DETAILED ACTION
1. Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
2. Status of Application and Claims
Claims 1-15 and 17-20 are pending.
Claims 1, 11 and 15 were amended or newly added in the Applicant’s filing(s) on 08/05/2025.
Claim 21 was cancelled in the Applicant’s filing(s) on 08/05/2025.
This office action is being issued in response to the Applicant's filing(s) on 08/05/2025.
3. Claim Interpretation
The subject matter of a properly construed claim is defined by the terms that limit its scope when given their broadest reasonable interpretation. see MPEP §2013(I)(C). Specifically, the “broadest reasonable construction ‘in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.’” See MPEP §2111, citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005). However, “[t]hough understanding the claim language may be aided by explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into claim limitations that are not part of the claim.” See MPEP §2111.01, citing Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 69 USPQ2d 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Construing claims broadly during prosecution is not unfair to the applicant, because the applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims to obtain more precise claim coverage. See MPEP §2111, citing In re Yamamoto, 222 USPQ 934, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
As a general matter, grammar and the plain meaning of terms as understood by one having ordinary skill in the art used in a claim will dictate whether, and to what extent, the language limits the claim scope. See MPEP §2013(I)(C). Language that suggests or makes a feature or step optional but does not require that feature or step does not limit the scope of a claim under the broadest reasonable claim interpretation. See MPEP §2013(I)(C).
As such, claim limitations that contain statement(s) such as “if, may, might, can, could” are treated as containing optional language. See MPEP §2013(I)(C). As matter of linguistic precision, optional claim elements do not narrow claim limitations, since they can always be omitted. See MPEP §2013(I)(C).
Similarly, a method step exercised or triggered upon the satisfaction of a condition, where there remains the possibility that the condition was not satisfied under the broadest reasonable interpretation, is an optional claim limitation. see MPEP §2111.04(II). As the Applicant does not address what happens should the optional claim limitations fail, Examiner assumes that nothing happens (i.e., the method stops). An alternate interpretation is that merely the claim limitations based upon the condition are not triggered or performed.
In addition, when a claim requires selection of an element from a list of alternatives, the prior art teaches the element if one of the alternatives is taught by the prior art. See MPEP §2143.03, citing Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Language in a method or system claim that states only the intended use or intended result, but does not result in a manipulative difference in the steps of the method claim nor a structural difference between the system claim and the prior art, fails to distinguish the claims from the prior art. In other words, if the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim.
The following types of claim language may raise a question as to its limiting effect (this list is not exhaustive):
Statements of intended use or field of use, including statements of purpose or intended use in the preamble. See MPEP §2111.02;
Clauses such as “adapted to”, “adapted for”, “wherein”, and “whereby.” See MPEP §2111.04;
Contingent limitations. See MPEP §2111.04(II);
Printed matter. See MPEP §2111.05; and
Functional language associated with a claim term. See MPEP §2181.
As such, while all claim limitations have been considered and all words in the claims have been considered in judging the patentability of the claimed invention, the following italicized, underlined and emboldened language is interpreted as not further limiting the scope of the claimed invention.
Additionally, the following italicized, underlined and emboldened language is not necessarily an exhaustive list of claim language that is interpreted as not further limiting the scope of the claimed invention. Applicant should review all claims for additional claim interpretation issues.
Claim 1 recites a method comprising:
determining, at the one or more processors, an operational mode for the vehicle, the operational mode indicative of whether a human driver, or the vehicle was in control of the vehicle at the time of the vehicle collision, based upon, at least in part, analysis of the sensor data;
identifying, at the one or more processors, a cause of the vehicle collision to be a faulty autonomous technology, wherein the faulty autonomous technology is Vehicle-to- Vehicle (V2V) wireless communication technology;
determining, at the one or more processors, (i) a first percentage of fault for the vehicle collision attributable to the human driver and (ii) a second percentage of fault for the vehicle collision attributable to the vehicle based upon, at least in part, analysis of the sensor data, and the operational mode for the vehicle at the time of the vehicle collision;
Examiner notes that the method claim recites “identifying … a cause of the vehicle collision to be a faulty autonomous technology.” The autonomous technology has been affirmatively identified as the cause of the of the vehicle collision.
Such an identification means that the method has determined the operational mode for the vehicle is the vehicle. If the autonomous technology caused the vehicle collision, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the vehicle (i.e., the autonomous technology of the vehicle) was in control of the vehicle.
