differently, the term “technical” does not add any further limiting details to the claimed “…interface…”, as the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “interface”, consistent with the Applicant specification, was already understood to correspond to interfaces corresponding to computers (i.e., a technological / “technical” environment). Accordingly, when considered as a whole, these claims do not improve the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical field, do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, and do not amount to significantly more. Therefore, dependent claims 23 and 24 are also not patent eligible.
No Prior Art Rejection
Examiner notes the closest prior art of record is the same as indicated on pages 28-32 of the 10/23/2025 non-final rejection (I.e., Javed, Sharma, Krupa, and El Husseini).
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/M.A.M./Examiner, Art Unit 3696
/MATTHEW S GART/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3696
1 See item “a.” on page 8 of the 7/23/2025 Non-Final Rejection, beneath ¶22.
2 See pages 10 of Remarks received 5/20/2025.
3 See MPEP §§ 2106.05(f)(2) & 2106.05(a) I.
4 See MPEP §§ 2106.05(f)(2) & 2106.05(a) I.
5 See MPEP § 2106 I.
6 See MPEP §§ 2106.03 I, II.
7 See MPEP §§ 2106.04 I, II, (d) I.
8 See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2) II
9 See MPEP § 2111.
10 MPEP §2106.07, underline emphasis added: “When evaluating a claimed invention for compliance with the substantive law on eligibility, examiners should review the record as a whole (e.g., the specification, claims, the prosecution history, and any relevant case law precedent or prior art) before reaching a conclusion with regard to whether the claimed invention sets forth patent eligible subject matter.”
12 See page 11 of the remarks received 5/20/2025: “Even if operated on a general purpose computer…”.
13 E.g., “…first signal”.
14 See MPEP §§ 2106.05(f)(2) & 2106.05(a) I.
15 See page 11 of Remarks received 5/20/2025.
16 See MPEP § 2106.05.