Such an identification also means that the method has determined the fault for the vehicle collision is attributable to the vehicle. If the autonomous technology caused the vehicle collision, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the vehicle (i.e., the autonomous technology of the vehicle) was the fault of the vehicle collision is attributable to the vehicle (i.e., the autonomous technology of the vehicle).
Claims 11 and 15 have similar issues.
Claim 4 recites a method wherein the sensor data includes data generated by smart infrastructure or by a vehicle not involved in the vehicle collision in the vicinity of the vehicle collision.
Claiming method steps in the past tense (i.e., data generated by a smart infrastructure) can be interpreted as the method steps performed in the past are outside the scope of the claimed method. Alternatively stated, the scope of the claimed method are the active method steps which are building off a pre-existing state. The method steps performed for creation of the pre-existing state are outside the scope of the claimed invention.
Claims 5-7 and 12-13 have similar issues.
Claim 6 recites a method wherein determining the first percentage of fault and the second percentage of fault includes inputting the sensor data collected into a machine learning program trained to identify a percentage of fault attributable to one or more factors based upon sensor data.
Examiner notes that the method comprises inputting data into a machine learning program not utilizing a machine learning program to process sensor data or receiving output data from a machine learning program.
Claiming method steps in the past tense (i.e., a machine learning program trained to identify) can be interpreted as the method steps performed in the past are outside the scope of the claimed method. Alternatively stated, the scope of the claimed method are the active method steps which are building off a pre-existing state. The method steps performed for creation of the pre-existing state are outside the scope of the claimed invention.
Claim 7, 14, 18 and 20 have similar issues.
4. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-15 and 17-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
STEP 1
The claimed invention falls within one of the four statutory categories of invention (i.e., process, machine, manufacture and composition of matter). See MPEP §2106.03.
STEP 2A – PRONG ONE
The claim(s) recite(s) a method, a system to perform a method and/or computer-readable medium containing instructions, when executed, perform a method comprising:
receiving, … , a first transaction … by a source and including sensor data;
verifying, … , an identity of the source using a … proof-of-identity included in the first transaction;
determining, … , that a vehicle collision involving a vehicle occurred based upon, at least in part, analysis of the sensor data;
determining, … , an operational mode for the vehicle, the operational mode indicative of whether a human driver or the vehicle system was in control of the vehicle at the time of the vehicle collision, based upon, at least in part, analysis of the sensor data;
identifying, …, a cause of the vehicle collision to be faulty autonomous technology, wherein the faulty autonomous technology is Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) wireless technology communication technology;
determining, … , (i) a first percentage of fault for the vehicle collision attributable to the human driver and (ii) a second percentage of fault for the vehicle collision attributable to the vehicle, at least in part, analysis of the sensor data, and the operational mode for the vehicle at the time of the vehicle collision;
generating, … , a second transaction including a … proof-of-identity of an entity associated with a first … , an indication of the operational mode for the vehicle at the time of the vehicle collision, an indication of the first percentage of fault, and an indication of the second percentage of fault; and
broadcasting, by …, the second transaction to at least one other … of the plurality ...
These limitations, as drafted, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers a series of steps instructing how to make determinations (e.g., fault) pertaining to an accident which can be practically performed in the human mind (e.g., observations, evaluations, judgments and opinions) which are mental process, a second enumerated grouping of abstract ideas. See MPEP §2106.04(a)(2)(III).
Examiner notes that “’collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis,’ where the data analysis steps are recited at a high level of generality such that they could practically be performed in the human mind” is a mental process. See MPEP §2106.04(a)(2)(III)(A) citing Electric Power Group v. Alstom, SA. (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Additionally, these limitations, as drafted, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers a series of steps instructing how to process an insurance claim which qualifies as a commercial or legal interaction, a subcategory of certain methods of organizing human activity, an enumerated grouping of abstract ideas. See MPEP §2106.04(a)(2)(II)(B); MPEP §2106.04(a)(2)(II)(C).
Examiner notes that “processing insurance claims for a covered loss or policy event under an insurance policy” is a court-provided example of a commercial or legal interaction. see MPEP §2106.04(a)(2)(II)(B) citing Accenture Global Services v. Guidewire Software, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, the claimed invention recites an abstract idea.
STEP 2A – PRONG TWO
The claimed invention recites additional elements (i.e., computer elements) of node(s) (Claim(s) 1, 11 and 15), a network (Claim(s) 1, 11 and 15), a processor (Claim(s) 1, 11 and 15), a blockchain (Claim(s) 1, 11 and 15), a sensor (Claim(s) 15), a network interface (Claim(s) 15), a memory (Claim(s) 15) and cryptographic proof-of-identity (Claim(s) 1, 11 and 15).
The claimed invention does not include additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application of the exception because the claims do not provide improvements to another technology or technical field; improvements to the functioning of the computer itself; are not applying or using a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition; are not applying the judicial exception with or by use of a particular machine; are not effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing; and are not applying the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. See MPEP §2106.04(d).
The additional elements are recited at a high-level of generality such that it amounts no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. See MPEP §2106.05(f). Alternately, the additional elements amount to no more than generally linking the exception to a particular technological environment or field of use. See MPEP §2106.05(h). Accordingly, these additional element(s), when considered separately and as an ordered combination, do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea.
Accordingly, the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without a practical application.
STEP 2B
Upon reconsideration of the indicia noted under Step 2A in concert with the Step 2B considerations, the additional claim element(s) amounts to (i) adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, (ii) adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception, and/or (iii) generally linking the use of judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use. See MPEP §2106.07(a)(II). The same analysis applies in Step 2B, i.e., mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component cannot integrate a judicial exception into a practical application at Step 2A or provide an inventive concept in Step 2B. The claim does not provide an inventive concept significantly more than the abstract idea.
Accordingly, these additional elements, when considered separately and as an ordered combination, do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea.
DEPENDENT CLAIMS
Dependent Claim(s)2-10, 12-14 and 17-20 recite claim limitations that further define the abstract idea recited in respective independent Claim(s) 1, 11 and 15. As such, the dependent claims are also grouped an abstract idea utilizing the same rationale as previously asserted against the independent claims.
Dependent Claim(s) recite additional elements (i.e., computer elements) of a machine learning program (Claim(s) 1, 10, 14, 18 and 20).
In each case, the additional element(s) are recited at a high level of generality such that these additional element(s) amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component.
The dependent claims do not include any additional elements that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application of the judicial exception or are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception when considered both individually and as an ordered combination utilizing the same rationale as previously asserted against the independent claims.
Accordingly, the dependent claim(s) are also not patent eligible.
Appropriate correction is requested.
5. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claim(s) 1, 4-8, 11-15, 17 and 18 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kumar (US PG Pub. 2019/0039545) in view of Nagla (US PG Pub. 2018/0018723)
Regarding Claim 1, Kumar discloses a computer-implemented method of handling vehicle collision-related data maintained by a plurality of nodes (systems) connected via a network, the computer-implemented method comprising:
receiving, at one or more processors of a first node (platform) of the plurality of nodes (systems), a first transaction broadcast by a source (vehicle) and including sensor data. (see fig. 1);
determining, at the one or more processors (event detector), that a vehicle collision involving a vehicle occurred based upon, at least in part, analysis of the sensor data. (see para. 43);
determining, at the one or more processors, an operational mode for the vehicle, the operational mode indicative of whether a human driver, the vehicle, or a vehicle system was in control of the vehicle at the time of the vehicle collision (level of autonomy of the vehicle, whether the vehicle or the driver was in control of the vehicle), based upon, at least in part, analysis of the sensor data. (see para. 13);
identifying, at least one or more processors, a cause of the vehicle collision to be faulty autonomous technology (faulty vehicle components), wherein the faulty autonomous technology (vehicle component) is Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) wireless communication technology. (see para. 19, 20 and 49);
determining, at the one or more processors, (i) a first percentage of fault for the vehicle collision attributable to at least one of the human driver and (ii) a second percentage of fault attributable to the vehicle, based upon, at least in part, analysis of the sensor data, the operational mode for the vehicle at the time of the vehicle collision. (see para. 13, 20, 22, 49 and 74);
generating, at the one or more processors, a second transaction (event report) including an indication of the operational mode for the vehicle at the time of the vehicle collision, an indication of the first percentage of fault, an indication of the second percentage of fault, and an indication that the cause of the vehicle collision is the faulty technology. (see abstract; para. 49); and
broadcasting (transmitting), by the one or more processors, the second transaction (event report) to at least one other node (system, such as a repair entity) of the plurality of nodes (systems). (see para. 32).
Kumar does not teach a method wherein the data is communicated via a blockchain; verifying, at the one or more processors, an identity of the source using a cryptographic proof-of-identity (data attribute identifying the creator or source of the block); or wherein the second transaction includes a cryptographic proof-of-identity of an entity associated with the first node.
Nagla discloses a method of handling vehicle collision-related data via a blockchain maintained by a plurality of nodes connected via a network, the method comprising:
receiving, at one or more processors of a first node of the plurality of nodes, a first transaction broadcast to the blockchain by a source and including sensor data (sensor IoT enable vehicle devices). (see abstract; para. 158);
verifying, at the one or more processors, an identity of the source using a cryptographic proof-of-identity (data attribute identifying the creator or source of the block, which is encrypted) included in the first transaction. (see para. 113 and 123);
determining, at the one or more processors, that a vehicle collision involving a vehicle occurred based upon, at least in part, analysis of the sensor data. (see para. 54);
generating, at the one or more processors, a second transaction including a cryptographic proof-of-identity of an entity (data attribute identifying the creator or source of the block, which is encrypted) associated with the first node. (see para. 113 and 123); and
broadcasting, by the one or more processors, the second transaction to at least one other node of the plurality of nodes. (see para. 161).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Kumar by recording data via blockchain, as disclosed by Nagla, thereby benefiting from the inherent benefits of blockchain. Specifically, an increase trust, security, transparency among the nodes by improving the traceability of data across the network.
Regarding Claim 4, Kumar discloses a method wherein the sensor data includes data generated by smart infrastructure (infrastructure devices) or by a vehicle not involved in the vehicle collision. (see para. 13-14).
Regarding Claim 5, Kumar discloses a method wherein the sensor data includes telematics data collected by the vehicle, a mobile device traveling within the vehicle, another vehicle involved in the vehicle collision, another vehicle not involved in the vehicle collision, or combinations thereof. (see para. 19).
Regarding Claim 6, Kumar discloses a method wherein determining the first percentage of fault and the second percentage of fault includes inputting the sensor data collected into a machine learning program trained to identify a percentage of fault attributable to one or more factors (determine causes of particular events and match the causes to corresponding at-fault entities) based upon sensor data. (see para. 50).
Regarding Claim 7, Kumar discloses a method wherein determining a vehicle collision occurred based upon, at least in part, analysis of the sensor data collected includes inputting the sensor data collected into a machine learning program trained to identify that vehicle collision occurred based upon sensor data. (see para. 45-46).
Regarding Claim 8, Kumar discloses a method comprising assigning, at the one or more processors, liability (fault) to a manufacturer of the vehicle or the human driver based upon whom had control before, during, or after the vehicle collision. (see para. 13, 20, 22, 49 and 74).
Regarding Claims 11-15, 17 and 18, such claims recite substantially similar limitations as claimed in previously rejected claims and, therefore, would have been obvious based upon previously rejected claims.
Claim(s) 2 and 3 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kumar and Nagla, as applied to Claim 1 above, and further in view of Canovi (US PG Pub. 2014/0156315).
Regarding Claim 2, Kumar discloses a method comprising generating, at the one or more processors, an electronic recommendation (insurance claim) based upon, at least in part, analysis of the first percentage of fault and the second percentage of fault; and processing insurance claims. (see para. 55).
Kumar does not teach a method comprising receiving, at the one or more processors, an electronic arbitration demand associated with the vehicle collision; or generating an electronic recommendation based upon the electronic arbitration demand.
Canovi discloses a method comprising:
receiving, at the one or more processors, an electronic arbitration demand (seeking arbitration of a dispute) associated with the vehicle collision. (see para. 47 and 2); and
generating an electronic recommendation (arbitration recovery likelihood) based upon the electronic arbitration demand. (see para. 45).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Kumar and Nagla by incorporating arbitration demands, as disclosed by Canovi, as arbitration demands are a standard and conventional mechanism to resolve determinations of fault and liability.
Regarding Claim 3, Kumar does not teach a method comprising generating, at the one or more processors, a new block including the electronic recommendation or a link thereto or a hash thereof; or adding, at the one or more processors, the new block to the blockchain.
Nagla discloses a method comprising generating, at the one or more processors, a new block including the accident attributes or a link thereto or a hash thereof, and adding, at the one or more processors, the new block to the blockchain. (see para. 14).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Kumar, Nagla and Canovi by adding new data to the blockchain, as disclosed by Nagla, thereby benefiting from the inherent benefits of blockchain as previously recited.
Claim(s) 9, 10 and 19-20 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kumar and Nagla, as applied to Claims 1 and 15 above, and further in view of Siegel (Seigel, Allan. D.C. Court of Appeals Rules on the Scope of the “Last Clear Chance” Doctrine in Auto Accident Cases. www.chaikinandsherman.com/blog/2016/10/d-c-court-of-appeals-rules-on-the-scope-of-the-last-clear-chance-doctrine-in-auto-accident-cases. 10/13/2016).
Regarding Claims 9 and 10, Kumar discloses a method comprising:
determining, at the one or more processors, which vehicle or human driver was at fault for the collision based upon, at least in part, analysis of the sensor data collected. (see para. 50); and
inputting, at the one or more processors, the sensor data into a machine learning program trained to identify a party or vehicle that is at fault for the vehicle collision using sensor data. (see para. 50).
Kumar does not teach a method wherein determination of fault comprises which party had the last clear chance to avoid the vehicle collision.
Seigel discloses a method wherein the determination of fault comprises which party had the last clear chance to avoid the vehicle collision.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Kumar and Nagla by incorporating determination of the last clear chance to avoid the vehicle collision into the fault analysis, as disclosed by Seigel, as the last clear chance is a factor in determining fault in vehicle collisions.
Regarding Claims 19-20 such claims recite substantially similar limitations as claimed in previously rejected claims and, therefore, would have been obvious based upon previously rejected claims.
6. Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 08/05/2025 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
§101 Rejection
Step 2A Prong Two
Applicant argues that the claimed invention recites a practical application, specifically “an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field,” and, as such, satisfies Step 2A Prong Two of the §101 Guidelines. See Arguments, pp. 10-12.
Specifically, the Applicant argues:
First, amended claim 1 requires identification of the cause of a vehicle collision as a faulty autonomous technology-specifically Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) wireless communication technology. Applicant respectfully submits that this feature renders claim 1 subject matter eligible at least because it recites a technological improvement in both the vehicle collision causation analysis and insurance claim processing domains. As detailed in the specification, determining fault based upon processor analysis of sensor, telematics, and V2V communications data requires computer-based analysis of real-world, technical data generated by modern vehicles. See, e.g., specification paras. 0162-0168. This process goes well beyond the mere collection or organization of data or mental steps, instead requiring the extraction, real-time analysis, and interpretation of sensor and V2V communication signals to reach an automated causation determination-in this case, that a faulty V2V wireless component was the cause. This is an improvement in the technological process of fault determination, as it enables automated assignment of fault to advanced vehicle subsystems. See Arguments, p. 10.
The Examiner respectfully disagrees.
A process requiring “the extraction, real-time analysis, and interpretation of sensor and V2V communication signals to reach an automated causation determination” is a mental process. The recited computer elements are collecting (i.e., extracting) information and analyzing (i.e., analyzing and interpretating) the information as in Electric Power Group v. Alstom, SA. (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §2106.04(a)(2)(III)(A) citing Electric Power Group v. Alstom, SA. (Fed. Cir. 2016).
A process that is “determining fault based upon processor analysis of sensor, telematics, and V2V communications data requires computer-based analysis of real-world, technical data generated by modern vehicles” is a mental process. The recited computer elements are determining fault. Generating evaluations, judgments and opinions, such as those pertaining to fault, are mental processes. See MPEP §2106.04(a)(2)(III).
While Applicant asserts that the claimed invention is a “technological improvement in both the vehicle collision causation analysis and insurance claim processing domains,” the Examiner asserts that the argued improvement is analogous to the improvement in Electric Power Group LLC v. Alstom SA (Fed. Cir. 2016) stated:
The claims here are unlike the claims in Enfish. There, we relied on the distinction made in Alice between, on one hand, computer-functionality improvements and, on the other, uses of existing computers as tools in aid of processes focused on “abstract ideas” (in Alice, as in so many other § 101 cases, the abstract ideas being the creation and manipulation of legal obligations such as contracts involved in fundamental economic practices). Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335-36; see Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358-59. That distinction, the Supreme Court recognized, has common-sense force even if it may present line-drawing challenges because of the programmable nature of ordinary existing computers. In Enfish, we applied the distinction to reject the § 101 challenge at stage one because the claims at issue focused not on asserted advances in uses to which existing computer capabilities could be put, but on a specific improvement—a particular database technique—in how computers could carry out one of their basic functions of storage and retrieval of data. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335-36; see Bascom, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11687, 2016 WL 3514158, at *5; cf. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (noting basic storage function of generic computer). The present case is different: the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools. see Electric Power Group LLC v. Alstom SA, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016) – emphasis added.
The claimed invention is not an improvement to computer technology or computer functionality. For example, the claimed invention has not improved computers or computer technology. Rather, the claimed invention is applying a computer’s existing capabilities to implement a particular abstract idea. As in Electric Power Group, the focus of the claimed invention is not on an improvement in computers as tools but on improving an abstract idea (i.e., vehicle collision causation analysis) that use computers as tools.
MPEP §2106.05(a) recites:
If it is asserted that the invention improves upon conventional functioning of a computer, or upon conventional technology or technological processes, a technical explanation as to how to implement the invention should be present in the specification. That is, the disclosure must provide sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement. The specification need not explicitly set forth the improvement, but it must describe the invention such that the improvement would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art. Conversely, if the specification explicitly sets forth an improvement but in a conclusory manner (i.e., a bare assertion of an improvement without the detail necessary to be apparent to a person of ordinary skill in the art), the examiner should not determine the claim improves technology. – emphasis added.
However, the specification does not provide any evidence that the claimed invention results in an improvement to the functioning of a computer, an improvement to conventional technology or technological processes, or is addressing a technology-based problem.
Additionally, the specification does not provide any evidence that there is even a technical (i.e., technology-based) problem to be solved. For example, the specification does not provide any evidence that existing technology was incapable of performing the claimed functions but for the claimed technical solution.
Applicant further argues:
Furthermore, this claim feature is rooted in the unique challenges and capabilities of modern autonomous vehicle technology. Unlike claims that are abstract or purely mathematical, claim 1 requires analyzing a specific technology-V2V communications. The identification of a defective V2V communication technology as a cause cannot be performed practically in the human mind or using paper-and-pencil analysis, but rather requires specialized computing systems, making the process inherently tied to a technological environment. As such, the claim is directed to a practical application of computer technology to a technological field (vehicle automation and inter-vehicle communication) to produce a technological result (automated, data-driven causation assignment for insurance claim resolution). See Arguments, p. 10.
The Examiner respectfully disagrees.
Examiner notes that the claimed invention identifies the cause of a vehicle collision to be a faulty Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication technology. The claimed invention identifies (i.e., determines) the cause of the vehicle collision. The claimed invention, as written, does not diagnose or analyze the V2V wireless communication technology to determine whether the V2V communication technology was faulty. The claimed invention, as written, merely assigns causation for the accident to the faulty V2V communication technology.
A human being can determine in their mind or using paper-and-pencil analysis whether a defective V2V communication technology was a cause of an accident. Examiner notes that insurance adjusters determining the cause of car accidents was performed prior to the advent of computers.
Additionally, MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III)(C) recites:
In evaluating whether a claim that requires a computer recites a mental process, examiners should carefully consider the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim in light of the specification. For instance, examiners should review the specification to determine if the claimed invention is described as a concept that is performed in the human mind and applicant is merely claiming that concept performed 1) on a generic computer, or 2) in a computer environment, or 3) is merely using a computer as a tool to perform the concept. In these situations, the claim is considered to recite a mental process.
The claimed invention recites a mental process even though the claimed invention recites that the mental process is being performed on a computer (i.e., a processor). Examiner notes that the claimed invention recites that the method step identification is performed on “one or more processors.” The claims merely recite that the “concept is performed 1) on a generic computer, or 2) in a computer environment, or 3) is merely using a computer as a tool to perform the concept.”
Admittedly, claims that recite limitations “that cannot practically be performed in the human mind” are not mental processes. See MPEP §2106.04(a)(2)(III)(A). For example, a limitation that cannot be practically performed in the human mind is “detecting suspicious activity by using network monitors and analyzing network packets” and “rendering a halftone image of a digital image by comparing, pixel by pixel, the digital image against a blue noise mask, where the method required the manipulation of computer data structures (e.g., the pixels of a digital image and a two-dimensional array known as a mask) and the output of a modified computer data structure.” See MPEP §2106.04(a)(2)(III)(A). The examples provided require a computer. A computer is inherent to the underlying process (e.g., there is no network traffic, data packets or pixels without a computer). This is not the case with the claimed invention.
Identifying a cause of the vehicle collision to be faulty autonomous technology, wherein the faulty autonomous technology is V2V wireless communication technology, is a process that can practically be performed in the human mind.
Applicant further argues:
systems present technical problems, such as how to electronically share data amongst all necessary parties to an insurance claim without risking fraud or unauthorized alteration of the data, and how to verify that shared data originated from the alleged source.
The claims provide a technological solution to these problems. In particular, the claims require two cryptographic proof-of-identity: a first cryptographic proof-of-identity to verify the source, and a second cryptographic proof-of-identity of an entity associated with the first node.
…
Therefore, Applicant respectfully submits that at least because amended claim 1 improves the computer security of electronic insurance communication systems, and further solves the problem of how to securely communicate that the cause of a vehicle collision was faulty autonomous technology, in particular V2V technology, claim 1 improves the functioning of a computer and/or is an improvement to any other technology or technical field. Applicant respectfully submits that claim 1 should therefore be found to be integrated into a practical application, and thus is eligible at Step 2A of the analysis. See M.P.E.P. § 2106.04(d)(1). Further, because of the improved computer security, claim 1 should be found to be eligible at Step 2B of the analysis. See M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(a). See Arguments, pp. 11-12 – emphasis original.
The Examiner respectfully disagrees.
MPEP §2106.05(a) recites:
If it is asserted that the invention improves upon conventional functioning of a computer, or upon conventional technology or technological processes, a technical explanation as to how to implement the invention should be present in the specification. That is, the disclosure must provide sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement. The specification need not explicitly set forth the improvement, but it must describe the invention such that the improvement would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art. Conversely, if the specification explicitly sets forth an improvement but in a conclusory manner (i.e., a bare assertion of an improvement without the detail necessary to be apparent to a person of ordinary skill in the art), the examiner should not determine the claim improves technology. – emphasis added.
However, the specification does not provide any evidence that the claimed invention results in an improvement to the functioning of a computer, an improvement to conventional technology or technological processes, or is addressing a technology-based problem.
Additionally, the specification does not provide any evidence that there is even a technical (i.e., technology-based) problem to be solved. For example, the specification does not provide any evidence that existing technology was incapable of performing the claimed functions but for the claimed technical solution.
Examiner asserts that the argued cryptographic improvement is analogous to the improvement in Electric Power Group LLC v. Alstom SA (Fed. Cir. 2016) stated:
The claims here are unlike the claims in Enfish. There, we relied on the distinction made in Alice between, on one hand, computer-functionality improvements and, on the other, uses of existing computers as tools in aid of processes focused on “abstract ideas” (in Alice, as in so many other § 101 cases, the abstract ideas being the creation and manipulation of legal obligations such as contracts involved in fundamental economic practices). Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335-36; see Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358-59. That distinction, the Supreme Court recognized, has common-sense force even if it may present line-drawing challenges because of the programmable nature of ordinary existing computers. In Enfish, we applied the distinction to reject the § 101 challenge at stage one because the claims at issue focused not on asserted advances in uses to which existing computer capabilities could be put, but on a specific improvement—a particular database technique—in how computers could carry out one of their basic functions of storage and retrieval of data. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335-36; see Bascom, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11687, 2016 WL 3514158, at *5; cf. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (noting basic storage function of generic computer). The present case is different: the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools. see Electric Power Group LLC v. Alstom SA, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016) – emphasis added.
The claimed invention is not an improvement to computer technology or computer functionality. For example, the claimed invention has not improved cryptographic proof-of-identity technology. Rather, the claimed invention is applying a computer’s existing capabilities (i.e., use of cryptographic proof-of-identity) to implement a particular abstract idea. As in Electric Power Group, the focus of the claimed invention is not on an improvement in computers as tools but on improving an abstract idea (i.e., preventing fraud or unauthorized alteration of the data) that use computers as tools.
MPEP §2106.04(d) recites:
The courts have also identified limitations that did not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application:
Merely reciting the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(f); [and]
Generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(h).
Examiner asserts that the additional elements amount to merely (1) including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea, or alternatively, (2) merely links the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use.
Step 2B
Applicant argues that the additional elements amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea as the additional elements are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously known to the industry” and, as such, satisfies Step 2B of the §101 Guidelines. See Arguments, p. 12.
Specifically, the Applicant argues:
Still further regarding Step 2B, Applicant notes that the proper inquiry is whether "certain claim elements recite well understood, routine, conventional activities in the relevant field." See M.P.E.P. § 2106.07(a); emphasis added. See Arguments, p. 12 – emphasis original.
Step 2B analysis is premised on determining whether a computer function is conventional activity previously known to the industry. Examiner asserts that the recited computer functions are conventional activity previously known to the relevant industry, the computer industry. The relevant industry is not limited to the insurance computer industry.
The above-mentioned features (i.e., the computer functions) are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant industry (i.e., the computer industry).
The claimed invention may be applying those computer functions in a novel and/or non-obvious way to enable the abstract idea but the computer functions, the underlying computer functions, are well-understood, routine and conventional computer functions. Therefore, the additional claim limitations do not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea.
§103 Rejection
Applicant argues that previously asserted prior art (Kumar and Nagla) fail to teach or suggest “identifying, at the one or more processors, a cause of the vehicle collision to be a faulty autonomous technology, wherein the faulty autonomous technology is Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) wireless communication.” See Arguments, pp. 8-9.
Specifically, Applicant argues:
Moreover, the causation identification system described throughout Kumar analyzes aggregate sensor and communication data to determine at-fault parties or contributory circumstances, such as driver error, weather, or infrastructure issues (see, e.g., Kumar paras. 0049-0050), but there is no disclosure or suggestion about analyzing the effectiveness, integrity, or operational status of V2V communication specifically as an autonomous technology, nor attributing a collision to its failure. Even though Kumar discusses a wide variety of data types (including communications "from vehicle to other vehicles," (see Id. at 0013), such data is not used for diagnosis of the V2V communication technology or for attributing causation to a "faulty" V2V system. Rather, the focus is on using communication data to reconstruct events and assign fault among parties, not on identifying the underlying autonomous system (such as V2V) as itself being the faulty cause of a collision. Therefore, Kumar does not teach nor suggest the specific feature of "identifying...a cause of the vehicle collision to be a faulty autonomous technology, wherein the faulty autonomous technology is Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) wireless communication technology." Nagla, Canovi, and Last Clear Chance are not cited for, and do not cure the deficiencies of Kumar. Applicant therefore respectfully submits that, at least for the reasons discussed above, the current rejection of claim 1 is overcome. See Arguments, p. 9 – emphasis added.
The Examiner respectfully disagrees.
The claims, as written, do not recite a method comprising analyzing the effectiveness, integrity, or operational status of V2V communication.
The claims, as written, recite a method comprising identifying the cause of a vehicle collision to be faulty autonomous technology, wherein the faulty autonomous technology is Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) wireless communication technology.
Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, analyzing the effectiveness, integrity, or operational status of V2V communication is performed prior to and outside the scope of the claimed method. The scope of the claimed method is identifying the cause of a vehicle collision to be faulty autonomous technology, wherein the (previously determined) faulty autonomous technology is Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) wireless communication technology.
Regardless, Kumar recites:
The example fault and causation identifier 112 may determine, from the collected data, a causation of the event and distribute fault accordingly. Causation may be anything from faulty vehicle components, faulty repairs, faulty design, driver error, faulty infrastructure, weather conditions, etc. The example fault and causation identifier 112 may allocate fault to one or more vehicles, infrastructure, environmental conditions, etc. For example, if the data from the first vehicle 104 and/or the second vehicle 106 indicates the vehicles are at a location associated with a four way stop sign and if the data from the first vehicle 104 indicates a rapid acceleration from a stop and the data from the second vehicle 106 indicates a constant velocity and/or does not indicate any change in acceleration, the example fault and causation identifier 112 may determine that the second vehicle 106 ran a stop sign. In such an example, the second vehicle 106 running the stop sign (i.e., driver error) may be determined to be the cause of the event and may be allocated 100% fault. Further information may be determined from the data such as, for example, mechanical and/or electrical failure of the brakes of the second vehicle 106. In such an example, the mechanical and/or elec